area handbook series 

Colombia 

a country study 



Colombia 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Rex A. Hudson 



On the cover: The Shamanic Flight, Iconic A, Tolima style, first mille- 
nium AD, a gold pendant discovered in Quimbaya territory, 
Quindio, The Gold Museum of the Central Bank, Bogota 

Courtesy Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, Orfebreria y chamanismo: Un 
estudio iconogrdfico del Museo del Oro, Medellin, 1988, 105 



Fifth Edition, First Printing, 2010. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Colombia: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Rex A. Hudson. ~ 5th ed. 

p. cm. -- (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294 ; 550-26) 
ISBN 978-0-8444-9502-6 

1. Colombia. I. Hudson, Rex A. EL Library of Congress. Federal Research 
Division. 

F2258.C64 2010-03-18 
986.1-dc22 

2010009203 



Use of ISBN 



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U.S. GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION 



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This is the Official U.S. Government edition of this 
publication and is herein identified to certify its 
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only. The Superintendent of Documents of the U.S. 
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edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authentic work 
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ISBN 978-0-8444-9502-06 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by the 
Federal Research Divison of the Library of Congress under the Coun- 
try Studies/Area Handbook Program, formerly sponsored by the 
Department of the Army and revived in FY 2004 with congressionally 
mandated funding under the sponsorship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationshps 
of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social sci- 
entists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the 
observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. 
Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, 
their origins, dominant beliefts and values, their common interests and 
the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each 
other and toward their social system and political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be 
construed as an expression of an official U.S. government position, pol- 
icy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted stan- 
dards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and suggestions 
for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

David L. Osborne 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-4840 
E-mail: frds@loc.gov 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The fifth edition of Colombia: A Country Study supersedes the 
1990 edition edited by Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz. 
The authors acknowledge general background information that the 
1990 edition and earlier editions may have provided for the present 
volume, which is, however, a completely new edition. The book editor 
would like to thank the authorial team for their dedication in produc- 
ing authoritative new material. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of the 
Colombian and U.S. governments and international organizations, 
including nongovernmental organizations, as well as scholars affili- 
ated with universities or other institutions, who offered their time, 
expertise, or research facilities and materials to provide information 
and perspective. None of these individuals is, however, in any way 
responsible for the work or points of view of the authors. 

The authors gratefully acknowledge any assistance, including chap- 
ter-review comments made by other chapter authors. The book editor is 
particularly indebted to Dr. David Bushnell. The book editor would also 
like to acknowledge the contributions to an early draft of chapter 2 made 
by Dr. Marta Juanita Villaveces Nino of the Economics Department of 
the University of El Rosario, Bogota. The authors of chapter 3, Drs. 
Roberto Steiner and Hernan Vallejo, would like to thank two individuals 
in particular for helpful comments on their chapter: Professor Miguel 
Urrutia of Los Andes University (Uniandes), Bogota; and Dr. Arturo 
Galindo, adviser, Ministry of Finance, Colombia. The author of chapter 
5, Dr. Ann C. Mason, would like to thank the following experts for their 
invaluable research assistance: Catalina Arreaza of the Political Science 
Department at Uniandes; Sebastian Bitar, School of Government at Uni- 
andes; and Mauricio Vargas of the Colombian government's National 
Planning Department (DNP). For their expert review of, and significant 
contributions to, various sections of the chapter, Dr. Mason is also grate- 
ful to Jaime Camacho of El Rosario University; Maria Victoria Llorente 
of the Center for Economic Development at Uniandes; Roman Ortiz of 
the Political Science Department at Uniandes; security consultant David 
Spencer; and Professor Arlene Tickner, also of the Political Science 
Department faculty at Uniandes. 

The book editor would also like to thank members of the Federal 
Research Division (FRD) of the Library of Congress who contributed 
directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. 
Meditz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials, served as liaison 



v 



with the sponsoring agency, and managed editing and production, which 
included providing numerous substantive and technical contributions; 
Catherine Schwartzstein, who unflaggingly provided substantive and 
meticulous editing, helped with layout for images and figures, and pre- 
pared the index; Janie L. Gilchrist, who did the extensive word process- 
ing and prepared the camera-ready copy; and Katarina M. David, who 
provided technical help with processing the images, including scanning 
those used for the artwork. Christopher S. Robinson, an outside contrac- 
tor, prepared the book's graphics based on FRD drafts, as well as the final 
digital manuscript for the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). 

Finally, the book editor acknowledges the generosity of the individ- 
uals, diplomatic and international agencies and organizations, and the 
U.S. government for allowing their photographs to be used in this 
study. The illustrations for the cover and chapter title pages are based 
on published illustrations of indigenous artwork found in books in the 
Spanish-language collection of the Library of Congress. 



vi 



Contents 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Selected Spanish Abbreviations and Acronyms ... xv 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events xxi 

Country Profile . xxix 

Introduction li 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

David Bushnell 

EARLY COLOMBIA 4 

THE SPANISH CONQUEST AND COLONIAL 

SOCIETY 6 

Exploration and Conquest 6 

Colonial Government 7 

Colonial Society and Economy 8 

Religion and Culture 11 

BREAKING THE SPANISH CONNECTION 13 

Antecedents of Independence 13 

The Struggle for Independence, 1810-19 15 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION, 1 8 1 9-1 904 18 

The Great Colombia Experiment, 181 9-32 18 

New Granada: Weak State, Strong Parties, 1832-63 . . 23 

A Failed Federalist Utopia, 1 863-85 28 

Continuity and Change in Social Relations 31 

Political Centralization and the Church-State 

Alliance 32 

The War of the Thousand Days and Loss of Panama, 

1899-1903 34 

A NEW AGE OF PEACE AND COFFEE, 1 904-30 35 

The Presidency of Rafael Reyes 35 

vii 



The Growth of the Coffee Industry 37 

Relations with the United States 38 

Decline of the Conservative Hegemony 39 

REFORM UNDER THE LIBERALS, 1930^6 40 

THINGS COME APART, 1946-58 43 

La Violencia 43 

Growth Amid Mayhem 46 

THE NATIONAL FRONT, 1958-78 47 

Instituting the Coalition Government 47 

Sociocultural Changes 49 

THE CONTEMPORARY ERA, 1 978-98 51 

The Rise of Drug-Trafficking Organizations 52 

The Spread of Leftist Insurgencies 54 

New Departures and Continuing Problems 57 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 63 

David Bushnell and Rex A. Hudson 

PHYSICAL SETTING 67 

Geology 70 

Geography 71 

Climate 77 

Environment 78 

RACE AND ETHNICITY 82 

Indigenous Peoples 82 

Racial Distinctions 86 

POPULATION AND URBANIZATION 90 

Population Growth Trends 90 

Immigration 92 

Regionalism 93 

Urbanization Trends 94 

Population Displacement 95 

Emigration 98 

Demography 99 

Social Strata Division 101 

FAMILY 103 

INCOME DISTRIBUTION 107 

Rural Poor and Urban Poor 110 

Income Effects of Narco-Trafficking Ill 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 112 

Resources and Organization 112 

viii 



Current Health Overview 115 

The Pension Conundrum 117 

RELIGION 119 

Church, State, and Society 122 

The Growth of Protestantism 124 

Other Religious Expressions 125 

EDUCATION 126 

Basic Education 126 

University, Technical, and Vocational Education 130 

Continuing Problems 132 

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 133 

Chapter 3. The Economy 141 

Roberto Steiner and Herndn Vallejo 

ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1819-1999 144 

Growth and Structure of the Economy, 1819-1989 ... 144 

The 1990s: A Decade of Economic Reform 148 

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND SECTORAL 

POLICIES 150 

Agriculture 152 

Mining and Energy 158 

Industry 160 

Services 165 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS . 170 

Air Transportation 171 

Inland Waterways 173 

Ports 173 

Railroads 175 

Road Transportation 175 

Telecommunications 178 

FINANCIAL REGULATION AND FINANCIAL 

MARKETS 181 

TRADE POLICY AND TRADE PATTERNS 1 84 

FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION AND 

OUTCOMES 186 

ILLEGAL DRUGS 188 

MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND TRENDS 191 

Monetary Policy and Inflation 1 92 

Exchange-Rate Policy and the Balance of Payments . . 193 

Fiscal Policy and Public Finances 195 

ix 



LABOR, THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, SOCIAL 

SPENDING, AND PENSIONS 199 

Labor Markets 199 

The Informal Economy 202 

Social Expenditure 203 

The Pension System 206 

OUTLOOK 207 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 213 

ArleneB. Tickner 

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 217 

The Executive 217 

Territorial Government 222 

The Legislature 227 

The Electoral System 230 

The Judiciary 233 

Attorney General's Office 238 

Public Administration 238 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 240 

The Weakening of the Bipartisan System 240 

Other Parties and Political Movements 241 

Political Party Reform 245 

Corruption 246 

Societal Institutions 248 

Colombian Interest Groups 251 

Internal Armed Conflict and Peace Negotiations 259 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 264 

General Foreign Policy Traits 264 

Primary Doctrines of Foreign Policy 266 

Foreign Policy Decision Making 267 

Diplomatic Relations 268 

OUTLOOK 279 

Chapter 5. National Security 283 

Ann C. Mason 

THE MILITARY 285 

Historical Background 285 

Modernization of the Military 286 

Constitutional Authority 290 



X 



Organization of the Armed Forces 291 

Conscription and Military Service 302 

Military Education System 305 

The Military Judiciary 307 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 309 

Defense and Security Spending 312 

LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 1 3 

National Police 313 

Administrative Security Department 318 

Judicial Police 319 

Penal System 321 

NATIONAL SECURITY BACKGROUND 323 

Nineteenth-Century Civil Unrest 324 

International Security Affairs 325 

La Violencia and the Emergence of Insurgency 326 

Drug Trafficking and the Origins of Paramilitarism . . . 328 

CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY PANORAMA 330 

Internal Armed Conflict 330 

Human Rights 334 

Violence and Crime 336 

NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINES AND 

POLICIES 338 

Counterinsurgency Strategies and Emergency 

Decrees 338 

Peace Processes 340 

Antidrug Strategies 342 

United States-Colombia Security Cooperation and 

Plan Colombia 343 

Democratic Security Policy 346 

Negotiations in 2007-8 347 

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY 

RELATIONS 351 

Agreements and Treaties 351 

Regional Relations 352 

OUTLOOK 357 

Appendix. Tables 365 

Bibliography 379 

Glossary 421 



xi 



Index 425 

Contributors 447 

Published Country Studies 449 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Colombia, 2009 xlviii 

2 Topography and Drainage 68 

3 Population Distribution by Age-group and Sex, 2008 .... 100 

4 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 2007 154 

5 Transportation System, 2008 174 

6 Structure of the Government, 2009 218 

7 Organization of the Ministry of National Defense and the 

Public Force, 2009 292 

8 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 2009 310 

9 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 2009 311 



xii 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a concise 
and objective manner the dominant historical, social, political, eco- 
nomic, and national security aspects of contemporary Colombia. 
Sources of information included scholarly journals and monographs, 
official reports of governments and international organizations, for- 
eign and domestic newspapers, and numerous periodicals and Internet 
sources, particularly official Colombian government Web sites. Chap- 
ter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; at the end of each 
chapter is a brief comment on some of the more valuable sources sug- 
gested as further reading. The Glossary provides supplementary expla- 
nations of words and terms used frequently or having particular 
importance. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conver- 
sion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with 
metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix). 

Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames gener- 
ally consist of two parts: the patrilineal name followed by the matrilin- 
eal. In the instance of Alvaro Uribe Velez, for example, Uribe is his 
father's name and Velez is his mother's maiden name. In nonformal 
use, the matrilineal name is often dropped. Thus, after the first men- 
tion in each part of the book, Uribe is sufficient. 

The use of foreign words and terms has been confined to those 
essential to understanding the text, with a brief definition upon first 
usage and additional treatment in the Glossary. A list of abbreviations 
and acronyms of Spanish names, with English translations, can be 
found in table A. The text uses the standard spelling of place-names 
sanctioned by the United States Board on Geographic Names. 

The book's formal information cutoff date for the chapters is 
December 31, 2008. Certain parts of the text, however, contain later 
information, added as it became available since the completion of 
research. The Introduction provides a general update for 2009 and 
early 2010. 



xiii 



Table A. Selected Spanish Abbreviations and Acronyms 

Abbreviation „ 

. Organization 
or Acronym 

AD Alternativa Democratica (Democratic Alternative) 

AD M- 1 9 Accion Democratica M- 1 9 (Democratic Action M- 1 9) 

Afeur Agrupacion de Fuerzas Especiales Antiterroristas Urbanas (Urban Counterterrorist 
Special Forces Group) 

AFP Administradores de Fondos de Pensiones (Pension Funds Administrators) 

AGC Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Gaitan Self-Defense Groups of Colombia) 

Aico Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia (Indigenous Authorities of Colombia) 

ALADI Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integration (Latin American Integration 

Association) 

ANDI Asociacion Nacional de Industriales (National Association of Industrialists) 

Anapo Alianza Nacional Popular (Popular National Alliance) 

ANH Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (National Hydrocarbons Agency) 

ANIF Asociacion Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (National Association of 

Financial Institutions) 

ANUC Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (National Association of Peasant 

Land Users) 

ARS Administradoras del Regimen Subsidiado (Administrators of the Subsidized 

Regimen) 

ASI Alianza Social Indigena (Indigenous Social Alliance) 

Asocana Asociacion de Cultivadores de Cana de Azucar de Colombia (Association of 

Colombian Sugarcane Growers) 

Asocolflores Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores (Colombian Association of 

Flower Exporters) 

AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) 

Augura Asociacion de Bananeros de Colombia (Association of Colombian Banana 
Producers) 

Bancoldex Banco de Comercio Exterior (Foreign Trade Bank) 

Banrep Banco de la Repiiblica (Bank of the Republic; Central Bank) 

BBVA Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria 

BCN Bloque Cacique Nutibara (Cacique Nutibara Bloc) 

Cacom Comando Aereo de Combate (Combat Air Command) 

CAE Comando Aereo de Entrenamiento (Air Training Command) 

CAEM Curso de Altos Estudios Militares (Higher Military Studies Course) 

CAIs Centres de Atencion Inmediata (Immediate Care Centers; police posts in large 

cities) 

Cajanal Caja Nacional de Prevision Social (National Social Pension Fund) 

Caman Comando Aereo de Mantenimiento (Air Maintenance Command) 

CAN Centro de Administration Nacional (National Administration Center) 

CAN Comunidad Andina de Naciones (Andean Community of Nations) 

Caracol Caracol Television, S A., previously Primera Cadena Radial Colombiana (Caracol 

Television, previously First Colombian Radio Channel) 

Carbocol Carbones de Colombia (Colombia Coal) 

CARE Comision Asesora de Relaciones Exteriores (Advisory Commission on Foreign 

Relations) 



XV 



Table A. Selected Spanish Abbreviations and Acronyms (Continued) 

Abbreviation 
or Acronym 



Organization 



Catam Comando Aereo de Transporte Militar (Military Air Transport Command) 

CAVs Corporaciones de Ahorro y Vivienda (savings and loan corporations) 

CCFs Cajas de Compensacion Familiar (Family Compensation Funds) 

CCJ Comision Colombiana de Juristas (Colombian Commision of Jurists) 

CCN Comision de Conciliacion Nacional (National Reconciliation Commission) 

CEC Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (Colombian Episcopal Conference) 

CEDE Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico (Economic Development Studies 

Center) 

Cedecol Confederacion Evangelica de Colombia (Evangelical Confederation of Colombia) 

Celade Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeno de Demografia (Latin American & Caribbean 

Demographic Centre) 

Cenicaiia Centro de Investigacion de la Cana de Aziicar de Colombia (Sugarcane Research 

Center of Colombia) 

Cepal Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe (Economic Commission for 

Latin America and the Caribbean — ECLAC) 

CGN Consejo Gremial Nacional (National Business Council) 

CGT Confederacion General del Trabajo (General Confederation of Labor) 

CGTD Confederacion General del Trabajadores Democraticos (General Confederation of 

Democratic Workers) 

CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (International Center for Tropical 

Agriculture) 

CICAD Comision Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (Inter- American 

Drug Abuse Control Commission) 

Cidenal Curso Integral de Defensa Nacional (Comprehensive Course of National Defense) 

Cinep Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular (Research and Public Education 

Center) 

CNA Coordinador Nacional Agrario (National Agrarian Coordinator) 

CNC Consejo Nacional Campesino (National Campesino Council) 

CNE Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council) 

CNRR Comision Nacional de Reparacion y Reconciliacion (National Commission for 

Reparation and Reconciliation) 

CNU Comando Nacional Unitario (National Unitary Command) 

Codhes Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (Consultancy for 

Human Rights and Displacement) 

Conpes Consejo Nacional de Politica Economica y Social (National Council for Economic 

and Social Policy) 

Cra Comision de Regulacion de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Basico (Water and Basic 

Sanitation Regulatory Commission) 

CREG Comision de Regulacion de Energia y Gas (Energy and Gas Regulatory 

Commission) 

CRIC Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca (Cauca Regional Indigenous Council) 

CRT Comision de Regulacion de Telecomunicaciones (Telecommunications Regulatory 

Commission) 

CSSDN Consejo Superior de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional (Superior Council on National 

Defense and Security, previously CSDN — Consejo Superior de la Defensa 
Nacional) 



XVI 



Table A. Selected Spanish Abbreviations and Acronyms (Continued) 

Abbreviation „ 

Organization 

or Acronym 

CSJ Consejo Superior de la Judicatura (Superior Judicial Council) 

CTC Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia (Confederation of Colombian 

Workers) 

CTI Cuerpo Tecnico de Investigacion (Technical Investigation Corps) 

CUT Confederacion Unitaria de Trabajadores (United Workers' Federation) 

DAFP Departamento Administrativo de la Funcion Publica (Administrative Department of 

the Public Function) 

DANE Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (National Administrative 

Department of Statistics) 

Dansocial Departamento Administrativo Nacional de la Economia Solidaria (National 

Administrative Department of Economic Solidarity) 

DAPR Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia de la Republica (Administrative 

Department of the Presidency of the Republic) 

DAS Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Security Department) 

DGPN Direccion General de la Policia Nacional (General Directorate of the National 

Police) 

DIC Direccion de Investigacion Criminal (Criminal Investigation Directorate) 

Dijin Direccion de Policia Judicial e Investigacion (Judicial and Investigative Police 

Directorate) 

DNP Departamento Nacional de Planeacion (National Planning Department) 

EAE Escuela de Aviacion del Ejercito (Army Aviation School) 

Ecopetrol Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos (Colombian Petroleum Enterprise) 

EFIM Escuela de Formation de Infanteria de Marina (Marine Infantry Training School) 

EFSP Escuela de Formacion de Soldados Profesionales (Training School for Professional 

Soldiers) 

Ehfup Escuela de Helicopteros de la Fuerza Publica (Helicopter School of the Public 

Force) 

ELN Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army) 

Emavi Escuela Militar de Aviacion Marco Fidel Suarez (Military Aviation School) 

Emcali Empresas Publicas de Cali (Cali Public Companies) 

Emcar Esquadron Movil de Carabineros (Mobile Squadron of Mounted Police) 

Enap Escuela Naval de Cadetes Almirante Padilla (Naval Cadet School) 

ENP Escuela Nacional de Policia General Santander (Police Cadet School) 

ENS Escuela Nacional Sindical (National Union School) 

ENSB Escuela Naval de Suboficiales ARC Barranquilla (Naval School for 

Noncommissioned Officers) 

EPL Ejercito de Liberacion Popular (Popular Liberation Army) 

EPM Empresas Publicas de Medellin (Medellin Public Companies) 

EPS Entidades Promotoras de Salud (health insurance entities) 

Esdegue Escuela Superior de Guerra (Superior War College) 

Esmic Escuela Militar de Cadetes Jose Maria Cordova (Military Cadet School) 

Esrem Escuela de Relaciones Civiles y Militares (Civil-Military Relations School) 

Esufa Escuela de Suboficiales Capitan Andres M. Diaz (Noncommissioned Officers 

School) 



Table A. Selected Spanish Abbreviations and Acronyms (Continued) 

Abbreviation _ 

. Organization 
or Acronym ° 

ETB Empresa de Telefonos de Bogota (Bogota Telephone Company) 

FAC Fuerza Aerea Colombiana (Colombian Air Force) 

Famig Fundacion de Atencion al Migrante (Migrants' Care Foundation) 

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) 

FEC Fondo de Compensation Educativa (Education Compensation Fund) 

Fecode Federacion Colombiana de Educadores (Colombian Federation of Educators) 

Fedecafe Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros (National Federation of Coffee Growers) 

Fedegan Federacion Colombiana de Ganaderos (Association of Colombian Stockbreeders) 

Fedemunicipios Federacion Colombiana de Municipios (Colombian Federation of Municipalities) 

Fenalco Federacion Nacional de Comerciantes (National Federation of Merchants) 

Fedesarrollo Fundacion para la Education Superior y el Desarrollo (Foundation for Higher 

Education and Development) 

Finagro Fondo para el Financiamento del Sector Agropecuario (Fund for the Finance of the 

Agricultural Sector) 

FNG Fondo Nacional del Ganado (National Livestock Fund) 

FSP Frente Social y Politico (Social and Political Front) 

Fudra Fuerza de Despliegue Rapido (Rapid Deployment Force) 

FUN Federacion Universitaria Nacional (National University Federation) 

Gacar Grupo Aereo del Caribe (Caribbean Air Group) 

Gaori Grupo Aereo del Oriente (Eastern Air Group) 

Gaula Grupos de Accion Unificada por la Libertad Personal (United Action Groups for 
Personal Freedom) 

GEA Grupo Empresarial Antioqueno (Antioquia Entrepreneurial Group) 

ICBF Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (Colombian Family Welfare Institute) 

IEPRI Instituto de Estudios Polfticos y Relaciones Internacionales (Institute for the Study 

of Politics and Foreign Relations) 

IFI Instituto de Fomento Industrial (Industrial Development Institute) 

IMA Instituto Militar Aeronautico (Aeronautics Military Institute) 

Incomex Instituto del Comercio Exterior (Foreign Trade Institute) 

Indumil Industria Militar (Military Industry) 

INEM Institutos Nacionales de Ensenanza Media Diversificada (National Institutes of 

Diversified Intermediate Education) 

Inpec Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (National Jail and Penitentiary 
Institute) 

INS Instituto Nacional de Salud (National Health Institute) 

IPS Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios de Salud (health care providers) 

ISS Instituto de Seguros Sociales (Social Security Institute) 

Justapaz Justicia, Paz y Accion No Violenta (Justice, Peace and Nonviolent Action) 

M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril (Nineteenth of April Movement) 

MAQL Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (Quintin Lame Armed Movement) 

MAS Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers) 

MCV Movimiento Colombia Viva (Living Colombia Movement) 



Table A. Selected Spanish Abbreviations and Acronyms (Continued) 

Abbreviation _ 

Organization 

or Acronym 

Mercosur Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the South) 

MIC Movimiento Indigena de Colombia (Colombian Indigenous Movement) 

Minga Asociacion para la Promocion Social Alternativa (Alternative Social Development 

Association) 

MIRA Movimiento Independiente de Renovacion Absoluta (Independent Movement of 

Absolute Renewal) 

MSN Movimiento de Salvation Nacional (National Salvation Movement) 

MSR Movimiento Socialista de Renovacion (Renewed Socialist Movement) 

MRTA Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 

Movement) 

OCNP Oficina del Comisionado Nacional para la Policia (National Police Commissioner's 

Office) 

OIE Oficio de International des Epizooties (World Organization for Animal Health) 

ONIC Organizacion Nacional Indigena de Colombia (National Indigenous Organization 

of Colombia) 

Opain Operadora Aeroportuaria Internacional (International Airport Operator) 

ORO Organizacion Radial Olimpica (Olympic Radio Organization) 

PAICMA Programa Presidencial para la Action Integral contra Minas (Presidential Program 

for Integral Action Against Antipersonnel Mines) 

PC Partido Conservador (Conservative Party) 

PCC Partido Comunista de Colombia (Communist Party of Colombia) 

PCD Partido Colombia Democratica (Democratic Colombia Party) 

PCN Proceso de las Comunidades Negras (Platform of the Black Communities) 

PCR Partido Cambio Radical (Radical Change Party) 

PDA Polo Democratico Alternativo (Alternative Democratic Pole) 

PDI Polo Democratico Independiente (Independent Democratic Pole) 

PL Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) 

Procana Asociacion Colombiana de Productores y Provedores de Cafia de Azucar 
(Colombian Association of Sugarcane Producers and Suppliers) 

Proexpo Fondo para la Promocion de Exportaciones (Export Promotion Fund) 

PSUN Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (also seen as Partido de La U; National Unity 

Social Party; Party of the U) 

PUJ Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Javeriana University) 

PVO Partido Verde Oxigeno (Oxygen Green Party) 

RAS Red de Apoyo Social (Social Assistance Network) 

RCN Radio Cadena Nacional (National Radio Network; it has radio and television 

channels) 

Redprodpaz Red Nacional de Programas de Desarrollo y Paz (National Network of 

Development and Peace Programs) 

RNC Radiotelevisora Nacional de Colombia (National Radio and Television of 

Colombia) 

RNEC Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil (National Registrar of Civil Status, or 

National Registrar's Office) 

RSS Red de Solidaridad Social (Social Solidarity Network) 

RTVC Radio y Television de Colombia (Radio and Television of Colombia) 



xix 



Table A. Selected Spanish Abbreviations and Acronyms (Continued) 

Abbreviation 

. Organization 
or Acronym ° 

SAC Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (Society of Colombian Farmers) 

Sapol Servicio Aereo de Policia (Police Air Service) 

SARC Sistema de Administration de Riesgo de Credito (Credit Risk Management System) 

Sena Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (National Apprenticeship Service) 

SFC Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (also seen as Superfinanciera; 

Colombian Financial Superintendency) 

SINA Sistema Nacional Ambiental (National Environmental System) 

SIC Servicio de Inteligencia Colombiana (Colombian Intelligence Service) 

SIC Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (Industry and Commerce 

Superintendency) 

SIP Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa (Interamerican Press Society) 

Sisben Sistema de Identification de Potenciales Beneficiarios de los Programas Sociales 

(System for the Identification and Selection of Beneficiaries of Social Programs) 

SNS Superintendencia National de Salud (National Superintendency of Health) 

SPEC Secretariado Permanente de la Conferencia Episcopal (Permanent Secretariat of the 

Episcopal Conference) 

SSPD Superintendencia de Servicios Publicos Domiciliarios (Residential Public Services 

Superintendency) 

Superfinanciera See SFC 

SVSP Superintendencia de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada (Superintendency of Guard 

Forces and Private Security Companies) 

Telecom Colombia Telecomunicaciones S.A. (Colombia Telecommunications) 

TSM Tribunal Superior Militar (Supreme Military Tribunal) 

UAEAC Unidad Administrativa Especial de Aeronautica Civil (Special Administrative Unit 

of Civil Aeronautics) 

UN, or Unal Universidad Nacional (National University) 

Unasur Union de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations) 

Uniandes Universidad de los Andes (University of the Andes) 

Uninorte Universidad del Norte (University of the North) 

UP Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union) 

UPAC Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo Constante (Unit of Constant Purchasing Power) 

USO Union Social Obrera (Workers' Social Union) 

UTC Union de Trabajadores de Colombia (Union of Colombian Workers) 

UVR Unidad de Valor Real (Real Value Unit) 



XX 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events 

EARLY HISTORY 

20,000 BC Approximate date of earliest evidence of human occupation in what is now 

Colombia. 

9790 BC Tibito archaeological site near present-day Bogota. 

4000-2000 BC Appearance of settled communities in Caribbean coastal plain. 

AD 1000-1500 Flourishing of Tairona and Muisca cultures, respectively, in the Sierra Nevada 

de Santa Marta and eastern highlands. 
COLONIAL ERA, 1499-1810 

1499 First Spanish expedition, led by Alonso de Ojeda, accompanied by Amerigo 

Vespucci and Juan de la Cosa, reaches Colombian coast (in September). 

1525 Rodrigo de Bastidas founds Santa Marta, first permanent Spanish settlement. 

1536-38 Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada leads expedition that conquers the Muiscas. 

1538 Jimenez de Quesada founds Santafe, present-day Bogota, known as Santa Fe 

during the colonial period (August 6). 
New Kingdom of Granada, 1538-1717 

1550 Royal high court, or audiencia, is established in Santa Fe. Jimenez de Quesada 

is appointed marshal of New Granada and councilor of Sante Fe. 

1 564 Arrival in Santa Fe of first captain general of New Granada, whose appointment 

represents consolidation of Spanish colonial government. 

1566 Smallpox epidemic reduces population by 10 percent. 

1580 Dominicans establish university-college of Santo Tomas, first institution of 

higher education in New Granada. 

1615-50 Ministry of Jesuit Pedro Claver, later canonized, to African slaves arriving 

through port of Cartagena. 

1629 Founding of Barranquilla, last established of today's principal Colombian 

cities. 

Viceroyalty of the New Kingdom of Granada, 1717-23 

1719 New Granada officially attains the temporary status of viceroyalty with Santa 

Fe as its capital; its territory includes present-day Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, 
and Venezuela. 

Presidency of the New Kingdom of Granada, 1723-39 

1738 First printing press begins operating in Santa Fe. 

Viceroyalty of the New Kingdom of Granada, 1739-1810 

1777 First public library opens in Santa Fe. 

1781 Comunero Rebellion protests new tax policies. 

1783 Jose Celestino Mutis leads expedition to search out and describe all botanical 

species in viceroyalty. 

1 794 Antonio Narino is arrested and convicted of sedition for having printed a Spanish 

translation of the French "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen." 

1 808 Abdication of Ferdinand VII, under pressure of Napoleonic France, creates 

vacancy on Spanish throne and opportunity for Spanish Americans to seek a 
form of self-government. 

FOUNDING OF THE NATION, 1810-1903 

1810 In Santa Fe and elsewhere, criollo revolutionists establish juntas to rule, 
ostensibly in the name of Ferdinand VII (interned in France). 

1811 Act of Federation of the United Provinces is declared (November 27). 



xxi 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 



United Provinces of New Granada, 1811-16 



1816 



Royalist forces retake Santa Fe (in May) and restore the colonial regime in most 
of New Granada. 



1816-19 Spanish Reconquest. 

Republic of Great Colombia, 1819-32 



1819 

1821 

1823 

1826 
1828 

1830 



Simon Bolivar Palacios wins Battle of Boyaca (August 7), delivering all of 
central New Granada to the patriots; congress meeting in Angostura, 
Venezuela, creates Republic of Colombia, referred to retrospectively as Great 
Colombia (Gran Colombia), comprising all of former Viceroyalty of New 
Granada, with its capital in renamed Santa Fe de Bogota. 

Congress of Cucuta adopts new nation's first constitution, which is strictly 
centralist in organization but otherwise conventionally liberal. 

Royalist forces surrender at Puerto Cabello, following Battle of Maracaibo in 
Venezuela; independence struggle in new Republic of Colombia ends. 

Rebellion in Venezuela weakens Great Colombia union. 

Bolivar assumes dictatorial powers and later survives assassination attempt (on 
September 25). 

Assembly in Santa Fe de Bogota issues new Colombian constitution; Ecuador 
and Venezuela secede; Bolivar resigns presidency and dies (on December 17) in 
Santa Marta. 



Republic of New Granada, 1832-58 



1832 



1837 
1840^2 

1843 
1847 
1848^19 

1849-52 

1853 
1854 
1855 



Present-day Colombia plus Panama is reconstituted as the Republic of New 
Granada. Its constitution, adopted in 1832, closely resembles Colombian 
charter of 1821. Francisco de Paula Santander y Omana, Colombian vice 
president whom Bolivar had sent into exile, becomes New Granada's first 
constitutional president. 

Jose Ignacio de Marquez Barreto defeats Santander's chosen successor in first 
fully contested presidential election. 

War of the Supreme Commanders is waged (and lost) by proto-Liberals against 
the proto-Conservatives who follow Santander in office, a watershed in 
development of two-party system. 

New constitution strengthens central executive. 

Regular steam navigation begins on the Magdalena. 

Liberal and Conservative parties evolve from main political factions in course 
of critical presidential election campaign. 

Election of the Liberal Jose Hilario Lopez Valdez is followed by a succession of 
reform measures: abolition of state tobacco monopoly (1850), abolition of 
clergy legal privileges (1850), and final elimination of slavery, effective 
January 1, 1852. 

New constitution grants suffrage to all adult males, enshrines full religious 
toleration, and makes concessions to provincial autonomy, although stopping 
short of outright federalism. 

Backed by disaffected military and artisans, General Jose Maria Dionisio Melo 
y Ortiz carries out a successful coup (on April 19) against Liberal president but 
is soon overthrown by Liberal-Conservative coalition (December). 

Constitution is amended to establish Panama as a federal state. 



1856 Colombia's first railroad, across the Isthmus of Panama, is completed. 

Granadine Confederation. 1858-61 



1858 



Still another new constitution establishes the Granadine Confederation and 
creates a federal organization for entire country. 



xxii 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events ( Continued) 



1859-62 In response to election law dictated by Congress, former Conservative Tomas 

Cipriano de Mosquera y Arboleda leads Liberal revolution against the Conser- 
vatives who had regained control in Bogota, the only full-fledged revolution 
(rather than civil or military coup) ever to overthrow a Colombian government. 

1861 As provisional head of what is now called United States of New Granada, 

Mosquera expropriates most church property and punishes the church for its 
support of Conservatives. 

United States of New Granada, 1861-63 

1863 Liberals enact new constitution that carries both federal autonomy of states and 

individual liberties to new extremes, while allowing states to limit suffrage 
again. 

United States of Colombia, 1863-86 

1870 Presidential decree declares primary education free, obligatory, and religiously 

neutral throughout the nation. 

1 876 Abortive Conservative uprising becomes brief but bitter civil war sparked in 

large part by Roman Catholic indignation over education policy. 

1878 Colombia grants concession to French interests for construction of canal across 

Panama. 

1878-1900 Regeneration movement (most influential in this period). 

1 880-82 Independent Liberal President Rafael Wenceslao Nunez Moledo's program of 

Regeneration aims to promote order and progress through strengthened national 
government but is thwarted by opposition of mainstream Liberals. 

1885 "Radical" Liberals launch a preemptive rebellion lest Nunez illegally change 
the constitution, providing him with pretext to declare the 1 863 constitution 
null and void. 

1886 Under Nunez's auspices, new constitution ends federalism in favor of highly 
centralized government and dilutes individual rights; United States of Colombia 
is renamed Republic of Colombia and is organized into departments rather than 
sovereign states. 

Republic of Colombia, 1886-Present 

1887 Concordat with Vatican restores special privileges to Roman Catholic Church 
and offers compensation for lost assets. 

1889 Coffee comes to dominate Colombian exports. 

1 890 Establishment of protected indigenous reserves. 
1 895 Another unsuccessful Liberal uprising. 

1899-1902 War of the Thousand Days, a final failed effort by Liberals to reverse Nunez's 

innovations, causes heavy loss of life and economic disruption. 

1900 Conservatives take power by coup. 

1902 Hay-Herran Treaty is signed with U.S. government (in September), allowing 
United States to complete Panama Canal. 

1 903 United States approves Hay-Herran Treaty. After the Colombian Senate refuses 
to ratify it (in August), a group of Panamanian politicians and foreign 
adventurers bring about Panama's secession from Colombia (on November 3). 

RECONCILATION, 1904-30 

1904-9 President Rafael Reyes Prieto, a pragmatic Conservative, introduces power 

sharing with opposition, restores government finances, and promotes public 
works. 

1907 Coltejer, first major textile-manufacturing company, is founded in Medellm. 

1909 Rail connection between Bogota and the Magdalena is completed. 

1914-18 Colombia remains neutral in World War I. 



xxiii 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 



1919 Colombian-German Air Transport Society, the airline that later becomes 

Avianca (one of first airlines in hemisphere), is founded. 

1921 Ratification of Urrutia-Thomson Treaty restores normal U.S.-Colombian 
relations, damaged by U.S. role in support of Panamanian independence. 

1922 United States pays Colombia US$25 million for loss of Panama. 

1 928 Violent repression of strike by United Fruit Company banana workers produces 

strong backlash against the company and the Conservative government. 

REFORMISM, 193(M5 

1930 Liberal Party wins peaceful elections; in some parts of the country, serious out- 

breaks of political violence follow; small Socialist Revolutionary Party formally 
becomes Communist Party of Colombia. 

1932-34 Colombia and Peru engage in a conflict over Amazonian territory of Leticia; 

Peru recognizes Colombia's ownership of port. 

1 934-38 First presidency of Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, whose program, Revolution on 

the March, brings first agrarian reform law and government support of unions 
in labor disputes. 

1936 Constitutional reform (Codification of 1936) sets limits on property rights, per- 

manently restores universal male suffrage, and reopens church-state conflict. 

1941^44 Colombia closely collaborates with United States in World War II, declaring 

war on the Axis in 1943. 
LA VIOLENCIA, 1946-58 

1946 Conservatives regain presidency as result of Liberal divisions; change is again 

accompanied by widespread political violence. 

1948 Assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan (on April 9) provokes 

wave of rioting (known as the Bogotazo but not limited to Bogota). 

1950 Conservative leader Laureano Gomez Castro is elected president, with Liberals 
boycotting polls as violence worsens in countryside. 

1951 Gomez sends Colombian troops to fight alongside United Nations forces in 
Korean War; Tropical Oil Company concession reverts to government and 
forms basis for creation of Colombian Petroleum Enterprise (Ecopetrol). 

1953 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla stages coup to oust Gomez (on June 13) and 
rules as military dictator, although at first with widespread Liberal and other 
support. 

1954 Introduction of television; suffrage for women is adopted but takes effect only 
when elections are held after the fall of Rojas. 

1957 Liberal-Conservative alliance, strongly supported by business community, 
compels resignation of Rojas (on May 10); plebiscite approves establishment of 
National Front power-sharing arrangement between the two major parties. 

1957-58 General Gabriel Paris Gordillo heads the military junta. 

THE NATIONAL FRONT, 1958-78 

1958 National Front is formed. Alberto Lleras Camargo takes office as its first 
president. 

1961 Government sponsors new agrarian reform law. 

1963-65 Military offensive, with some U.S. aid, overcomes most guerrillas and bandit 

groups but fails to capture Pedro Antonio Marin, alias Manuel Marulanda Velez 
or Tiro Fijo, and his associates, nucleus of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), formed in 1964. 

1 965-66 Radical priest Camilo Torres Restrepo joins the Cuban-inspired National 

Liberation Army (ELN), formed in 1964, and is killed in combat. 

1967 Pro-Chinese Popular Liberation Army (EPL) begins operations. 



XXIV 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 



1970 Former dictator Rojas runs for president and narrowly loses attempt to regain 

power (on April 19). 

1973 ELN is decimated by army campaign, Battle of Anori (August 7-October 18), 

and internal feuds, but remnant survives to regain strength in next decade; 
Nineteenth of April Movement (M-1 9) forms in October. 

1978 National Front power-sharing mandate ends. 
TERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY, 1979-Present 

1979 U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty for drug traffickers comes into operation. 

1980 M-1 9 members seize diplomatic hostages at Dominican Republic Embassy and 
occupy it for 61 days. 

1982 Novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez becomes first Colombian to win Nobel Prize. 

1984 Assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (on April 30), by 
narco-traffickers inspires first major, but unsuccessful, crackdown on illicit 
drug industry. 

1985 In Bogota M-1 9 members seize Palace of Justice (on November 6), which is 
destroyed during army counterassault, with more than 100 deaths, including 
half of Supreme Court; eruption of Nevado del Ruiz volcano destroys Armero, 
a town in Tolima Department, killing 25,000 people (on November 13). 

1989-90 Luis Carlos Galan and two other presidential candidates are assassinated in the 

1 990 election campaign. 

1989 Coffee loses first place among legal exports. M-1 9 disarms and creates a 

political party (October-November). 

1991 New constitution goes far toward decentralizing power and enshrines long list 

of citizen guarantees. 

1993 Medellin Cartel's Pablo Escobar Gaviria is killed (December). 

1994 Ernesto Samper Pizano takes office as president amid accusations of accepting 
narco-traffickers' contributions to his campaign fund. 

1997 Founding of United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) unites paramili- 

tary groups. 

1998-2002 Presidency of Andres Pastrana Arango, who cedes an extensive, although 

lightly populated, area (despeje) to FARC guerrillas to advance peace 
negotiations that eventually fail. 

1999 FARC kidnaps and murders three U.S. citizens, who were activists for 

indigenous rights (in February). 

200 1 FARC kidnaps popular former Minister of Culture Consuelo Araujo Noguera 
and then murders her during army rescue attempt, provoking public outrage 
against the guerrillas and the peace process (in September). 

2002 FARC's kidnapping of a senator prompts President Pastrana to end peace talks 
and to order army to retake FARC's demilitarized zone; FARC kidnaps 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt Pulecio and her colleague, Clara Rojas 
(in February). 

Right-wing independent candidate Alvaro Uribe Velez wins presidential elec- 
tions with landslide in first round (in May). 

Attorney General's Office reactivates arrest orders for ELN commanders, 
including maximum chief Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista, alias El Gabino (in 
June). 

Uribe assumes presidency (on August 7). 

2003 FARC takes hostage three U.S. drug-control contractors — Keith Stansell, Marc 
Goncalves, and Thomas Howes (in February). 

Government negotiators and AUC representatives sign accord at Santa Fe de 
Ralito marking the start of formal peace negotiations (in July). 



XXV 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 



President Uribe is defeated in a referendum, in which he sought sweeping 
powers to streamline the state, reform the bloated political apparatus, and attack 
corruption (in October). 

2004 Dialogue between the government and the ELN begins after Mexico offers to 
mediate (in July). 

Congress passes Uribe 's legislation allowing for presidents to serve two 
consecutive terms (in December). 

2005 Constitutional Court ratifies legislation allowing presidents to serve a second 
consecutive term (in October). 

Controversial Justice and Peace Law, which grants AUC almost blanket 
amnesty, goes into effect, increasing AUC rate of demobilization (in 
December). 

2006 Parapolitics scandal begins: 12 pro-Uribe legislators are arrested for alleged 
collusion with outlawed paramilitary groups (January-May). 

Parties associated with President Uribe win majority in both houses of 
Congress (in March). 

AUC demobilization is officially completed (April 18). 

Uribe easily wins presidential election in first round with 62 percent of the vote 
(in May). 

ELN and government tentatively agree to begin formal peace process (in 
October). 

2007 FARC assassinates 1 1 regional legislators, kidnapped five years earlier in Cali, 
when a military group attempts to rescue them (in June). 

Samuel Moreno Rojas, candidate of left-wing Alternative Democratic Pole 
(PDA) and a political rival of President Uribe, is elected mayor of Bogota (in 
October). 

International Court of Justice at The Hague recognizes validity of Treaty of 
Esguerra-Barcenas, under which Nicaragua acknowledged Colombian 
sovereignty over the Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y Santa 
Catalina. Colombia recognizes Nicaraguan sovereignty over the Costa de 
Mosquitos (in December). 

2008 Nationwide demonstrations occur on February 4 to protest FARC kidnappings. 

With Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez Frias mediating, longtime FARC 
hostages Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez de Perdomo are released, 
followed by four congressional hostages (in February). 

FARC Secretariat members Raul Reyes and Ivan Rios are killed in cross-border 
strike into Ecuador, and Manuel Marulanda Velez, FARC's founder and its 
supreme commander since 1964, dies (in March). 

Guillermo Leon Saenz Vargas, alias Alfonso Cano, is named as Marulanda's 
replacement to lead FARC (in April). 

Supreme Court rules that a former legislator had received a bribe to ensure the 
passage of the constitutional amendment that allowed Uribe to run for a second 
term in 2006, prompting Uribe to call for a referendum on his rule (in June). 

FARC's four highest-profile hostages — former presidential candidate Ingrid 
Betancourt and three U.S. contractors — plus 11 military and police members 
are rescued (in July). 

Military "false positives" scandal emerges, revealing large-scale extrajudicial 
killings of impoverished young civilian men in order to raise guerrilla casualty 
counts (in September). 

Thousands of irate Colombians stage violent protests in 10 cities across the 
country after national Ponzi scheme victimizes hundreds of thousands 
(November 13). 



xxvi 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events ( Continued) 



2009 FARC releases a Swede, Erik Roland Larsson, thought to be its last foreign 
hostage (March). 

Veteran Colombian journalist Jose Everardo Aguilar, 72, a noted critic of 
corruption, is assassinated (April 28). 

United Kingdom ends bilateral military aid to Colombia because of human 
rights concerns (April 29). 

Senate approves holding referendum on whether constitution should be 
changed to allow possibility of second Uribe reelection (May 19). 

President Uribe visits President Barack H. Obama at the White House (June 
29). 

Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Defense 
and Security between the Governments of the United States of America and the 
Republic of Colombia, or Defense Cooperation Agreement, is signed in Bogota 
(October 30). 

National Electoral Council (CNE) invalidates petition for referendum on a 
second presidential reelection bid by President Uribe (November 13). 

FARC kidnaps and murders governor of Caqueta Department (December 21). 

2010 Inspector general of the nation endorses proposed referendum (January 13). 

FARC military chief Jorge Suarez Briceno, alias El Mono Jojoy, reaffirms 
FARC's armed struggle and rejects surrendering in letter to Military Forces 
general commander (February 13). 

Constitutional Court rules the proposed plebiscite unconstitutional (February 
26). 

Legislative elections (March 14). 
Presidential election (May 30). 



xxvii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Colombia (Republica de Colombia). 



Short Form: Colombia. 



Term for Citizen(s): Colombian(s). 

Capital: Bogota. Although officially called Distrito Capital de Santa 
Fe de Bogota under the 1991 constitution, Santa Fe was formally 
dropped from the name of Bogota in 2000. 

Major Cities: In order of population, Bogota, Medellm, Cali, Barran- 
quilla, and Bucaramanga. 



xxix 



Independence: Colombia marks its independence from Spain on July 
20, 1810, when criollo revolutionists established a ruling junta in the 
capital city of Santa Fe de Bogota (present-day Bogota). 

Flag: Three horizontal bands of yellow (top, double-width), blue, and 
red. 

Historical Background 

By the time of the Spanish Conquest, the Chibcha, numbering 500,000 
and split between two groups — Taironas and Muiscas — dominated the 
Central Highlands of what is now Colombia, where they had lived for 
at least 2,000 years and had become the most advanced of the indige- 
nous peoples. Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada led the first conquering 
expedition from Santa Marta to Sabana de Bogota (1536-39). In 1538, 
when Jimenez de Quesada founded Santafe (Santa Fe during the colo- 
nial period) in the Bagata zone of the country, Muiscas still lived in the 
hills overlooking the settlement, but their notable system of political 
centralization was crushed, and they became assimilated with the rest 
of the population. Conquistadors Nikolaus Federmann and Sebastian 
de Belalcazar led other expeditions in 1537-39 and 1538-39, respec- 
tively. In 1719 present-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Pan- 
ama formed the Viceroy alty of the New Kingdom of Granada. In 1781 
anger over Spanish taxation led to the Comunero Rebellion. 

On July 20, 1810, revolutionary leaders took part in an uprising in 
Santa Fe, deposing the Spanish viceroy. On August 7, 1819, General 
Simon Bolivar Palacios defeated the Spanish at the Battle of Boyaca, 
allowing colonists to sever ties with Spain and form the Republic of 
Great Colombia, with its capital in renamed Santa Fe de Bogota. Boli- 
var was the first president of Great Colombia, with fellow liberator 
General Francisco de Paula Santander as vice president. When Ecua- 
dor and Venezuela seceded in 1830, the remainder of Great Colombia 
soon became the Republic of New Granada, with Santander as its first 
president. From 1849 to 1886, Colombia oscillated between a liberal 
republic and a highly centralized, authoritarian government. 

The 1886 constitution gave the country its present name, reversed the 
federalist trend, and inaugurated 45 years of Conservative rule. Fac- 
tionalism within political parties and political and economic instability 
characterized the inaptly named Regeneration period (1878-1900). 
The War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902) between Liberals and Con- 
servatives devastated the country. Panama declared its independence 
in 1903. 



xxx 



In 1948 the assassination of popular Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gai- 
tan instigated major political rioting in Bogota (the Bogotazo). Coun- 
trywide violence, known as La Violencia, which had begun in 1946, 
continued to rage until 1958, when the Conservatives and Liberals 
banded together in the National Front. The arrangement greatly 
reduced political violence in the early 1960s, but by excluding dissi- 
dent political forces, it contributed to the emergence of guerrilla 
groups. 

The National Front arrangement ended in 1978, but the tradition of pres- 
idents inviting opposition figures to hold cabinet positions continued. 
Following a constitutional reform convention, a new constitution was 
adopted in July 1991. The election of Alvaro Uribe Velez (president, 
2002-6, 2006-10), an independent, ended the Liberal-Conservative 
duopoly of political power. Immensely popular for his handling of the 
economy and his hard line against the insurgency, Uribe was reelected to 
a second term. In 2008 his popularity was strengthened by major set- 
backs to the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC). In February 2010, a proposed referendum, which might have 
led to a second reelection, was declared unconstitutional. 

Geography 

Size and Location: Colombia measures 1,138,910 square kilometers, 
or slightly less than twice the size of Texas. The country lies in the 
northwestern part of South America, bordered by the Caribbean Sea to 
the north, the North Pacific Ocean and the Isthmus of Panama to the 
west, Ecuador and Peru to the south, and Brazil and Venezuela to the 
east. 

Topography: Colombia has five major geographic regions: the Carib- 
bean lowlands; the Pacific lowlands; the Andean region, including 
three rugged parallel, north-south mountain ranges; the vast eastern 
and northeastern grassy plains, known as llanos; and the Amazon 
region, which is tropical rainforest. Colombia's insular region includes 
four small islands. The most important rivers are the Magdalena, 
Cauca, and Putumayo. 

Climate: Because of differences in elevation, Colombia has an exten- 
sive temperature range, with little seasonal variation. The hottest 
month is March (9° C-20° C); the coldest months are July and August 
(8° C-19° C). Precipitation is generally moderate to heavy with an 
annual average of 3,000 millimeters and considerable yearly and 
regional variations. 



xxxi 



Natural Resources: Colombia is well endowed with energy resources 
and minerals, including coal, copper, emeralds, gold, hydropower, iron 
ore, natural gas, natural nickel, petroleum, platinum, and silver. Its 
coal reserves, totaling 7.4 billion metric tons, are foremost in Latin 
America and are concentrated in Peninsula de La Guajira and the 
Andean foothills. Colombia's natural gas reserves, totaling 4 trillion 
cubic feet in 2007, and proven oil reserves, totaling 1 .45 billion barrels 
in 2007, are located mostly in the eastern Andean foothills and Ama- 
zonian jungle. There are abundant renewable water resources. Only a 
small percentage (probably less than 3 percent) of Colombia's total 
land area, such as the fertile Andean mountainsides and valleys, is cul- 
tivated for crops. 

Environmental Factors: Colombia's forests cover 578,000 square 
kilometers, and about 10 percent of the total land area is designated as 
a protected area in the national park system. The country's abundant 
rivers and streams have long been degraded by industrial and munici- 
pal pollution, as well as by guerrilla sabotage of oil pipelines and 
chemicals used in the coca-refining process. Other issues include 
deforestation in the jungles of the Amazon and in Choco on the Pacific 
coast, air pollution (especially in Bogota), and the use of herbicides. 
As a result of soil erosion, 65 percent of the country's municipalities 
face water shortages by 2015. Nearly 12 million Colombians have no 
access to clean water, and 4 million have only limited access. 

Society 

Population: Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin 
America, after Brazil and Mexico. The 2005 census put the national 
population residing in Colombia at 41,468,384; the average annual 
population growth rate during 2001-5 was 1.6 percent, falling to an 
estimated 1.4 percent in 2008. The estimated population in February 
2010 was about 45.3 million. By 2005 the largely urban population 
had increased to 75 percent. The internal armed conflict as well as the 
violence generated by the illegal drug-trafFicking industry caused mas- 
sive displacement of the rural population, and many people fled to the 
cities. Population density per square kilometer averaged 44 in 2005, 
but with major regional variation. The 2005 census found that 3.3 mil- 
lion Colombians were living abroad because of insecurity and unem- 
ployment at home; external migration is primarily to Ecuador, the 
United States, and Venezuela. In 2008 some 29.4 percent of Colombi- 
ans were aged 14 years or younger; 65.1 percent were in the 15-64 
age-group; and only 5.5 percent were 65 or older. The estimated 
median age in 2008 was 26.8 years. The birthrate was 19.9 per 1,000 



xxxii 



people; the estimated fertility rate was 2.5 children born per woman. 
The death rate was 5.5 deaths per 1,000 people. Overall life expec- 
tancy at birth was 72.5 years (males, 68.7 years; females, 76.5 years). 
The number of male homicide victims accounts for the significant gap 
between life expectancy for men and women. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages: The official language is Spanish. 
The 2005 census reported that whites and mestizos (of mixed white 
and Amerindian ancestry) constituted 86 percent of the population. 
The Afro-Colombian population, including blacks, mulattoes (mixed 
black and white ancestry), and zambos (mixed Amerindian and black 
ancestry), accounted for 10.5 percent of the population; the indigenous 
population, for 3.4 percent; and the gypsy (Rom) population, for 0.01 
percent. Colombia has about 78 living languages; there are about 
500,000 speakers of Amerindian languages, but their numbers are 
diminishing rapidly. 

Health: Health standards in Colombia have improved greatly since 
the 1980s. Employees must pay into health plans, to which employers 
also contribute. Although in 2005 the system covered 66 percent of the 
population, health disparities persist, with the poor suffering relatively 
high mortality rates. In 2005 Colombia had only 1.1 physicians per 
1,000 people, compared to a Latin American average of 1.5. The 
health sector reportedly is plagued by rampant corruption, misalloca- 
tion of funds, and evasion of health-fund contributions. Total expendi- 
tures on health constituted 5.6 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2005. In 2002 Colombia had one of the world's highest 
homicide rates of more than 60 per 100,000 inhabitants, or 28,837. 
Some 1 7,206 violent deaths were recorded in 2006, the lowest figure 
since 1987, and the number was about the same in 2007, declining fur- 
ther to 16,359 in 2008. Other than homicide, heart disease is the main 
cause of premature death, followed by strokes, respiratory diseases, 
road accidents, and diabetes. Prevalent in lowland and coastal areas 
are waterborne diseases such as bacterial diarrhea, cerebral malaria, 
and leishmaniasis; water-contact diseases such as leptospirosis; and 
vectorborne diseases such as dengue fever, malaria, and yellow fever. 
In 2004 some 92 percent of infants under 12 months of age were 
immunized against measles. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) is also a major cause of death among those of working age, 
and the number of AIDS and hepatitis B cases has been rising. 

Welfare: All Colombian workers are legally required to be affiliated 
with a basic pension and health provider. The Social Security Institute 



xxxiii 



is one of Colombia's largest state companies and is the principal 
agency involved in the field of social security, with responsibility for 
pensions. Serious social problems include high rates of criminal vio- 
lence; extensive societal discrimination against women, child abuse, 
and child prostitution; trafficking in women and girls for sexual 
exploitation; widespread child labor; extensive societal discrimination 
against indigenous people and minorities; drug addiction; poverty; and 
displacement of the rural population. Poverty remains widespread in 
Colombia, where income distribution has huge disparities. The pro- 
portion of the population living below the poverty line was estimated 
at between 50 and 60 percent in 2005, according to the Comptroller 
General's Office, with up to 40 percent of rural dwellers living in 
extreme poverty. The Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean said that the overall poverty index had declined to 46.8 
percent by 2005. 

Religion: The constitution states somewhat ambiguously that there is 
no official church or religion, but the great majority of the population 
traditionally has been Roman Catholic. Statistics on religious affiliation 
in Colombia vary widely, however, and the National Administrative 
Department of Statistics (DANE) does not collect religious statistics. 
Between 80 and 90 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, at 
least nominally; approximately 10 percent of Colombians belong to 
other Christian denominations, particularly Protestant, or profess no 
belief. Very small percentages of Colombians adhere to Judaism, Islam, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism, as well as Afro-Colombian syncreticism. 
For political reasons, the illegal armed groups, both left-wing and para- 
military, have targeted religious leaders and practitioners. 

Education and Literacy: Public spending on education was 4.7 per- 
cent of GDP in 2006, when the pupil/teacher ratio was 30:1. Many 
teachers are poorly qualified, particularly in rural areas, where only 
five years of primary school may be offered, although primary educa- 
tion for children between six and 12 years old and a total of nine years 
of education are free and compulsory. Secondary school begins at age 
11 and lasts up to six years; graduates gain the bachillerato (high- 
school diploma). The 2005 census found that 50.3 percent of those 
aged between three and five were enrolled in school, as were 90.7 per- 
cent of those between six and 10 years old and 79.9 percent of those 
between 11 and 17. By 2008 literacy had risen to 93 percent of the 
general population; only 67 percent of rural dwellers were literate in 
2004. The ratio of public to private primary and secondary schools 
was 3: 1; at the tertiary level, the private sector dominated, with a ratio 



xxxiv 



of 2.4:1. In 2004 Colombia had 279 institutions of higher learning, 
including professional technical schools, technological schools, col- 
leges, and universities. 

Economy 

Overview: In 2007 Colombia had the fifth-largest economy in Latin 
America (after Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela), a status 
expected to continue through 2010; by regional standards, it is a diver- 
sified economy. Since 1991 a free-market economy has evolved 
through measures such as tariff reductions, financial deregulation, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, and adoption of a more lib- 
eral foreign-exchange rate. In 2007 agriculture accounted for 13 per- 
cent of GDP, industry (including manufacturing and construction) for 
29 percent, and services for the remaining 58 percent. 

The economy became mired in a recession in 1998-99 as a result of 
external shocks and monetary tightening to curb inflation. It has 
rebounded since 2003 as a result of confidence in the political and eco- 
nomic policies of President Alvaro Uribe. The recovery of growth in 
the GDP in 2005 and an overall reduction in criminal and political vio- 
lence contributed to favorable conditions that made 2007 one of the 
best economic years in recent history. The economy is expected to 
remain steady despite continuing weak domestic and foreign demand, 
slow GDP growth, austere government budgets, and serious internal 
armed conflict. Problems facing the government include reforming the 
pension system, reducing unemployment, and funding new explora- 
tion to offset declining oil production. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Overall GDP increased by 6.8 per- 
cent in 2006 and by 7.5 percent in 2007, when it totaled US$172 bil- 
lion. Colombia is a lower middle-income country. Real GDP per 
capita contracted by 6 percent in 1998-2002 and only recovered its 
1997 level in 2005, when it reached US$2,735 (or US$5,867 at pur- 
chasing power parity, or PPP, in current international dollars). The 
GDP per capita at PPP in 2008 was US$6,958. In 2005 the median 
household income was US$3,904. 

Government Budget: Favorable international conditions such as 
higher oil prices and Colombia's economic expansion aided the efforts 
of the Uribe administration to bring Colombia's public finances under 
control. Public-sector debt has fallen as a share of GDP from 2002, 
when it was 63.5 percent of GDP, to 46.4 percent in 2009, but it was 
expected to rise to 48 percent in 2011. Under President Uribe 's tax 



xxxv 



reforms, the income tax rate probably declined to 34 percent in 2008 and 
to about 33 percent in 2009, with lower corporate taxes and a simpler 
value-added tax. From a balance of 0.5 percent in 2008, the estimated 
deficit for 2009 was 2.8 percent of GDP, 3.1 percent for 2010, and 2.7 
percent for 201 1 . Continuing foreign direct investment and other capital 
inflows to the oil sector were expected to allow the government's widen- 
ing fiscal and current-account deficits to remain manageable. 

Inflation: During 1990-2002, the inflation rate averaged 18.1 percent 
per year. Although it gradually fell to an estimated 4.5 percent in 2006, 
it rose to 5.7 percent in 2007 and registered 7.7 percent in 2008, well 
above the official year-end target of 3.5 to 4.5 percent. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Diverse climate and topography 
allow cultivation of a wide variety of crops and other agricultural 
products, including bananas, beef, cassava, cocoa, coffee, corn, cotton, 
cut flowers, livestock, palm oil, potatoes, rice, soybeans, sugarcane, 
timber, and tobacco. Coffee remains Colombia's leading legal cash 
and export crop, still accounting for about one-third of employment in 
agriculture. Endemic guerrilla and paramilitary violence has plagued 
many campesinos and cattle-ranch owners and discouraged invest- 
ment in the sector. Colombia has at least 53 million hectares of forest 
and woodland, but only 3 million hectares are commercially exploited. 
Roundwood removals in 2004 totaled 8.1 million cubic meters, and 
sawn-wood production totaled 622,000 cubic meters; much harvested 
wood is used as fuel. Coastlines on both the Caribbean Sea and Pacific 
Ocean provide Colombian fisheries with extensive and diverse 
resources. Nevertheless, low fish consumption and rudimentary fish- 
ing techniques apparently account for the relatively marginal perfor- 
mance of the fishing industry. The total catch in 2004 was 211,385 
metric tons. 

Mining, Minerals, and Energy: Colombia is a major producer of fer- 
ronickel and is famous for its gold, silver, platinum, and emeralds, 
accounting for 90 percent of the world's emerald production. Colom- 
bia was self-sufficient in energy in 2008, with substantial proven 
reserves of coal and natural gas and currently adequate petroleum, as 
well as vast hydroelectric potential. 

Industry and Manufacturing: In 2007 this sector accounted for 29 
percent of GDP and for 18.7 percent of employment. Major manufac- 
tured products include beverages, cardboard containers, cement, 
chemicals, electrical equipment, machinery, metal products, pharma- 



xxxvi 



ceuticals, plastic resins and manufactures, textiles and garments, trans- 
port equipment, and wood products. Construction, a growing sub- 
sector, contributed an estimated 6.7 percent of GDP in 2005. 

Services: The services sector accounted for about 58 percent of GDP 
in 2007. The sector includes commerce; communications; electricity, 
gas, and water; financial services; tourism; and transportation. Repre- 
senting nearly 18 percent of GDP, financial services are centered in 
Bogota, Medellin, and, to a lesser extent, Cali. 

Labor: During 2001-5 the generally well-educated and well-trained 
workforce grew by 1 .4 percent. The unemployment rate was down to 
about 10-11 percent of a labor force of 18.8 million by 2007, but 
underemployment affected an estimated 35 percent of the working 
population. 

Foreign Economic Relations: The United States is Colombia's most 
important trading partner; Andean countries are also major markets. 
Venezuela was an important trading partner until it began imposing 
restrictions on trade with Colombia in 2009. Others include Chile, 
Mexico, Caribbean Community and Common Market countries, and 
members of the European Union, especially Germany. 

Imports: Imports of goods (free on board — f.o.b.) totaled US$37.5 
billion in 2008. In 2006 some 26 percent of Colombia's total imports 
came from the United States, 9 percent each from China and Mexico, 
7 percent from Brazil, 6 percent from Venezuela, 4 percent each from 
Germany and Japan, 3 percent from Ecuador, and 1 percent from 
Spain. Principal imports were machinery, industrial and oil and gas 
industry equipment, grains, chemicals, transportation equipment, min- 
eral products, consumer products, metal and metal products, plastic 
and rubber, paper products, and aircraft supplies. 

Exports: Exports of goods (f.o.b.) totaled US$38.5 billion in 2008. 
Exports were projected to have dropped significantly in 2009. Until 
2008 the trend of increasing exports reflected higher commodity 
prices and growing foreign demand, as well as an export-oriented pol- 
icy. The relative importance of coffee exports in the country's GDP 
plummeted from 51 percent in 1985 to less than 6 percent in 2006. 
Coal and oil are Colombia's two other primary export commodities, 
accounting for 38 percent of total exports in 2006. Traditional 
exports — oil, coal, coffee, and nickel — reached US$5 billion in 2005. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, manufacturing and new exports such as cut 



xxxvii 



flowers began to earn more export revenue than the country's tradi- 
tional products — coffee, bananas, and textiles. Colombia has become 
the world's second largest exporter of fresh-cut flowers. In addition to 
major oil and gas discoveries, mineral exports have strengthened the 
economy. Significant nontraditional exports include agricultural prod- 
ucts (cut flowers and sugar), mining products (ferronickel, gold, 
cement, and emeralds), and industrial products (textiles and apparel, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cardboard containers, printed material, 
plastic resins, and manufactures). The main destinations of 68 percent 
of total exports in 2006 were the United States, 40 percent; Venezuela, 
1 1 percent; Ecuador, 5 percent; Mexico and Peru, 3 percent each; and 
Germany, Japan, and Belgium, 2 percent each. 

Balance of Trade: Exports grew faster than imports during the 
1999-2006 period, resulting in positive trade balances. In 2008 there 
was a positive balance of US$1 billion from total trade of US$76 billion. 

Balance of Payments: Colombia has had a negative current account 
since 1993. The current-account deficit was 2.8 percent of GDP in 
2007 and 2008, but continuing strong foreign investment was expected 
to fully finance the deficit. Nevertheless, the current-account deficit in 
2009 was estimated at 2.4 percent of GDP. Foreign currency reserves 
totaled US$25.3 billion in 2009. 

External Debt: The foreign debt level was high; external debt rose to 
US$44 billion in 2007. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Colombia uses the peso, formally 
abbreviated as COP and informally as COL$ or Ps. On February 16, 
2010, COPs 1,900.8 equaled US$1. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Overview: Almost 70 percent of cargo is transported by road, but 
Colombia has a very low ratio of paved roads per inhabitant; air and 
waterway routes are well developed. Waterways are the only means of 
transport in 40 percent of the country, but guerrilla groups imperil 
those in the south and southeast. By the 2000s, mass transportation 
systems existed in Bogota, Medellfn, and seven other cities. Traffic 
congestion in Bogota was exacerbated by the lack of a rail system but 
eased by the TransMilenio Bus Rapid System and private cars being 
subjected to a daily rotating ban. Barranquilla has a similar bus rapid- 



xxxviii 



transit system. Cali's transit system of articulated buses opened in late 
2008. Medellin has a modern urban railroad connecting with the cities 
of Itagui, Envigado, and Bello and an elevated cable-car system, 
added in 2004, linking some poorer mountainous neighborhoods with 
Metro de Medellin. 

Civil Aviation and Airports: In 2009 Colombia had 992 airports (116 
with paved runways), plus two heliports. Bogota, Rionegro near 
Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Cucuta, Leti- 
cia, Pereira, San Andres, and Santa Marta have international airports. 
Bogota's El Dorado International Airport handled 579,000 metric tons 
of cargo and 13.5 million passengers in 2008. 

Inland Waterways: In 2008 some 18,300 kilometers were navigable 
by riverboats. Approximately 3.8 million metric tons of freight and 
more than 5.5 million passengers are transported annually, a majority 
on the Magdalena-Cauca, Atrato, Orinoco, and Amazon river systems. 

Ports: Seaports handle around 80 percent of the country's interna- 
tional cargo. In 2005 a total of 105,25 1 metric tons of cargo was trans- 
ported by water. Colombia's main ocean terminals are at Barranquilla, 
Cartagena, and Santa Marta on the Caribbean Coast and at Buenaven- 
tura and Tumaco on the Pacific Coast. Exports mostly pass through 
Cartagena and Santa Marta, while 65 percent of imports arrive at the 
port of Buenaventura. 

Railroads: Colombia had 3,304 kilometers of rail lines in 2006. The 
rail network is underdeveloped, but much of the system was upgraded 
in 2004-6. Although the network links seven of 10 major cities, very 
little of it is used regularly because of security concerns, lack of main- 
tenance, and the country's powerful road-transport union. 

Roads: Of the 164,257 kilometers of roads, about 8 percent were 
paved in October 2008. Colombia has three main north-south high- 
ways, mostly in good condition. Despite major terrain obstacles, 70 
percent of cross-border dry cargo is transported by road. Major road 
improvements are expected in the near future. 

Telecommunications and Mass Media: Telecommunications consti- 
tuted 3 percent of GDP in 2007, when Colombia had fewer than 8 mil- 
lion fixed telephone lines. According to the Industry and Commerce 
Superintendency (SIC), the Colombian cell-phone market reached 
40.7 million subscriptions at the end of 2008, bringing the penetration 



xxxix 



rate to 91 percent. In 2008 Colombia had an estimated Internet pene- 
tration rate of 32.3 percent and broadband reception rate of 3.9 per- 
cent. In 2008 Colombia had five national channels, local and regional 
channels, 76 registered providers of cable television, one company 
broadcasting by satellite (DIRECTV), and about 12 million TV sets. 
In 2004 there were almost 1,300 radio stations. Ownership of news 
media is highly concentrated among wealthy families, national con- 
glomerates, and major political parties. Journalists practice self- 
censorship for fear of corrupt officials, criminals, and members of 
illegal armed groups. 

Government and Politics 

Government Overview: The constitution of 1991 established a multi- 
party democracy in a unitary republic, a strong presidential regime, 
and separation of powers among the three branches of government. 
President Alvaro Uribe's broad congressional alliance and institutional 
stability have prevailed from 2002 to early 2010, despite endemic vio- 
lence from guerrilla, paramilitary, and narcotics-trafficking activities, 
as well as high-level corruption associated with wealth created by the 
drug cartels that have undermined Colombia's political and social 
foundations. 

Branches of Government: As chief of state and head of government, 
the president has executive power and strong policy-making authority 
and is elected for a four-year term. The president heads and is assisted 
by a cabinet. The bicameral Congress of the Republic consists of a 
102-member Senate and 166-member House of Representatives, 
which includes 161 members elected to represent the 32 departments 
and one for the Distrito Capital de Bogota, as well as an extra two 
members to represent Afro-Colombians, one for the indigenous popu- 
lation, one for the Colombians living abroad, and one for other politi- 
cal minorities. Members of both chambers are popularly elected with 
no reelection limit. The judicial branch is largely independent. It is 
composed, at the highest level, of a coequal Supreme Court of Justice, 
Council of State, Constitutional Court, and Superior Judicial Council. 
The system includes the Attorney General's Office, an autonomous 
judicial agency headed by an independent attorney general, elected for 
a four-year term by Congress and responsible for investigating crimi- 
nal offenses and prosecutions. The military justice system, as part of 
the Ministry of National Defense, falls under the executive branch. 

Administrative Divisions and Local Government: Colombia is 
divided into 32 administrative departments and the Distrito Capital de 



xl 



Bogota. In 2009 departments were subdivided into a total of 1,120 
municipalities, each headed by a mayor. Citizens directly elect gover- 
nors, deputies, mayors, municipal and district councils, and members of 
local administrative boards. Department governors are popularly elected 
for four-year terms. Each department has a popularly elected depart- 
mental assembly that oversees actions of the governors. 

Politics: For 150 years after their official establishment in the mid- 
nineteenth century, the rival Liberal Party and Conservative Party 
dominated politics. In recent years, a multiparty system has devel- 
oped, and in 2002 Alvaro Uribe became the first independent presi- 
dent in Colombian history. In the March 2006 congressional elections, 
winners were parties associated with President Uribe, including the 
Conservative Party in alliance with two main Uribista groupings. The 
center-left Liberal Party is still the largest party in Congress but is cur- 
rently relatively powerless, as is the leftist Alternative Democratic 
Pole (PDA), but the Liberals have been moving to the center, while the 
PDA has been consolidating its ranks and expanding grassroots sup- 
port. After the March 2006 elections, 16 recognized political parties 
had seats in Congress. Political parties generally operate freely and 
without government interference. Members of independent parties 
may be elected to regional or local office and may also win seats in 
Congress, as may dissidents from the two main parties. President 
Uribe has been very popular, owing to his success in improving 
domestic security and socioeconomic conditions, particularly contain- 
ing the guerrillas, significantly reducing high rates of criminal and 
political violence, and reviving economic growth. The Uribe adminis- 
tration has stressed combating insurgency by providing internal secu- 
rity within the framework of democratic protections and guarantees. 
Other priorities are international trade, supporting alternative means of 
development, and reforming the judicial and tax systems. 

Foreign Relations: Colombia has generally adopted a low profile, 
relying on international law and regional and international security 
organizations to pursue its interests. The country has good relations 
with the United States in its most important foreign relationship. U.S. 
aid, which totaled more than US$7 billion in 1999-2007, is designed 
to boost Colombian counternarcotics capabilities by providing heli- 
copters and training, and to support human rights, humanitarian assis- 
tance, alternative development, and economic and judicial reforms. 
The main issues for the United States are Colombian drug trafficking 
and illegal Colombian immigrants to the United States. Regional rela- 
tions remain good despite contentious issues with neighbors, espe- 



xli 



cially the spillover from Colombia's civil conflict, including guerrillas 
moving across borders, the flow of refugees, and the spread of drug 
crops — activities of particular concern to the bordering countries of 
Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Brazil is the second- 
largest market in the world for Colombian cocaine after the United 
States and a source for weapons for Colombian guerrilla and paramili- 
tary groups. Relations with Nicaragua and Venezuela have been 
strained over territorial disputes, Colombian complaints of Nicaraguan 
and Venezuelan support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), and from 2009, over Colombia's Defense Cooper- 
ation Agreement with the United States. Under the Uribe administra- 
tion, relations with the European Union (EU) have been cool, with the 
EU critical of Colombia's counterinsurgency strategy and human 
rights abuses. 

Major International Agreements and Treaties: Defense treaties to 
which Colombia is a party include the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty). Regional treaties include 
the Andean Community of Nations (formerly the Andean Pact), which 
also includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela and the bodies 
and institutions making up the Andean Integration System (AIS). 
Colombia has also signed, adhered to, and ratified 105 international 
treaties or agreements relating to the environment. Colombia is a sig- 
natory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
is also a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). By 1975 signatories to the 1974 
Declaration of Ayacucho, including Colombia, had decided on limita- 
tions to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Colombia is a 
party to the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention, and in 1994 it rat- 
ified the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Nar- 
cotics and Psychotropic Substances. 

National Security 

Armed Forces Overview: Under the constitution, the president is 
commander in chief, and, in practice, President Uribe exercises direct 
command over the military and security forces, leaving the minister of 
national defense with mostly administrative duties. The London-based 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated 2008 active 
armed forces to total 267,231: army, 43,013 career active-duty plus 
183,339 conscripts, for a total of 226,352; navy, 23,515 plus 7,214 con- 
scripts, for a total of 30,729; and air force, 10,150. The IISS total does 
not include naval aviation, 146, and marines, 14,000. Reservists totaled 
an additional 61,900 (army 54,700; navy, 4,800; air force, 1,200; and 



xlii 



joint, 1,200). In 2008 the army ranks included approximately 7,000 
officers and 26,000 noncommissioned officers (NCOs). 

Defense Budget: Colombia's defense budget and military expendi- 
tures have been rising in response to significant security challenges, 
including the continuing insurgency, massive narcotics trafficking, and 
an arms-buying spree by Venezuela. With U.S. aid under Plan Colom- 
bia, the defense budget's share of GDP has been expanding; in August 
2008, it totaled US$12.25 billion, or 5.6 percent of GDP; and total 
defense spending per member of the armed forces totaled US$49,814, 
with budget increases funding additional professional soldiers and 
counterguerrilla battalions. In 2008 defense expenditures totaled 
US$8.27 billion, and the defense budget totaled US$5.55 billion. The 
army received US$2 billion in 2007, while US$1.8 billion went to the 
National Police, US$400 million to the navy, and US$392 million to 
the air force. On top of U.S. aid, much increased spending is funded 
by President Uribe's wealth tax levied on the country's richest individ- 
uals and enterprises; this tax is expected to raise up to US$3.7 billion 
in 2007-11. 

Major Military Units: The army is organized into seven divisions 
subdivided into brigades and battalions; the navy is organized into 
three naval forces (Caribbean, Pacific, and Southern) and four com- 
mands (marine infantry, coast guard, naval aviation, and the Specific 
Command of San Andres and Providencia); and the air force is orga- 
nized into six combat air commands, three auxiliary commands, and 
two smaller air groups without operational aircraft. As of mid-2009, 
the military forces were undergoing radical change and were gradually 
introducing a new organization. The current structure will be replaced 
with five joint commands: Pacific (covering the western coastline and 
Ecuadorian border); Caribbean (created in 2005 and covering the 
north coast and Panamanian border); Eastern (the frontier with Vene- 
zuela); Central (the Andean heartland of Colombia); and the original 
pilot joint command called the Omega Force Command expanded to 
cover the southeast, including the borders with Peru and Brazil. The 
new organization is designed to encourage closer cooperation among 
different branches of the military and to ensure dedicated resources of 
troops and naval and air assets in all zones. 

Major Military Equipment: In 2009 the army inventory included 176 
light tanks and reconnaissance vehicles, 194 armored personnel carri- 
ers, 584 artillery pieces (including 101 towed and 483 mortars), 18 
antitank guided weapons, 118 helicopters, and 27 aircraft. The navy 



xliii 



had 4 submarines, 4 principal surface combatants (corvettes), 84 patrol 
and coastal combatants, 8 amphibious craft, and 6 logistical and sup- 
port craft. In 2008 the navy received funds for programs including 
modernization of its FS-6 guided missile corvettes and new maritime 
patrol aircraft. Naval aviation had 1 1 aircraft and 10 helicopters. The air 
force inventory included 85 fighter jets and 114 helicopters of various 
kinds. In 2006 the air force signed a contract for 25 Brazilian Embraer 
EMB-314 Super Tucano light attack aircraft, the last of which was 
delivered in August 2008. The air force fleet of Israel Aerospace Indus- 
tries Kfir TC-7 and C-7 aircraft and Dassault Aviation Mirage 5 
COAMs and 5 CODMs, in service more than 30 years, is being 
upgraded to C-lOs or replaced. In 2007 Colombia purchased 13 
upgraded Israeli Kfir 2000 fighter jets fitted with electronic monitoring 
equipment, the first four of which were received in June 2009 (C-10 
and C-12 versions). The National Police force had 65 aircraft and 60 
utility helicopters. 

Military Service: All nonstudent males reaching age 18 must present 
themselves for military service of 12-24 months; those who can afford 
to may buy their way out of serving, and those with high-school diplo- 
mas are exempt from combat, so it is mostly the poor with little educa- 
tion who actually serve. After military service, conscripts become part 
of the reserves. Females may volunteer for military service, which 
could be required in some circumstances. 

Foreign Military Relations: Since the late 1980s, the United States 
has been the primary provider of military training and equipment to 
Colombia; other suppliers include Brazil, Spain, France, Germany, 
Italy, and Israel. Many Colombian military personnel have received 
training in the United States or U.S. instruction in Colombia. In 
1999-2001 the U.S. government approved a US$1.3 billion aid pack- 
age called Plan Colombia, mostly earmarked for military hardware for 
antidrug efforts, such as a fleet of 71 helicopters for spraying coca 
fields; subsequent aid also has been used for counterinsurgency. U.S. 
support for counternarcotics efforts included more than US$2.5 billion 
in aid between 2000 and 2004, making Colombia the third-largest 
recipient of U.S. aid, after Israel and Egypt. In fiscal year 2004, how- 
ever, Colombia became the fifth-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, 
as a result of U.S. aid to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2004 U.S. mili- 
tary aid also has focused on increasing state presence by improving 
access to social services and supporting economic development 
through sustainable growth and trade. The United States has continued 
aid for counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts averaging 



xliv 



US$600 million per year through 2007; aid is devoted primarily to 
training units of the Urban Counterterrorist Special Forces Group 
(Afeur). Colombia has one infantry battalion in Egypt in support of the 
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), an independent interna- 
tional peacekeeping organization established by Egypt and Israel to 
monitor the security arrangements of their 1979 Treaty of Peace. 
Some National Police personnel served with United Nations peace- 
keeping forces in Croatia and El Salvador. Between 120 and 150 
Colombian soldiers were reportedly supporting the Spanish force in 
Afghanistan by the end of 2009. 

Security Forces: In early 2008, armed security forces totaled at least 
144,097 personnel, including 136,097 members of the National Police 
and 8,000 members of the rural militia. In addition to supporting the 
army in its internal security role, the police share some law-enforcement 
duties with elements of the Attorney General's Office. Highly trained 
United Action Groups for Personal Freedom have long enjoyed U.S. 
support and operate a fleet of Blackhawk helicopters and aircraft for the 
tasks of drug-crop eradication and antikidnapping and urban hostage- 
rescue operations. One of Colombia's most effective counternarcotics 
forces is a U.S.-trained and -funded force of 200 members of the Crimi- 
nal Investigation Directorate. 

Internal Threat 

Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Narco-trafficking: The pro- 
Cuban National Liberation Army (ELN), Maoist People's Liberation 
Army (EPL), and pro- Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- 
bia (FARC) were founded in the mid-1960s; the FARC quickly 
became the largest guerrilla group. The ELN and FARC, as well as a 
dissident EPL element, have continued insurgent activities to the pres- 
ent day, although the ELN lost at least 30 percent of its members and 
the FARC, 60 percent during the 2002-8 period, from members 
deserting, being captured, or killed. In 2009 the ELN had an estimated 
1,500 guerrillas and the FARC at least 1 1,000. By the mid-1980s, large 
narco-trafficking syndicates, particularly the Medellfn and Cali cartels, 
gained wide power through terror and corruption. During the narco- 
terrorist era (1983-93), traffickers sponsored assassinations of numer- 
ous government officials, justices, and politicians, particularly those 
who favored an extradition treaty with the United States. Illegal armed 
groups increasingly depended on the drug trade to finance their insur- 
gent operations. Despite the breakup of the big cartels, hundreds of 
smaller, lower-profile cartels have proliferated, often operating in 
association with the paramilitary and guerrilla groups. 



xlv 



Trafficking in processed cocaine and other illicit drugs accounts for 
more than US$5 billion a year and represents between 2.0 percent and 
2.5 percent of GDP a year. Colombia is the world's leading coca culti- 
vator and supplier of refined cocaine. More than 90 percent of the 
cocaine that enters the United States is produced, processed, or trans- 
shipped in Colombia. The country is also a growing source for heroin. 
Stepped-up government actions against insurgents since 2002, with 
significant U.S. military aid and growing professionalization of the 
armed forces and police, kept the guerrillas mostly withdrawn into the 
remote countryside. The FARC reaffirmed in mid-2008 that it has no 
intention of entering any peace negotiations and would continue the 
insurgency. 

Paramilitary Partial Demobilization: Paramilitary groups that 
emerged in the early 1990s, particularly the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC), the country's largest paramilitary organi- 
zation, have fought guerrilla groups and terrorized campesinos and 
human rights workers suspected of supporting or sympathizing with 
them. Members of these paramilitary groups are sometimes in the pay 
of drug cartels or landowners or backed by elements in the army and 
police. After several years of negotiations and a demobilization pro- 
cess, on April 18, 2006, the government announced that the AUC had 
disbanded, with a formal demobilization of 30,150 paramilitaries, who 
surrendered about 17,000 weapons, 117 vehicles, 3 helicopters, 59 
urban properties, and 24,000 hectares of land under the controversial 
Justice and Peace Law of July 22, 2005. Nevertheless, an estimated 
2,000 paramilitaries belonging to other groups have remained outside 
the peace process altogether. 

The Continuing Insurgency: At least 12,500 guerrillas were still 
active in late 2009. It is generally believed that the guerrillas have no 
realistic chance of taking power in Colombia, but the FARC and ELN 
remain well funded, well equipped, and capable of carrying out effec- 
tive guerrilla attacks against military and security forces and occa- 
sional acts of urban terrorism in Bogota. The FARC suffered major 
setbacks in 2008, including the rescue of its most important hostages 
and the capture or killing of several top leaders. The group became 
largely confined to remote jungle areas, but by 2010 it appeared to 
have regrouped and strengthened. The ELN has been involved in 
peace talks with the government since December 2006. Violent crime 
by common criminals is rampant in Colombia's major cities; homicide 
levels are among the highest in the world. Criminal bands specializing 
in kidnapping, extortion, and robbery target businesses and civilians. 



xlvi 



After drug trafficking, the main illicit industries are contraband, forg- 
ery (principally of currency, clothing, books, CDs, and audio- and 
video-cassettes), and, more recently, the theft of gasoline. 

Human Rights: The constitution provides for freedom of speech and 
the press, and the government generally respects these rights in prac- 
tice. Individuals criticize the government both publicly and in private. 
The media express a wide spectrum of political viewpoints and often 
sharply criticize the government, all without fear of government repri- 
sal. However, Colombia is one of the world's most dangerous coun- 
tries in which to practice the profession of journalism; a few 
journalists are killed almost every year, and journalists continue to 
work in an atmosphere of threats and intimidation, in some instances 
from corrupt local officials in collaboration with paramilitary groups, 
but primarily from terrorist groups. 

According to the U.S. Department of State's human rights report for 
2008, the government's respect for human rights continued to improve, 
as seen particularly in the implementation of the Justice and Peace Law. 
Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the mili- 
tary and security forces, but there were instances in which elements of 
the security forces acted in violation of state policy. President Uribe 
generally has been quick to hold senior military officials accountable 
for criminal incidents within the ranks, causing considerable turnover 
in the military high command. 

Police, prison guards, and military forces routinely mistreat detainees. 
Conditions in the severely overcrowded and underfunded prisons are 
harsh, especially for prisoners without significant outside support, and 
prisoners frequently rely on bribes for favorable treatment. The gov- 
ernment claims not to hold any political prisoners. In 2008 there were 
3,336 prisoners accused of rebellion or aiding and abetting insurgence, 
2,263 of whom were accused of supporting the FARC. 



xlvii 




35' f jy-^ 
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( Andres 

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Pnovidencia 

.3' J - 

20 ' 1^0 2 

MILES 

8TI22' 


12' / Isla de San Andres 

30 ' f / 2 

8VI40' 



Isla de 74 
Santa Catalina 



Caribbean Sea 



NETHERLANDS 

ANTILLES 
(Netherlands) 



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"Pacific 
Ocean 



7 



i 



\ ' -O ^ ^ 

10 y Bucaramanga I ^ ^ Arauca^ 
\ Medellfn / 11 _ 

uibdo^ #._< j V 12 \ 

Pereira-f-, I 1\ n./ 
Armenia*/ ./fcague!? ,\ ^ 

/ 21 -1/A Villavicencio 
Popayan >\. 



"Puerto*: 
Carrehof 



26 



V 



24 /_ " • 

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\ Moc'oa^- 

ECUADOR v 



\_ r- ' San Jose del 
\ j Guaviare - 

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International boundary 

Internal administrative 

boundary 
£ National capital 
• Department capital 

50 100 150 Kilometers 



50 100 150 Miles 



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Boundary representation 
not nenesfzarilv authoritative 



not necessaniy 
PERU 

74 



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i 

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BRAZIL 

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Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Colombia, 2009 



xlviii 



Administrative Divisions of Colombia 



Amazonas 32 

Antioquia 10 

Arauca 1 3 
Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y (see inset) 

Santa Catalina 

Atlantico 2 

Bolivar 7 

Boyaca 1 2 

Caldas 16 

Caqueta 27 

Casanare 1 8 

Cauca 25 

Cesar 4 

Choco 9 

Cordoba 5 

Cundinamarca 17 

Distrito Capital de Bogota* 22 

Guaim'a 29 

Guaviare 28 

Huila 26 

La Guajira 1 

Magdalena 3 

Meta 23 

Narino 24 

Norte de Santander 8 

Putumayo 31 

Quindio 20 

Risaralda 15 

Santander 1 1 

Sucre 6 

Tolima 21 

Valle del Cauca 14 

Vaupes 30 

Vichada 19 



Bogota also serves as the capital of Cundinamarca Department. 



xlix 



Introduction 



"PARADOXICAL" is how observers often describe the Republic of 
Colombia, and this contradictory characteristic is reflected in this 
fifth edition of Colombia: A Country Study. On the one hand, 
Colombia has a distinguished tradition of political stability as one of 
Latin America's longest-functioning democracies, with a lasting 
record of usually fair and regular elections and respect for political 
and civil rights. It is the only Latin American country with two rival 
traditional parties, the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador) and 
the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), which have survived since their 
formation in the midnineteenth century. 

Colombia is also one of South America's gems, not only for its spec- 
tacular geography but also for its cultural and intellectual life. Long a 
cultural leader in Latin America, it has produced internationally cele- 
brated writers, such as Nobel Laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and 
artists, such as Fernando Botero and Alejandro Obregon. When Ger- 
man naturalist and statesman Alexander von Humboldt visited Santa 
Fe (present-day Bogota) during 1800-1804, he named it the "Athens of 
America" in honor of its cultural and scientific institutions; the latter 
included South America's first astronomical observatory, founded by 
Jose Celestino Mutis. Bogota enjoyed this appellation for most of the 
nineteenth century and part of the twentieth. 

On the other hand, Colombia is a very fractured and polarized soci- 
ety where the tradition of electoral competition has existed alongside a 
history of various forms of political violence — insurgency, terrorism, 
narco-terrorism, and paramilitarism. After six interparty wars in the 
nineteenth century, the country enjoyed nearly a half-century of rela- 
tive peace. However, the Bogotazo riots that followed the assassina- 
tion of popular Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on April 9, 1948, 
destroyed downtown Bogota, including the neoclassical Palace of Jus- 
tice building, killed 2,000 people, and made the city more analogous 
to the Athens sacked by a Roman general in 86 B.C. The Bogotazo 
intensified a period of countrywide violence known as La Violencia 
(The Violence, 1946-58). Since the 1960s, the country has suffered a 
continuous insurgency. 

The term culture of violence is often applied to Colombia. The late 
U.S. political scientist Robert H. Dix attributed the nation's violent 
legacy in part to the paradoxical and elitist nature of the political sys- 
tem; members of the traditional elite competed bitterly, and sometimes 



li 



violently, for control of the government through the Liberal and Con- 
servative parties. What Dix termed the inherited hatreds of a person's 
identity, handed down from generation to generation, created an emo- 
tional bond to the chosen party, carrying members not only to the polls 
but periodically also into violent conflict with adherents of the oppos- 
ing party. Constitutional order and institutional stability generally have 
prevailed, despite the continuing violence. 

The interparty violence finally abated under a power-sharing 
arrangement during 1958-78 called the National Front (Frente Natio- 
nal). The pro-Conservative Party stance of the Roman Catholic 
Church and the anticlericalism of the Liberal Party had remained trou- 
blesome for both parties for about a hundred years, even though 
Colombia was the first country in Latin America to separate church 
and state in 1853. The longstanding argument between the Conserva- 
tive Party's advocacy of centralized government and the profederalist 
Liberal Party's insistence on a decentralized form of state had been an 
equally contentious issue. By the 1980s, the two main areas that had 
so long antagonized the parties, church-state relations and centralism 
versus federalism, had been largely resolved. By then, however, 
Colombians were looking to third-party alternatives. The two tradi- 
tional parties finally lost their duopoly of power in 2002 with the his- 
toric election of independent Alvaro Uribe Velez (president 2002-6, 
2006-10). 

Colombia's autochthonous violence constitutes the central paradox 
that differentiates its political system from other Latin American coun- 
tries. The negative international image created by the country's long- 
running insurgency, political violence, narco-terrorism, criminality, 
and political and military scandals has overshadowed many impres- 
sive features that distinguish Colombia as a major Latin American 
country. By discussing key aspects of the country's history, society 
and environment, economy, government and politics, and national 
security, the authors of this edition of the Country Study attempt to 
provide a multidimensional portrait of contemporary Colombia. 

Even the etymology of Colombia's name is paradoxical, which may 
help to illustrate the country's almost schizophrenic character. Although 
Colombia's eponym honors Christopher Columbus (Cristobal Colon), 
in homage to his early exploration of the New World, the Genoese-born 
navigator had a less well-known reputation as a failed administrator and 
a ruthless and greedy tyrant who enslaved the indigenous population of 
Hispaniola. Moreover, the closest that he ever got to present-day 
Colombia was the Golfo del Darien, during his fourth voyage to the 
New World in 1502-3. Nevertheless, Colombia's Great Liberator, 
Simon Bolivar Palacios, a Venezuelan, adopted the name Republic of 



lii 



Great Colombia for a union of present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Ecua- 
dor, and Panama, which was established at the Congress of Angostura in 
Venezuela on December 17, 1819. Earlier, Venezuelan revolutionary 
Francisco Jose de Miranda had conceived the name Colombia as a sug- 
gested epithet for all of the New World, especially those territories and 
colonies under Spanish and Portuguese rule. A more historically based 
name would have been Nueva Granada (New Granada), considering 
that Spain's Granada was the toponym of what is now Colombia for 
most of the time before 1863. Nevertheless, the country adopted four 
additional names, including the United States of Colombia (1863-86). 
Finally, the 1886 constitution settled on the Republic of Colombia. 

In his influence on Colombia's history, Bolivar towers over Colum- 
bus (as historian David Bushnell's numerous references to Bolivar, 
and none to Columbus, attest). Bolivar has not only Colombia's sec- 
ond-highest peak named after him, Pico Simon Bolivar (5,775 
meters), located on Colombia's Caribbean coast near its twin, Pico 
Cristobal Colon (5,776 meters), but also one of Colombia's 32 admin- 
istrative departments, more than a dozen towns, and Bogota's central 
plaza. Moreover, popular reservations about the country's namesake 
began surfacing in the 1920s, when Colombians and other Latin 
Americans adopted an alternative name for the holiday known in His- 
panic America as Dia de Colon (Columbus Day). The name Dia de la 
Raza (Day of the Race) came to be preferred not only as an offshoot of 
growing resentment toward the United States, which was generally 
seen as interventionist, but also in acknowledgment of Columbus's 
legacy of slavery and brutal conquest of Amerindians (some use the 
term genocide). 

Today, Amerindians constitute no more than 3.4 percent of the 
Colombian population, and demographers struggle to make racial and 
cultural distinctions between the mestizos, who account for about half 
of the population, and the whites, who make up at least a third. The 
Colombian population is ethnically homogeneous, compared to coun- 
tries such as Brazil and the United States. 

Because of its great geographical diversity, Colombia is one of Latin 
America's most regionalist nations, in which Colombians identify tra- 
ditionally more closely with their regional origins than with the nation 
as a whole. The country's characteristic introversion prompted Alfonso 
Lopez Michelsen (president, 1974—78) to refer to Colombia as "the 
Tibet of South America." Moreover, Colombians refer to the sharp con- 
trast between the major cities, which are islands of relative safety and 
prosperity, and the rural areas by the anarchic expression ausencia del 
estado (absence of the state). Much of the countryside surrounding the 
major cities remains almost a battleground where the ley del monte 
(law of the jungle) applies. Because of Colombia's regionalism, 



liii 



national unity has eluded the country. Indeed, despite its democratic 
political system, common religion — like most Latin American coun- 
tries, the vast majority of Colombia's population (between 80 and 90 
percent) is, at least nominally, Roman Catholic — and common lan- 
guage (Spanish), Colombia is characterized more by social fragmenta- 
tion than by national unity. 

Regional disparities, especially between urban and rural areas, 
remain acute. Since 2000 Colombia's largest cities, particularly Bogota 
(with more than 7 million inhabitants, or more than 8.2 million in the 
greater metropolitan area in 2007), and Medellin, have been undergo- 
ing a renaissance. They now have amenities that include modernized 
public transport, new libraries, outdoor cafes, art galleries, renovated 
parks, and bicycle paths. Yet, despite its progress, even Bogota may not 
be a safe haven, if a global survey conducted by the Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit (EIU) on the "livability" of cities in 2009 is to be believed. 
It ranked Bogota and Caracas at 127 and 118, respectively. 

A highly stratified society, Colombia also remains characterized by 
considerable social exclusion and by sharp inequalities, not only in 
income but also between the standard of living in urban and rural areas 
and in the lack of opportunities for ethnic minorities, women, and the 
displaced population. Despite improvement in overall indicators in 
recent years, poverty affects at least half of the population, and Colom- 
bian income distribution remains the second most unequal in Latin 
America, after Brazil. The government figures for poverty and extreme 
poverty in Colombia in 2008 were: 46 percent, or 20.5 million Colom- 
bians; and 17.8 percent, or 7.9 million, respectively. Whereas the pov- 
erty rate fell 4.3 percent from 2005, abject poverty rose by 2. 1 percent. 

Making progress on an ambitious poverty-reduction strategy, 
unique in Latin America, was a major priority of the second adminis- 
tration of President Uribe. In 2007, however, Colombia was just start- 
ing the poverty-reduction process of the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals project, adopted by 189 countries, to be accom- 
plished by 2015. Colombia's slow progress in this regard has been 
blamed on the country's recession in 1999, the armed conflict, and 
population displacement. Five goals that Colombia is not expected to 
achieve by 2015 include: significant further reduction of poverty and 
of teenage pregnancies, greater vaccination coverage, improved hous- 
ing in shantytowns, and expansion of preschool-education coverage. 
The decentralization process of the early 2000s, in which financial 
resources have devolved to the municipalities and private companies, 
ironically has worsened service quality, particularly in the public- 
health and education sectors. This deterioration in service is because 
municipal authorities and private companies often cannot be relied on 
to allocate the funds intended for national programs. 



liv 



Despite the country's still-serious domestic security problems, 
Colombia's economy in recent years has been one of Latin America's 
most robust, and the country has been a model of economic stability. 
About US$40 billion in foreign investment flowed into the country 
during the first seven years of the twenty-first century. Reliable data 
exist only for the formal economy. In 2007 Colombia, with an impres- 
sive gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) growth rate of 7.5 
percent (compared with -4.2 percent in 1999), had the fifth-largest 
economy in Latin America. 

The combination of an economic revival in 2007, a hard-line strat- 
egy against the guerrillas, and improving domestic security and socio- 
economic conditions enhanced President Uribe's image as a strong and 
capable leader and made him immensely popular with Colombians; his 
successes led to popularity ratings in the 70 to 80 percent range, 
according to Gallup polls. During his second term, Uribe focused on 
improving public finances, reducing inflation (at a record low of 2 per- 
cent at the end of 2009), and strengthening economic growth. Never- 
theless, Uribe faced fiscal challenges during the remainder of his term, 
especially with an international financial crisis and a slowdown in the 
economies of its main trade partners, including the United States, 
which accounts for about one-third of Colombia's exports. In late 
2008-early 2009, these conditions, which included the loss of 600,000 
jobs in 2008, were seriously affecting the broader economy. 

Colombia's GDP growth rate dropped 2.8 percent in 2008 and 
probably did no better than about zero in 2009. The construction and 
manufacturing sectors were down sharply in 2008, as were traditional 
exports such as coal and coffee. However, energy, mining, and finan- 
cial services continued to grow in 2008, and oil production rose. The 
authors of the economy chapter point out that a key feature of Colom- 
bia's economy has been a growing dependence on remittances from 
abroad as a source of foreign exchange, but the Ministry of Finance 
and Public Credit has estimated that this income may have dropped by 
20 percent in 2009, resulting in a US$1 billion reduction in remit- 
tances to US$4 billion. 

The continuing juxtaposition of democracy, economic and political 
stability, and internal conflict — many years after other countries in Latin 
America managed to overcome their own insurgencies — makes Colom- 
bia an anomaly in the region. Colombia's insurgency is unique in the 
world because of its longevity, being a relic of the 1960s. The Colom- 
bian government has pacified a few of the illegal armed groups: the 
Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19) and the Maoist Popular Libera- 
tion Army (EPL) in the early 1990s, and the paramilitary United Self- 
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2006. Nevertheless, the diehard 
leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary 



lv 



Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have sustained the insurgency. 
Although the ELN has engaged in occasional peace talks since 2005, the 
FARC has yet to demonstrate that it is willing to undertake good-faith 
peace negotiations with the government, despite crippling setbacks that 
the organization suffered during 2008. 

For many Colombians, the apparently never-ending conflict has 
scarred the face of the nation socially, psychologically, and ecologi- 
cally, condemning them to live with it for their entire lives. The armed 
conflict is also somewhat anachronistic in that it has pitted the defunct 
political ideologies of the insurgents and their now-mostly demobi- 
lized paramilitary enemies against each other, in contrast to the reli- 
gious fanaticism that characterizes many of the world's active 
extremist groups. Although the guerrilla forces still operating in the 
countryside generally wear uniforms, this does not mean that the reb- 
els can be categorized ipso facto as legitimate insurgents under inter- 
national law, which is how some Latin American governments — such 
as those of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela — may see them. In 
urban areas, they operate in civilian guise. Canada, Colombia, the 
European Union (EU), and the United States have categorized the 
ELN and the FARC as terrorist organizations, but they are also drug- 
trafficking networks. 

Narco-terrorism, and the military's often equally violent response to 
it, again turned the rebuilt Palace of Justice into a battleground on 
November 6-7, 1985. The Colombian government's Truth Commis- 
sion determined in 2006 and reaffirmed in December 2009 that the 
Medellin Cartel funded the M-19's takeover of the Palace of Justice, in 
a failed effort to intimidate the government from extraditing cartel 
bosses to the United States. The free rein granted the military to deal 
with the Palace of Justice takeover, without regard for the lives of the 
justices and the employees, and subsequent military impunity for using 
violence against the civilian population in the countryside created the 
conditions for paramilitarism to thrive for the next two decades. 

Since December 1997, when Colombia reauthorized the extradition 
of its nationals, at least 855 individuals have been extradited to the 
United States, including 789 since Uribe first assumed office, 208 of 
them in 2008 alone. In the narco-terrorism period of the 1980s and 
1990s, the Extraditables' attitude toward extradition to the United 
States was summed up in their adage about preferring a grave in 
Colombia to a jail in the United States. Since 2007, however, in a par- 
adoxical about-face, Colombian drug traffickers and paramilitary 
criminals facing prosecution for their crimes reportedly have been 
endeavoring to be extradited to the United States in order to be tried in 
U.S. courts. According to Semana magazine, they concluded that 



lvi 



being tried in a Colombian court would likely result in an automatic 
30-year sentence and lawsuits from their victims, as well as a high risk 
of being murdered in an overcrowded Colombian prison. They 
believed that a U.S. court would reduce their sentences by up to 70 
percent in exchange for testifying against the big capos who were 
brought to trial, resulting in sentences of only two to four years. More- 
over, they heard of fellow traffickers who, having settled their 
accounts with U.S. authorities, were able to start new lives in the 
United States. 

The paramilitary warlords, guerrilla kidnappers, and drug kingpins 
who have been extradited to the United States and tried in U.S. courts 
have plenty of time to pine about a tomb in Colombia. For example, 
Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, alias Don Berna, a paramilitary 
chief extradited in May 2008, was sentenced to 31 years in prison and 
fined US$4 million for smuggling cocaine into the United States. Sim- 
ilarly, on May 1, 2009, a U.S. court sentenced Eugenio Montoya San- 
chez, alias Hector Fabio Carvajal, a leader of the Norte del Valle Car- 
tel, to 30 years in prison. On December 12, 2008, Montoya's brother, 
Diego Montoya Sanchez, alias Don Diego, a former top-ten most- 
wanted fugitive of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and princi- 
pal leader of the Norte del Valle Cartel, was extradited from Colombia 
to the United States to face federal charges. 

Despite this extraordinary bilateral cooperation, there has been 
some nationalistic backlash to extradition in Colombia, in part because 
the victims of those who were extradited generally have been 
excluded from the judicial process in the United States and unable to 
seek reparations. Supreme Court of Justice decisions in February 2009 
marked yet another major shift in extraditions from Colombia to the 
United States, raising perplexing questions about how to deal with 
future extradition requests. The Supreme Court blocked the extradi- 
tions of the FARC kidnappers of three former U.S. hostages — Marc 
Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell — ruling that the 
United States had no jurisdiction over Colombians in some crimes 
committed in Colombia, including taking hostages. In mid-2009, the 
U.S. government reaffirmed its commitment to ensuring that former 
paramilitary leaders imprisoned in the United States can continue tes- 
tifying injudicial proceedings underway in Colombia, either by video- 
conferencing or in person. 

The illegal armed groups in Colombia are criminal enterprises that 
are deeply involved in activities such as extortion and kidnapping for 
ransom, but primarily drug trafficking. Much of the violence in the 
Colombian countryside involves fighting among the FARC, para- 
militaries, and narcotics cartels over coca-growing land, which is typi- 
cally in remote and marginal areas. Moreover, endemic guerrilla and 



lvii 



paramilitary violence has been a serious problem for many campesi- 
nos and cattle-ranchers, and it has discouraged investment in the agri- 
cultural sector. The FARC and the ELN control all aspects of the drug 
trade in their areas of influence; for example, they levy "taxes" at all 
levels of the narcotics production chain. 

Over four decades of armed conflict, the countryside has been lit- 
tered with land mines and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 
Between 2002 and 2007, these IEDs inflicted a minimum of 2,000 
casualties and an additional 300 victims in the first nine months of 
2008, according to the Presidential Program for Integral Action 
Against Antipersonnel Mines (PAICMA). According to the National 
Army, in 2008 troops destroyed 17,353 explosive devices, deactivated 
405 land mines, and seized 1 1 8 tons of explosive material. The land- 
mine problem worsened in 2008 after FARC commander Alfonso 
Cano ordered his guerrillas to sow more minefields. Moreover, the 
FARC mastered the manufacture of homemade land mines after 
receiving training from former members of the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), according to Freddy Padilla de Leon, the general commander 
of the Military Forces. In August 2009, Vice President Francisco San- 
tos Calderon denounced the FARC for using the planting of anti- 
personnel mines as a war strategy, and noted that mines had killed or 
injured an additional 370 victims during the year. 

One reason why Colombia's internal armed conflict continues is the 
country's illegal drug industry, which, since the 1970s, has allowed the 
guerrillas and paramilitaries to fund their violent campaigns with a 
vast source of revenue. Today, the FARC continues to operate a guer- 
rilla version of a drug cartel. According to the Colombian government, 
the FARC's annual revenues declined to about US$500 million in 
2007. The group's cash reserves reportedly have been depleted as a 
result of a crackdown on exchange houses that the FARC used to laun- 
der money, while much of the reduction in revenues is because of 
competition from Mexican cartels. In August 2009, the U.S. Depart- 
ment of the Treasury identified an "important financial contact" of the 
FARC living in Costa Rica. 

Despite counternarcotics efforts since the mid-1980s, the supply of 
drugs in 2006 remained steady, prices had fallen, and purity had 
increased. Colombia remained Latin America's largest exporter of ille- 
gal drugs. Increased aerial spraying under Plan Colombia, a U.S.-sup- 
ported program for combating the insurgency and narcotics trade, 
temporarily reduced the coca-growing area under cultivation, primarily 
by displacing the local population. However, as much coca was culti- 
vated in Colombia in 2006 as when aerial fumigation of the drug crop 
began in 2000. Instead, coca growing simply had been redistributed into 



lviii 



smaller, harder-to-reach crops. Moreover, aerial spraying of coca crops 
along the border with Ecuador on December 11, 2006, caused a series of 
diplomatic incidents with that country and damaged bilateral relations. 
A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released in 
November 2008 found that, although opium-poppy cultivation declined 
by about 50 percent from 2000 to 2006, coca-leaf production actually 
had increased by 15 percent over the same period. The report recom- 
mended cuts in U.S. funding of the program. 

The Uribe government strongly disputed a report by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that illicit crops 
increased by 27 percent in 2007. However, the government and the 
UNODC agreed that the area planted in coca in 2008 decreased from 
99,000 to 81,000 hectares, as a result of record aerial spraying and 
manual-eradication efforts during the year. A collateral effect of the 
concentration of eradication and interdiction efforts in the agricultural 
zones of the interior was to displace coca-growing activity to the bor- 
der regions and the Pacific coast. 

Paradoxically, despite at least US$5 billion in U.S. counternarcotics 
aid under Plan Colombia, Colombia remains the world's leading coca 
cultivator and supplier of refined cocaine and a major source of her- 
oin; in 2007 at least 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United 
States was produced, processed, or transshipped in Colombia. Traf- 
ficking in processed cocaine and other illicit drugs accounts for more 
than US$5 billion a year and represents between 2.0 percent and 2.5 
percent of GDP a year. However, only an estimated one-half of these 
illicit revenues returns to Colombia. 

The narco-terrorism that characterized the large drug cartels in the 
last decades of the twentieth century has abated, but the drug-smug- 
gling industry is now dominated by hundreds of smaller, lower-profile 
syndicates, many of which are based in Venezuela and operate in asso- 
ciation with the Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups. More- 
over, the corruption that this illegal industry has spawned has 
remained widespread, as have criminal and political violence and 
abuse of human rights. The societal conditions that contributed to the 
country's internal violence have been aggravated by endemic poverty, 
inequality, social injustice, population displacement, and weak state 
institutions. 

Colombia's long-running two-party rivalry was interrupted for the 
first time since the midnineteenth century in 2002, when Alvaro Uribe, 
an independent and Liberal Party dissident, won the presidency. Born 
on July 4, 1952, in Medellm, Uribe was a brilliant student, earning a 
doctorate in law and political science in Medellfn. He also completed 
studies in administration and management at Harvard and conflict reso- 
lution at Oxford. 



lix 



After the 2002 election, the two once-dominant traditional parties 
had to form alliances with some of the approximately 60 political par- 
ties then formally recognized, most of which were not represented in 
the Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la Republica) because they 
were too small. As if confirming the demise of the two-party system, 
Uribe easily won reelection on May 28, 2006, becoming the first 
Colombian president in 100 years to be reelected, thanks to a constitu- 
tional amendment authorizing reelection for a second consecutive 
term. Moreover, he won by a record majority (62 percent of the bal- 
lots) in the first round. With this strong electoral mandate and a work- 
ing majority in Congress, Uribe began his second four-year term that 
August. His congressional alliance included independents, some for- 
mer Liberal Party members, and the Conservative Party. 

As a multiparty, constitutional democracy and a unitary republic 
with a strong presidential regime, Colombia is not unique in Latin 
America. Like numerous other countries from Mexico to Argentina, 
its national government has executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches that were established with separation of powers and with 
checks and balances. However, Colombia is unusual in the region in 
that its armed forces have seized power far less often than in many 
Latin American countries, on only three occasions — 1830, 1854, and 
1953. The informal ending in 1991 of the tradition of military defense 
ministers has ensured civilian oversight of the military. This trend was 
interrupted in May 2009, after Juan Manuel Santos Calderon resigned 
as minister of national defense in order to qualify as a potential presi- 
dential candidate, and President Uribe appointed General Padilla de 
Leon to act concurrently as the Military Forces general commander 
and his interim minister, pending consideration of other candidates for 
the post. Although Colombia subsequently has another civilian minis- 
ter of national defense, as do the other South American nations, it 
stands out in the region as a militarized nation whose armed forces are 
second in size in Latin America only to those of Brazil. 

This updated edition of Colombia: A Country Study reflects the 
reforms of the amended 1991 constitution, which was the first revised 
charter since 1886. These wide-ranging reforms of the country's insti- 
tutions are aimed at establishing a new political and judicial model. 
They include the creation of institutions such as the Attorney General's 
Office (Fiscalia General de la Nation) to investigate criminal cases, the 
Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (Defensoria del Pueblo) to medi- 
ate between the state and its citizens, the Constitutional Court to pro- 
vide constitutional oversight and to protect human rights, and the 
Superior Judicial Council (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura) to con- 
trol and administer the judicial branch. In addition, they include tute- 



lx 



lary mechanisms (tutelas), to protect basic human rights. With the main 
exception of these popular judicial improvements, however, Colombi- 
ans reportedly have not been particularly impressed by the effect of the 
new constitution on their quality of life and have been especially frus- 
trated by the lack of congressional reform, such as the system for elect- 
ing senators, and the lack of accountability of public officials. In short, 
the new constitution has not proven to be the panacea for Colombia's 
problems that many had hoped it would be. Instead, it has strengthened 
presidentialism by allowing, as of 2005, for a president to be reelected 
to a second consecutive term and to invoke a referendum on possibly 
allowing yet a third successive term. In the view of some scholars, 
presidentialism is a prescription for authoritarianism, as in Venezuela, 
and the combination of presidentialism with a multiparty system is 
especially inimical to stable democracy. 

Colombia's poor record on human rights makes it far from being a 
paragon as a constitutional democracy, despite a long history of party 
politics, usually fair and regular elections, and respect for political and 
civil rights. The systemic violence of the left-wing insurgents, right- 
wing paramilitaries, drug traffickers, and common criminals, as well 
as the often-indiscriminate counterinsurgency tactics of the Colom- 
bian military and security forces, have resulted in egregious human 
rights violations and massive population displacement. 

Despite the persistence of serious problems, the government's 
respect for human rights has been improving, according to the U.S. 
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
2008. A new Code of Criminal Procedure took effect at the start of 

2008, raising hopes that it would reduce judicial impunity. According 
to Freedom House, in 2007 Colombia's freedom of the press status 
"improved from Not Free to Partly Free, owing to the increased will- 
ingness of journalists to report critically on political issues such as 
high-level corruption scandals, as well as a gradually improving secu- 
rity situation," although, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
added, "Colombia remains the most dangerous country for journalists 
in South America." Although no journalists were murdered for politi- 
cal reasons in 2008, three were killed in Colombia in the first half of 

2009, as compared with four killed in Russia. 

His electoral mandate to pursue further reforms in his second term 
notwithstanding, President Uribe's stellar image began to be sullied, at 
least internationally, in 2006, as reports of high-level governmental 
corruption surfaced. The harshest blow yet suffered by Uribe and his 
administration became known in 2006 as the parapolhica (parapoli- 
tics) scandal, which exposed the alliance between paramilitary groups 
and many politicians and other officials in the executive, legislative, 



lxi 



and judicial branches, as well as the Military Forces and security per- 
sonnel. The spreading parapolitics scandal and concerns over his 
administration's human rights record caused the U.S. Congress to 
reduce U.S. funding of Uribe's Plan Colombia. Although the scandal 
did not hurt Uribe personally or even lower his popularity ratings, it 
opened a fissure in his coalition. The Alternative Democratic Pole 
(PDA), a left-leaning party, underscored the Uribe government's 
weakened political influence by capturing the mayoralties of the three 
largest cities — Bogota, Medellin, and Cali — in the regional elections 
for mayors and governors held on October 28, 2007. 

The parapolitics scandal has debilitated not only the executive and 
legislative branches of government, but the judiciary as well. In 2008 
relations between the executive and judiciary became increasingly 
tense as a result of the latter 's investigations and prosecutions of legis- 
lators with suspected ties to paramilitary groups — some of the 95 law- 
makers under arrest or investigation in 2008 were Uribistas. Another 
factor was President Uribe's frequent public verbal attacks on the judi- 
ciary, particularly on the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court for 
its role in the parapolitics investigations. On June 24, 2008, Yidis 
Medina, a former legislator, was convicted of accepting bribes in 2004 
in exchange for supporting the legislation that approved the constitu- 
tional changes allowing Uribe to seek a second consecutive term. The 
conviction opened a debate within the judiciary over the legality of 
President Uribe's historic landslide election victory in May 2006. 
Claiming that Uribe was aware of the bribes, Medina told the court 
that she had supported the legislation after senior government officials 
offered political jobs to her supporters. The Constitutional Court sub- 
sequently reviewed the legislation that permitted Uribe to seek his sec- 
ond consecutive term in office. Uribe responded to the court's ruling 
by accusing its judges of political bias and asking Congress to autho- 
rize the holding of a national referendum, in which voters would be 
asked whether or not they wanted to hold new presidential elections. 
In August 2009, security measures in the Palace of Justice were inten- 
sified because of a growing campaign of threats against the justices. 

The corruption and violence associated with the enormous wealth 
created by the drug cartels have undermined the country's political and 
social foundations. The illegal narcotics industry has corrupted every 
level of Colombian society, from the campesinos who grow and har- 
vest the mostly illegal coca crops (as in Bolivia and Peru, however, a 
very small percentage of the coca crop is legal for domestic medicinal 
or traditional purposes) to some members of the government and mili- 
tary and security forces, who provide discreet services to the narcotics 
traffickers in exchange for a bribe. 



Ixii 



International surveys that take such factors into account provide a 
comparative perspective of Colombia's global standing. Colombia 
ranked seventieth of 180 countries in Transparency International's 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2008, a significant decline from its bet- 
ter ranking in 2005 of fifty-fifth place. However, Colombia ranked 
thirteenth of 32 countries in the Americas, a relatively good rating, at 
least in comparison with its immediate neighbors, particularly Venezu- 
ela, which placed thirty-first. In a survey taken in Colombia in 
November 2008, Transparency International found that 41 percent of 
respondents considered political parties to be the most corrupt institu- 
tions in the country, while 26 percent said that Congress was. 

Corruption is one of the political, economic, military, and social 
indicators of instability that contributed to Colombia's borderline 
ranking of 41 out of 60 countries surveyed in Foreign Policy maga- 
zine's pejoratively named Failed States Index 2009. The authors of 
this edition of the Country Study all agree that Colombia is far from 
being a "failed state," only a weak one. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2008 democracy index ranks Colombia 60 out of 167 countries, 
categorizing it as one of 52 "flawed democracies." Colombia has low 
scores in the EIU index for political culture and participation, mainly 
owing to low confidence in political parties, low levels of political 
engagement, and struggles with democracy and order because of 
insurgency and drug trafficking. However, Colombia's EIU score has 
risen since 2006, mainly as a result of improvements in the function- 
ing of government, the electoral process, and civil liberties. 

Numerous Colombian government institutions have a reputation for 
inefficient, corrupt, and bureaucratic management. Notable exceptions 
reportedly include the independent Bank of the Republic (Banrep; 
hereafter, Central Bank), the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, 
and some other agencies responsible for economic policy formulation 
and judicial investigation and prosecution. As an example of the latter, 
President Uribe's independent attorney general (fiscal), Mario Iguaran 
Arana, earned the respect of human rights workers and average 
Colombians in 2007 for ordering high-level arrests on charges of col- 
lusion with paramilitaries. Although the military's public approval rat- 
ing in Colombia in 2008 reportedly was about 80 percent because of 
counterinsurgency successes, the armed forces, too, have been in the 
spotlight in recent years for corruption at senior levels within the chain 
of command. Links between Colombia's various paramilitary groups 
and the armed forces continue to surface. 

With U.S. aid contingent on fighting corruption, the Uribe govern- 
ment reportedly has been making improvements in these areas, but 
underfunded, key investigative agencies such as those of the attorney 



lxiii 



general, the comptroller general, and the inspector general face a 
major challenge. In addition, since May 2009, the paramilitary Black 
Eagles (Aguilas Negras) have been waging a campaign of threats 
against the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, two of whose staff 
members have been shot at, with one being wounded. A Human 
Rights Watch report released in October 2008 summed up the implica- 
tions for Colombia of systemic corruption and human rights abuses as 
follows: "What is at stake in Colombia goes beyond the problem of 
how to find the truth and secure justice for past atrocities. At stake is 
the country's future: whether its institutions will be able to break free 
of the control of those who have relied on organized crime and often 
horrific human rights abuses to secure power." In an interview with 
Semana in June 2009, Christian Salazar Volkmann, representative in 
Colombia of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, pointed out that there have been at least 50,000 victims 
of disappearance in Colombia since the United Nations registered the 
first case in the country in 1973. 

The focus of the second Uribe administration has been on both secu- 
rity and military aspects of the state of law and order in Colombia and 
promotion of international trade, including the ratification of a coveted 
free-trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. Other priorities 
involve fiscal and judicial reforms, including removing responsibility 
for prosecuting members of Congress from the Supreme Court and 
vesting it instead in the Attorney General's Office; and alternative 
development. The opposition's refusal to debate the Uribe govern- 
ment's reforms has diminished their prospects. The Uribe govern- 
ment's efforts to negotiate an FTA with the United States have stalled 
since mid-2007. There has been strong opposition in the U.S. Congress, 
which signaled its displeasure over the parapolitics scandal by postpon- 
ing a vote on the FTA until after the administration of President Barack 
H. Obama took office in January 2009. The delay may have reduced 
the FTA's chances of approval, given the concerns of the U.S. Congress 
over Colombia's record on human rights and labor standards. Accord- 
ing to Freedom House, more than 60 percent of all murders of trade 
unionists have taken place in Colombia. The National Union School 
(ENS), a labor-rights think tank in Medellin, reported that more than 
2,500 Colombian union members have been murdered since 1986. The 
number of killings in 2007 dropped to 39 from 72 in 2006, but the ENS 
reported 41 killings in 2008. 

Despite its best efforts, the FARC failed to sabotage Uribe 's reelec- 
tion in a landslide vote in the presidential election of May 2006 or to 
disrupt his inauguration on August 7 by launching a mortar attack on 
Narino Palace that killed 21 people and wounded 70 others. The gov- 
ernment adopted new counterinsurgency tactics in December 2007, 



lxiv 



using smaller-scale, more mobile military forces. According to a 
report by the government's National Planning Department (DNP), ter- 
rorist attacks dropped by 46.3 percent in Colombia in 2008, compared 
to 2006. However, the report found that comparing figures for 2007 
and 2008 showed an increase of 9.8 percent in the number of attacks, 
as a result of an increase in terrorist incidents in the departments of 
Antioquia, Arauca, Cundinamarca, Guaviare, and Meta, as well as in 
the Distrito Capital de Bogota. 

The demobilization of 30,150 AUC paramilitaries was formally 
completed on April 1 8, 2006. According to Cambio magazine, by the 
end of 2008 a total of 49,000 armed combatants reportedly had been 
demobilized, including 32,000 former paramilitary group members 
and 17,000 former guerrillas. Of those numbers, 22,000 were enrolled 
in technical and vocational courses and about 9,800 were finishing 
elementary or high-school studies; the whereabouts of roughly 17,200 
were unknown. An associate professor of political science at Kean 
University, New Jersey, who had interviewed many paramilitary 
members, Nazih Richani, asserted at Georgetown University on May 
7, 2007, that the demobilization was more myth than reality and that 
the AUC command structure remained mostly intact. The director of 
the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) 
announced on April 28, 2009, that about 2,500 of the demobilized 
paramilitaries had rearmed, but the rearmament rate was only between 
5 and 15 percent. 

According to other authoritative sources, not only had the AUC's 
drug-trafficking networks continued operating, but they had retained 
an active armed wing, principally for the settling of scores and the pro- 
tection of narcotics shipments. Carlos Salgado, the director of the 
humanitarian organization Peace Planet, told Notimex, the Mexican 
state press agency, on October 18, 2008, that the appearance of AUC 
redoubts in several areas shows that "paramilitarism is still alive." One 
such new group, operating in the northwestern part of Uraba and in the 
neighboring department of Cordoba, calls itself Gaitan Self-Defense 
Groups of Colombia (AGC). Although the AUC initially was able to 
demobilize largely on its own terms, most of the top well-known para- 
military leaders were extradited to the United States. On May 9, 2008, 
the Uribe government extradited AUC warlord Carlos Mario Jimenez 
(alias Macaco) to face drug-trafficking charges and on May 13 extra- 
dited an additional 14 AUC leaders for continuing to run their criminal 
networks from prison and failing to pay reparations to victims. 

In addition to the aforementioned insurgent, paramilitary, and 
narco-terrorism threats, violence in Colombia often takes the form of 
kidnappings and homicides. Colombia has had some of the highest 



lxv 



kidnapping and homicide rates in the world in recent decades. As of 
mid-2007, some 24,000 Colombians, including 2,700 children, had 
been kidnapped during the previous decade; 1,269 had died in captiv- 
ity, and 3,143 were still being held according to El Tiempo. Guerrilla 
and paramilitary groups have been responsible for an estimated three- 
fifths of kidnappings, and common criminals for about two-fifths. 

Colombia's homicide and kidnapping rates in major cities report- 
edly declined significantly under the two Uribe administrations, as a 
result of improved law enforcement, the government's offensive 
against the guerrillas, and demobilization of many paramilitaries. 
These declines allowed significant new foreign investment in Colom- 
bia, especially since 2006, and spurred sustained economic growth. At 
the end of 2005, Medellfn, a city of 2.2 million people, had 755 homi- 
cides, significantly fewer than the annual figure of just over a decade 
earlier. Proportionately, Medellm's rate, which was 29 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2006, was lower than that of some U.S. cities, 
such as Detroit. In 2006 the Colombian city with the highest homicide 
rate was Buenaventura on the Pacific coast at 144 per 100,000 people, 
or 408 murders, more than seven times the rate in Bogota and more 
than four times that in Medellfn. Although the urban homicide and 
kidnapping rates reportedly had abated, with the former down by 6.2 
percent and the latter by 14.3 percent in 2008, compared with 2007, 
homicides, armed robberies, and extortion reportedly were on the 
upswing in the main cities in 2009. 

Despite lower overall rates, political kidnappings and kidnappings 
for ransom by common criminals and guerrillas have remained fre- 
quent. Both criminal bands and the illegal armed groups have special- 
ized in kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and robbery of businesses 
and civilians. The FARC and the ELN have also kidnapped or mur- 
dered numerous government officials, including members of Congress 
and the Supreme Court of Justice. On February 23, 2002, the FARC 
abducted its most high-profile hostage, Ingrid Betancourt Pulecio, a 
Liberal Party senator and presidential candidate of the Oxygen Green 
Party (PVO), along with her campaign manager, Clara Rojas. They 
were en route to a preannounced campaign visit to San Vicente del 
Caguan, Caqueta Department, where they intended to investigate the 
ending earlier that month of negotiations for peace talks between the 
government and the FARC. They entered the FARC-infested region, 
which had been serving as a 42,000-square-kilometer, demilitarized 
zone, despite an army warning. 

The kidnapping of Betancourt, who has dual Colombian and 
French nationality, prompted Jacques Chirac, then-president of 
France, to immediately express his concern to Andres Pastrana 



lxvi 



Arango (president, 1998-2002). As a result of Betancourt's kidnap- 
ping, the European Union added the FARC to its list of terrorist orga- 
nizations only two months later. Although Pastrana characterized 
Betancourt's kidnapping as akin to "kidnapping democracy," he 
rejected a FARC demand that a prisoner-exchange law be passed as a 
condition for releasing her. With the FARC being unwilling to engage 
in peace negotiations, Pastrana's successor, President Uribe, followed 
a no-negotiation strategy. The French government pursued all diplo- 
matic options to win Betancourt's release, and Chirac again called for 
her release in June 2005 and January 2006. Ironically, the French gov- 
ernment's campaign to free Betancourt only strained its relations with 
Colombia and convinced the FARC of her importance as a hostage. 
Consequently, the FARC decided to retain her indefinitely as a bar- 
gaining chip with the Uribe government, demanding the release from 
prison of 500 of its members in exchange for that of 59 military and 
political figures, including Betancourt and three Americans. 

By the time of her kidnapping, Senator Betancourt was well known 
in Colombia and France as a courageous politician struggling against 
corruption (from early 1994 to early 2002). Her 2001 autobiography, 
Rage au coeur, was hailed in France — where it was a best seller — as the 
story of a crusader against corruption and injustice. Published in English 
in 2002 as Until Death Do Us Part: My Struggle to Reclaim Colombia, 
it is the remarkable story of an outspoken, young, Franco-Colombian 
woman's meteoric rise to the Senate of the Republic (Senado de la 
Republica) through sheer determination. Betancourt's bold use of politi- 
cal influence was not to enrich herself, as commonly done in Colombia, 
but to expose the endemic corruption at the highest levels of govern- 
ment. Translated into 20 languages, the Spanish version was the top- 
selling book in Colombia at the time of her kidnapping. 

Betancourt was born in Bogota on December 25, 1961, into one of 
Colombia's patrician families; her father, who died shortly after her 
kidnapping, was a revered Colombian minister of education and diplo- 
mat; her mother, a former Miss Colombia, became a leading social 
activist on behalf of Colombia's abandoned, homeless children and, in 
1990, a senator. Although her parents regularly hosted prominent 
members of the Colombian and Latin American political and cultural 
elite (the latter included Fernando Botero, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, 
and Pablo Neruda), they disdained the corrupt Colombian oligarchy. 
Betancourt grew up in Paris, where she studied political science at 
elite universities and became a French citizen through her marriage to 
a French diplomat. 

On August 18, 1989, assassins firing Uzis killed popular Liberal Party 
presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan a few feet away from Betan- 
court's mother, who was Galan's campaign manager, at a campaign rally 



lxvii 



in southern Bogota. Galan's fight against drug trafficking practically pre- 
ordained his assassination because he favored extradition of the traffick- 
ers. That murder, combined with her long-held desire to help improve the 
lot of ordinary Colombians, motivated Betancourt to give up the comfort 
and safety of life as a diplomat's wife and, with her two children, move 
back to Colombia a few months later. After working in the Ministry of 
Finance (now the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit) and the Minis- 
try of Foreign Trade (now the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tour- 
ism), she launched an unconventional campaign to become a Liberal 
Party legislator with the aim of picking up Galan's banner, or at least 
restoring the political morality that he represented, for she felt compelled 
to confront corrupt elected officials. Starting without any money or pub- 
lic recognition but waging a brilliant, grassroots campaign, she ran on an 
idealistic, anticorruption platform and, to the surprise of the pundits, won 
election in March 1994 to the House of Representatives (Camera de Rep- 
resentantes), with the most votes of any Liberal Party candidate. 

Betancourt quickly overcame a media-supported campaign by dis- 
honest legislators to discredit her attempt to expose venality at the high- 
est levels of the administration of Ernesto Samper Pizano (president, 
1994-98) and won credibility with the public, albeit at the cost of 
antagonizing corrupt politicians. Betancourt's two-week-long hunger 
strike in the legislative chamber and her documented and televised, but 
ultimately futile, exposure of presidential corruption further raised her 
standing with the public but earned her Samper's enmity. Her protest 
also made Betancourt and her family a target of death threats and an 
attempted assassination. In response to Samper's Teflon-like ability to 
deflect even documented evidence of corruption, Betancourt wrote a 
book, Si, sabia (Yes, He Did Know), asserting that Samper knew that 
his campaign received millions of pesos from the Cali Cartel. An ensu- 
ing death threat forced her to flee the country with her family for the 
second time in six months. In 1997 Betancourt waged a lonely and per- 
ilous battle in the legislature in support of extradition of drug traffick- 
ers. Ironically, thanks to the support of the Samper administration, 
which sought to repair its tarnished image, extradition was reestab- 
lished later that year, after a constitutional amendment to provide for it. 

As a senatorial candidate in the March 1998 legislative election, 
Betancourt founded the Oxygen Green Party, and she placed first, 
despite having 40,000 votes stolen from her by her Cali opponents. As 
senator, she subsequently campaigned for the Conservative Party's 
presidential candidate, Andres Pastrana, after he agreed to champion 
her proposed anticorruption reforms. However, Pastrana reneged on 
his promise, making her more determined than ever to seek the presi- 
dency herself in 2002. 



lxviii 



During her years of captivity (2002-8), Ingrid Betancourt became 
what Maria Jimena Duzan, a columnist for the weekly Semana, 
describes as "an icon of the resistance to the FARC." After her abduc- 
tion, her family in Paris and the French press transformed her — some- 
what inauspicious ly — into a Colombian Joan of Arc. A more 
contemporary analogy is Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace 
Prize-winning author of Freedom from Fear and longtime prisoner of 
conscience of the Burmese military regime, which denied her the 
prime ministership to which she was legitimately elected in 1990. 

In Bogota, however, the elite reportedly resented the global public- 
ity over Betancourt 's captivity, regarding her as just one of the thou- 
sands of irresponsible secuestrados (kidnap victims), who had allowed 
themselves to fall prey to criminal or guerrilla organizations. One of 
her fellow prisoners, a police officer, escaped in May 2007 after nine 
years in captivity, and he reported that Betancourt had been tortured 
and was kept chained by the neck for having tried to escape five times. 
The officer's first-hand report, which included news of the location of 
several groups of hostages in the departments of Guaviare and Vaupes, 
prompted President Uribe finally to order the military leadership to 
plan a rescue operation. 

On November 29, 2007, the army intercepted three rebel emissaries 
in Bogota and seized a letter from Ingrid Betancourt to her mother 
along with video footage of several of the hostages, including the three 
Americans. The despair and pain expressed by Betancourt in the letter 
and her haggard image, which at least provided long-awaited proof that 
she was still alive, awakened national and international conscience over 
the plight of the hostages and made her case, in particular, a cause ce- 
lebre. By 2008 the international condemnation over news of Betan- 
court's inhuman captivity apparently pressured the FARC into releasing 
to Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez Frias four key hostages, includ- 
ing Clara Rojas, on January 10 and four former Colombian legislators, 
among whom was Senator Luis Eladio Perez, on February 27; all had 
been held since 2001-2. By subsequently barring Chavez from partici- 
pating in efforts to reach a humanitarian agreement with the FARC, 
Uribe provoked another crisis in Colombian- Venezuelan relations. 

The kidnapping industry in Colombia and the murder of any captives 
for whom ransom demands are not met (and even some captives for 
whom ransom has been paid) seem to epitomize the cruel contradictions 
of Colombian society. Tragically, almost a decade into the new millen- 
nium, Colombia's political and criminal violence has continued to eviscer- 
ate the country's great potential as one of the major South American 
countries. Despite the lower levels of violence associated with the internal 



lxix 



conflict, drug trafficking, and common crime, they remain high by inter- 
national standards. The many Colombians who marched against the 
FARC's hostage taking on February 4, 2008, in what was described as the 
largest demonstration in Colombia's history (at least 1 million people took 
part), showed the extent of popular outrage against this terrorist and crimi- 
nal practice and the FARC itself 

In the first half of 2008, the FARC suffered even more spectacular 
blows, beginning on March 1, when the Colombian army attacked a 
FARC camp on the Ecuadorian side of the border in the remote 
Angostura jungle area. This action resulted in the death of Luis Edgar 
Devia Silva, alias Raul Reyes, the FARC's second in command and 
the first member of its seven-member Secretariat (the group's highest 
command body) to be killed since the 1960s. Despite bellicose pro- 
tests by Ecuador and Venezuela, the incursion revealed the extent of 
the FARC's international support network in more than 30 countries, 
particularly Venezuela and Ecuador. FARC ties with Peru's Tupac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) were confirmed by 107 e- 
mail messages to or from the MRTA found in Reyes's computer files. 

The death of Ivan Rios (nom de guerre of Manuel de Jesus Munoz), 
the FARC's youngest Secretariat member, on March 6, 2008, was fol- 
lowed on March 26 by the death of its oldest, the septuagenarian and 
legendary but widely reviled Pedro Manuel Marin, alias Manuel Maru- 
landa Velez or Tiro Fijo (Sure Shot). Although most Colombians 
would like to forget Marin, Fernando Botero immortalized him in one 
of his paintings, depicting him as a rotund figure clad in camouflage 
uniform, holding an assault rifle and standing in a forest. Marin's suc- 
cessor, Guillermo Leon Saenz Vargas, alias Alfonso Cano More, had 
been a student leader in the law school of the National University of 
Colombia in Bogota and, despite coming from an intellectual back- 
ground, was described by Semana as "uncompromising and dogmatic." 

Extensive files found on three laptop computers seized from 
Reyes's headquarters caused enormous concern regarding the rela- 
tions between the FARC and President Chavez and revealed broader 
support by Chavez for the FARC than previously known. For exam- 
ple, one e-mail, apparently sent by a Venezuela-based FARC com- 
mander, Rodrigo Londono, alias Timochenko, to the FARC Secretariat 
in March 2007, describes meetings with Venezuelan naval intelligence 
officers. They offer the FARC assistance in obtaining "rockets" and 
help in sending a FARC guerrilla to the Middle East to learn how to 
operate them. In another e-mail dated early 2007, Luciano Marin 
Arango, alias Ivan Marquez, describes meetings with Venezuela's mil- 
itary intelligence chief, General Hugo Carvajal, and another Venezue- 
lan officer to talk about "finances, arms, and border policy." Carvajal 



lxx 



offers to provide the FARC some 20 "very powerful bazookas," while 
another Venezuelan general at the meeting offers Venezuela's port of 
Maracaibo to facilitate arms shipments to the guerrillas. In reporting 
on a November 2007 meeting with Chavez at Miraflores Palace, two 
FARC leaders, Ricardo Granda and Ivan Marquez, e-mail their Secre- 
tariat that Chavez gave orders to create "rest areas" and hospital zones 
for the guerrillas to use on the Venezuelan side of the border. In recent 
years, the FARC has established a major presence in the Sierra de 
Perija of Venezuela's western Zulia State, where it forcibly recruits 
and trains young members of indigenous tribes. 

The setbacks inflicted on the FARC not only raised military morale 
but, according to a Gallup Poll, boosted the confidence of 75 percent 
of Colombians that the guerrillas could be defeated after all. A Gallup 
Poll taken in early March 2008 showed that Uribe's approval rating 
topped 84 percent, the highest since he took office, apparently as a 
show of solidarity in the wake of ostensible FARC denunciations by 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, whose stances toward the FARC 
previously had been sympathetic. 

In what was the most humiliating setback in the FARC's history and 
one of the world's most audacious and successful hostage-rescue oper- 
ations, Minister of National Defense Juan Manuel Santos announced 
on July 2, 2008, the success of a 22-minute operation freeing 15 impor- 
tant hostages, including Ingrid Betancourt, being held in the Guaviare 
jungle. The rescued hostages also included three U.S. Department of 
Defense contractors — U.S. citizens Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, 
and Keith Stansell — who had been captured when the FARC guerrillas 
shot down their Cessna while they were surveilling illicit coca and 
poppy crops on February 13, 2003; and 11 members of the Colombian 
military and police. In a press conference at the French Embassy in 
Quito on December 3, 2008, Betancourt explained that the earlier mili- 
tary raid on the FARC's Angostura camp allowed the rescue operation 
to succeed by disrupting communications between the FARC leader- 
ship and the commander who was holding the 15 hostages. 

Operation Check, which involved the teamwork of 1 5 members of 
the army's Special Intelligence Force, was carried out by two unarmed 
helicopter pilots and several other undercover agents posing as pro- 
FARC humanitarian aid workers. The agents convinced the cell's 
leader that they had been instructed by senior FARC commanders to fly 
the 15 hostages to a new rebel camp in southern Colombia. The spec- 
tacularly successful operation established a new model for rescuing 
hostages. In contrast to many failed hostage-rescue operations that have 
relied exclusively on military force, it had intelligent civilian and mili- 
tary leadership, a stratagem based on audacity, cunning, cutting-edge 



lxxi 



communications technology, and, according to Agence France-Presse, 
intelligence support provided by France, Israel, and the United States. 
Paradoxically, the Colombian military achieved its most celebrated 
success using nonviolent means. The operation may prove to have been 
a decisive turning point in the FARC's four decades of warfare, for it 
exposed the group internationally as a terrorist organization. Moreover, 
the USB flash drives found on the two FARC jailers guarding the 15 
hostages contained a trove of information regarding the service records 
of 35 1 guerrillas from the FARC's Eastern Bloc, including photographs 
of the subversives and their aliases. 

In the weeks and months after her miraculous rescue, Betancourt 
became Colombia's most celebrated personality and one of the 
world's most famous women, transforming herself from liberated pol- 
itician to global citizen, having taken up the cause of liberating the 
world's forgotten hostages. Awards bestowed on her in 2008 included 
France's Legion d'honneur and Spain's Premio Principe de Asturias. 
Although Betancourt reportedly lost some popularity by leaving 
Colombia (not surprisingly) three weeks after her liberation, she 
returned to Colombia from France in November 2008 to make a tour 
to protest against kidnapping, which included stops in the major South 
American capitals. The tour helped to focus regional and world atten- 
tion on the continued captivity of approximately 3,000 hostages in 
Colombia. She pledged to do all she could to secure the release of the 
FARC's 28 political hostages in particular. 

Having taken up residence in France, Ingrid Betancourt publicly 
ruled out running for president again in 2010. Uribe's popularity and 
third-term prospects could have dissuaded her from becoming a candi- 
date, and she acknowledged concerns over the security risk that she 
would have faced. After her liberation, the FARC, reafYirming its status 
as a terrorist organization, declared Ms. Betancourt, who is a private 
Franco-Colombian citizen, a "military target." Moreover, Betancourt's 
public statements in 2008 indicated her disillusion with politics in 
Colombia, which she described as more about calculation, compro- 
mise, and corruption than about serving the public. Betancourt 
announced that she intended to spend most of 2009 rebuilding her life 
and writing a book about her harrowing ordeal as a FARC hostage. 

Other signs in late 2008 that the government was making progress in 
the counterinsurgency war, against the FARC in particular, included a 
40-percent diminishment in FARC-held territory and loss of urban net- 
works; increasingly effective military actions against the insurgents; 
and a sharp drop in the number of FARC attacks. Furthermore, there 
was a considerable toll inflicted on the FARC by the army's offensive 
against the guerrillas' jungle rearguard (1,893 FARC fighters killed in 



lxxii 



2007) ; a sharp drop in FARC morale and increasing FARC desertions 
(2,480 fighters in 2007 and more than 1,450 others in the first half of 

2008) ; and as much as a 50-percent decline in FARC membership from 
about 18,000 to about 9,000. 

Desperate for new recruits to fill their ranks depleted by desertions 
and casualties, the guerrilla organizations have been forcibly recruit- 
ing children averaging 11.8 years of age, according to Christian Sala- 
zar. Colombian authorities estimated in mid-2009 that the number of 
child warriors had grown from 11,000 in 2006 to between 14,000 and 
17,000, about 50 percent of whom joined the FARC. According to the 
Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, 6,410 children had died in com- 
bat with the army between January 2000 and mid-2009. 

In another indication that the government's rewards program was 
prompting more FARC members to defect, a 2 8 -year-old FARC defec- 
tor, Wilson Bueno Largo, alias Isaza, delivered former Congressman 
Oscar Tulio Lizcano, who had been held hostage by the FARC for 
more than eight years, to army troops in a jungle town in Choco 
Department on October 29, 2008. Bueno was then allowed to emigrate 
to France, which had agreed to take in reformed FARC members not 
guilty of crimes. There were reports that Bueno received a 
US$400,000 reward or that Colombia provided him with a subsidy of 
800 euros per month to live in France. In her new role as activist on 
behalf of FARC hostages and defectors, Ingrid Betancourt accompa- 
nied Bueno and his girlfriend on the flight from Colombia to France. 

As the battered FARC becomes increasingly desperate in the face 
of overwhelming national sentiment against its continued existence, 
instead of making gestures to revive peace talks, it has been carrying 
out indiscriminate acts of urban terrorism. Since July 2008, the FARC 
under Alfonso Cano has committed several bombings in Bogota and 
other cities, including one in Ituango, Antioquia, in August that killed 
seven pedestrians and wounded 5 1 others. That month it perpetrated 
more lethal car bombings in Cali, in which nine civilians were killed 
and 31 others wounded. One of those bombings destroyed 10 of 18 
floors of Cali's Palace of Justice building. President Uribe cited the 
bombing of Cali's Palace of Justice as an example of narco-terrorism, 
and the military attributed it to a FARC faction called the Manuel 
Cepeda Vargas Group. The Cali police also blamed the group for 
assassinating, on August 11, 2009, the Cali prosecutor who was inves- 
tigating this bombing. Three days later, two suspects who had been 
implicated were released from jail, leaving one perpetrator serving a 
42-year prison sentence and another awaiting sentencing. 

Minister Santos observed in March 2009 that the FARC had ceased 
guerrilla war for the time being and replaced it with terrorist bombings 



lxxiii 



and attacks using antipersonnel mines against security and military 
forces. The minister's dismissal of the FARC's guerrilla capabilities 
may have been somewhat premature, however, because clashes 
between the FARC and the army have remained common. Evidence 
that the FARC is not a spent force and has been regrouping included 
its cross-border ambushes and killing of 1 7 soldiers in early May 2009 
in the northeastern and southwestern border areas. Apparently, the 
FARC has adopted a tactic of operating out of border areas and carry- 
ing out relatively safe hit-and-run attacks. Indeed, practically all of the 
top FARC leaders, including Ivan Marquez, were believed to be living 
in neighboring countries, particularly Ecuador and Venezuela. Only 
Secretariat members Alfonso Cano, Jorge Briceno Suarez (alias El 
Mono Jojoy), and Mauricio Jaramillo (alias El Medico) were known 
to be operating in Colombia. 

Computer evidence found in a FARC camp in the first half of 2009 
confirmed that Venezuelan officials were continuing to assist FARC 
commanders by providing weapons from Venezuela's military stock- 
piles, helping to arrange arms deals, and obtaining identity cards to 
move about in Venezuelan territory. The same Ivan Marquez, citing 
talks with specific Venezuelan security officials, describes in one mes- 
sage to the FARC Secretariat the plan to purchase SA-7 surface-to-air 
missiles, Dragunov sniper rifles, and HF-90M radios in Venezuela in 
2008. 

The Colombian military tarnished its newly burnished image as a 
result of a scandal that began to emerge in September 2008. An investi- 
gation linked dozens of army personnel, including three generals, to an 
alleged army practice since 2002 of killing mostly homeless young 
civilian men in order to inflate the number of supposed insurgents or 
drug traffickers killed in combat by security forces. In 2002 the army 
commander, General Mario Montoya Uribe, himself was allegedly 
involved in covering up a case of what in Colombia is termed false pos- 
itives. The scandal, which affected mostly the Bogota-based 5th Divi- 
sion, revealed that civilian control of the military and security forces 
under President Uribe had not been as effective in respecting basic 
human rights as some Uribistas had claimed. Trying to remedy this lack 
of control and to repair the damage done to his own national standing, 
President Uribe on October 29, 2008, dismissed 25 army officers, 
including Montoya and two other generals and four colonels, over the 
extrajudicial executions of at least 1 1 civilians who disappeared from 
Bogota in early 2008. He also announced in early November that every 
military unit down to the battalion level would have an appointed offi- 
cial to monitor allegations of abuse. Another casualty of the military 
purge, the army's 15th Mobile Counterinsurgency Brigade, which had 



lxxiv 



been accused of extrajudicial executions by the U.S. Department of 
State's 2008 human rights report, was dismantled in January 2009. The 
23rd Mobile Counterinsurgency Brigade, which replaced it, had 1 ,400 
members who reportedly had received training in human rights. These 
actions did little to dampen the false-positives scandal. By May 2009, 
prosecutors had recorded 900 cases of extrajudicial killings, involving 
1,708 victims (1,545 men, 110 women, and 53 minors). The number of 
implicated members of the security forces had grown to 1,177, of 
whom 15 were sentenced to 30 years of prison for disappearing 11 
youths in the Bogota district of Soacha. 

Although most of the paramilitaries have demobilized officially, the 
challenge remains for the government to disband the criminal drug- 
trafficking networks. The government will likely continue talking with 
the ELN, despite the lack of significant progress to date. Prospects for 
peace talks with the FARC generally have been considered to be mini- 
mal, given that it has become more criminal and terrorist than politi- 
cal, thoroughly corrupted by years of narcotics trafficking, and 
seemingly averse to engaging in peace talks in good faith. However, 
the FARC could be forced to the negotiating table as a result of the 
mounting military pressure on it. Some observers believed that the 
only solution would require incorporating a demobilized FARC into 
the democratic system, as was done with the M-19. For example, in 
August 2008, the head of the Colombian government's peace commis- 
sion, Luis Carlos Restrepo, said that the government believes it can 
advance demobilization negotiations with both the ELN and the 
FARC. In early September 2008, Ingrid Betancourt proposed opening 
"a political niche" to FARC guerrillas where they can act "in a scheme 
of political legitimacy." 

In an apparent attempt to improve its extremely negative public 
image, the FARC released four hostages (three policemen and a sol- 
dier) on February 1 , 2009, and former governor Alan Jara on February 
3, after holding him for eight years. Senator Piedad Cordoba Ruiz 
mediated both releases. By the late spring, the intransigent FARC 
leadership did not appear to be serious about adopting the M-19 and 
AUC model of demobilization and political legitimacy. Instead, the 
FARC seemed bent on a fight-to-the-end strategy. A Gallup Poll sug- 
gested that the military successes achieved during 2008 had validated 
Uribe's Democratic Security and Defense Policy. However, the con- 
tinuing stalemate in 2009 suggested that the government lacked the 
ability to defeat the FARC through only military means, at least in the 
near term. 

In 2009 the Uribe government remained mired in scandals. In late May, 
the attorney general brought charges against the four former officials who 



lxxv 



had successively headed the Administrative Security Department (DAS) 
security service during 2002-8, accusing them of involvement in illegal 
wiretapping and surveillance of Supreme Court justices, journalists, 
NGOs, and opposition politicians. In addition, Uribe's two sons invested 
in land that subsequently soared in value after the government designated 
it part of a tax-free industrial zone. Another consideration was Colombia's 
relations with the United States. The U.S. Department of State expressed 
its opposition to a third term for Uribe. However, President Obama hosted 
a visit by Uribe in the spring of 2009 and surprisingly offered to support 
passage of the stalled FTA. After visiting President Obama at the White 
House on June 29, President Uribe expressed his optimism that Washing- 
ton would support the FTA. 

Except for the Middle East and Afghanistan, in 2009 Colombia 
remained the largest recipient of U.S. assistance, receiving a total of at 
least US$5 billion in Plan Colombia U.S. aid in the 2000-2008 period, 
including about US$582 million in aid in 2006, US$593 million in 
2007, and US$422 million in 2008. Despite a declining trend, with 
US$420 million budgeted in 2009 and US$405 million in 2010, in 
August 2009, the Uribe government's political and military scandals 
did not appear to be jeopardizing Plan Colombia. Colombian-U.S. 
security cooperation was actually poised to expand substantially upon 
ratification of a 10-year military base "access" pact, formally called a 
Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in 
Defense and Security between the Governments of the United States 
of America and the Republic of Colombia, or Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA) for short. Ministerial representatives of both coun- 
tries reached provisional agreement on the DCA in Washington, DC, 
on August 14. 

Once formally ratified by both countries, the new DCA would 
allow the United States to lease access to seven Colombian military 
bases for U.S. logistical support in countering drug trafficking by car- 
tels and guerrilla organizations. President Uribe approved the pact, but 
it still required authorization from Colombia's Senate, which must 
decide whether to "allow the transit of foreign troops through the terri- 
tory of the Republic." In addition, the government is required to hear 
the consultative advice of the judiciary's Council of State on matters 
involving foreign troops and military aircraft or ships traversing 
Colombian territory or territorial waters. The Council of State was 
considering holding hearings on aspects of the agreement. 

The DCA with Colombia will offset for the United States the expi- 
ration in November 2009 of an Ecuadorian-U.S. agreement allowing 
U.S. military personnel to use Ecuador's Manta Base as a Forward 
Operation Location (FOL) in the "war on drugs." Moreover, the DCA 
would significantly enhance the FOL concept by providing confirmed 



lxxvi 



U.S. access to five army and air bases, including Major General 
Alberto Pauwels Rodriguez Air Base at Malambo, near Barranquilla, 
Atlantico Department; Captain German Olano de Palanquero Air Base 
at Puerto Salgar, Cundinamarca Department; and Captain Luis F. 
Gomez Nino Air Base in Apiay, Meta Department. It would also pro- 
vide for U.S. access to two naval bases: AUC Bolivar, Cartagena; and 
ARC Bahia Malaga, near Buenaventura on the Pacific coast. Two 
other military air bases that could be used are Lieutenant Colonel Luis 
Francisco Pinto Parra, also known as Tolemaida, near Melgar, Tolima 
Department; and Larandia in Caqueta Department. On mutual agree- 
ment, access could be granted to additional bases. 

The DC A would also allow for the stationing of up to 800 U.S. mil- 
itary personnel and up to 600 U.S. civilian contractors at Colombian 
bases to support both drug-interdiction and counterterrorist missions 
in coordination with the Colombian military. These levels of U.S. mil- 
itary and associated personnel in Colombia are also governed by U.S. 
statute, and the U.S. Congress already had authorized these limits in 
October 2004, although the actual number of U.S. military personnel 
in Colombia in 2009 reportedly was only about 280. 

The DC A would not allow U.S. personnel to engage in combat 
operations in the country, and the bases would remain entirely under 
Colombian jurisdiction and sovereignty. A Colombian national execu- 
tive committee is to authorize the number and type of personnel and 
equipment deployed to each base. Furthermore, both parties agreed to 
a security protocol for the entry, overflight, and landing of aircraft, as 
well as the number of flights and the airports. According to the 
Colombian air force commander, the aircraft arriving at the seven 
bases would not be fighters but aircraft for tracking, logistics support, 
intelligence collection, and airborne surveillance of drug trafficking. 
Colombia's most important air base, at centrally located Puerto Salgar, 
would be the first to receive U.S. upgrading investment, totaling 
US$46 million. 

In July news that the DCA was being finalized stunned the leaders 
of South America. Instead of a "new alliance of the Americas," as pro- 
posed by presidential candidate Barack Obama in 2008, South Ameri- 
can leaders were suddenly confronted with the specter of what they 
initially perceived to be a militarization and expansion of the previous 
U.S. administration's failing "war on drugs." It appeared to them that 
Colombia would become a strategic platform for U.S. aerial intelli- 
gence surveillance of the region and possibly military intervention. 
For the Left, the DCA issue appeared to resurrect their image of 
Colombia as a U.S. "garrison state" like Israel. 

Incensed over news of the Colombian-U.S military pact, the Vene- 
zuelan president, Hugo Chavez, immediately denounced it as a direct 



lxxvii 



threat to Venezuela and himself in particular. Claiming that the accord 
could "generate a war in South America," Chavez vowed to strengthen 
his country's growing military buildup and announced that he had 
informed the Russian government, Venezuela's principal arms supplier, 
of his intention to double the number of tank battalions by buying doz- 
ens of T-72 main battle tanks and other military vehicles. Venezuela's 
earlier purchases since 2005 of US$4.4 billion worth of Russian arms 
had already generated concern in Bogota about its neighbor's military 
buildup and its greatly superior air force. Moreover, since July 2009, 
Chavez has used bellicose rhetoric to spearhead a propaganda cam- 
paign in Latin America against the DCA, criticizing even its granting of 
immunity for U.S. personnel in Colombia — usually considered a bilat- 
eral matter between the two negotiating parties. Chavez has also por- 
trayed the DCA as a U.S. conspiracy against Latin America designed to 
reestablish U.S. "imperial domination" in the region. 

Addressing the Chavez-led campaign to isolate Colombia for its 
growing reliance on U.S. military and counternarcotics support, Presi- 
dent Uribe pointed out at a multinational meeting held on July 23 in 
Santa Marta that "Colombia has never been an aggressor." Rather, he 
explained that "This agreement guarantees continuity of an improved 
Plan Colombia," and that it is aimed at fighting terrorism and drug 
trafficking. "These agreements are never made to create conditions to 
attack third-party states," he stated. "This is excluded from the text, 
the agreements themselves, and in practice." Uribe added that the pact 
would allow the implementation of "joint responsibility between both 
countries" under Plan Colombia. 

In another attempt to counter Chavez's anti-Colombia campaign, 
President Uribe made a whirlwind tour of seven South American 
countries between August 4 and August 6 to explain the Colom- 
bian-U.S leasing agreement. Brazil and Chile then suggested that 
Bogota's bilateral military agreements are a sovereign matter for 
Colombia. Although Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay also appeared to 
be mollified by Uribe 's personal diplomacy, Argentina later that 
month announced its opposition to the DCA. 

President Chavez sent his ambassador back to Bogota in early 
August, but he noted that Venezuela's "relations with Colombia 
remain frozen" and "under review." Chavez had recalled his ambassa- 
dor on July 28 because of a diplomatic row over the Uribe govern- 
ment's announced discovery of a Swedish antitank weapon and 
ammunition in a FARC camp that had been traced by serial numbers 
to official Venezuelan stockpiles. Chavez failed to provide a credible 
public explanation for how the FARC obtained the Swedish weapons 
from the Venezuelan army, and, according to the Uribe government, 
"Venezuela has provided no explanation whatsoever." 



lxxviii 



Nevertheless, Chavez's propaganda offensive against the DC A 
effectively eclipsed the FARC -related developments and the apparent 
clandestine support role played by Venezuela. Thus, Colombia, rather 
than the Russia- and Iran-allied Chavez regime, became the cynosure 
of regional concern and isolation. Calling the DCA a "declaration of 
war against the Bolivarian revolution," Chavez announced in late 
August that he would soon again be breaking diplomatic relations with 
Colombia. 

In addition to his diplomatic and military threats, Chavez also 
began to use trade as a weapon to retaliate against the DCA. He 
ordered a freeze on bilateral trade with Colombia, beginning with the 
cancellation of imports of 10,000 cars made in Colombia, arranging 
instead to purchase that many vehicles from Argentina. Chavez also 
announced in August 2009 that Venezuela would stop all imports from 
Colombia in 12 months; he also cancelled preferential pricing for Ven- 
ezuelan oil and oil derivatives for Colombia. Colombia's trade with 
Venezuela in this decade has been greatly to Colombia's advantage, 
according to the National Administrative Department of Statistics 
(DANE). In 2008 Colombian exports to Venezuela totaled US$6 bil- 
lion, while Venezuelan sales to Colombia amounted to only US$1.2 
billion. In the first five months of 2009, Venezuela was the leading 
market for Colombia's nontraditional exports, absorbing 33 percent of 
that category, followed by the United States, with 19.6 percent. In con- 
trast, Colombia acquired from Venezuela only 1.8 percent of its total 
foreign purchases. Thus, exports to Venezuela have been vital to the 
Colombian economy. 

Chavez's fanning of the rhetorical winds of regional war against 
Colombia appeared to have had the effect of rallying the support of 
Colombians for the DCA and President Uribe. A poll commissioned by 
the National Radio Network in July 2009 found that 55 percent of 
Colombians supported the agreement, while 36 percent opposed it. A 
tri-country poll taken in late August by Colombia's National Consul- 
tancy Center found that Uribe had a 69. 1 percent favorability rating, as 
compared with 20.2 percent for Chavez and 23.4 percent for Ecuador's 
President Rafael Correa Delgado. Chavez's propaganda campaign 
against the Uribe government prompted Colombia's Roman Catholic 
Church to inject itself into matters of state by harshly criticizing the 
presidents of Venezuela and Ecuador, accusing Chavez and Correa of a 
complete lack of decorum in their treatment of Colombia. In late 
August, the National Federation of Merchants (Fenalco), an influential 
business guild, expressed its "total support" for Uribe's handling of 
relations with Venezuela and Ecuador, and said that "the highest inter- 
ests of the country" came before "commercial conveniences." Some 



lxxix 



observers viewed Chavez's drive to cast the DC A as a military threat to 
the region as a way of supporting the FARC, in some ways his ally and 
surrogate. 

The DCA is not without its critics in Colombia, who included 
Rafael Pardo Rueda, a former minister of national defense and a presi- 
dential candidate; members of the judiciary's Council of State; and 
some members of Congress. By allowing for a significantly increased 
U.S. military and counternarcotics role in Colombia and by providing 
immunity from Colombian laws to U.S. military personnel in Colom- 
bia, the DCA raised national sovereignty issues with some Colom- 
bians. Colombia's position reportedly is that legal immunity will be 
applicable only to U.S. troops and not the U.S. contractors and civil- 
ians to be hired to help implement the DCA. Basically, all immunity 
cases are to be handled under the terms of already existing bilateral 
agreements, such as the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 
1952 and the U.S. Military Missions in Colombia Agreement of 1975 
(signed in Bogota in October 1974). Moreover, U.S. military courts 
would not be allowed to operate on the bases. Nevertheless, negotia- 
tors reportedly decided to defer the controversial immunity issue to a 
future judicial cooperation agreement. 

Some Colombian critics also expressed concern that the DCA 
would accentuate Colombia's already tense relations with neighboring 
Ecuador and Venezuela in particular, and risk further destabilizing and 
militarizing the region. Colombia and Ecuador have not had diplo- 
matic relations since March 2008, when the left-wing government of 
President Correa withdrew its ambassador in protest of the Colombian 
army raid on a FARC camp located just inside Ecuadorian territory. 
Apparently in response to perceived cross-border aggression by 
Colombia, Ecuador increased its defense spending by buying 24 Bra- 
zilian fighter aircraft and six Israeli drones. Moreover, Ecuador 
denounced the DCA as a threat to regional stability. Despite the tense 
relations between Colombia and Ecuador, the Correa government, 
apparently alarmed by Chavez's chilling warning that "the winds of 
war were beginning to blow" across the region, announced in mid- 
August 2009 that it would not allow Chavez to draw Ecuador into a 
war with Colombia. Furthermore, both Colombia and Ecuador made 
efforts that month to reach a rapprochement, with the mediation assis- 
tance of the Carter Center. 

In view of Chavez's continuing attempts to define the Uribe gov- 
ernment's DCA with the United States as a threat to the region, on 
August 26 Colombia accused the Venezuelan leader of meddling in 
Colombia's internal affairs and proceeded to lodge a formal protest 
with the Organization of American States (OAS). Uribe succeeded in 



lxxx 



dampening the regional firestorm over the DCA by debating the 
agreement at a tense seven-hour summit of the Union of South Ameri- 
can Nations (Unasur), held on August 27-28, 2009, in Bariloche, 
Argentina. Consisting of the 12 presidents of the member countries, 
Unasur is intended to serve as a regional interlocutor with the United 
States and the European Union. 

Uribe explained to his fellow Unasur members that the DCA is lim- 
ited to fighting narcotics trafficking and terrorism within Colombian 
territory and sharing tactical and operational intelligence as opposed to 
strategic intelligence. He also reminded them of Chavez's frequent 
military threats against Colombia and his campaign of intimidation. 
Although Uribe attempted to raise other regional concerns such as ter- 
rorism and military buildups by "certain neighbors," the meeting 
focused exclusively on the DCA. Realizing that the outcome of the 
summit would not be the cancellation of the DCA and that President 
Uribe was not there to renegotiate Colombia's bilateral agreement 
with the United States, the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 
toned down their criticism of the DCA. The fact that Unasur did not 
officially condemn the DCA counted as a victory for Uribe. Neverthe- 
less, most South American governments remained wary of the DCA. 
Exceptions included Peru, whose minister of defense discounted the 
notion that the DCA is a threat to South America. Following the Una- 
sur meeting, those most critical of the DCA remained Bolivia, Ecua- 
dor, Paraguay, and Venezuela. 

In a sign of the times, President Uribe returned from the Unasur 
summit ill with the H1N1 (swine) influenza. Colombia's National 
Health Institute (INS) confirmed the diagnosis. It was not yet known if 
Uribe contacted the virus in Argentina, which had many cases, or 
before he arrived there. According to the Ministry of Social Protec- 
tion, Colombia had 621 confirmed cases of swine flu by the end of 
August 2009, including Uribe's, and 34 deaths, but the actual number 
of those infected with the virus was thought to be much higher. Two 
other high-level officials in the Uribe administration also contracted 
the H1N1 virus. 

On the domestic political front, President Uribe asserted, in a late 
June 2009 interview with Semana magazine, that, "Today we have a 
nation with more trust." This strengthened trust, he explained, derives 
from his administration's policies of building democratic security, 
investor confidence based on social responsibility, and social cohesion 
based on liberties. Although the parapolitics, false-positives, and DAS- 
wiretapping scandals and the rampant extrajudicial executions and 
forced disappearances were symptomatic of a betrayal of the public 
trust, Uribe omitted any mention of them. As an example of the Uribe 
administration's tendency to gloss over scandals, in early May 2009 the 



lxxxi 



outgoing minister of national defense replaced the civilian director of 
Military Penal Justice with an acting director, a colonel, who subse- 
quently transferred 40 of its prosecutors, or 30 percent of the military 
judiciary's staff, who had been investigating the false-positives cases. 

Against this backdrop of seeming abuse of the public trust, the 
appointment in late July 2009 of Gabriel Silva Lujan, a close associate 
of Juan Manuel Santos, as the new minister of national defense was 
well received by Colombian politicians in general, who saw him as 
someone with the executive skills needed to manage the powerful 
ministry effectively. Trained at universities in Bogota and Washington, 
DC, in economics and political science, Silva had served as Colom- 
bia's ambassador to the United States in the 1990s and had been serv- 
ing as president of the National Federation of Coffee Growers 
(Fedecafe). 

One of the first tasks of the new minister of national defense was to 
decide how to improve the defense of soldiers being investigated by the 
justice system, the number under investigation having ballooned. In 
2009 Military Penal Justice had 17,000 unresolved cases; and the 
Attorney General's Office, 1,117. Until 2008, when Congress approved 
a law creating within the ministry a specialized Legal Defense Office 
(Defensoria) for the Public Force (the armed forces and National 
Police), these soldiers had to pay all their own legal expenses. This new 
Ministry of National Defense office is staffed with attorneys who pro- 
vide free legal counsel to members of the armed forces facing Military 
Penal Justice courts. However, if a case begins with Military Penal Jus- 
tice courts and then transfers to the Attorney General's Office, the min- 
istry is required to continue its legal defense of the defendant in order to 
guarantee due process. As a result, the ministry is obligated to fund the 
defense of many military members who are, in some cases, eventually 
revealed to have been working with criminal networks. Thus, to some 
observers, it may seem paradoxical that the taxpayers should be financ- 
ing the defense of military members indicted for murdering civilians, 
whether for the false-positives massacres in this decade or the Palace of 
Justice disappearances in 1985. In August 2009 a female civilian law- 
yer became director of Military Penal Justice. Another initiative 
launched by Minister Silva in his first month in office is called Plan 
Patria (Fatherland Plan), which is aimed at strengthening military and 
social efforts and state presence in the border areas. The idea was for 
Plan Patria to focus initially on La Guajira Department's border com- 
munities, which bear the brunt of unstable economic relations between 
Colombia and Venezuela. 

In August 2009, President Uribe had to propose a list of candidates 
to replace the respected attorney general, Mario Iguaran Arana, whose 



lxxxii 



four-year term expired at the end of July. During Iguaran's challenging 
term, he reactivated several investigations into the most serious crimes 
in the nation's history that had looked as if they would remain 
unsolved because of the statute of limitations. In the Palace of Justice 
case, the military commanders of the disastrous counterassault opera- 
tion and Belisario Betancur Cuartas (president, 1982-86) were being 
investigated not so much for their responsibility for the resulting mas- 
sacre as for their role, if any, in the disappearance, torture, and murder 
of eight employees of the Palace of Justice cafeteria, three female visi- 
tors to the cafeteria, and one female hostage-taker. Whether Iguaran's 
successor would be able to continue prosecuting these high-profile 
cases remained to be seen. The Supreme Court was supposed to elect 
the new attorney general on July 23 from the president's list of candi- 
dates. The leading candidate proposed by Uribe was Camilo Ospina 
Bernal, a former minister of national defense and more recently 
ambassador to the OAS, whose background was in administrative 
rather than penal law. However, the Supreme Court, apparently unim- 
pressed, declared that it would take its time in making the important 
appointment in order to ensure that the candidates met the qualifica- 
tions needed for the post. 

The selection of Mario Iguaran's replacement as attorney general 
was particularly consequential because his successor would have to 
decide on how to handle no fewer than five scandals, several of which 
could compromise top government officials. These scandals included 
parapolitics, the DAS wiretappings, the assassination of Luis Carlos 
Galan, the false positives, and "FARC -politics." In the last case, a for- 
mer presidential candidate and two journalists were being investigated 
in connection with several files found in Raul Reyes's captured com- 
puters. In the parapolitics case, the new attorney general would have to 
decide whether to close the case or to summon former Senator Mario 
Uribe Escobar, cousin of President Uribe, to trial for his role in the 
scandal. 

On August 14, 2009, the last day before the 20-year statute of limita- 
tions in Galan's assassination case expired, the Attorney General's 
Office ordered the arrest of General (ret.) Miguel Maza Marquez, the 
former DAS director, on a charge of ordering Galan's assassination. 
This was a stunning development because the drug cartels were gener- 
ally assumed to have perpetrated the assassination, and, if supported by 
the evidence, it may illustrate once again how high drug-related corrup- 
tion can reach into the security agencies. Maza's indictment prompted 
Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (president 1990-94) to reveal publicly, 
after 20 years, that he had received an intelligence warning of a possi- 
ble link between Maza and the Cali Cartel capos. Ernesto Samper 
Pizano (president, 1994-98) then faulted Gaviria for not making that 



lxxxiii 



information known earlier. With the drug cartels lurking like lobbyists 
behind government officials, the selection for the post of attorney gen- 
eral provided a likely indicator of whether the Uribe government was 
serious about overcoming Colombia's culture of impunity or was sim- 
ply condoning it for reasons of political expediency. 

Uribe's 2006 electoral mandate permitted him to remain in power 
until August 2010. As a first step toward a national referendum on 
amending the constitution to allow him the possibility of a third suc- 
cessive term as president, in November 2007 Uribe's allies began col- 
lecting 5 million signatures (well over the 1.4 million needed to 
initiate the proposal). Although the continuing parapolitics scandal 
weakened Uribe's political capital in 2007, the military successes 
against the FARC in 2008, particularly the rescue of Ingrid Betancourt 
and other hostages, and the generally favorable condition of the econ- 
omy strengthened his popularity. Nevertheless, on October 29, 2008, 
the House of Representatives rejected a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would have allowed Uribe to seek reelection in 2010. 
Arguing the undemocratic nature of extending Uribe's time in office, 
the Liberal Party cited a letter in which Simon Bolivar said that "noth- 
ing is as dangerous as to allow the same citizen to remain in power a 
long time." Citing the need for continuity of his Democratic Security 
Policy, Uribe persevered with his third-term stratagem. 

On May 19, 2009, the Senate approved by a vote of 62 to 5 a mea- 
sure that could lead to a referendum on whether the constitution 
should be changed to allow Uribe to be reelected a second time. 
Whether this vote reflected the popular will was unclear because 30 
percent of the 102-member body had resigned as a result of the 
parapolitics scandal and had been replaced by unelected officials, and 
only 20 senators attended the final debate on this issue. Moreover, the 
Senate's bill still had to be reconciled with the lower-house measure 
that would bar Uribe from seeking office again until 2014. Before a 
referendum could be scheduled, the Constitutional Court still had to 
ratify the proposal. Then 25 percent of Colombia's electorate, or 7.2 
million voters, would have to approve it. However, resistance to his 
plan was significant in mid-2009. Sectors opposed to it included the 
Roman Catholic Church, the business community, and news media. 
Indeed, a growing concern in Colombia was that a constitutional 
amendment allowing Uribe the possibility of a third consecutive term 
would discredit him and put him in the same league as the leftist Pres- 
ident Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Foreign news media increasingly 
portrayed President Uribe as authoritarian. For example, the May 14, 
2009, issue of The Economist, the British weekly magazine that usu- 
ally praised President Uribe, was critical of a third term for him, sug- 
gesting that it would lead to an "autocracy." 



lxxxiv 



On August 19, 2009, Uribe's prospects suddenly took on new life, 
when the referendum proposal received a majority vote in the Senate's 
Conciliation Committee and in the House of Representatives. The text 
then went to the Constitutional Court for review before going to the 
plenary Congress, where it had to be independently voted on in both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives. As expected, it easily 
passed the Senate, with 56 votes in favor and two against. On Septem- 
ber 1, the House of Representatives voted to approve the referendum 
on the proposed constitutional reform by 85 votes against five, where- 
upon the project was sent to the Constitutional Court for review. 

On September 17, 2009, the Supreme Court, in a 13-to-eight deci- 
sion, took the unprecedented step of refusing to elect a new attorney 
general from the government's pool of candidates. Most justices 
decided that the proposed candidates did not meet the requirements of 
the post, which include, in particular, the credential of being a criminal 
attorney. As a result, filling the position, considered the second most 
important public post after the president of the republic, was expected 
to take several more months until this new power struggle between the 
judicial and executive branches could be resolved. 



October 16, 2009 

* * * 

As Colombia began 2010, the country was facing challenging polit- 
ical and security issues in particular. The issue of naming a new attor- 
ney general remained unresolved, and the acting attorney general 
continued to serve. Meanwhile, academics and the courts welcomed a 
new proposal by the minister of interior and justice that these two 
areas should again be separate ministries. 

Colombia's internal conflict appeared to be taking another turn for 
the worse. The impressive successes of Uribe's Democratic Security 
Policy in 2008 had led many Colombians to believe that the insurgency 
was at last about to end and that the AUC demobilization had tamed 
paramilitary violence. However, the New Rainbow Corporation (Cor- 
poration Nuevo Arco Iris), an NGO, reported that the effectiveness of 
the Uribe government's much- vaunted Democratic Security Policy had 
diminished during 2009, when the FARC regrouped in isolated areas of 
the Cordillera Central and along Colombia's borders with Ecuador and 
Venezuela. The FARC launched a new, more aggressive strategy, 
emphasizing attacks against small groups of servicemen, increased use 
of minefields, and manufacture of some of their own weapons. The 



lxxxv 



FARC increased the number of its offensive actions by 30 percent over 
2008, and boosted its membership to 1 1,500. The ELN also appeared to 
be strengthening and becoming more active in its areas of operation 
near the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan borders. 

According to the NGO, a continuous, seven-year counterinsurgency 
offensive and more than 2,000 pending prosecutions for extrajudicial 
executions were stalling the Military Forces, which reportedly had lost 
the initiative in various parts of the country. Military resources had 
declined, and casualties had increased, totaling an estimated 2,500 mil- 
itary deaths or injuries in 2009, many of them caused by antipersonnel 
mines. On December 21, 2009, the FARC kidnapped and murdered the 
governor of Caqueta Department. A new generation of ex-paramilitary 
criminal gangs was rapidly spreading throughout the country, including 
to the outskirts of Bogota, Medellm, and a dozen other cities, and carry- 
ing out more violent actions than the FARC and ELN combined. In an 
apparent attempt to establish drug-smuggling corridors, these armed 
gangs were operating on key highways to Bogota and its airport, Carta- 
gena, and Uraba. 

On the diplomatic front, relations between Colombia and Ecuador 
had normalized, but Colombian-Venezuelan relations remained tense. 
At the Copenhagen climate conference held in December 2009, Presi- 
dent Uribe equated Colombia's counterinsurgency and counternarcot- 
ics struggles with the fight against deforestation. He pointed out that 
coca processing and trafficking in cocaine and lumber have been defor- 
esting Colombia, threatening the country's biologically rich jungle and 
rainforests that cover 5 1 percent of the national territory. Therefore, he 
argued, cocaine-consuming countries have an obligation to provide 
financial support for efforts to combat deforestation. Just before the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) would 
have expired at the end of 2009, the U.S. Congress extended its benefits 
to Colombia for another year. However, the U.S. Congress had yet to 
ratify the free-trade agreement, which is an economic priority for 
Colombia. 



January 21, 2010 

* # * 



It had seemed inevitable to many Colombians that President Uribe 
would somehow be a candidate in the May 30, 2010, presidential elec- 
tion and be reelected again. However, instead of the overwhelming 



lxxxvi 



public support that he received for his first reelection, scandals and 
skeptical public opinion tainted Uribe's never formally declared third 
presidential run. His chance to remain in power received its first signif- 
icant setback on November 13, 2009, when the National Electoral 
Council (CNE) invalidated the petition of the Uribistas because the 
organizers had exceeded the legal limit of finance for the collection of 
signatures. The inspector general of the nation presented to the Consti- 
tutional Court on January 13, 2010, his opinion favoring the congres- 
sionally approved referendum on a constitutional amendment that 
would allow Uribe to run for a third successive presidential term, and 
some determined Uribistas began calling for the postponement of the 
May 30 election to permit the completion of the plebiscite process. In 
early February, their hopes were effectively quashed when a Constitu- 
tional Court justice (a Uribe appointee) filed a 434-page nonbinding 
opinion calling for the proposed referendum law to be overturned for 
legal and electoral reasons. The national registrar subsequently cast fur- 
ther doubt on the feasibility of holding a referendum on such short 
notice, even in the unlikely event that the Constitutional Court were to 
approve it. Finally, on February 26, the Constitutional Court brought 
the contentious referendum issue to a definitive close by ruling 7-2 
against the proposed plebiscite, because both the bill and the legislative 
process that produced it were deeply flawed and unconstitutional. That 
Uribe graciously accepted the court's ruling distinguished Colombia's 
democracy from neighboring Venezuela's autocracy 

The court ruling vastly altered Colombia's political landscape by 
throwing the presidential election wide open. Political pundits and 
polls began reassessing the field of candidates in a new light, which no 
longer shone so brightly on the Uribistas. President Uribe was now 
seen as having marred his historical legacy. Instead of uniting his fol- 
lowers to ensure the continuation of his policies of democratic secu- 
rity, social cohesion, and investor confidence, he appeared to have 
clung to power, relying, moreover, on the same mechanism that Vene- 
zuela's Hugo Chavez used to make himself president for life, namely, 
a plebiscite. In this view, Uribe's unquenchable presidential aspiration 
only succeeded in fracturing the government coalition and eliminating 
any guarantee that he would be succeeded by one of his followers, 
notably Juan Manuel Santos. 

In the absence of a united Uribista coalition, a rare uncertainty 
over who would become the next occupant of Narino Palace preceded 
the March 14 legislative elections. Commentators predicted that the 
presidential race would be determined by whether or not Uribe's sup- 
porters could remain united in the congressional elections in a tacit 
alliance between the National Unity Social Party (PSUN) and the 
Conservative Party or whether Uribism would crumble. None of the 



lxxxvii 



leading presidential candidates looked strong enough to win outright 
in the first round on May 30. Rather, surveys indicated that party alli- 
ances would determine the winner of the runoff election in June. 

As of March 10, the three most likely runoff candidates appeared to 
be: Sergio Fajardo Valderrama, the independent candidate of Citizen 
Commitment for Colombia (Compromiso Ciudadano por Colombia): 
Noemi Sanin Posada, an independent conservative with surprising run- 
off potential; and Juan Manuel Santos, the official standard bearer of the 
Uribe-allied PSUN. Other registered presidential candidates included 
centrist Rafael Pardo (Liberal Party), leftist Senator Gustavo Petro 
Urrego (Alternative Democratic Pole), and centrist German Vargas Lle- 
ras (Radical Change Party). 

A relatively unknown but fast-rising candidate. Fajardo is a popular, 
charismatic, innovative, and independent former mayor of Medellin 
and a mathematics professor. In January 2009. he began informally 
organizing a Barack Obama-style, national grassroots campaign with 
the aid of the Internet and thousands of campaign volunteers. The only 
candidate seen as neither pro- nor anti-Uribe, Fajardo appeared to be 
surpassing Santos in some polls. 

Sanfn, who has held several ministerial and ambassadorial posts, 
resigned as ambassador to Britain to enter the presidential race. 
Favored by Conservative Party leader Andres Pastrana, she was con- 
sidered likely to be selected as the party's candidate on March 14. The 
Conservative and Green parties both planned to announce their presi- 
dential candidates on the same day as the legislative elections. The 
Green Party (Partido Verde) came into existence on October 2, 2009. 

Santos had resigned as Uribe's minister of national defense in May 
2009 in order to be able to qualify as a candidate. In contrast to Uribe. 
who had been a relatively provincial rancher, the U.S. -educated Santos 
is seen as well informed about how Washington operates. Before 
heading the ministry for three years, Santos, whose family were the 
main shareholders in El Jiempo until 2007, was a journalist and econ- 
omist. Under his management, coordination between military and 
police forces improved, the services made the legitimate use of mili- 
tary force part of their war strategy, and the military scored major suc- 
cesses against the FARC. However, the period was also marked by the 
false-positives scandal. Running on the slogan "If not Uribe, Santos."' 
Santos promised to build on Uribe's legacy. Although the early front- 
runner, Santos lacked Uribe's high public approval ratings and was not 
a shoo-in for the presidency. For example, Semana noted that a coali- 
tion of adversaries could derail Santos in the second round. 

The economic and social challenges facing Colombia's next presi- 
dent were summed up by Roberto Steiner, director of the Foundation 



lxxxviii 



for Higher Education and Development (Fedesarrollo), in a March 1 
interview with Cali's El Pais. Forecasting a slow economic recovery 
from the low point in 2009, Steiner pointed out the disadvantageous 
position that Colombia found itself in — trading heavily with countries 
with minimal economic growth but not with the rapidly growing 
Asian economies. He noted that Colombia's major problem is that it 
has the highest unemployment and informal employment rates in 
Latin America. Steiner explained that the country's pension and 
health-care systems cannot be adequately funded by payroll taxes, 
when 60 percent of people are working in the informal economy. Con- 
sequently, the country's health care is a benefit for all, paid by a few. 
Thus, Steiner emphasized the need to reform the tax code in order to 
fund these foundering systems and make the public debt sustainable 
again. 

March 10,2010 Rex Hudson 



lxxxix 



Top: An Amazonian indigenous geometric design, Archaeology Museum of 
the Casa del Marques de San Jorge, Bogota 

Courtesy Carlos Arturo Jaramillo Giraldo, Murmullos del lenguaje Uik: 
La practica del mopa mopa: De lo recolector a lo sedentario, MedelUn, 
1986, 77 

Bottom: A Tolima-style indigenous geometric design 
Courtesy Museo del Oro, Banco de la Republica; Banco del Pacifico 
(Ecuador); and Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana Benjamin Carrion, El oro 
de Colombia: Homenaje al Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador, 1982, 82-83 



AT THE BEGINNING of the twenty-first century, Colombia exhib- 
ited social and economic indicators that, with few exceptions, were 
close to the Latin American norm. Yet forms of political and crimi- 
nal violence plagued the country, with an intensity and duration that 
had few parallels in the region. Neither could many countries in 
Latin America or elsewhere in the developing world match Colom- 
bia's record of persistent, albeit imperfect, adherence to democratic 
forms and procedures. An examination of the historical path by 
which Colombia arrived at its present situation offers no easy expla- 
nation of these paradoxes but is a logical place to start. 

The initial building blocks for the future Colombian nation were 
the same as for its Latin American neighbors: Amerindian peoples, 
European conquerors and colonizers, and Africans arriving as 
slaves. During three centuries of Spanish colonial rule, these ele- 
ments were unevenly combined into a new multiethnic society. The 
Europeans and their descendants enjoyed a predominant share of 
political influence, economic wealth, and social prestige, while the 
Amerindians were assimilated or marginalized and inexorably 
reduced to subordinate status. The latter was also true of Afro- 
Colombians, even when they escaped from slavery. Yet for most of 
the colonial population, Spain's control was light, and it was main- 
tained less by force than by the mystique surrounding the monarchy 
and by the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, which estab- 
lished a strong institutional base and acted as cultural and ideologi- 
cal arbiter. 

Colombia played a preeminent role in the movement for indepen- 
dence in Latin America. Once independence was achieved, however, 
the country lapsed into relative obscurity, with a weak connection to 
the world economy and, for many years, scant progress in the develop- 
ment of infrastructure or public education. At the same time, peculiari- 
ties of the political system, notably the rise of strong and warring 
parties within a weak state, began to make themselves felt. Only with 
the rise of the coffee industry, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, did Colombia enter clearly on a path of economic modern- 
ization. Coffee likewise seemed, for a time, to usher in a phase of har- 
monious political consolidation. But by the mid-twentieth century, 
dysfunctional aspects of social and political development were increas- 
ingly evident as economic growth continued. 

The successful transfer of power from one party to another by 
electoral means in 1930 and again in 1946 — something that in much 



3 



Colombia: A Country Study 

of Latin America was still far from normal — seemed to confirm the 
maturity of Colombian democracy. Yet in both cases, the transfer 
was followed by outbreaks of violence in the backcountry. These 
revolts were relatively short-lived in the first case, but the latter was 
the start of what Colombians called La Violencia (The Violence), 
which would wrack the nation for roughly two decades and then give 
way to the leftist insurgencies that marked the last four decades of 
the century. The bitter antagonism between the entrenched Liberal 
and Conservative parties was a triggering mechanism in both 1930 
and 1946, but the existence of deep rural poverty and illiteracy, 
despite rising gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) per cap- 
ita and a modest beginning of social reform legislation, created an 
environment in which those antagonisms more easily found virulent 
expression. The same social problems, even though gradually dimin- 
ishing, provided superficial justification for the violence of later 
guerrilla organizations. 

Regular elections and formally constitutional government were 
interrupted only briefly, in the 1950s, yet the inability of the state to 
maintain public order throughout the country — indeed its virtual 
absence from much of Colombian territory — favored growth of the 
illegal drug industry in the final quarter of the century. That indus- 
try's combination with chronic political and criminal violence led to 
ever-greater disillusion with existing institutions. The adoption in 
1991 of a new constitution aimed to make the political system more 
inclusive as well as to enshrine a long list of social guarantees. 
Although two of the irregular armed groups had earlier agreed to 
demobilize and pursue their objectives by legal political action, oth- 
ers wanted further concessions and assurances before doing the 
same. And the drug traffickers, of course, were more responsive to 
world market conditions, which remained favorable, than to any 
changes in the constitution. Nevertheless, the new constitution went 
into effect, and in the nation as a whole there was no lack of positive 
developments alongside the continuing traumas. 

Early Colombia 

It is not known when the earliest humans reached what is now 
Colombia. The oldest evidence of occupation, which is pending con- 
firmation, dates from before 20,000 B.C., at sites in the central 
Andean highlands, but the first native peoples undoubtedly arrived 
earlier, coming presumably by way of the Isthmus of Panama. Over 
succeeding millennia, there were further migrations and mutual cul- 
tural influences between different geographic regions of Colombia 
and not just Central America but the Caribbean, coastal Ecuador, and 



4 



A stone divinity in San Agustin, 
Huila Department 
Courtesy Embassy of Colombia, 
Washington, DC 




the Amazon region. It is likely that settled, partly agricultural socie- 
ties first arose in the northern Caribbean lowlands of Colombia by 
the second millennium B.C. No single dominant native culture 
emerged. Rather, most of the original Colombians belonged to one 
or another of three major linguistic groups — Arawak, Carib, and 
Chibcha — and comprised a patchwork of separate cultures and sub- 
cultures. These indigenous peoples developed the cultivation of 
yucca in the lower elevations, maize at middle altitudes, and pota- 
toes in the highlands. They practiced ceramic pottery and other 
crafts, with impressive achievements in the working of gold from 
alluvial deposits. And by the time of the Europeans' arrival, they 
generally displayed the beginnings of both social stratification and a 
political system on the basis of chieftainships. 

None of the native peoples developed a system of writing compa- 
rable to that of the Mayas, and much less would the Spaniards 
encounter a native empire such as that of either the Aztecs or Incas. 
By 1500 A.D., the most advanced of the indigenous peoples were 
two Chibcha groups: the Taironas and the Muiscas. The Taironas, 
who appear to have been fairly late arrivals from Central America, 
inhabited well-organized towns connected by roads on the lower 
slopes of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in the far north of 
Colombia, rising just to the east of Santa Marta, Colombia's oldest 
city. Politically, they had progressed beyond the stage of local chief- 
tainships, forming two larger, and rival, confederations. They were 
also the only people to construct works of engineering such as stone 
temples and stone-paved roads. 

By contrast, the Muiscas — based in the present departments of 
Cundinamarca and Boyaca in the Cordillera Oriental — lived in dwell- 
ings scattered through the countryside, and their temples and palaces 



5 



Colombia: A Country Study 

were of perishable materials. But Muiscas, of whom there were per- 
haps 600,000, were far more numerous than the Taironas and covered 
a wider territory, extending from the area of present-day Bogota 
northeastward to Tunja and beyond. As in the case of the Taironas, 
Muisca local chiefdoms had consolidated into two separate confeder- 
ations. The Muisca territory also included Laguna de Guatavita, site 
of the fabled ceremony of El Dorado, the gold-dusted dignitary who 
plunged into the crater lake along with a rain of golden offerings. 
More than any other native people, the Muiscas have served as a 
model for later ideas of Colombia's pre-Columbian civilization. 

The Spanish Conquest and Colonial Society 

Exploration and Conquest 

The first Europeans to visit what is now Colombia were the crew 
of Alonso de Ojeda, who in 1499 led an expedition to the north coast 
of South America. It reached Cabo de la Vela, on the Peninsula de La 
Guajira, but did not tarry, because these visitors were interested in 
trading for gold and pearls, not in colonization. As a member of 
Ojeda's expedition, Amerigo Vespucci was among the first to 
explore the Colombian coasts. Other early expeditions also came to 
trade, or to seize indigenous people as slaves for sale in the West 
Indies. 

In 1510 Ojeda, having been named governor of the coast as far as 
Uraba in the west, returned to establish a settlement, named San 
Sebastian, on the Golfo de Uraba not far from the present border with 
Panama. Neither it nor other settlements in that vicinity survived long, 
although from them explorers struck out toward the Isthmus of Panama 
and elsewhere. A first permanent Spanish settlement on the Colombian 
coast was founded in 1525 at Santa Marta; it was close to the territory 
of the Taironas and would later serve as a base for conquest of the 
Muiscas. Before that took place, Pedro de Heredia, on January 14, 
1533, had founded the city of Cartagena, farther west along the coast 
and with a magnificent harbor, thanks to which it became the principal 
port of the colony as well as a leading Spanish naval base in Caribbean 
waters. 

Bands of Spaniards set out from Cartagena and Santa Marta for 
the exploration and conquest of both coastal lowlands and the 
Andean interior. In 1536 Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada, a lawyer 
turned military commander who was comparable to Hernan Cortes, 
the conqueror of Mexico, or Francisco Pizarro in Peru, launched the 
most important of these expeditions. He headed inland up the 
Magdalena toward the land of the Muiscas, which he reached early 



6 



Historical Setting 



in 1537 after losing more than half of his party to shipwreck at the 
mouth of the Magdalena and to disease, insects, and hunger on the 
march. After easily overcoming armed resistance, Jimenez de Que- 
sada and his lieutenants occupied the entire Muisca territory and on 
August 6, 1538, founded the city of Santafe (present-day Bogota, 
known as Santa Fe during the colonial period), as capital of the New 
Kingdom of Granada, as he called this new possession after his 
birthplace in Spain. 

Jimenez de Quesada shortly found his control challenged by two 
rival expeditions converging on the same spot from different direc- 
tions. One was led by Nikolaus Federmann, a German in Spanish 
service who arrived from western Venezuela, and the other by 
Sebastian de Belalcazar (or Benalcazar), a former lieutenant of 
Pizarro coming north from Quito who had founded Popayan and 
Cali on the way. Instead of fighting among themselves for the spoils 
of the Muiscas, the three conquistadors referred the matter to author- 
ities in Spain, who, not wanting any one conquistador to become too 
powerful, placed a fourth party in charge instead. However, Jimenez 
de Quesada was granted other privileges and was one of those who 
continued the work of exploration and conquest. By the end of the 
century, most of the principal cities of today's Colombia already had 
been founded. 

Colonial Government 

After some initial improvisation, a definitive form of political 
organization took hold during the second half of the sixteenth cen- 
tury. The highest official was the captain general of New Granada, 
who from Santa Fe had oversight of all modern Colombia except the 
far southwest (Pasto and Popayan), which initially was administered 
from Quito in present-day Ecuador, and most of Venezuela except 
the area of Caracas. He shared superior jurisdiction with an audien- 
cia, which functioned as both administrative council and court of 
appeal — separation of powers being foreign to the Spanish imperial 
system. At an intermediate level, the colony was divided into prov- 
inces headed by governors, whose titles and powers might vary. For 
example, because of Cartagena's strategic importance, its governor 
enjoyed a degree of military and other authority that most governors 
lacked. At the local level, the towns and cities had cabildos (munici- 
pal councils) in which positions were sometimes appointive, some- 
times hereditary, and sometimes filled by election. Even in the latter 
case, elections were far from democratic, and it was only in town or 
city government that some element of direct popular participation 
could be found. 



7 



Colombia: A Country Study 

New Granada in the beginning formed part of the Viceroyalty of 
Peru, which was formed in 1 544 and comprised all of Spanish South 
America plus Panama. However, subordination to the viceroy in 
Lima was mostly nominal, and in 1717-19 New Granada in its own 
right attained viceregal status, which it lost in 1723 but regained per- 
manently in 1739. In its final shape, the Viceroyalty of the New 
Kingdom of Granada included Venezuela, Quito (now shorn of juris- 
diction over Pasto and Popayan), and Panama. Venezuela became a 
captaincy general and as such conducted most affairs without refer- 
ence to the viceroy, exactly as New Granada had done when attached 
to Peru, whereas Quito was a presidency and not quite so indepen- 
dent of the viceregal capital. Yet when even a fast courier would take 
weeks to travel from Santa Fe to Panama or Quito, officials in those 
outlying areas enjoyed substantial autonomy in practice. Exactly the 
same could be said of the viceregal administration at Santa Fe vis-a- 
vis the Council of the Indies and other officials in Spain who in prin- 
ciple exercised supreme executive, legislative, and judicial authority 
over all Spanish America. It was understood that sometimes an order 
from the mother country might be inapplicable in a given colony, 
whose top administrator could then suspend it while appealing for 
reconsideration — with a final decision likely to be years in coming, 
if it came at all. 

Colonial Society and Economy 

The highest officials in Spanish America were mostly natives of 
Spain, known as peninsulares because they came from the Iberian 
Peninsula. Spaniards also played a major role in commerce, espe- 
cially at the wholesale level and in trade with Spain itself, whose 
government sought to keep all overseas trade a Spanish monopoly. 
But after one or two generations of European settlement, the princi- 
pal owners of the means of production — landed estates, or hacien- 
das, and mining concessions — were mostly criollos (Creoles), that 
is, persons of Spanish descent born in the New World. Even while 
recognizing the right of the Amerindians to keep land of their own, 
the Spanish monarchy claimed ultimate control over property in the 
conquered territory, and it rewarded many of the original conquerors 
with lavish land grants, which eventually passed to their children. In 
other cases, the early settlers and their descendants were allowed to 
buy land on favorable terms or simply helped themselves to what 
they found, assuming that through payment of the necessary fees 
they could later regularize their title. 

Land in itself was of little use without people to work it, but there 
were a number of ways to obtain the needed labor. As in the other 



8 



Colonial entryway, Bogota 
Courtesy Embassy of Colombia, 
Washington, DC 




Spanish colonies, one device was the institution of the encomienda 
(see Glossary), whereby a specific group of Amerindians was 
"entrusted" to a Spanish colonist to protect them and convert them to 
Christianity in return for payment of tribute. This tribute often was 
paid in the form of labor, although that practice was generally 
against Spanish policy. Even when the Amerindians paid their trib- 
ute in money, the result was much the same, as they needed to work 
for the newcomers to obtain it. Although the encomienda never 
legally entailed a grant of land, in practice the Spanish encomendero 
(see Glossary) might well find a way to usurp the property of Amer- 
indians entrusted to him. Spanish authorities gradually phased out 
the encomienda system, but Amerindians then paid tribute directly to 
the state, and they would still have to work to earn the money. Other 
systems of quasi-voluntary labor developed, too, while in early years 
some Amerindians were subjected to outright enslavement. Amer- 
indian slavery was exceptional in New Granada and never took root 
there, but African slaves were soon being introduced, and although 
never as important to the overall economy as in Brazil or the West 
Indies, they became an appreciable part of the labor force in at least 
some parts of the colony. 

Although the dominant criollos prided themselves on their Span- 
ish descent, bloodlines in practice were often less pure than they 
might appear. In order to gain access to higher education, for exam- 
ple, it was technically necessary to prove one's limpieza de sangre, 
or "cleanness of blood," which meant not just European pedigree but 



9 



Colombia: A Country Study 

freedom from any trace of Jews, Muslims, or heretics in the family 
tree. However, both formal marriage and informal unions with the 
native population produced an ever-larger mestizo, or mixed Euro- 
pean and Amerindian, population; by the end of the colonial period, 
this was the largest single demographic group (see Racial Distinc- 
tions, ch. 2). For most purposes, the population of mestizos was not 
clearly differentiated from that of criollos. Nevertheless, for a mes- 
tizo to enter the higher social strata and possibly marry the descen- 
dant of some conquistador, it did help to have a light complexion and 
some respectable economic assets, because upward mobility in colo- 
nial society was not easy to achieve. 

It was even harder for someone of African or part- African descent 
to rise in society. The first African slaves to reach New Granada 
arrived with the conquistadors themselves because African slavery 
existed on a small scale in Spain. Greater numbers came later directly 
from Africa, to work in the placer gold deposits of the western Andes 
and Pacific slopes, landed estates of the Caribbean coastal plain, and 
assorted urban occupations. Few were to be found in the Andean high- 
lands, and roughly the same relative distribution of Afro-Colombian 
people as in the eighteenth century continues to this day. Although at 
first all were slaves, the processes of voluntary manumission, self-pur- 
chase (with money slaves could earn by working on their own 
account), and successful escape into the backcountry produced a 
growing population of free blacks. Free and slave alike mixed with 
other ethnic groups, and some of the free — mainly pardos ("browns") 
of part-European ancestry — became small landowners, independent 
artisans, or lower-ranking professionals. But unlike mestizos, anyone 
with a discernible trace of African ancestry faced not just social preju- 
dice but also legal prohibitions very roughly comparable to the jim 
crow laws that mandated segregation in the United States between 
1876 and 1965. These laws were not always enforced, but they placed 
a limit on the advancement even of free pardos. 

By the close of the colonial period, Amerindians accounted for 
less than a quarter of New Granada's total of roughly 1.4 million 
inhabitants. This change naturally reflected both the expansion of 
other demographic groups and the drastic fall in Amerindian num- 
bers as a result of European diseases, mistreatment, and the wide- 
spread disruption of traditional lifestyles. In some peripheral areas, 
such as the Colombian portion of the Amazon basin, the Spanish had 
no incentive to establish effective control, and the ancestral modes of 
political and social organization remained in effect. In the central 
highlands and other areas of permanent Spanish settlement, how- 
ever, the situation of the indigenous peoples was different. Imperial 



10 



Historical Setting 



policy aimed to group them into villages where they would have 
their own local magistrates and would continue to own lands in com- 
mon (resguardos — see Glossary) just as before the conquest, 
although under ultimate control of the Spanish and owing tribute to 
the crown itself or, especially in the first century of colonial rule, to 
individual Spanish encomenderos . In practice, the Amerindians were 
often irregularly stripped of their lands and compelled to labor for 
the newcomers. Willingly or not, they also adopted many aspects of 
European civilization, from chickens and iron tools to the Roman 
Catholic faith. In the Muisca heartland, all had become monolingual 
Spanish speakers by the end of the colonial period (in return contrib- 
uting place-names and other terms to the speech of their conquerors). 

Agriculture remained the principal activity of indigenous villages, 
the small farms of many mestizos or poor whites, and the large estates 
of the socially prominent. Products were the same as before the Euro- 
peans' arrival but with the addition of such novelties as wheat, which 
was consumed mainly by Spaniards and criollos. The hacienda own- 
ers also took particular interest in raising livestock. Whether cattle or 
crops, almost all of this production was for domestic consumption. 
Gold was the only significant export; it alone could support the cost 
of transportation from the interior to the seacoast, given the primitive 
state of internal transport networks. Theoretically, such tropical com- 
modities as sugar could have been grown for export along the coastal 
plain, but New Granadan producers could not compete with the more 
developed plantation economies of Cuba or Venezuela. Hence, gold 
paid the bill for virtually all New Granada's imports, which were 
mainly for the upper social strata: wine and oil from Spain, cloth and 
other manufactured goods either from Spain or from other European 
countries by way of Iberia (or as contraband bypassing Spanish ports 
entirely). Coarser textiles and other handcraft items were made 
locally, however, and sometimes traded from one province to another. 
One example was the cotton cloth produced in the northeastern prov- 
ince of Socorro (present-day Santander Department). This industry 
featured the putting-out system, whereby an entrepreneur farmed out 
successive stages of the production process to local households. This 
system was widespread at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution 
in Europe and gave full or part-time employment to a significant 
number of criollos and mestizos. 

Religion and Culture 

The conversion of the indigenous population to Christianity was 
cited at the time as a guiding motive and justification for Spain's 
conquests in America and is cited still by traditionalists who reject 



11 



Colombia: A Country Study 

the pervasive Black Legend of Spanish cruelty to the native inhabit- 
ants. In New Granada, proselytism was at least superficially a great 
success, with most of the native population quickly adopting the new 
religion. As elsewhere in America, the Amerindian converts did not 
necessarily abandon all previous beliefs or ascribe the same meaning 
to Roman Catholic rituals as did Hispanic Christians, but they con- 
formed outwardly to those rituals, helped build churches and cha- 
pels, and showed the Roman Catholic clergy due respect. Spanish 
colonizers were sometimes annoyed when a priest or friar protested 
against mistreatment of the native population or of enslaved blacks, 
but they were eager to see the church established on a solid footing 
in the new lands and gave generously of their often ill-gotten gains 
to that effect. Likewise, the Spanish state, both from sincere convic- 
tion and from a realization of the church's value as an instrument of 
social control, helped endow the church with property, support its 
missionary activity, and, to the extent possible, suppress religious 
dissent. Extirpation of heresy and heretics, by burning as a last 
resort, was the special responsibility of the Spanish Inquisition, 
which had one of its three American headquarters (the least active of 
the three) at Cartagena. In the late colonial period, both state support 
and the missionary enthusiasm of the clergy tended to diminish, but 
by then the Roman Catholic Church was firmly entrenched as an 
institution, with roughly one priest or friar per 750 inhabitants, 
extensive property holdings, and additional wealth from invest- 
ments, fees, and the compulsory payment of tithes by the faithful. 
That strong position would inevitably influence the course of 
Colombian history after independence. 

Saints' portraits and other religious themes dominated colonial 
painting, including much popular art of the period, and religious fes- 
tivals were regular occasions for public entertainment (commonly 
marked by drunkenness and rowdy behavior that the clergy disap- 
proved of). Formal education was largely in the hands of the clergy, 
who controlled the only university-level institutions and were active 
at other levels too. The great majority of the population remained 
illiterate. For most of the colonial period, the literate were dependent 
on imported reading matter because the first press was set up in 
Santa Fe only in 1738, and the first real newspaper did not appear 
until 1791. However, the latter development coincided with a wider 
intellectual awakening to new currents in science and philosophy 
emanating from the European Enlightenment. A leader in this move- 
ment was Jose Celestino Mutis, a Spanish-born priest who settled in 
Santa Fe and won acclaim from European scientists for his work in 
studying botanical species of the viceroyalty. 



12 






r3 























Cathedral at Pasto, Narino Department 
Courtesy Embassy of Colombia, Washington, DC 



Breaking the Spanish Connection 

Antecedents of Independence 

Several criollo disciples of Mutis would be active participants in 
the early nineteenth-century movement for independence. Not only 
scientific concepts but also ideas subversive of the existing political 
order managed to penetrate late-colonial New Granada, which was 
in principle an absolute monarchy. News of the American and 
French revolutions penetrated, too, and in 1793 a prominent member 
of the criollo elite, Antonio Narino, printed in Santa Fe a translation 
of the French revolutionary "La Declaration des Droits de l'Homme 
et du Citoyen" (Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen) of 
1789. For this act, Narino was arrested in 1794 and would spend 
much of his time in prison until the final independence movement 
began. It would seem that even at that early date he was hoping ulti- 
mately for outright independence, in which regard he was ahead of 
most New Granadans. Yet it occurred to more and more New Grana- 
dans, especially in the ranks of the educated minority, that the colo- 
nial regime was susceptible to improvement, even short of breaking 
all ties to Spain. 



13 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Political unrest reflected more than just the appearance of liberal 
and democratic ideas or the example of the British American colo- 
nies, which had demonstrated the feasibility of breaking loose from 
imperial control. Another contributing factor was the turn of events 
in Spain after the "Enlightened Despot," Charles III, was succeeded 
in 1788 by his son, the well-intentioned but weak Charles IV, under 
whom corruption and incompetence seemed the order of the day. 
Nor did the colonial population lack additional long-standing griev- 
ances, ranging from taxes and trade restrictions to the discrimination 
against native New Granadans in favor of those from the mother 
country in government appointments and other considerations. Of 
course, these grievances would be exaggerated by independence- 
period propagandists and by many later historians. For most people, 
taxes were more an annoyance than a crushing burden, and overseas 
trade was hampered more by the shortage of viable exports and lack 
of purchasing power for imports than by imperial regulations. Dis- 
crimination in appointments was rampant only at the highest levels, 
and the criollo upper class could influence the decisions and conduct 
even of peninsular appointees through social connections or, if need 
be, outright corruption. Moreover, different elements of the popula- 
tion sometimes disagreed on what was a grievance and what was 
not: people on the coast objected to barriers to the importation of 
cheap flour from the United States, whereas wheat growers in the 
highlands wanted stricter enforcement of the rules. Nevertheless, 
sources of discontent did exist, and any sudden aggravation could 
lead to violent protest. 

Alongside lesser examples of rioting and protest in the late colo- 
nial period, one episode stands out: the Comunero Rebellion of 
1781. The triggering mechanism was Spain's participation, as a tra- 
ditional foe of England, in the very struggle that was bringing the 
British colonies their independence. Spain needed money for the 
naval base at Cartagena among other things, and the result was tax 
increases in New Granada along with irritating new controls to make 
sure the taxes were paid. Farmers and artisans in the province of 
Socorro demonstrated their defiance of these measures by destroying 
the liquor and tobacco belonging to state monopolies and establish- 
ing revolutionary committees (comunes), which took control of local 
administration. The movement spread beyond Socorro to much of 
New Granada, with the Comuneros demanding a rollback of the 
offensive tax measures. The protesters also made some unrelated 
demands designed to satisfy other complaints, such as that native 
New Granadans be given preference over Spaniards in official 
appointments. The audiencia, acting on behalf of the viceroy, who 



14 



Historical Setting 



was in Cartagena overseeing defenses, gave an outward show of 
granting most demands, but as soon as it became possible to send 
military reinforcements from the coast into the interior, the move- 
ment quickly collapsed. A few leaders of last-ditch resistance were 
executed. At no point had the Comuneros proclaimed independence 
as an objective, and most likely few even considered the idea, but the 
rebellion underscored the existence of grievances and the potential 
for popular protest. 

The Struggle for Independence, 1810-19 

The trigger for the independence movement was the Napoleonic 
intervention in Spain in 1808 and resultant disarray of the Spanish 
monarchy. The French forces of Napoleon Bonaparte forced the 
abdication, first of Charles IV and then of his son and immediate 
successor, Ferdinand VII, who ended up a captive across the Pyre- 
nees. A Spanish resistance movement arose to fight against the 
French and the intrusive authorities they imposed, and, with signifi- 
cant British help, it ultimately prevailed, but for some time most of 
Spain was in the hands of the French and their Spanish collaborators. 
And when the rump government that claimed to speak for what was 
left of free Spain — ostensibly in the name of the absent Ferdi- 
nand — claimed also to exercise authority over the American colo- 
nies, the response in New Granada, as elsewhere, was mixed. 

The viceroy in Santa Fe, Antonio Amar y Borbon, sidetracked a 
first move in 1809 by criollo notables to form a governing junta that 
would rule in Ferdinand's name but enjoy virtual autonomy in prac- 
tice. For their part, the leaders of Spain's struggle against Napoleon 
offered Spanish Americans token representation in their Central 
Junta and then in the Cortes, or Spanish parliament, which they were 
reviving after years of disuse. However, the Spanish Americans 
would be a small minority despite a population greater than that of 
Spain, and the Spanish offer did not diminish the ultimate authority 
that was to be exercised from Spain over the entire Spanish Empire. 
It therefore failed to satisfy the criollo lawyers and bureaucrats who 
aspired to greater control of their destinies (and higher positions for 
themselves), and with the future of the mother country itself still 
uncertain, new moves for local autonomy were inevitable. The year 
1810 brought a series of mostly successful efforts to set up American 
governing juntas: in Caracas on April 19, in Cartagena not long 
afterward, and finally on July 20 in Santa Fe, where the viceroy was 
first made a member of the junta but soon was forced out. 

Caracas and the rest of Venezuela, which had been little more than 
nominally subject to the viceroy, would go their own way until in the 



15 



Colombia: A Country Study 

end Simon Bolivar Palacios, a son of Caracas, combined the inde- 
pendence movements of all northern South America. But neither did 
the towns and cities of New Granada proper agree to act in unison. 
The new authorities in Santa Fe, considering themselves natural suc- 
cessors to the viceroy, sought to establish under their leadership a 
government for the whole of the former colony. However, Cartagena 
and most outlying provinces refused to cooperate and in 1811 
instead formed the United Provinces of New Granada, a league even 
weaker than the Articles of Confederation under which the rebel- 
lious British American colonies fought the American War of Inde- 
pendence. Insisting on the need for strong central authority, Santa Fe 
refused to join and instead annexed several adjoining towns and 
provinces to form the separate state of Cundinamarca, which before 
long was bogged down in intermittent civil warfare with the United 
Provinces. Even so, faced with Spain's refusal to offer meaningful 
concessions and bitter denunciation of all the Spanish Americans 
were doing, New Granada reached the stage of formally declaring 
independence, doing it piecemeal in the absence of an effective over- 
all government: Cartagena led the way in 1811; Cundinamarca fol- 
lowed in 1813. To complicate matters further, still other parts of 
New Granada — notably Santa Marta on the coast and Pasto in the 
extreme south — remained loyal to the authorities in Spain and did 
their best to harass the revolutionaries. 

Traditional historians dubbed the first years of the independence 
struggle the Patria Boba (Foolish Fatherland), both because of the 
patriots' disunity and because provincial legislatures wasted so 
much time on well-intentioned but impractical innovations. Elabo- 
rate declarations of citizens' rights, more on the French than the 
American model, are just one example. But a few of the measures 
were noteworthy: thus Antioquia Province began the process of 
abolishing slavery with a law of free birth, and Cartagena, which had 
one of the headquarters of the Spanish Inquisition, closed it down. 
Moreover, although political disunity was unfortunate, it faithfully 
reflected the fact that New Granada's population clusters, isolated by 
rugged topography and abysmal internal transportation, had really 
never had much to do with each other. 

An outward appearance of unity was finally achieved in Novem- 
ber-December 1814, when Bolivar, who owed the United Provinces 
a debt of gratitude for helping him militarily in Venezuela but was at 
the time a fugitive in New Granada, assumed command of an army 
that took Santa Fe and compelled Cundinamarca to join the confed- 
eration. Unfortunately, Ferdinand VII, having been returned to his 
throne as king of Spain in March 1814, was determined to restore the 



16 



Historical Setting 



colonial status quo. Early in 1815, a major expedition of Spanish 
veterans under General Pablo Morillo set sail for America, landing 
first on the coast of Venezuela in April to mop up what remained of 
patriot resistance there. Its next target was New Granada. Correctly 
diagnosing the patriots' cause as hopeless because of their continu- 
ing dissensions, Bolivar decamped to the West Indies, to prepare for 
a better day. During August-December, Morillo's forces besieged 
Cartagena, starving it into submission, then advanced into the inte- 
rior, where they restored Spanish rule in Santa Fe in May 1816. 

The ease of the Spanish "reconquest" of New Granada in 
1815-16 can be attributed not only to patriot divisions but also to 
weariness with the hardships and disruptions of wartime. Moreover, 
the pro-independence leadership, mainly drawn from criollo upper 
sectors of society, had generally failed to convince the popular 
majority that it had a real stake in the outcome. Although one patriot 
faction at Cartagena had succeeded in rallying artisans and people of 
color to participate actively on its side, more aristocratic rivals won 
local control, not only in Cartagena but also in all of the more popu- 
lated regions of New Granada by July 1816. Yet restoration of the 
old regime was never complete. Some patriot fighters followed 
Bolivar into Caribbean exile to continue plotting, and oth- 
ers — including the man destined to become Bolivar's closest New 
Granadan collaborator and ultimate rival, General Francisco de 
Paula Santander y Omana — retreated to the eastern plains (llanos), 
which became a republican sanctuary. Moreover, the financial exac- 
tions of the Spanish authorities together with revulsion against their 
tactics of repression, which included systematic execution of most 
top figures of the Patria Boba, turned feeling increasingly against 
them. Patriot guerrillas sprang up in many parts of the highlands. 

Definitive liberation came from the direction of Venezuela under 
the leadership of Bolivar, who, by October 1817, had returned from 
the West Indies and occupied most of the Orinoco basin, an area 
encompassing one-fourth of Colombia and four- fifths of Venezuela. 
However, Bolivar had little success against Spanish units entrenched 
in Caracas and the Venezuelan Andes. In mid-1819, he therefore 
turned west toward New Granada, joined forces with Santander and 
other New Granadans who had taken refuge on the plains, and 
invaded the central highlands over one of the most difficult of 
Andean paths. On August 7, he defeated the Spanish in the Battle of 
Boyaca, which freed central New Granada, and three days later he 
entered Santa Fe, soon renamed Santa Fe de Bogota. The battle had 
involved little more than 2,000 men on either side and was of short 
duration, but it destroyed the main Spanish force in New Granada 



17 



Colombia: A Country Study 

and sorely damaged royalist morale. By the end of the year, patriot 
columns fanned out and occupied most of the rest of New Granada 
except the Caribbean coast and far southwest. Bolivar organized a 
provisional patriot government at Bogota, naming Santander to head 
it. Then, in December 1819, he was in Angostura (present-day Ciu- 
dad Bolivar), temporary capital of patriot Venezuela, where at his 
behest the Venezuelan Congress (with the addition of a few New 
Granadan members) proclaimed the creation of the Republic of 
Great Colombia, comprising all the former Viceroyalty of New 
Granada. 

Development of the Nation, 1819-1904 

The Great Colombia Experiment, 1819-32 

The Republic of Colombia founded by Bolivar is referred to retro- 
spectively as "Gran Colombia," or "Great Colombia," to distinguish 
it from the smaller present-day Republic of Colombia. And it took 
almost four years for all the far-flung lands theoretically included to 
come under the Colombian flag. Bolivar's victory at the Battle of 
Carabobo, on June 24, 1821, delivered Caracas and virtually all the 
rest of Venezuela into his hands, except for the coastal fortress of 
Puerto Cabello, which held out another two years. The liberation of 
New Granada's Caribbean coast was completed when Cartagena fell 
to General Mariano Montilla's army in October 1821. In the follow- 
ing month, the Isthmus of Panama overthrew Spanish authority in a 
bloodless coup and then joined Colombia, ostensibly of its own voli- 
tion, although Bolivar was prepared to take it by force if necessary. 
Bolivar assigned the task of extending Colombian rule to the Presi- 
dency of Quito (present-day Ecuador) to his lieutenant, Antonio Jose 
de Sucre, who went initially to the port of Guayaquil, where another 
local uprising had already deposed the Spanish authorities, and even- 
tually won a decisive victory in the Battle of Pichincha, on the out- 
skirts of Quito itself, in May 1822. The defeated royalist commander 
quickly surrendered the rest of the presidency to Colombia. The roy- 
alist army holding out at Pasto was now in an untenable position and 
surrendered, too. Guayaquil still posed a problem, for it had been 
operating as an autonomous city-state since its own rebellion against 
Spain, but Bolivar had no intention of allowing Quito's principal out- 
let to the sea to remain outside Colombia. In July, just days before he 
met in Guayaquil with the Argentine liberator Jose de San Martin, 
who was then serving as protector of Peru, which also had designs on 
Guayaquil, Bolivar's followers took control of the port city. A vote on 
joining Colombia was held, but the result was predetermined. 



18 



Simon Bolivar Palacios, 
1783-1830, bust portrait, 
artist unknown 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs 
Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC 




The creation of Bolivar's Republic of Colombia was the only 
instance in which an entire Spanish viceroyalty remained united, 
even briefly, after independence. This unity resulted in large measure 
from the particular way in which independence was achieved in 
northern South America — by forces moving back and forth without 
regard to former colonial boundaries, under the supreme leadership 
of a single commander, Bolivar. It also reflected the conviction of 
Bolivar himself that the union brought together peoples whose sense 
of common destiny had been heightened in the recent struggle, plus a 
wealth of resources — the gold of New Granada, the agricultural 
economy of Venezuela, and the textile workshops of highland Ecua- 
dor — that were basically complementary. He likewise felt that only a 
large nation could gain respect on the world stage. However, he did 
not adequately weigh certain problems, of which perhaps most obvi- 
ous was the lack of an integrated transportation and communication 
network: it was easier to travel from Caracas to Philadelphia or from 
Quito to Lima than from either one to Bogota, which, by its central 
location, was the inevitable capital of the new nation. Although 
economies may have been complementary to some extent, interests 
were not necessarily compatible; the insistent demand of Ecuadorian 
textile makers for high protective tariffs was not what suited Venezu- 
elan agricultural exporters. Neither did the common experience of 
Spanish rule and then the fight against it offset the stark social and 
cultural differences between, for example, the lawyers of Bogota, the 
Quechua-speaking Amerindians of highland Ecuador, the pardo and 



19 



Colombia: A Country Study 

mestizo vaqueros of the Orinoco basin, and the planters of Andean 
Venezuela. 

Nevertheless, in 1821 the young republic held a constituent 
assembly, known as the Congress of Cucuta, which duly reaffirmed 
the union and went on to adopt a highly centralized system of gov- 
ernment, under which the entire country was divided into provinces 
and departments whose heads were named from Bogota. There were 
elected provincial assemblies, but with no meaningful power in local 
affairs. While eschewing federalism, the constitution of 1821 in 
some other respects revealed the clear influence of the U.S. model 
and was for the most part a conventionally republican document. It 
provided for strict separation of powers — too strict, in Bolivar's 
view, despite the fact that, like other early Latin American constitu- 
tions, it authorized sweeping "extraordinary" prerogatives for the 
executive to use in cases of emergency. Socioeconomic restrictions 
limited the right to vote to at most 10 percent of free adult males, but 
that was fairly standard procedure at the time. Citizens were guaran- 
teed a list of basic rights that did not include freedom of worship, but 
neither were non-Roman Catholic faiths expressly forbidden, so that 
the question of religious toleration was left open to be dealt with 
later. At the same time, the Congress of Cucuta itself equipped the 
new nation with a number of enlightened reforms: slavery was not 
immediately abolished, but provision was made for its gradual 
extinction by adopting nationwide the free-birth principle enacted 
earlier in Antioquia; likewise, Amerindians were relieved of the 
obligation to pay tribute or perform any kind of involuntary labor. 
Finally, the same Congress of Cucuta elected Bolivar president and, 
because he was Venezuelan, provided regional balance by making 
the New Granadan Santander vice president. 

In addition to acquiring a fine new constitution, the Republic of 
Colombia was the first Spanish American nation to obtain diplo- 
matic recognition from the United States, in 1822; British recogni- 
tion followed three years later. In 1824 Colombia even raised a 
foreign loan on the London market for the extraordinary sum of 30 
million pesos (then equivalent to dollars). This consisted in part of 
mere refinancing of earlier obligations incurred during the indepen- 
dence struggle. It would prove impossible to maintain debt service, 
but the fact that the loan was even granted, on what for the time were 
quite favorable terms, attested to the prestige of Bolivar's creation. 

Another sign of the Republic of Colombia's international prestige 
was the fact that it played host to Bolivar's Congress of Panama of 
1826, which in the end accomplished little but was the first in a long 
line of Pan-American gatherings. Yet even before that meeting 



20 



Historical Setting 



began, the fragility of the republic's unity was becoming apparent. 
The first serious crack came in Venezuela, where many people had 
been unhappy from the start with formal subjection to authorities in 
Bogota, particularly when the head of government turned out to be 
the New Granadan, Vice President Santander, who became acting 
chief executive when Bolivar continued personally leading his 
armies against Spain. Indeed, Bolivar carried the struggle into Peru 
and stayed there even after the Battle of Ayacucho, won by Sucre in 
December 1824, put an end to serious royalist resistance. Venezue- 
lans did have some real grievances, but equally important was the 
feeling that their present status was a step down from that of the 
colonial captaincy general, which for most purposes took orders (not 
necessarily obeyed) directly from Madrid. Thus, when General Jose 
Antonio Paez, the leading military figure in Venezuela, was sum- 
moned to Bogota early in 1 826 to answer charges against him in the 
Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la Republica), he refused to 
go, and most of Venezuela joined him in defiance. Both Paez and 
Santander looked for support to Bolivar, still absent in Peru, but he 
proved less interested in the immediate dispute than in the opportu- 
nity that the crisis seemed to offer to revamp Colombian institutions 
in a form more to his liking. 

Bolivar knew that Venezuelan regionalism was not the only prob- 
lem to be faced. There was similar, if less critical, unrest in Ecuador. 
The efforts of liberal-minded congressional representatives to sub- 
ject the military more fully to civilian courts were seen by the latter 
as an affront. And much of the clergy resented legislation designed 
to curb church influence, such as measures closing small convents 
and promoting secular education. As a committed freethinker, Boli- 
var did not oppose the objectives of these first anticlerical measures, 
and as one who supported total abolition of slavery, he definitely 
opposed the campaign of slaveholders to water down the free-birth 
law passed by the Congress of Cucuta in 1821. But he felt that many 
of the reforms adopted were premature, thus needlessly promoting 
unrest, and he assigned part of the blame to Vice President San- 
tander, a man who had dropped out of law study to fight for indepen- 
dence but as chief executive surrounded himself with ardent young 
lawyers as helpers and advisers. What the country needed, in Boli- 
var's view, was a stronger executive, a less assertive legislature, and 
a partial rollback of overhasty reforms. He also hoped to see some 
form of a new constitution that he had drafted for Bolivia adopted in 
the Republic of Colombia. Its central feature was a president serving 
for life and appointing his successor. Some other features were 
highly liberal, but what attracted attention was the call for a life-term 
president, who in the Colombian case would obviously be himself. 



21 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Bolivar journeyed back from Peru to Colombia in Septem- 
ber-November 1826. He found little real support for introducing his 
constitutional panacea, but he solved the Venezuelan rebellion by 
meeting with General Paez in Venezuela in January 1 827 and pardon- 
ing him, as well as by promising to call a convention to reform the 
existing constitution in some way. That September Bolivar returned 
to Bogota and resumed the presidency of Colombia. However, the 
Congress of Ocana, which met in April- June 1828, ultimately dis- 
solved with nothing accomplished. Bolivar then yielded to demands 
that he assume a personal dictatorship "to save the republic." It was a 
mild dictatorship, which had strong support from the military, espe- 
cially the Venezuelan officers who dominated the upper ranks. He 
further enjoyed support from the church, which hoped that he would 
reverse recent anticlerical measures and was not disappointed. 
Although there was no clear-cut division along social lines, Bolivar's 
chief civilian supporters tended to come from long-established, aris- 
tocratic families, in effect his own class, whereas more of his oppo- 
nents represented an emerging upper class of previously peripheral 
regions, such as Antioquia and eastern New Granada. 

Santander, who came from one of those peripheral upper-class fam- 
ilies, had since Bolivar's return aligned himself with the opposition 
and helped block progovernment initiatives at Ocana. Once the dicta- 
torship was established, he was given the option of diplomatic exile as 
minister to the United States, and he accepted, but before he could 
depart, some of his supporters attempted to assassinate Bolivar. The 
plot failed, and Santander, although not directly involved, was tried 
and condemned to death but instead was sent into nondiplomatic exile. 
In the aftermath, the dictatorship hardened, but opposition increased, 
especially when it became known that Bolivar's ministers were sound- 
ing out opinion at home and abroad on the possibility of recruiting a 
European prince to become king whenever Bolivar died or retired. 
Bolivar was not a party to the scheme, having gone south from Bogota 
in December 1 828 to deal with a local uprising and brief conflict with 
Peru. Yet he was blamed, and the monarchist intrigue caused the great- 
est backlash of protest in his native Venezuela, where a new revolt 
began before the end of 1829. This time Venezuela went all the way to 
secession. 

In New Granada (the traditional name for the Colombian prov- 
inces carried over from the dissolved United Provinces of New 
Granada), there was virtually no support for an attempt to retain Ven- 
ezuela by force. Instead, many New Granadans were happy to see 
the Venezuelans go. Under these circumstances, the more moderate 
elements of Bolivar's party took charge in Bogota, even admitting 



22 



Historical Setting 



some of the recently repressed Santanderistas to a share of power. 
Bolivar resigned the presidency, intending to go into voluntary exile, 
but in December 1830, before he could set sail, he died at Santa 
Marta on the coast. By that time, Ecuador had followed Venezuela's 
example to become an independent state. 

Many of those who suffered repression during Bolivar's final dic- 
tatorship were slow to forgive, so that the division between his sup- 
porters and opponents foreshadowed, at least in part, subsequent 
party alignments in Colombia. Nevertheless, from his time to the 
present, virtually all Colombians have accepted his preeminence 
among the founders of the nation. Political liberals, including in due 
course the founders of the Liberal Party (PL), deplored most of what 
Bolivar did in that dictatorship but had no trouble finding things to 
approve in his earlier words and actions. Conservatives, naturally 
including founders of the Conservative Party (PC), tended to see the 
dictatorship as a necessary evil that Bolivar himself regarded as tem- 
porary, while emphasizing his consistent support for strong execu- 
tive power and latter-day rapprochement with the church. Certain 
twentieth-century right-wing extremists lauded the dictatorship as a 
positive good, while present-day leftists claim him as forerunner and 
assert that they are striving to complete the work that he left unfin- 
ished. The leftists point to Bolivar's condemnation of slavery, rhetor- 
ical defense of Amerindian rights, and often keen analysis of social 
inequality in his statements to argue that he would have carried out a 
true social revolution if he had not been thwarted by selfish oli- 
garchs, by which they chiefly mean the faction of Santander. Their 
analysis conveniently ignores the fact that Bolivar retained the sup- 
port of the very cream of the traditional aristocracy. There is, in any 
case, a Bolivar for every conceivable ideological taste. 

New Granada: Weak State, Strong Parties, 1832-63 

In April 1830, an assembly meeting in Bogota adopted a new con- 
stitution for the Republic of Great Colombia. It bore little resemblance 
to the one Bolivar drafted for Bolivia, even though he at one time had 
placed his hopes on this assembly to reform Colombian institutions in 
line with his ideas. The constitution of 1830 strengthened the execu- 
tive and increased the presidential term (even if not to life) but was lit- 
tle different in fundamentals from that of 1821, and with the republic 
already in process of dissolution, it was an exercise in futility. The 
rump that was left of Great Colombia — present-day Colombia plus 
Panama — reconstituted itself as the Republic of New Granada 
(1832-58), and in 1832 it adopted another constitution closely follow- 
ing the 1821 model. The new charter slightly liberalized the conditions 



23 



Colombia: A Country Study 

for suffrage and gave the provincial assemblies a limited right to enact 
ordinances on local affairs. One of its articles abolished the fuero, a 
royal charter bestowing special judicial privileges on the military. 
There was no similar action on the ecclesiastical fuero because the 
clergy was still too powerful to antagonize unnecessarily. But the pres- 
tige of the military had suffered in New Granada from overly close 
association with Venezuelan influence during Bolivar's Republic of 
Colombia. In addition, many top officers, being Venezuelan, had gone 
home after the collapse of the union. The military establishment was 
thus reduced in size and vulnerable, and its treatment in the first New 
Granadan constitution was a foretaste of the subordinate role it would 
continue to play in Colombian history. 

The weakness of the military was a characteristic common among 
Colombian state institutions generally. The country's broken topog- 
raphy and primitive transportation made it difficult, if not impossi- 
ble, to assert effective control in outlying areas. No cart roads 
existed anywhere outside the cities, and regular steam navigation on 
the Magdalena, the main artery connecting the coast with the inte- 
rior, did not take hold until the 1840s. Improvements in transport 
infrastructure — or any ambitious governmental activity — would 
have cost money, which was not readily available, for the central 
administration operated on an annual budget of about one and a half 
pesos (still roughly equivalent to U.S. dollars of the time) per capita. 
Local governments had even smaller resources. 

Fiscal poverty reflected, in turn, the underdeveloped state of the 
economy, in which the vast majority of the population labored farm- 
ing crops, raising livestock for domestic consumption, or producing 
primitive handicrafts. Foreign trade per capita was the lowest among 
Latin America's larger countries, and this in itself was a major rea- 
son for fiscal poverty because customs duties were the leading 
source of revenue. New Granada began independent life with a sin- 
gle important export, gold, exactly as in the colonial era, but gold 
mining employed few people and had few linkages to the rest of the 
economy. Native, and some foreign, entrepreneurs looked intermit- 
tently for other exports that might stimulate wider economic growth, 
and these efforts led to a succession of speculative booms in tobacco, 
quinine, and certain lesser commodities. None would have lasting 
success until the expansion of coffee cultivation at the end of the 
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth; until then, with 
brief and partial exceptions, stagnation was the rule. 

Only limited options were thus available when Santander (presi- 
dent, 1832-37) returned from exile to become the first elected presi- 
dent of New Granada (see table 2, Appendix). He was more cautious 



24 



Historical Setting 



than in the 1 820s in pushing liberal reforms, but he promoted educa- 
tion while holding down military expenditures. At the end of his 
term, Santander gave evidence of his legalistic bent by accepting the 
defeat of his chosen candidate and turning the presidency over to 
Jose Ignacio de Marquez Barreto (president, 1837^11), a former col- 
laborator whom he now opposed. Most of their differences were 
minor, but Santander objected to Marquez 's conciliatory gestures 
toward the former Bolivarian faction, with which he proceeded to 
share power once in office. When an assortment of malcontents rose 
up against Marquez in the so-called War of the Supreme Command- 
ers (1840-42), Santander refused to give his blessing. However, 
most of his personal followers and the more intransigent liberals did 
back the uprising, and it became a watershed in the evolution of the 
Colombian political system. The threat to his government caused 
Marquez and moderate liberals who shared his views to tighten their 
alliance with the former Bolivarians, who in return gave crucial mil- 
itary support. Formal Liberal and Conservative parties did not exist 
until midcentury, but they were present in embryo in the forces 
arrayed on either side of this first of independent New Granada's 
civil wars. 

Early conservative leaders, or Ministerials as they were called ini- 
tially, were slightly more distinguished socially than their adversar- 
ies, and each faction was stronger in some regions than others, but 
there were no significant differences in economic interest or social 
policy. Neither faction was necessarily averse to economic liberal- 
ism. Differences revolved instead around constitutional and ecclesi- 
astical issues. Having won the civil war, the Ministerials in 1843 
adopted still another constitution, which strengthened central control 
over provincial authorities, whereas their opponents increasingly 
flirted with federalism. The Ministerials also invited the Jesuits, 
expelled from the Spanish Empire by Charles III, to return to New 
Granada, with a view to their playing a key role in secondary educa- 
tion and defending the country's youth against dangerous new doc- 
trines. In this, they demonstrated their intention to forge a close 
relationship with the Roman Catholic Church, both from religious 
conviction and from a belief in its importance as a force for social 
and political stability. By contrast, their opponents hoped to resume 
the course of religious reform begun at the Congress of Cucuta in 
1821 and interrupted by Bolivar's dictatorship. Unfortunately for the 
Ministerials, however, in 1849 divisions in their camp allowed the 
opposition candidate, General Jose Hilario Lopez Valdez (president, 
1849-53), to triumph. It was during this presidential campaign that 
the contending factions adopted definitively the terms Liberal and 



25 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Conservative and that the parties bearing those names can be said to 
have taken shape. 

The victory of Lopez and the Liberals can be attributed not just to 
the failure of government supporters to agree on a candidate but also 
to their alliance with artisan groups antagonized by the tariff legisla- 
tion adopted during the administration of the last Ministerial presi- 
dent, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera y Arboleda (president of New 
Granada, 1845-49; president of Colombia, 1861-63, 1863-64, 
1866-67), which sharply reduced duties on imported manufactures. 
The alliance was strictly opportunistic, as Lopez and the Liberal high 
command were not truly protectionist. They were lawyers, mer- 
chants, and landowners, much like their Conservative counterparts, 
and they had no stake in domestic manufacturing and in principle 
favored an opening to foreign trade. Yet the alliance held together 
long enough for the Liberals to enact a sweeping set of reforms. 
They again expelled the Jesuits, abolished the last vestiges of slavery 
and the colonial tobacco monopoly, authorized provincial assemblies 
to divide up Amerindian communal lands into private plots, reduced 
the standing army to a maximum of 1,500 men, and abolished libel 
laws for the printed (but not yet the spoken) word. 

The capstone of this flurry of reforms was the constitution of 1853. 
It introduced for the first time unqualified freedom of worship and uni- 
versal male suffrage, although the latter aroused misgivings among 
many Liberals for fear of clerical influence over the uneducated 
masses. The new constitution implemented a quasi-federalist system; 
it reversed the limitations on provincial authority contained in the con- 
stitutional reform of 1843, and provincial governors, although still 
regarded as agents in some sense of the national executive, were 
henceforth to be elected locally. The Liberal government did not, how- 
ever, satisfy the protectionist demands of its artisan allies. New tariff 
legislation brought in a slight increase in import duties, but not enough 
to make a significant difference. Nor were thwarted protectionists the 
only source of political discontent. Conservatives, of course, had been 
unhappy all along, and in 1851 they launched a foolhardy rebellion. It 
was suppressed easily, but the more moderate or pragmatic elements 
of the Liberals were also convinced that ideologues in the Congress 
and administration were pushing their reform agenda too far and too 
fast, thereby undermining the foundations of law and order. A good 
many Liberal military officers took the same view, and on April 17, 
1 854, one of them, General Jose Maria Dionisio Melo y Ortiz, staged a 
coup d'etat. The coup succeeded in overthrowing Lopez's successor, 
Jose Maria Obando del Campo, who was president for the second time 
in 1853-54 and another Liberal general. The ousted president had 



26 



Historical Setting 



been unhappy with the latest developments but too indecisive to do 
anything about them. 

Melo ruled only about eight months, with the support of one fac- 
tion of Liberals and of the artisans, who were particularly enthusias- 
tic in his defense. Opposition came in the form of an alliance of 
Liberal and Conservative leaders, whose banner was the defense of 
constitutional legality but who at the same time rallied together in 
fear of the threat to social order posed by Melo's artisan allies. This 
partnership of ruling groups against their social inferiors would be 
cited repeatedly in the future, as a precedent for putative alliances of 
elite Liberals and Conservatives to thwart social change. By Decem- 
ber 4, 1854, Melo's mild dictatorship had been defeated. Then, 
instead of restoring Obando, whom they distrusted, the victors 
formed a coalition government in which Conservatives increasingly 
gained the upper hand. When the next presidential election was held 
in 1856 — the first to be decided by universal male suffrage — it was 
won by a civilian Conservative, Mariano Ospina Rodriguez (presi- 
dent, 1857-61). He defeated both the Liberal Party candidate and 
former President Mosquera, who renounced his previous associates 
to run as candidate of an improvised National Party that would soon 
be absorbed by the Liberal Party. 

Official returns in the 1856 election would suggest that 40 percent 
of adult males participated. Undoubtedly, some of the votes tallied 
were fraudulent, but the results nevertheless demonstrated the extent 
to which the population had become aligned with one party or 
another. In the case of Conservatives, often the local priest recruited 
his flock on their behalf; or a local potentate of some sort — a leading 
landowner or a petty official — might recruit for either side. But no 
matter how initial allegiances took shape, they remained remarkably 
constant, passed down from generation to generation in such a way 
that small towns that voted Conservative or Liberal in 1856 were 
likely to be voting the same way a century later. Inherited party affil- 
iation likewise generally determined on which side one participated 
or gave passive support in case of civil war. Although the reach of 
the state was limited, the parties blanketed the country, instilling in 
their adherents an instinctive loyalty that easily could trump obedi- 
ence to a government of the opposite persuasion. 

The extreme frequency of elections under the 1853 constitution, 
held at different times for all sorts of local and national offices, con- 
tributed to the early consolidation of party affiliations. And although 
the constitution did not introduce outright federalism, it was soon 
being amended to transform specific parts of the country into 
"states" with substantial powers of self-government. Panama, which 
had never felt much affinity with the rest of New Granada, was the 



27 



Colombia: A Country Study 

first to receive such status, but other sections demanded and 
achieved the same, until in 1858 the ambiguous nature of the coun- 
try's administration was tidied up by adoption of the first frankly 
federalist constitution. It was adopted during the Conservative 
administration of Ospina, whose party had been gradually warming 
to the idea of federalism, among other reasons because it seemingly 
guaranteed the Conservatives control of regions where they were 
strongest, regardless of who held power in Bogota. However, before 
long the Liberals accused Ospina of failing to faithfully observe the 
new system and rose up in what would be the nation's only full- 
fledged civil war (as distinct from civil or military coup) to succeed 
in toppling a government. The war lasted from 1859 to 1862, and 
when it was over the provisional head of state was General Mos- 
quera, now fully transformed into paladin of the Liberal cause. 

A Failed Federalist Utopia, 1863-85 

During the last stage of the civil war, in 1861, the Liberals changed 
the name of the country from Granadine Confederation (as in the 
1858 constitution) to United States of New Granada (Estados Unidos 
de Nueva Granada, 1861-63). This action was followed by the adop- 
tion, in 1863, of another constitution that restored the name Colombia 
(more specifically Estados Unidos de Colombia, 1863-86) and took 
federalism to remarkable extremes. The new charter divided the 
nation into nine states, which could exercise any functions not 
expressly reserved to the central authorities. They could raise their 
own militias and, if they saw fit, issue their own postage stamps. 
They alone determined who had the right to vote, and more than half 
used this authority to retreat from the recent universal male suffrage, 
which had not worked out wholly to the Liberals' satisfaction. The 
constitution could be amended only by unanimous consent of all 
states. And the national president was elected on a basis of one vote, 
one state, for a period of only two years with no possibility of imme- 
diate reelection. This weakening of the presidential office resulted not 
just from theoretical considerations but also from the Liberals' real 
distrust of their current leader, Mosquera, whose undoubted ability 
was accompanied by a certain tendency toward megalomania. 

The 1863 constitution took individual rights to similar extremes. 
Now there was no possible limit on the spoken word. In addition to 
abolishing the death penalty, the constitution guaranteed citizens' 
right to bear arms and to practice freedom of religion, at least in prin- 
ciple. However, the Liberals were not quite prepared to leave the 
Roman Catholic Church to its own devices, and therefore the charter 
endowed both national and state governments with vague supervisory 



28 



Historical Setting 



authority in religious matters. Moreover, Mosquera had not waited 
for the constitution to be enacted before issuing decrees that yet again 
expelled the Jesuits, who had returned under Ospina's presidency, 
seized most church property, and (with certain exceptions) legally 
abolished the religious orders of monks and nuns. 

The latest burst of anticlericalism was in part to punish the clergy 
for supporting the Conservatives in the recent civil war. It drove a 
further wedge of bitterness between the parties, and it consolidated 
the image of Liberal impiety among the Conservative rank and file. 
Had elections been free and fair, the Conservatives surely would 
have returned to power, for without much doubt they were the 
majority party at the time. Intent on staving off any such disaster, the 
Liberals engaged in rampant electoral manipulation. Nevertheless, 
the opposition was not totally excluded; much of the time it con- 
trolled one or two of the states, and it had some share of influence 
elsewhere by exploiting divisions in the Liberal camp. The ruling 
Liberals established a somewhat better record as far as basic civil 
liberties were concerned. And when Mosquera, who was reelected a 
last time in 1866, showed insufficient respect for constitutional tech- 
nicalities, the Liberals summarily deposed him in May 1867. The 
Liberals also made a few attempts to promote social and economic 
development, despite the constitutional straitjacket in which they 
had placed the national authorities. 

In Colombia, as throughout Latin America, publicists and politi- 
cians saw railroad construction as one key requirement. U.S. conces- 
sionaires had opened a first rail line, over the Isthmus of Panama, in 
1856. In present-day Colombia, the first route was a short line com- 
pleted in 1871, connecting the river port of Barranquilla with a point 
on the Caribbean to bypass the treacherous mouth of the Magdalena. 
Other railroads followed: most were short, supplementing river 
transport, and built by foreign entrepreneurs in return for subsidies 
and privileges granted by state or federal governments. For the fed- 
eral authorities to be concerned with railroads at all, outside Panama, 
it was necessary to stretch the constitutional article restricting them 
to the promotion of interoceanic commerce. But they were well 
within their rights in 1878 in approving a concession for French 
interests to construct a canal across Panama, and in 1882 work actu- 
ally began — which the French never finished. 

Another area of earnest but limited accomplishment was educa- 
tion. The present National University of Colombia was founded in 
1867. The need was much greater, however, in primary education, 
where little had been accomplished since the days of Santander; an 
illiteracy rate of more than 80 percent was an obstacle to almost any 
aspect of modernization. Accordingly, the Liberals in 1 870 adopted 



29 



Colombia: A Country Study 

a measure declaring primary education free and obligatory, as well 
as religiously neutral. New normal schools trained the necessary 
teachers, and experts from Germany imparted the latest pedagogical 
methods. However, this ambitious program required collabora- 
tion — not always forthcoming — between federal and state govern- 
ments, and adequate resources were unavailable at either level. Thus, 
net progress was far from matching the contemporaneous push for 
popular education in Argentina. And although ecclesiastical back- 
lash was a problem in Argentina also, it was much more severe in 
Colombia. Even though a provision existed for supplementary reli- 
gious instruction to be offered by church representatives to children 
whose parents requested it, much of the clergy and devout Roman 
Catholic laity saw the Liberals' education initiative as heretical or 
worse. 

Agitation over public education contributed to the outbreak of a 
brief but bitter civil war between Conservatives and Liberals in 
1876. The government prevailed, but this was only one of an almost 
constant round of civil conflicts. Most were struggles for the control 
of particular state governments, pitting Conservatives against Liber- 
als or simply different Liberal factions (with or without Conserva- 
tive help) against each other; and the national authorities, taking a 
strict interpretation of states' rights, usually let the fighting run its 
course. Few people took part in general, casualties were few, and not 
much properly was destroyed. However, the climate of insecurity 
clearly worked against the creation of new wealth. The state of pub- 
lic order thus contributed to a growing reaction against the Liberal 
regime, in which dissident Independent Liberals received support 
from the Conservatives and in 1880 saw their foremost leader, 
Rafael Nunez Moledo (president, 1880-82, 1884-86, 1887-88, 
1892-94), elected to the presidency. 

Nunez received further support from the artisans, to whom he 
offered and delivered a modest amount of tariff protection. He hoped 
to increase Colombia's options by stimulating domestic industry, and 
he also expanded the government's economic role through creation 
of a national bank. But the requirement of unanimity among the 
states for any amendment of the 1863 constitution thwarted his 
planned strengthening, or Regeneration, of the nation's political 
institutions — as in his slogan "Regeneration or Catastrophe!" After 
stepping down from the presidency at the end of his two-year term, 
he returned to office in 1884; and this time he had better luck. The 
doctrinaire Radical faction of Liberals, fearing he would try to 
change the constitution illegally, launched a preemptive revolt in 
1885 that Nunez crushed, with massive help from the Conservatives. 



30 




Rafael Nunez Moledo, 
(president, 1880-82, 1884-86, 
1887-88, 1892-94), as illustrated 
in Harper's Weekly 71 (1885): 52 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs 
Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC 



1 



He then felt emboldened to declare that the constitution of 1 863 had 
"ceased to exist." 

Continuity and Change in Social Relations 

Neither the rise and fall of federalism nor the frequent civil war- 
fare had much impact on social structures. A federal system did pro- 
vide more employment for politicians and officeholders than a 
strictly centralized one, thus continuing an expansion of opportuni- 
ties of public service that began with independence. Yet it was hard 
to penetrate the upper strata without some formal education, which 
the vast majority still did not receive. In some Latin American coun- 
tries (and to some extent during the independence struggle in 
Colombia), military prowess might be enough to propel an able indi- 
vidual of humble origin to positions of power, although not necessar- 
ily social esteem; but the weakness of the military institution made 
this a less promising path of advancement in Colombia. Once the 
veterans of independence died or retired, the generals of the civil 
wars tended to be lawyers or landowners who dabbled in fighting 
part-time. 

The institutional reforms carried out since independence had done 
little to increase social mobility. The reform of most sweeping social 
significance might seem the abolition of slavery, but it was a gradual 
process, and there were no programs to help former slaves improve 
their material condition. The conversion of Amerindian communal 
land into private smallholdings, supposedly to imbue the recipients 
with a proper entrepreneurial spirit, apparently did not make much 



31 



Colombia: A Country Study- 

difference in most of the country. In the southwest, where the Amer- 
indian presence was greatest, their objections caused state authorities 
to hold off implementing the policy. Neither did the series of com- 
modity export booms, in products such as tobacco and quinine, have 
much impact on basic social structures, other than enriching some 
speculators and middlemen. However, one phenomenon of long- 
term significance during the mid-nineteenth century was the move- 
ment of settlers from Antioquia in the northwest into adjoining sec- 
tions of the Cordillera Central. The traditional view of this process 
as one of homesteading by sturdy independent farmers was ideal- 
ized, for speculators and intermediaries likewise found opportunities 
in colonization projects. Even so, campesino smallholders were the 
predominant settlers, who would eventually serve as the backbone of 
a new and more lasting industry, coffee. 

Social as well as economic stagnation was still the rule, and most 
Colombians were illiterate, poorly housed, and all too subject to dis- 
ease and early mortality, but they seldom went hungry. Vacant land 
was available for farming, and food of some sort was generally abun- 
dant. And in material — if not social — terms, class differences were 
less pronounced than they would become later. Members of the coun- 
try's small upper and middle sectors could read and write and were 
proud of their lighter skins and (when possible) distinguished pedi- 
grees, but by European standards their homes were meanly furnished, 
and the total assets even of the wealthiest were unimpressive. More- 
over, because few luxury goods were produced locally, such com- 
modities had to be brought from overseas and in most cases carried 
up the Magdalena, then over primitive mountain paths (sometimes on 
the backs of human carriers) before reaching their destination — at a 
vast increase over the products' original prices. This situation was 
beginning to change with such improvements as the introduction of 
steamboats on the Magdalena and the gradual accumulation of wealth 
from commerce or otherwise; meanwhile, to be rich in Bogota was 
not the same as to be rich in Boston or Bordeaux. 

Political Centralization and the Church-State Alliance 

The Regeneration proposed by Rafael Nunez had much in com- 
mon with the positivist program of order and progress in evidence 
elsewhere in Latin America during the late nineteenth century. 
Nunez was not a military man and avoided overt dictatorship, but he 
was prepared to make arbitrary arrests or close opposition newspa- 
pers when he felt the cause of order required such action. Above all, 
after declaring the constitution of 1863 null and void, he convoked a 
national council of delegates to draft a very different replacement. 



32 



The National Cathedral on the 
Plaza de Bolivar, Bogota 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(David Mangurian) 



which was formally adopted in 1886 and would last more than 100 
years — an exceptionally long life for any Latin American constitu- 
tion. It exchanged the ultrafederalism of the 1863 charter for an 
equally extreme centralism, under which the president named the 
governors of the departments (as the former federal states were now 
called), and the governors in turn named all the mayors. Whatever 
party controlled the national presidency could thus control every 
departmental and municipal executive position in the country. The 
departments did have elected assemblies, but with very limited 
power. Naturally, the country could no longer be called the United 
States of Colombia but was now once again simply the Republic of 
Colombia, as it had been in the days of Bolivar. In addition, the 
sweeping definitions of individual rights in the old constitution were 
replaced by carefully restrictive wording in the new. The death pen- 
alty, abolished in 1863 as incompatible with the right to life, was 
reinstituted. Suffrage requirements were unified on a nationwide 
basis, and literacy was again required for national (not local) elec- 
tions. The presidential term was lengthened, too, and with immediate 
reelection permitted. Nunez himself took advantage of these elec- 
toral changes to enjoy two more consecutive terms, one by vote of 
the constitutional convention and the other by popular election. But 
immediate reelection was subsequently forbidden again and was 
unavailable to any president until Alvaro Uribe Velez (president, 
2002-6, 2006-10) in 2006. 




33 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Although a religious freethinker himself, Nunez was convinced 
that to put law and order on a sound footing, it was necessary to end 
the conflict between clergy and anticlericals. In view of the institu- 
tional strength of the Roman Catholic Church and its hold on popu- 
lar sentiment, he saw no way to do this other than by accepting the 
church's terms. The resulting religious settlement was contained 
partly in the new constitution itself and partly in a concordat signed 
with the Vatican the following year. There was no retreat from reli- 
gious toleration per se, but the church was compensated for seizure 
of its properties, religious orders were legal again, and along with 
the restoration to the church of other miscellaneous privileges, the 
settlement provided that public education must be conducted in 
accordance with Roman Catholic doctrine. Divorce, which the Lib- 
erals had legalized, naturally was forbidden, and remarriages of 
divorced persons were retroactively annulled, even though the latter 
change affected Nunez himself. 

As one more step toward the consolidation of order, Nunez hoped 
to overcome Colombia's bitter partisan rivalries by combining his 
Independent Liberals with like-minded Conservatives in a new 
National Party. In practice, however, many Independents drifted 
back to the main body of liberalism, incensed not only at the new 
constitution and religious concordat but at their members' almost 
total exclusion from power. They were denied all executive posi- 
tions, and, thanks to the prevalence of fraud and intimidation, 
allowed to win the merest handful of seats in deliberative bodies. It 
was indeed ludicrous that only two Liberals could be found in the 
House of Representatives (Camara de Representantes) as of the late 
1890s. For their part, the Nationalists eventually became just another 
faction of the Conservatives, opposed by the self-styled Historical 
Conservatives, who tended to regard Nunez and Vice President 
Miguel Antonio Caro Tovar (acting president, 1 894-98), who came 
to office on Nunez's death in 1894, as overly harsh politically and 
guilty of gross economic mismanagement. They complained of mon- 
etary inflation resulting from excessive issues of paper money and 
objected vigorously to an export tax introduced in 1895 on coffee, 
which was becoming an ever-more important export commodity but 
was trading in a world market of declining prices. 

The War of the Thousand Days and Loss of Panama, 
1899-1903 

The combination of economic malaise and dissension within the 
Conservative camp emboldened Liberals to launch another uprising, 
starting on October 17, 1899, and lasting three years — hence called 



34 



Historical Setting 



the War of the Thousand Days. It featured two massive engage- 
ments, the first won by the revolutionists and the second by govern- 
ment forces, after which the stalled conflict degenerated into 
desultory campaigning and some vicious guerrilla warfare. In the 
midst of it, a bloodless coup in Bogota by the Thirty-First of July 
Movement, a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, deposed 
Caro's successor in favor of his vice president, Jose Manuel Marro- 
quin Ricaurte (president, 1900-1904), but this development did not 
help the Liberals, who finally had to accept defeat. By a conven- 
tional though unverifiable estimate, 100,000 persons died in combat 
or indirectly as a result of the war, in a population of about 4 million. 
The war battered the economy and reduced the government to bank- 
ruptcy, which it sought to overcome by a flurry of hyperinflation. 
The three years of war also distracted and weakened the government 
just when it was involved in critical negotiations with the United 
States over the projected Panama Canal. The definitive agreement 
that ended the conflict was the Treaty of Wisconsin, signed aboard a 
U.S. battleship of that name off the Panamanian coast on November 
21, 1902. 

After the failure of the French canal enterprise, it became appar- 
ent that the U.S. government was the entity best able to carry the 
project to a successful conclusion. The United States was certainly 
interested, provided it had total control of the strip of territory the 
canal would pass through, and the Colombian government entered 
into an agreement satisfying this condition even while civil war 
raged. The agreement was submitted to the Senate of the Republic 
(Senado de la Republica) in Bogota after the war was over but there 
faced bitter opposition as an infringement of Colombian sovereignty. 
Despite warnings from Panama that the isthmus would secede if the 
agreement fell through, the Senate rejected it unanimously, unrealis- 
tically hoping to obtain better terms. Instead, Panamanian politicians 
in league with foreign canal promoters declared independence in 
November 1903, and the United States made clear that it would not 
allow Colombia even to attempt to retake the isthmus. 

A New Age of Peace and Coffee, 1904-30 

The Presidency of Rafael Reyes 

General Rafael Reyes Prieto (president, 1904-9) became the 
leader of a country that had just gone through a ruinous civil war and 
humiliating loss of territory. A highly pragmatic Conservative, he 
accepted the main lines of Nunez's political and religious settlement. 
However, recognizing the pressing need to conciliate the defeated 



35 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Liberals, Reyes proceeded to anger hard-line members of his own 
party by taking Liberals into his administration and revamping the 
electoral system to guarantee the opposition a reasonable number of 
seats in Congress, department assemblies, and municipal councils. 
To do so, in 1905 he arbitrarily dissolved the overwhelmingly Con- 
servative Congress and convoked in its place a national assembly, 
which voted to extend his presidential term from six years to 10. 
Reyes was also quite prepared to take high-handed measures against 
his critics, and there were leaders in both parties who either never 
supported him or ultimately turned against him. Nevertheless, the 
Reyes presidency inaugurated a period of general internal peace, 
broken by sporadic bursts of political violence mainly in the back- 
country and at election time. This period lasted until 1930 and offers 
one argument against the notion that a propensity to violence is a 
defining trait of the Colombian national character. 

Reyes had other accomplishments. He introduced a military 
reform designed to professionalize the armed forces and take them 
out of politics, importing a Chilean training mission to pass on les- 
sons the Chileans had learned from similar German missions. To 
place Colombian finances on a solid footing, he made a settlement 
with foreign creditors over debts that had fallen into arrears and 
replaced depreciated pesos with sound new currency at a ratio of 
100:1. He sponsored tariff legislation that gave more effective pro- 
tection to manufacturing industries than Nunez had offered; one ben- 
eficiary was the nascent textile industry of Medellfn. Not least, he 
energetically promoted more railroad construction and other public 
works. 

The scope of Reyes's achievements was still limited, of course, by 
sheer lack of resources. During his presidency, the railroad network 
increased from 561 to 901 kilometers, which in percentage terms was 
a sharp increase, but unimpressive for a country of Colombia's size. 
In addition, public works contracts and other public programs gave 
rise to serious allegations, whether well-founded or not, of official 
corruption. Because the dominant sectors of Colombian society had 
always been wary of anything approaching one-man rule, if only 
because it limited their own opportunities for status and influence, the 
authoritarian tendencies that Reyes undoubtedly displayed were a 
further reason for the growth of opposition. What brought matters to a 
head in 1 909 and induced him to step down, however, was a wave of 
indignation set off by his failed attempt to restore normal relations 
with the United States, through a treaty that provided a modest 
indemnity for Colombia while requiring Colombia to recognize the 



36 



Historical Setting 



independence of its lost territory. Public opinion, at least in the major 
cities, was not yet ready for this step. 

The fall of Reyes was triggered, in part, by street protests in 
Bogota, but Congress chose an interim successor, after whom presi- 
dents were again chosen by regular elections. Until 1930, they were 
still Conservatives — even one who ran as a Republican with wide 
Liberal support — so that the entire era has come to be known as the 
Conservative Hegemony. Elections were not wholly free and fair, 
but neither were they a mere farce. Public order suffered minor dis- 
ruptions here and there, yet no one tried to overthrow the govern- 
ment by revolution. Memory of the War of the Thousand Days was 
one reason for such forbearance. Another was the fact that, thanks to 
Reyes's reforms, opposition Liberals and dissident Conservatives 
could always count on some share of representation; indeed, much of 
the time, as under Reyes, members of both parties held administra- 
tive positions. Even so, political affairs only went so smoothly 
because the economy performed in such a way as to give ambitious 
individuals something else to think about and to relieve, slightly, the 
government's chronic penury. 

The Growth of the Coffee Industry 

The biggest economic success was the takeoff of Colombia's cof- 
fee industry. Coffee planting had grown steadily in the late nine- 
teenth century. At the same time, the center of the industry was 
shifting westward, from the Cordillera Oriental to Antioquia and 
adjoining areas of antioqueno colonization. Here, the pattern of 
smallholdings was ideally suited to production of the higher grades 
of coffee in which Colombia came to specialize. Paradoxically, 
recurring crises of coffee overproduction in Brazil also helped, by 
causing the Brazilian government to undertake programs of crop 
reduction and price stabilization that in practice gave other nations, 
such as Colombia, an incentive to increase their output. Shipping 
problems and temporary loss of the German market hindered the 
advance of coffee during World War I, but in the mid- 1920s it 
accounted for roughly three-quarters of Colombian export value, and 
Colombia was then the leading producer after Brazil. Colombia had 
no serious rival for that second-place ranking until the rapid rise of 
Vietnamese coffee production at the end of the twentieth century. 

Although overshadowed by coffee and centered in a coastal 
enclave around the port of Santa Marta, bananas were another rising 
export commodity. The exploitation of petroleum deposits in the 
central Magdalena valley was also underway, initially for the domes- 
tic market, but by 1930 petroleum was being exported on a modest 



37 



Colombia: A Country Study 

scale. The new textile mills clustered around Medellm were import- 
ers of cotton rather than exporters of finished cloth, but their grow- 
ing importance was an indication of Colombia's belated and still 
somewhat limited entry into the industrial age. They at least found 
an expanding home market, including among campesino families 
who until the rise of coffee could seldom afford factory-made cloth. 
Like coffee growing, textile manufacturing was almost entirely in 
Colombian hands, whereas the Boston-based United Fruit Company 
controlled the banana trade, and U.S. and British firms had a stake in 
exploiting Colombian oil. 

The fact that Colombia's leading export industry, coffee — with at 
least some presence in all parts of the country and multiple linkages 
to other segments of the economy — remained under native control 
tended to mute the appeal of economic nationalism, in which respect 
Colombia differed from much of Latin America. Total foreign 
investment remained low, mainly because foreign capitalists saw 
even greater advantages elsewhere. Yet most leaders of both parties 
were favorably disposed toward foreign capital, however much they 
might question the details of a concession or specific actions of a 
foreign company. For this reason, the Colombian government 
showed increasing interest in the very thing that led to Reyes's 
downfall: full normalization of relations with the United States, 
which supposedly would demonstrate to outside investors that a 
friendly climate awaited them. 

Relations with the United States 

The man most closely associated with this renewed push for a set- 
tlement with the United States was Marco Fidel Suarez (president, 
1918-21). The career of Suarez, the illegitimate son of a campesino 
woman and a schoolteacher, is one indication that class divisions in 
Colombia have not been quite as rigid as often stated. Ideologically, 
he was a stalwart Conservative and Roman Catholic traditionalist, 
yet Suarez admired the more open society of the United States and 
believed that Colombia's progress depended on close relations with 
the leading hemispheric power. He therefore worked for ratification 
of a revised treaty that normalized relations with both the United 
States and Panama and provided for Colombia to receive a US$25 
million indemnity from Washington. When Suarez perceived that 
political opposition to him stood in the way of a favorable vote, he 
resigned the presidency altogether, and under his interim successor 
the treaty was approved. 

In the United States, the oil industry had been the main private 
interest pressing for the treaty, in the hope that Colombia would now 



38 



Historical Setting 



resolve issues involving the exploitation of subsoil resources in a 
peaceful and friendly manner. That hope was only partially realized, 
but the indemnity amount, although a paltry sum for the United 
States, was equal to 10 times the total of Colombian bank reserves. 
Nor was it the only influx of new money during the 1920s, as Wall 
Street bankers were eagerly handing out loans during those pre- 
Great Depression boom years, and in Colombia national and depart- 
mental governments alike took advantage. The most obvious result 
was a splurge of public works: new government buildings, roads, 
and, above all, railroads, which in 1929 totaled 2,434 kilometers. 
The spending spree had a generally stimulative effect on the econ- 
omy. In some areas, where workers were in high demand for con- 
struction projects, wages rose so sharply that landowners were hard 
put to recruit the hands they needed. 

Decline of the Conservative Hegemony 

The stimulus from loans and indemnity was not evenly spread. 
Outlying regions felt little impact, and neither was all the money 
wisely spent. Railroads were pushed through vote-rich Boyaca 
Department, when there was still no rail link or even a passable 
highway connection from Bogota to the nation's second city, 
Medellfn. Moreover, a good bit of money ended up in the pockets of 
well-connected businessmen and politicians as fees or contracting 
profits, giving rise to the inevitable suspicion (as earlier under 
Reyes) of official corruption, which in turn dimmed the prestige of 
the Conservative rulers. 

A further complication was social and labor unrest, in part a 
renewal or continuation of the artisans' struggle during the previous 
century for job security and benefits. While Suarez was president, a 
tailors' demonstration in Bogota against the importation of military 
uniforms led to several deaths at the hands of the Presidential Honor 
Guard in what has been termed a baptism of blood of the Colom- 
bian working class. On coffee estates in the upper Magdalena val- 
ley, there were also outbreaks as tenants and sharecroppers defied 
landlords who tried to prevent them from selling on their own 
account. That struggle was not a serious problem in the chief grow- 
ing regions, where small proprietors prevailed, but it was a harbin- 
ger of future agrarian tensions. Above all, labor trouble broke out in 
two rising industries dominated by foreign capital — petroleum and 
bananas. Tropical Oil Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of 
New Jersey, which obtained concession rights in 1916, faced mili- 
tant union organization and two massive strikes during the 1920s. 
Worse still was the banana strike of 1928 against United Fruit, in 



39 



Colombia: A Country Study 

which soldiers fired on strikers and by official admission killed at 
least 13 of them. 

Colombian governments were not wholly insensitive to social 
problems, enacting a limited workers' accident-compensation law 
and a few similar measures. But these laws were little more than 
tokenism, and the inability to think of anything better than harsh 
repression to deal with the banana strike was just one indication of 
the ruling Conservatives' lack of fresh ideas. The year after that 
strike, moreover, brought the first impact of the world economic 
depression, in the form of falling prices for Colombian exports and 
the drying up of possible foreign credit sources. With a looming eco- 
nomic crisis added to the accumulation of other problems, the Con- 
servatives themselves were increasingly disheartened. Unable to 
overcome a deep internal division, they fielded two unsuccessful 
candidates in the presidential election of 1930, one representing 
moderate Conservatives and the other reactionary Conservatives. 
Capitalizing on the Conservative divisions, the Liberals returned to 
power for the first time in almost half a century. 

Reform Under The Liberals, 1930-46 

Enrique Olaya Herrera (president, 1930-34) was a moderate Lib- 
eral who had served as an envoy to the United States under the Con- 
servatives before being elected president. To ease the transition, he 
established a coalition government, with Conservatives in his cabi- 
net and elsewhere, and in Bogota bipartisanship generally prevailed. 
In some parts of the country, however, Liberals who had been accu- 
mulating grievances (real or imagined) during the long Conservative 
ascendancy now seized the opportunity to take revenge. The result 
was spreading violence, especially in the eastern departments, which 
came under control in 1932 only when a border conflict with Peru 
over Leticia, a Colombian outpost on the Amazon, induced members 
of both Colombian parties to set aside hostilities in the cause of 
national defense. The dispute was settled by direct negotiations in 
1934, when Peru recognized Colombian sovereignty over the port. 

Colombia weathered the Great Depression rather successfully. 
More than half of the population was still rural and able to feed 
itself, while a sharp fall in coffee prices was partially offset by 
increased volume. The Olaya administration followed an orthodox 
policy of cutting expenses while at the same time raising tariffs, 
measures that both saved foreign exchange that would have gone to 
imports and stimulated domestic manufacturing. The government 
did not show great interest in fundamental social or economic 
reform, although it did more than previous Conservative administra- 



40 



Historical Setting 



tions. New legislation established the eight-hour working day and 
explicitly guaranteed the right of labor to organize. Also, Colombia 
finally gave married women the same rights as their husbands to dis- 
pose of property, but suffrage for women remained a topic too hot to 
handle, as a result of both traditionalist Roman Catholic views on the 
role of women and Liberal fears that women would be too prone to 
vote as their priests suggested. 

Olaya's successor, Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (president, 1934-38, 
1942-45), was more receptive to the demands for change being put 
forward by labor activists, avant-garde intellectuals, and the recently 
founded Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), whose support he 
accepted, without giving it any formal share of power. He abandoned 
coalition government and grandly titled his program the Revolution 
on the March. His main service to organized labor was simply to 
reject any notion of using force (as the Conservatives had done) 
against strikers and to side instead with the workers in labor dis- 
putes. He sponsored the first agrarian reform law for rural workers, 
the effectiveness of which is still debated but which was a symbolic 
step of some importance. Above all, Lopez presided over a set of 
constitutional amendments that reintroduced universal male suf- 
frage, declared that properly rights were limited by social rights and 
obligations — thereby legitimizing more extensive government regu- 
lation of the economy — and eliminated the previous constitutional 
provision requiring public education to be always in accord with 
Roman Catholic doctrine. The extension of suffrage was, if any- 
thing, a help to the Conservatives, who were strongest in rural areas 
where illiteracy was higher, but the business sectors of both parties 
expressed concern over the treatment of property rights. Even more 
controversial was the education reform of 1936, which, by outlawing 
racial and religious discrimination in education, helped to reopen the 
struggle between clergy and anticlericals that caused such strife in 
the previous century. 

Many even in Lopez's party felt that he was moving too fast. The 
Liberal candidate nominated to succeed him — and who won easily, 
with Conservatives abstaining on the ground that their opponents 
would not allow a fair vote — was a more moderate figure, Eduardo 
Santos Montejo (president, 1938^2). Partisan rancor briefly was 
put aside, but it soon returned, and it intensified once Lopez won re- 
election to a second term in 1942. Distracted by the economic short- 
ages resulting from World War II and by the demands of wartime 
cooperation with the United States, which Colombia had readily 
agreed to while Santos was president, Lopez this time launched few 
reforms but still faced the hostility of those offended by his earlier 



41 



Colombia: A Country Study 

policies. He even had to face one coup attempt by disaffected mili- 
tary; it was unsuccessful, but nevertheless alarming, because Colom- 
bia had for many years experienced nothing of the sort. Shaken by 
the political agitation surrounding him, Lopez resigned from office 
before completing his second term. 

A passionate Francophile, Santos had looked to the United States 
to help support both France and Colombia and the rest of the world 
against Adolph Hitler. The United States, for its part, as it first pre- 
pared for and then entered the war, was anxious to assist reliable 
friends on its southern flank. Hence, the tightening of formal 
U.S. -Colombian relations — while reflecting the growth of economic 
and cultural ties and even a sort of ideological affinity between 
Colombian Liberals and U.S. Democrats — also had much to do with 
developments on the larger world scene. Once the war began, 
Colombia gave full cooperation to the United States both before and 
after Pearl Harbor. The Santos administration never declared war, 
but it expedited the supply of strategic materials and supported all 
proposals for hemispheric defense collaboration made at inter- Amer- 
ican gatherings. Wartime collaboration with the United States even- 
tually reached the point of an outright declaration of war on the 
Axis, made after Lopez had returned to the presidency and techni- 
cally in retaliation for German attacks on Colombian snipping in the 
Caribbean. 

Liberals liked to blame the vehemence of Conservative opposi- 
tion on the supposed influence of European fascism, and undoubt- 
edly Hitler and Benito Mussolini favorably impressed some 
Conservatives. More Conservatives felt an affinity with the Spanish 
variant of fascism under Francisco Franco. More important than for- 
eign ideology, however, was the sheer frustration felt by Conserva- 
tives over their loss of power. The major parties were in fact rather 
evenly matched, although with the balance beginning to tip in the 
Liberals' favor (thanks to the advance of urbanization, among other 
factors). Conservatives insisted that they were the true majority and 
were denied the power they were entitled to by Liberal chicanery. 
After making this charge, Laureano Eleuterio Gomez Castro (presi- 
dent, 1950-53) emerged as the party's national leader and with vitri- 
olic passion denounced everything done by the Liberal regime. 

As if Gomez's relentless opposition were not enough, the Liberal 
leadership found itself attacked on another front by a dissident Lib- 
eral, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. A gifted lawyer and orator of middle-class 
origin, Gaitan espoused a social democratic program not much differ- 
ent from Lopez's Revolution on the March, but he assailed his party's 
establishment as involved in a tacit alliance with its Conservative 



42 



Historical Setting 



counterpart to ward off real change. He appealed in particular to the 
social resentment of the middle and working classes against the 
mostly well-born and lighter-skinned figures who staffed the higher 
levels of government and of all the nation's institutions. When he pre- 
sented himself as candidate for president in 1946, Gaitan carried 
Bogota and several other large cities, while the Liberal machine was 
able to control most smaller Liberal strongholds and deliver their vote 
to the party's official candidate. The two Liberal contenders between 
them received a majority of the vote, but thanks to their division the 
winner was the Conservative, Luis Mariano Ospina Perez (president, 
1946-50). 

Things Come Apart, 1946-58 
La Violencia 

The Liberals' fall from power because of a party split was an 
exact reproduction, with party roles reversed, of the Conservatives' 
defeat in 1930. What came next also eerily resembled earlier events. 
Ospina, like Olaya previously, chose to ease the transition by form- 
ing a coalition government, and at the upper levels this approach at 
first worked reasonably well. In the backcountry, things were differ- 
ent; only this time reempowered Conservatives provoked trouble by 
setting out to avenge themselves on Liberals — and to make sure the 
Conservative Party would not again be cast into opposition. Out- 
breaks of violence spread through much of the country, so that what 
came to be called La Violencia (The Violence) actually began in 
1946 rather than (as is sometimes said) on April 9, 1948, the day that 
the assassination of Gaitan set off the orgy of rioting known as the 
Bogotazo. The riots were not limited to Bogota, but that is where the 
greatest destruction and loss of life occurred. 

The official investigation identified Gaitan 's murderer as an 
unbalanced individual acting on his own, and this remains the most 
likely explanation, but the Liberal masses assumed that he had been 
struck down by a Conservative conspiracy. They proceeded to loot 
stores owned by the oligarchy in the hope that the government would 
fall. The Liberal top command, which had shortly before withdrawn 
its members from Ospina's coalition in protest over mounting car- 
nage in the countryside, briefly shared the latter hope. But Ospina 
refused to resign, the army gradually regained control in Bogota, and 
the Liberal leaders reluctantly rejoined the government for the sake 
of restoring order in time of crisis or, in the view of Gaitan's hard- 
core followers, to form a united oligarchic front against the demands 
of the people. Violence did diminish in the immediate aftermath of 



43 



Colombia: A Country Study 

April 9, but it built up again, particularly as the date for new elec- 
tions drew near. Before the next presidential vote, the Liberals again 
left the government and at the last minute withdrew their candidate 
on the grounds that, in the climate of violence, no fair election was 
possible. The Conservative most hated by the Liberals, Gomez, thus 
won the presidency unopposed in 1950, but in such a way that most 
Liberals refused to regard him as a legitimate ruler. 

Except for the Bogotazo, La Violencia was overwhelmingly rural. 
It was also vicious, with atrocities freely committed by Conservative 
police or vigilantes as well as by Liberal guerrillas, who received no 
formal endorsement from party directorates but enjoyed widespread 
sympathy. In certain enclaves of PCC strength, self-defense forces 
arose that would develop into communist guerrilla bands. Gomez 
himself, who took office in 1950, proposed a long-term solution to 
Colombia's problems in the shape of a constitutional reform project 
that would have retained some democratic forms but showed obvi- 
ous borrowing from Franco's Spain. Making little headway against 
the violence, however, he steadily lost support even within his own 
party. On November 5, 1951, Gomez, because of his delicate health, 
temporarily ceded power to his minister of government, Roberto 
Urdaneta Arbelaez. Hours after Gomez resumed his presidency on 
June 13, 1953, military leaders loyal primarily to former President 
Ospina replaced Gomez with General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (presi- 
dent, 1953-57). Beneath the veneer of military nonpartisanship, 
Rojas was close to the Ospinista wing of the Conservative Party. 

Repressed Liberals and all but hard-core followers of Gomez 
greeted the 1953 coup with sighs of relief. A few Liberals joined the 
government, and many Liberal guerrillas accepted Rojas's offers of 
amnesty; for a time, the level of political violence subsided. How- 
ever, Rojas made no serious effort to win over the guerrillas, and 
eventually violence picked up again; it was also changing. The orig- 
inal political conflict between Liberals and Conservatives became 
increasingly blurred by elements of economic competition and 
sheer banditry, using the party labels as banners to cover actions 
carried out for material gain. Rojas tried brute force against those 
who failed to accept his overtures, but without much success, and so 
the death toll kept climbing. By 1957 it had reached a cumulative 
total on the order of 175,000, in a population that had grown by 40 
percent since 1946 to more than 14 million. Meanwhile, a string of 
Rojas's arbitrary actions — together with allegations of personal 
enrichment — eroded his support among both Liberals and Ospinista 
Conservatives. In May 1957, he was overthrown by another coup, 
organized by civilian leaders of both parties in conjunction with 



44 



Colonial architecture in Cartagena 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 



45 



Colombia: A Country Study 

members of the business elite. A provisional military junta took his 
place but turned the government over to a sui generis bipartisan 
coalition the following year. 

Growth Amid Mayhem 

Death and destruction dominated news from Colombia during the 
years of La Violencia, but other things were happening, including 
steady economic growth — in 1945-55 the GDP increased at an 
annual rate of 5 percent. This growth was fueled in part by favorable 
world prices for coffee, still by far the leading export, which in the 
early 1950s for the first time pierced the dollar-a-pound barrier (and, 
of course, a dollar then was worth much more). The Conservatives' 
generally probusiness stance encouraged domestic and foreign 
investment, although the Conservatives were willing for government 
to take a hand in the development process when they considered it in 
the national interest. When the Tropical Oil Company's concession 
expired in 1951, a state corporation, the Colombian Petroleum 
Enterprise (Ecopetrol), took over production from its wells, but 
Tropical still shared in marketing. At roughly the same time, the 
government established a Colombian steel industry in the mining 
town of Paz de Rio in Boyaca Department; private enterprise had not 
yet shown sufficient interest even though steel was deemed a neces- 
sary aspect of modernization. There was also a further increase in 
protective tariffs, representing a more explicit commitment to 
import-substitution industrialization than had been shown by the 
Liberals in the Great Depression years. During 1945-55, industrial 
output grew at 9 percent a year. 

Among the obvious winners from higher import duties were own- 
ers of the Medellin textile factories, who were generally good Con- 
servatives. The interest of workers in those same factories was a 
chief concern of the Union of Colombian Workers (UTC), which 
was founded in 1946 with government support and Jesuit advisers 
and grew rapidly in the industrial sector. The older Liberal and com- 
munist unions, whose main strength had been in transportation and 
services, suffered harassment if not outright repression. But govern- 
ments of the period also introduced a few innovations in social pol- 
icy intended to benefit the working class. The Conservatives 
produced a scheme of industrial profit-sharing as well as the first 
social security legislation, albeit initially with very limited coverage. 
For his part, Rojas established a state welfare agency, part of whose 
mission was to offer relief to victims of La Violencia; it bore some 
resemblance to the Eva Peron Foundation in Argentina, a similarity 
that became more pronounced when Rojas placed his daughter in 



46 



Historical Setting 



charge of it. His flirtation with the model of Peronist Argentina was 
likewise evident in his sponsoring of a new labor confederation that 
ostensibly rejected Colombia's traditional partisan feuding in favor 
of a populist ideology similar to Peron's Justicialismo (Fairness). 
However, this last effort was not very successful, and by angering 
not only the existing unions but also the church, which had ties with 
the UTC, it contributed to his overthrow. More lasting achievements 
of Rojas were the introduction of television, in 1954, and the final 
adoption of suffrage for women, by vote of a largely handpicked 
assembly. Rojas named the first woman to a cabinet post, but he held 
no election in which women could exercise their vote — that hap- 
pened only after he left office. 

Another development of La Violencia was increased urbanization, 
reflecting not just the pull of industrial employment and other urban 
opportunities but also the flight of campesinos from strife-torn rural 
areas. By the end of the 1950s, Bogota had finally surpassed 1 mil- 
lion in population, and secondary cities grew rapidly as well, so that 
Colombia continued to be an exception to the common Latin Ameri- 
can pattern of a single primate city vastly overshadowing the rest. 
Altogether the urban population was now close to equaling that of 
the countryside. This shift meant that a greater percentage of Colom- 
bians would have access to education and social benefits and also 
that the pace of all sorts of change was likely to accelerate, with con- 
sequences difficult to foresee. 

The National Front, 1958-78 

Instituting the Coalition Government 

Those who engineered the fall of Rojas were determined to cure 
their country of the partisan animosities that first produced La Vio- 
lencia and then led, indirectly, to Rojas's rather mild dictatorship. 
Their solution was the National Front (Frente Nacional), a bipartisan 
coalition whose system of government was first approved by plebi- 
scite and would last through four presidential terms. Liberals and 
Conservatives would alternate in the presidency while equally shar- 
ing cabinet posts and other appointive offices. Positions in Congress, 
department assemblies, and municipal councils were likewise allo- 
cated equally to the two parties until the return of unrestricted elec- 
toral competition in 1974. But the other key aspect of the National 
Front, the equal sharing of appointive positions — in which more was 
at stake because far more people were involved — was extended 
another four years, so that the system formally expired in 1978. Even 
after that, much of it remained in effect. 



47 



Colombia: A Country Study 

The power-sharing plan succeeded brilliantly in its primary objec- 
tive: Liberals and Conservatives no longer had an incentive to fight 
each other, and many lost interest altogether in their ancient rivalry. 
Political violence diminished sharply, thanks not only to the elimina- 
tion of traditional antagonisms but also to a combination of military 
action and social assistance in specific areas. Furthermore, the 
charge most commonly made against the arrangement, that it stifled 
democracy by totally excluding other parties, is not entirely accu- 
rate. Quite apart from the relative insignificance of other parties in 
Colombia up to that point, they could still take part in elections by 
presenting themselves as dissident factions of either major party and 
competing for a share of that parly's quota of seats in Congress or 
some other body. The communists continued to compete, and occa- 
sionally win election, by the expedient of calling themselves Liber- 
als on election day. Even more successful was the movement headed 
by Rojas on his return from temporary exile and known as the Popu- 
lar National Alliance (Anapo). It ran candidates under both party 
labels, put a sizeable contingent in Congress, and nominated Rojas 
for president in 1970, for a term that under National Front rules had 
to go to a Conservative. Combining populist appeals to leftist nation- 
alism and Roman Catholic traditionalism a mixture of "vodka 

and holy water," one critic observed — he came close to winning a 
plurality, in a race against three more conventional Conservative 
candidates. According to his supporters and some others, Rojas did 
win, but backcountry chicanery deprived him of the presidency. 

The alleged electoral fraud in 1970 seriously weakened percep- 
tions of the National Front's legitimacy. The system also had certain 
undesirable and unintended consequences. The internal factions of 
each major party competed for their party's guaranteed share of 
offices in a way that was often unseemly even though it could never 
affect the balance between the parties, all of which tended to dis- 
credit the political system generally. Apart from the Anapo phenom- 
enon, which with the declining health of Rojas soon petered out after 
the 1970 election, party politics simply became less interesting. 
Indeed, in some quarters there was outright revulsion against the 
existing regime, to the extent that a varied assortment of disaffected 
Colombians threw in their lot with the leftist guerrillas that began to 
make their appearance just as La Violencia wound down. 

One guerrilla organization was the pro-Soviet Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an outgrowth of earlier com- 
munist self-defense forces that never made peace with Rojas and 
survived the military offensives launched against them by the 
National Front. The FARC remained a largely campesino force, 



48 



Historical Setting 



whereas the National Liberation Army (ELN), inspired by the Cuban 
Revolution, attracted more urban students and professionals. A 
smaller group, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), was of Maoist 
inspiration. These were only the most important guerrilla forces, but 
by the mid-1970s all had seemingly been contained in large but 
remote areas where the presence of the state had been close to non- 
existent and where the guerrillas were mostly out of sight and out of 
mind. 

Sociocultural Changes 

The strength of leftist guerrillas was due in part to disillusion with 
the social and economic achievements of the National Front; yet 
these were hardly negligible. Alberto Lleras Camargo (president, 
1945^6, 1958-62) was the first president elected under its terms. In 
1945^6 Lleras Camargo had filled out the term of Alfonso Lopez 
on the latter 's resignation, and he then gained international prestige 
as the first head of the Organization of American States (OAS). Lle- 
ras Camargo now pushed hard for a new agrarian reform law, which 
passed in 1961. The purpose of the measure was to defuse social ten- 
sions in the countryside, and although its main aim was to resettle 
the landless — or those whose plots were simply too small to support 
a family — on public land rather than break up existing estates, there 
was provision for the latter as a last resort. The main implementa- 
tion, combined with some co-optation of campesino organizations, 
came during the presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (president, 
1966-70), a cousin of Lleras Camargo and easily the most vigorous 
of all National Front executives, who surrounded himself with eager 
young technocrats. If subsequent administrations had shown the 
same interest in the problems of the peasantry, it might have been 
harder for the new wave of leftist guerrillas to gain a foothold; unfor- 
tunately, such was not the case. 

Progress in education was more striking. The plebiscite creating 
the National Front specified that henceforth at least 10 percent of the 
national budget should be devoted to education, and the target was 
regularly exceeded. One result was that the illiteracy rate, which had 
been almost 40 percent, fell in two decades to around 15 percent. 
Secondary enrollments doubled, admittedly from a very low level, 
during the 1960s alone. Such quantitative improvements were all the 
more notable in light of the rapid increase of population numbers 
and thus of those needing schooling. The annual rate of population 
increase reached a record 3.2 percent in the 1960s, and the figure 
would have been higher except for legal and illegal emigration to 
oil-rich Venezuela. Colombian officials were perfectly aware of the 



49 



Colombia: A Country Study 

problem this posed for adequate provision of public services. They 
accordingly adopted family-planning programs, which were neces- 
sarily low-key because of disapproval both from Roman Catholic 
traditionalists and from leftists who claimed to see a U.S. plot to 
limit the number of proletarian antiimperialists. But the programs 
were successful — by 1980 the rate of increase was roughly 2 per- 
cent, one of the sharpest declines registered in any country. 

Official promotion of family planning was one sign of the declin- 
ing influence of what had once seemed an all-powerful Roman Cath- 
olic Church. Another was the return of legalized divorce, even if 
only for persons married in a civil, not a religious, ceremony. How- 
ever, the church itself was changing. As in other Latin American 
countries, there was a segment of the priesthood that not only 
responded to the Second Vatican Council's call for renewal but also 
embraced the new tenets of liberation theology (see Glossary). In a 
few cases, this element carried disenchantment with the existing 
order to the point of joining hands with Marxist revolutionaries. One 
such priest was the charismatic Camilo Torres Restrepo, who after 
enlisting in the ELN died in combat in 1966. As a whole, the Colom- 
bian clergy was probably more conservative than the continental 
average. But it was lower-case "conservative," for the automatic 
identification of Roman Catholic clergy with the Conservative Party 
was a thing of the past. Also gone was the rabid anti-Protestantism 
that led a good many priests during La Violencia to urge on the faith- 
ful in attacks against the country's small Protestant minority, consid- 
ered beyond the pale as both religiously heretical and politically 
Liberal. Now it even happened that Roman Catholic priests and Prot- 
estant pastors might amicably take part in the same civic events. 

In economic policy, the National Front indulged in no lavish 
spending to court popular support and reward followers, as under 
Latin American populist regimes, but neither did it set off runaway 
inflation. Net growth was most of the time unspectacular, but it was 
at least uninterrupted. Governments did continue to promote import- 
substitution industrialization, of which one result was the definitive 
establishment of a Colombian automobile industry during the 1960s. 
But export promotion was not neglected, with tax rebates favoring 
the emergence of Colombia as the world's second-ranking (after the 
Netherlands) exporter of cut flowers. The flower industry was based 
primarily in the area around Bogota, which offered both a favorable 
temperate climate and easy access to international air transport as 
well as a significant increase in employment opportunities for 
women. Other aspects of economic growth, along with the spread of 
education, likewise helped more women to find work outside the 



50 



Historical Setting 



home, and there was even one more legal change in women's status 
when mothers were finally placed on the same footing as fathers in 
authority over their own children (see Family, ch. 2). 

The slow but steady economic growth and the sociocultural 
changes that accompanied it did not meet everyone's expectations, of 
course, particularly given that the National Front had been launched 
amid quite unrealistic hopes and promises of all kinds. The contrast 
with neighboring Venezuela and with the developed-world scenes in 
movies or in the ever-more-widespread medium of television also con- 
tributed to disappointment, and certainly much remained to be done. 
Educational coverage expanded, but the quality was too often poor. 
Infrastructure was sorely inadequate. A railroad from Bogota to the 
Caribbean was finally completed in 1961, but there was no integrated 
rail network, and that which the country had was soon deteriorating as 
officials concentrated on building highways, which still were far from 
meeting its needs. Per capita income increased, and inequality in 
income distribution tended to diminish, thanks in part to the greater 
educational opportunities and the effect on the labor market of slower 
population growth. Yet in absolute terms, income inequality remained 
high, with far too many Colombians living well below the poverty 
line. Poverty was less extreme in urban areas, where an ever-greater 
proportion of Colombians lived, than in the countryside, but in the cit- 
ies it was also more visible. 

The Contemporary Era, 1978-98 

The agreement to share government positions equally between 
Liberals and Conservatives expired in 1978. However, there 
remained a constitutional requirement to give the runner-up party an 
"equitable" share of appointments, and the next president — a Liberal 
politician of Lebanese descent, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (president, 
1978-82) — interpreted this requirement as meaning that he should 
give Conservatives a quota proportionate to their share of elected 
members of Congress. That amounted to roughly 40 percent. With 
two Liberals splitting their party's vote next time around, a Conser- 
vative, Belisario Betancur Cuartas (president, 1982-86), succeeded 
Turbay and reverted to the system of the two parties each having a 
half share of appointments. Single-party rule reappeared only when 
Conservatives declined to accept the slice of patronage offered to 
them by Virgilio Barco Vargas (president, 1986-90), the Liberal 
elected after Betancur. Barco was not displeased, feeling that biparti- 
san government, by diluting responsibility, had contributed to the 
decline of public confidence in the political system; indeed, he did 
not really try very hard for Conservative collaboration. In practice, 



51 



Colombia: A Country Study 

however, there was no sharp difference between Barco's administra- 
tion and those preceding it, and neither were there any longer signif- 
icant policy differences between the traditional parties. The religious 
question, once hotly fought over, had disappeared from politics. 
Both parties supported the relative fiscal orthodoxy that spared 
Colombia the hyperinflation and unmanageable foreign debt afflict- 
ing various regional republics; and both were willing to maintain 
macroeconomic stability even at the expense of further investment in 
infrastructure and social services. Thus, the radical left was not 
wholly unjustified in regarding Liberals and Conservatives as two 
branches of a single establishment party. 

Popular election of mayors, provided for in a 1985 constitutional 
amendment, did not necessarily improve the quality of local govern- 
ment, where entrenched clientelism (see Glossary) and, in most 
places, extreme fiscal penury were hard to overcome. Even so, local 
elections were a step toward greater openness, allowing anyone to 
compete for positions to which incumbents formerly were appointed 
by the governors, who in turn were appointed by the president. 
Although Conservatives were shut out of Barco's cabinet, when the 
reform first went into effect they won the mayor's office in both 
Bogota and Medellm (thanks to Liberal divisions), while a new 
Patriotic Union (UP) party, with informal ties to the revolutionary 
left, picked up 16 mayoralties (out of 1,009 nationwide). 

The Rise of Drug-Trafficking Organizations 

Neither changes in the distribution of cabinet posts nor the elec- 
tion of mayors had much effect on the increasingly negative popular 
perceptions of the political system, and another reason for this was 
the sudden rise of the illicit drug industry. In Colombia as elsewhere, 
illegal drugs were nothing new, but in the Colombian case the rapid 
expansion of the drug trade in the last quarter of the twentieth cen- 
tury had obvious destabilizing effects. The phenomenon first 
attracted attention in the 1970s, when the isolated mountain range 
just south of Santa Marta, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, became 
the source of large amounts of marijuana grown for the United States 
market, but this was a short-lived boom. Production did not cease, 
but the Colombian product was competing against improved North 
American cannabis, and counternarcotics efforts likewise took a toll. 

More serious was the emergence of Colombia in the following 
decade as the leading supplier of cocaine. Colombia was not at first a 
major producer of the coca plant and its coca paste derivative, which 
came principally from Peru and Bolivia, but Colombia had compara- 
tive advantages as processor and distributor. The country's location 



52 



Historical Setting 



in the northwest corner of the continent meant that shipments could 
easily be made to either coast of the United States and to Europe. In 
addition, entrepreneurial skills were rather more developed in 
Colombia, most notably in Antioquia, where it further happened that 
the textile industry was facing hard times because of an increase in 
contraband imports. It is thus not altogether surprising that, in the 
1980s, what was loosely termed the Medellin Cartel gained notoriety 
as the world's leading supplier of cocaine. Within that cartel, the key 
player was Pablo Escobar Gaviria, who was not just a gifted entre- 
preneur but also a second-string Liberal politician, local philanthro- 
pist, and employer of squads to kill both inconvenient rivals and 
public servants intent on enforcing the laws. The most eminent vic- 
tims of the cartel and its associates were the Colombian minister of 
justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who was assassinated on April 30, 
1984, and, five years later, the Liberal reformist Luis Carlos Galan, 
who was the odds-on favorite to succeed Barco as president in the 
next election. 

The excesses of the drug barons inevitably provoked countermea- 
sures by the Colombian authorities, with eager U.S. encouragement. 
Escobar himself was induced to surrender, on promise of lenient 
treatment, but still escaped from his comfortable prison, although 
police tracked him down and killed him on a Medellin rooftop as he 
attempted to flee in 1993. Yet even before his death, the Medellin 
Cartel had lost its preeminence, thanks to the rise of the rival Cali 
Cartel plus assorted minicartels and independent operators. Drug- 
processing laboratories continued to be raided, shipments inter- 
cepted, and the occasional member of the drug industry extradited to 
face charges in the United States, but the narcotics problem did not 
go away. In fact, certain new elements entered the picture. One was 
the rapid increase of coca cultivation in Colombia itself, which ulti- 
mately outstripped Peru and Bolivia in production. Another was the 
increasing involvement of leftist guerrillas as well as of the paramil- 
itary groups that arose to combat them. These forces generally began 
by extorting protection money from growers, processors, and export- 
ers but increasingly took a hand themselves, at least in processing 
and commercialization. And, by the 1990s, Colombia was becoming 
an important source of heroin from opium poppies, although the 
country's role in supplying heroin was far more limited than in 
cocaine. 

Coca plantings and most processing laboratories were in areas of 
scant state presence, so the scope of the illicit drug industry was hard 
to estimate and susceptible to frequent exaggeration. One often read 
that the drug lords "controlled" Colombia, but they were not even 



53 



Colombia: A Country Study 

interested in controlling most of what went on — only in staying 
alive, out of jail, and not extradited to the United States. Partly 
because of declining world coffee prices, illegal drugs came to sur- 
pass coffee in export value but did not outstrip mineral 
exports — petroleum, coal, and nickel — which in the late twentieth 
century were gaining new importance. Nor did the drug industry 
ever come close to coffee as a source of employment. The influx of 
dollars from drug sales contributed to an upward revaluation of 
Colombian currency, which inevitably had an adverse effect on the 
nation's legal exports. Drug dollars may have helped Colombia 
maintain its exemplary record of foreign-debt service, although it 
can be argued that even this apparent benefit was offset by a loss of 
revenues from legitimate business and by the increase in police and 
security expenditures. By purchasing protection from government 
officials as well as guerrillas or paramilitaries, primary figures in the 
industry fostered official corruption, and by their willingness to use 
violent intimidation when corruption was not enough, they further 
demoralized the weak criminal justice system. 

The Spread of Leftist Insurgencies 

Among the negative consequences of the illegal drug industry, the 
most serious was the impulse it gave to the advance of leftist guerril- 
las (and their paramilitary counterparts). The most notable sign of a 
resurgence of the revolutionary left after its low point in the early to 
mid-1970s was the rise of a new group, the Nineteenth of April 
Movement (M-19). Typically led by disenchanted middle-class pro- 
fessionals, the M-19 was ideologically more moderate than other 
guerrilla forces — more social democratic than Marxist — and it spe- 
cialized in urban operations. One such was its seizure on February 
27, 1980, of the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota with a 
party of ambassadors within; the standoff ended peacefully, after 61 
days, with the grant of safe-conduct out of the country for the terror- 
ists and payment of an undisclosed ransom. The M-19 overreached 
itself on November 6, 1985, when it seized the Palace of Justice, also 
in Bogota. The outcome of an army counterattack was the death of 
all but a few of the hostage takers and many hostages, including half 
of the Supreme Court of Justice. Weakened and discredited, the 
M-19 subsequently agreed with the Barco administration to lay 
down arms and enter legal political competition, which for a time it 
did with conspicuous success. 

A few other guerrilla organizations, including the EPL, also 
entered into demobilization agreements, but not the ELN and the 
FARC. After being nearly defeated, the ELN made a striking come- 



54 







■ ■ ■ J 


1 i 






jjjj 




Plaza de Bolivar, Bogota, before the destruction of the Palace of Justice 
(not visible) on November 6-7, 1985. Seen in the background on the right 
is the National Capitol; in the foreground on the right, the mayor s office; 

and on the far left, the National Cathedral. 
Courtesy Embassy of Colombia, Washington, DC 



back largely because of its success in extorting the German firm con- 
structing a pipeline to transport the oil from newly developed fields 
in the llanos. When that work was finished, the ELN kept on extort- 
ing funds from oil-industry suppliers and contractors, local govern- 
ment agencies, and private citizens, in the latter case through the act 
or mere threat of kidnapping for ransom. It took to applying similar 
tactics against other industries and in other parts of Colombia, 
although, like the M-19, it avoided deep entanglement with illicit 
drugs. The FARC did not show similar restraint. By far the largest 
revolutionary organization, the FARC became larger still as it 
branched out from the extortion of ranchers and other commonplace 
ways of raising money to selling protection to coca growers and pro- 
cessors and, ultimately, entering the drug business on its own 
account. With its bulging war chest, it could import arms and recruit 
idle youths at far better pay than offered by army or police. The ELN 
and the FARC continued to operate mainly outside urban areas, but 
they committed acts of terrorism in the cities from time to time, and 
the growing epidemic of kidnapping brought the conflict home to 



55 



Colombia: A Country Study 

middle- and upper-class Colombians, living almost exclusively in 
the cities, in a manner not before experienced. 

The areas under effective guerrilla control were increasing, 
although they tended to be peripheral and thinly inhabited. Almost 
no part of Colombia was wholly safe from a sudden attack on the 
local police station or the abduction for ransom of some wealthy cit- 
izen or even of the less wealthy — crimes sometimes perpetrated by 
common criminals copying guerrilla methodology. The problem thus 
seemed to be getting worse, even though Colombia's GDP and most 
social indicators were generally improving, at least until the mid- to 
late 1990s. And popular support for the FARC and the ELN, which 
had once been around 1 5 percent in some opinion surveys, declined 
almost to the vanishing point thanks to the steady degradation of 
guerrilla tactics. The improvement in guerrilla finances was natu- 
rally one reason for the paradox. To some extent, moreover, Colom- 
bia was paying the price for its success over the years in containing 
military influence. The armed forces (including the National Police) 
simply lacked the personnel and equipment needed to root out politi- 
cal and criminal violence— both drug trafficking and leftist insur- 
gency — over a vast expanse of poorly connected regions. Human 
rights abuses by government forces became all too common, yet the 
attachment of the country's rulers to democratic forms ruled out the 
frankly dictatorial response used against guerrilla movements in the 
Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. 
Neither had the government, or the general public, taken the problem 
seriously enough — until it was already out of hand. 

Some of the guerrillas' victims chose to take matters into their 
own hands, unleashing a spiral of counterguerrilla violence. This 
phenomenon first gained attention in the early 1980s, when members 
of the Medellin Cartel formed the group Death to Kidnappers 
(MAS), in response to the foolhardy seizure of one of their loved 
ones by the M-19, and landowners of the central Magdalena valley, 
tired of extortions, banded together to rid the area of radical trouble- 
makers by fair means or foul. MAS and similar groups in different 
parts of the country, conventionally dubbed right-wing paramilitar- 
ies, made little distinction between guerrilla fighters and real or 
alleged sympathizers, and one result was decimation of the ranks of 
the UP, including assassination of its leader who had run for presi- 
dent in 1986 and its presidential candidate in 1990 (slain before the 
election). The paramilitaries were not right-wing in any ideological 
sense, for they were a mixed assortment united only by hatred of the 
guerrillas. Like the latter, they sold protection and extorted and, if 
not already part of the drug industry, became entangled with it; they 



56 



Historical Setting 



generally did not kidnap, but they committed countless massacres of 
suspected guerrilla supporters. Despite their unsavory reputation, 
paramilitary forces in some areas developed an unacknowledged 
alliance with the army and National Police, which, according to crit- 
ics, relied on them to do their dirty work and were certainly less 
inclined to crack down on them simply because they shared a com- 
mon foe. 

New Departures and Continuing Problems 

In the view of many Colombians, the epidemic of multifaceted 
violence resulted in considerable part from the rigidity of the coun- 
try's institutions. The existing constitution, dating back to 1886 and 
holding a record in Latin America for longevity, was seen as part of 
the problem. Accordingly, President Virgilio Barco agreed to the 
holding of a referendum, in May 1990, in which an overwhelming 
majority of voters approved the holding of a convention to reform 
the constitution. President Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (president, 
1990-94), the Liberal who a few weeks later succeeded Barco (and 
who reinstituted coalition government), moved quickly to convoke 
new elections for members of the Constituent Assembly. Some 
jurists seriously questioned the legality of the procedure, but the 
elections were held, albeit with a disappointingly high abstention. 
The eventual outcome was the constitution of 1991, easily the most 
democratic in Colombian history and also the most complicated. 

The new charter further reduced government centralization, for 
example, by specifying that departmental governors as well as may- 
ors should be elected, although the governors' independent authority 
was still less than in a truly federalist regime. It revamped the elec- 
toral system, required that the Senate be chosen by proportional rep- 
resentation on a nationwide basis, supposedly to counteract the evil 
influence of local bosses, and provided for special representation in 
Congress of the Amerindian and Afro-Colombian minorities. It con- 
tained a long list of sweeping individual rights, such as the right to 
work and special rights of children and adolescents. There was even 
the right not to be extradited to the United States, because an article 
prohibiting extradition of Colombian citizens was written into the 
text on the understanding that in return the drug lords would mend 
their behavior. A procedure of tutela was established whereby citi- 
zens whose rights had been abused could seek a writ of protection 
against the offending party. The new constitution also completed dis- 
establishment of the Roman Catholic Church by dropping any refer- 
ence to Roman Catholicism as the religion of the nation, placing all 
denominations on an equal footing, and extending the relegalization 



57 



Colombia: A Country Study 

of divorce, timidly granted for couples in civil marriage in 1976, to 
cover religious unions as well. 

There was something in the new constitution to please almost 
everyone, and in its immediate aftermath the mood of euphoria was 
such that some Colombians hoped that the FARC and the ELN, rec- 
ognizing the constitution's democratic and egalitarian bent, would 
agree to lay down arms and pursue their objectives peacefully under 
its framework. Alas, no such thing happened. Neither did the drug 
problem go away; on the contrary, it returned to center stage when 
narco-traffickers made massive contributions to the campaign chest 
of Gaviria's successor, Ernesto Samper Pizano (president, 1994-98), 
and for his entire term he labored under the resulting cloud of dis- 
trust. The degree of administrative decentralization entailed onerous 
transfers of funds from the national treasury to the regions, taking 
money from other urgent needs and handing it to local politicians 
who did not always use it properly. The tutela device corrected some 
injustices, but at the cost of further clogging an overburdened legal 
system. Other articles of the constitution, too, either did not live up 
to expectations or had regrettable unintended consequences. Thus, 
before long the amendment provisions were put to use in changing 
one article or another, including, in 1997, the prohibition of extradi- 
tions, which had vastly annoyed the United States. The basic frame- 
work nevertheless remained in place, while Colombians settled 
down to argue over other things. 

Drugs and guerrillas remained at the forefront of public discus- 
sion and debate, for both problems appeared resistant to all 
attempted countermeasures. A newer source of controversy was the 
Colombian version of the neoliberal and globalizing policies 
adopted in so much of Latin America, with strong urging from 
Washington and assorted international agencies, during the last 
decade of the twentieth century. Some steps toward a greater open- 
ing (aperturd) of the economy occurred earlier, but President 
Gaviria was the leader who firmly committed Colombia to this path. 
Restrictions on foreign trade and investment loosened, at first gradu- 
ally and then more abruptly, and the flow of foreign goods and capi- 
tal duly increased, even though deficiencies in Colombian 
infrastructure limited the impact of policy changes. Privatization, 
another aspect of the neoliberal agenda, was also limited both 
because it was politically impossible for the government to divest 
itself of Ecopetrol, the preeminent state enterprise, and because in 
Colombia the public sector was not a particularly large employer. 

The reduction in tariffs and elimination of numerous controls 
affecting foreign trade did have some clearly positive effects: for 



58 



■ 



A sculpture donated by 
Colombian artist Fernando 
Botero at the entrance to 
Bogota s Parque La 
Esperanza on 26th Street 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 




example, the availability of inexpensive foreign ingredients for 
chicken feed led to more protein in the Colombian diet. However, in 
Colombia as elsewhere greater opening to the world economy 
favored those with specialized training over unskilled workers, and, 
more broadly, capital as against labor, with a resultant increase in 
socioeconomic inequality. And while in the agricultural sector, those 
most affected by the competition of imports were large-scale com- 
mercial producers, some of the loudest protests against apertura 
came from the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, whose 
own production was not greatly threatened but who had borne much 
of the brunt of continuing rural violence and seized upon the evils of 
globalization as an effective way to publicize their other, quite justi- 
fied, grievances and frustrations. 

Colombia thus ended the twentieth century a land of many contra- 
dictions. A popularly elected government was in place, with no 
chance of being overthrown, yet unable to assert effective control 
over much of the nation's territory. Among Latin American nations, 
Colombia held a record for most consecutive years of economic 

growth stretching back to the 1930s and uninterrupted until 

1999 — but a majority of its inhabitants lived in poverty, and income 
distribution remained highly unequal. Colombians such as Gabriel 
Garc a M rquez in literature, Fernando Botero in painting and sculp- 
ture, and several performers of popular music were esteemed 
throughout the Western world, but the standard image attached to the 
country was one of violence and criminality. Among Colombians 



59 



Colombia: A Country Study 

themselves, there was a steady stream of emigrants seeking greater 
opportunities and security in the United States or other developed- 
world destinations. Nevertheless, the human and material resources 
for a turn for the better were clearly present. 

* * * 

On pre-Columbian history, Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff's Colom- 
bia indigena is a masterful overview, of which an earlier version in 
English is titled simply Colombia. On the colonial era, there is 
Anthony McFarlane's Colombia Before Independence: Economy, 
Society, and Politics under Bourbon Rule, and for the independence 
period, Rebecca Earle's Spain and the Independence of Colombia, 
1810-1825. For the nineteenth century, Frank Safford's The Ideal of 
the Practical: Colombia s Struggle to Form a Technical Elite covers 
considerably more than its stated topic of technical education; James 
E. Sanders's Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and 
Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia is a recent analysis covering 
the second half of the century, particularly in the southwest; Jaime 
Jaramillo Uribe's El pensamiento colombiano en el siglo XIX is a 
classic history of ideas; and Jose Antonio Ocampo's Colombia y la 
economia mundial, 1830-1910 analyzes one critical aspect of eco- 
nomic development. Charles W. Bergquist's Coffee and Conflict in 
Colombia, 1886-1910 covers politics and economics in the transition 
from nineteenth century to twentieth. James D. Henderson's Modern- 
ization in Colombia: The Laureano Gomez Years, 1889-1965 takes 
the story to the 1960s, and John W. Green's Gaitanismo, Left Liberal- 
ism, and Popular Mobilization in Colombia examines an abortive but 
significant left-Liberal movement at midcentury. On La Violencia in 
the later 1940s and 1950s, German Guzman Campos, Orlando Fals 
Borda, and Eduardo Umana Luna's La Violencia en Colombia: Estu- 
dio de un proceso social has not been surpassed. The most recent 
developments are covered in several excellent compilations of con- 
tributed chapters, including Eduardo Posada-Carbo's Colombia: The 
Politics of Reforming the State and Cristina Rojas and Judy Meltzer's 
Elusive Peace: International, National, and Local Dimensions of 
Conflict in Colombia. Two readily available general surveys of 
Colombian history are David Bushnell's The Making of Modern 
Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself and Frank Safford and Marco 
Palacios's Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. The second 
edition of the 1 1 -volume Nueva historia de Colombia edited by Jara- 
millo Uribe, with the assistance of Alvaro Tirado Mejia, Jorge 
Orlando Melo, and Jesus Antonio Bejarano, offers contributions on 



60 



Historical Setting 



topical themes by Colombian and some foreign specialists. Economic 
history is surveyed by William Paul McGreevey's An Economic His- 
tory of Colombia, 1845-1930 and the collaborative Historia 
economica de Colombia, edited by German Colmenares and Jose 
Antonio Ocampo. Although it goes only to the 1960s, the historical 
review of political development in Robert H. Dix's Colombia: The 
Political Dimensions of Change remains useful. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



61 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Top: An indigenous geometric design, Museo Zambrano, Pasto, Narino 
Department 

Bottom: An indigenous geometric design 

Courtesy Carlos Arturo Jaramillo Giraldo, Murmullos del lenguaje Uik: 
La practica del mopa mopa: De lo recolector a lo sedentario, MedelUn, 
1986, 83 



COLOMBIA IS KNOWN FOR ITS DIVERSE ethnicities and cul- 
tures and its tradition of producing world-renowned novelists and 
artists, as well as for its disparate and spectacular geography, ranging 
from beautiful Pacific and Caribbean coastlines to the three awe- 
inspiring Andean cordilleras that divide the country between the 
coastal lowlands and the expansive eastern plains (llanos) and the 
dense Amazonian jungle of the southeast. Perhaps because of its 
Andean topography and sociocultural diversity, national unity has 
long eluded this divided nation. 

Supposedly unifying factors are a common religion (Roman 
Catholicism) and language (Spanish) and a long tradition of consti- 
tutional government, with varying degrees of political stability. Nev- 
ertheless, the society has low levels of solidarity and social trust; 
citizens are too wary of each other to develop enough social cohe- 
sion to build an effective and functioning state. Instead, some schol- 
ars characterize Colombians as extreme individualists who are 
heedless of the social effects of their actions. Rather than identify 
with the state, which is seen as an institution distant from the people 
and of benefit only to those in power who control it, most Colom- 
bians limit their social bonding to families and small social circles. 

Extreme regionalism — fostered by the country's geographical and 
sociocultural divisions — historically has prevailed over national cul- 
tural and political unity and made Colombia one of Latin America's 
most regionalist nations. As Rafael Nunez Moledo, president in the 
late nineteenth century, observed, Colombia "is not a single national- 
ity, but a group of nationalities, each one needing its own special, inde- 
pendent, and exclusive government." Even longtime residents of 
Bogota, the country's capital, retain their original departmental identi- 
fication. Colombia's traditionally low levels of national identification 
and regard for the rule of law, combined with sharp socioeconomic 
inequalities and political exclusion, have made the country a very fer- 
tile ground for breeding endemic violence, illegal narcotics trafficking, 
corruption, and other social ills. 

The country's internal armed conflict has been fraught with social 
and environmental degradation, much of it resulting from cultivation 
of crops of coca (the plant that is processed for cocaine) and poppy 
(the flower from which heroin is derived). Another by-product of the 
internal conflict, which has included terrorizing of campesinos and 
other rural residents by the illegal armed groups, has been massive 
displacement of the rural population and its movement to tugurios 



65 



Colombia: A Country Study 

(slums) in cities. This forced displacement reflects not only a shift 
away from agriculture but also a flight from guerrilla and paramili- 
tary terrorism and problems associated with military operations and 
occupations of towns. Yet rampant criminal violence is even worse. 
It is hardly reassuring that scholars such as Eduardo Pizarro 
Leongomez have pointed out that between 80 and 90 percent of 
Colombia's homicides have resulted from criminal rather than politi- 
cal violence. The total number of uniformed insurgents and paramil- 
itaries is probably well under 25,000, whereas perpetrators of 
criminal violence — most of it carried out with impunity — probably 
number in the hundreds of thousands. 

Other serious social problems include widespread child labor, 
child abuse and child prostitution, and extensive societal discrimina- 
tion against indigenous people and minorities. Post-traumatic stress 
disorder has been common and untreated, with many of its victims 
among the vast numbers of displaced people (desplazados), includ- 
ing children. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sex- 
ual exploitation is a major criminal industry in Colombia. Although 
the country's laws mandate economic and social equality of women 
with men, women in Colombia nevertheless continue to suffer from 
sexism and extensive societal discrimination. 

Some social advances appear more mixed than clear-cut. The 
autonomous Comptroller General's Office (Contraloria General de la 
Republica) estimated that between 50 and 60 percent of the popula- 
tion remained in poverty in 2005. The World Bank figure for 2005 
was 52.6 percent. The administration of Alvaro Uribe Velez (presi- 
dent, 2002-6, 2006-10) cited a lower estimate that the number of 
those living below the poverty line had fallen to 49.5 percent of the 
population from 57 percent in 2002. The estimate of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America was also lower, at 46.8 percent of the 
population in 2005. Government estimates of extreme poverty indi- 
cated a reduction from 26 percent of the population in 2002 to 15 
percent in 2005. The field of education too showed mixed progress. 
Enrollment in basic and primary education rose from 9.6 million 
children in 2001 to 10.9 million in 2005, while the figures for ter- 
tiary education increased from 1 million to 1 .2 million in the same 
period. However, enrollment in secondary education in 2004 was 
only 54.9 percent, while enrollment at primary schools included 83.2 
percent of pupils in the relevant age-group. In short, despite being 
resource rich and broadly literate, Colombia remains socially 
divided and troubled. 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



Physical Setting 

South America's fourth-largest and Latin America's fifth-largest 
country, Colombia measures 1,138,910 square kilometers (including 
insular possessions and bodies of water), or nearly the same size as 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom combined. Of this total, 
land constitutes 1,038,700 km 2 and water, 100,210 km 2 . Located in 
the northwestern part of South America, Colombia is bordered by 
the Caribbean Sea to the north and the North Pacific Ocean to the 
west. With a total of 3,208 kilometers of coastline, it is the only 
country in South America with littorals along both the Caribbean 
(1,760 kilometers) and the Pacific (1,448 kilometers). Colombia 
claims a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, a 12-nautical- 
mile territorial sea, and jurisdiction over the continental shelf to a 
200-meter depth or to the depth of resource exploitation. Colombia 
has international borders with five nations: Panama, Venezuela, Bra- 
zil, Peru, and Ecuador (see fig. 2). 

In addition to its mainland territory, Colombia possesses or claims a 
number of small islands in the Caribbean Sea, located 1 89 kilometers 
off the coast of Nicaragua and 640 kilometers from the Colombian 
coast. These islands include the Archipielago de San Andres, Provi- 
dencia y Santa Catalina, which forms the country's smallest depart- 
ment with a total land area of about 44 km 2 (Isla de Providencia, 16 
km 2 ; Isla de San Andres, 26 km 2 ; and Isla de Santa Catalina, 2 km 2 ). 
The department has jurisdiction over the following small, uninhabited 
outcroppings of coral banks and cays in the Caribbean: Cayos de Ron- 
cador, 65 km 2 ; Banco de Serrana, 500 km 2 ; Banco de Serranilla (80 
km 2 ), which is mostly lagoons, 1,200 km 2 ; and Banco de Quita Sueno, 
400 km 2 . Several small Colombian islands also lie off the Caribbean 
coast southwest of Cartagena. These include the archipelago of Isla 
del Rosario (8.4 km 2 ), which consists of 27 tiny coral islands south- 
west of Cartagena; Isla San Bernardo (24.4 km 2 ), which is located off 
the coast of Sucre Department; and Isla Fuerte (6.2 km 2 ), which is 
located off the coast of Cordoba Department. In the Pacific, Colom- 
bian territory encompasses Isla de Malpelo (measuring only 0.14 km 2 ) 
lying about 430 kilometers west of Buenaventura, a port city that han- 
dles the largest single share of the country's imports. Nearer the coast, 
a prison colony is located on Isla Gorgona, and lying off this island's 
southern shore is the even smaller Isla Gorgonilla. 

Colombia has had territorial disputes with Nicaragua, Venezuela, 
and, at least technically, the United States. The issue of Nicaragua's 
alleged sovereignty rights over San Andres, Providencia y Santa 
Catalina and 50,000 km 2 of the archipelago's surrounding Caribbean 
waters has occasionally produced diplomatic flare-ups. In December 



67 




2007, the International Court of Justice at The Hague ratified the 
Treaty of Esguerra-Barcenas of 1928, under which Nicaragua recog- 
nized Colombian sovereignty over the Archipielago de San Andres, 
Providencia y Santa Catalina, and Colombia recognized Nicaraguan 
sovereignly over the Costa de Mosquitos. 

Under the Treaty of Quita Sueno, signed on September 8, 1972 
(and ratified in 1981), the United States renounced all claims to the 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



banks and cays of Banco de Quita Sueno, Cayos de Roncador, and 
Banco de Serrana without prejudicing the claims of third parties. The 
U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in 1981. In the meantime, in Decem- 
ber 1979, the new Sandinista government, emboldened by the 
extended delay, revived Nicaragua's longstanding claim over the 
reefs, including Banco de Quita Sueno and Banco de Serranilla, as 
well as the Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y Santa Cat- 
alina. Although the United States recognized Colombian possession 
of Cayos de Roncador, Banco de Serrana, and Banco de Quita Sueno 
in 1981, it claims two small island areas also claimed by Colombia. 
One is Banco de Serranilla, an atoll located about 130 kilometers 
north-northeast of Nicaragua; it has an abandoned military station 
used by the U.S. Marine Corps during the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
an active lighthouse. The other is Bajo Nuevo (also called the Petrel 
Islands), a small, uninhabited, grass-covered reef of 234 km 2 with 
some small islets. Claimed by the United States in 1856 under the 
Guano Islands Act, Bajo Nuevo became a U.S. military site. 
Although most of the "guano islands" claimed by the United States 
in the area of San Andres, Providencia y Santa Catalina were ceded 
to Colombia in 1981, it is unclear whether that is the case with Bajo 
Nuevo, which is also claimed by Jamaica. 

To emphasize its claimed sovereignty over San Andres, Colombia 
began building up a naval presence on the island, including an arse- 
nal of Exocet missiles. In 2001 Nicaragua pursued its claim in the 
International Court of Justice. In July 2002, the dispute flared up 
when Nicaragua began offering offshore oil concessions near the 
disputed waters and asked the court to validate its claim. The court 
ruled in December 2007 that a 1928 treaty awarding Colombia the 
archipelago was valid. However, the court also allowed Nicaragua's 
claim to the waters around San Andres— rich in fish and, potentially, 
petroleum — to move forward. 

Colombia's long-running dispute with Venezuela is over substan- 
tial maritime territory lying off the Peninsula de La Guajira and in 
the Golfo de Venezuela, an area of potential petroleum wealth popu- 
larly referred to by Colombians by its colonial name of the Golfo de 
Coquibacoa. The dispute is theoretically being resolved through pro- 
longed bilateral negotiations, although elements of national prestige 
continue to make it a major issue in both countries. The dispute has 
centered on control over the entrance to the Golfo de Venezuela. The 
key to establishing this control has been ownership of the Islas Los 
Monjes, a chain of three small rock outer oppings lying at the gulf's 
northern mouth. Although now owned by Venezuela, these islands 
are located in the relatively narrow maritime zone claimed by 



69 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Colombia. The latter projects its maritime boundary on the basis of 
Colombian ownership of 36 kilometers of the gulf's 748-kilometer 
coast (the remainder is Venezuelan territory). In April 2009, the 
Colombian government dismissed as speculation Caracas news 
reports that the dispute was nearly resolved. 

Geology 

As in the rest of South America, a combination of external and 
internal tectonic, volcanic, and glacial forces over the aeons formed 
Colombia's present-day geology. Island-like outcroppings in the 
eastern llanos are visible remnants of Precambrian times when 
Colombia consisted of metamorphic rocks. During the 332-million- 
y ear-long Paleozoic Era, which began 570 million years ago, the 
ocean again invaded Colombia's Andean zone, as subterranean vol- 
canic eruptions in the western part of the country spouted lava. In the 
Triassic Period of the 143 -million-year-long Mesozoic Era, which 
began 240 million years ago, the sea that occupied the Andean zone 
separated into two parts after the Cordillera Central rose. Large lay- 
ers of sedimentary rock were deposited during the Jurassic Period, 
which ended with great igneous activity. During the Cretaceous 
Period, the sea to the east of the Cordillera Central extended to Putu- 
mayo in the south, while subterranean volcanic activity continued to 
the west of the Cordillera Central. During the 63 -million-year-long 
Tertiary Period of the Cenozoic Era, which began about 65 million 
years ago, the seas withdrew from most of Colombia's territory, and 
enormous granite masses formed along the Cordillera Occidental. 
The three Cordilleras began to take shape 12 million years ago. The 
Cordillera Occidental and the Cordillera Central form the western 
and eastern sides of a massive crystalline arch, which extends from 
the Caribbean lowlands to the southern border of Ecuador. The Cor- 
dillera Oriental, however, is composed of folded stratified rocks 
overlying a crystalline core. 

Tectonic movement of the Cordilleras continues today, as evi- 
denced by frequent seismic activity. Indeed, Colombia remains part 
of the Ring of Fire, an active seismic area that surrounds the Pacific 
basin. The country is located where three lithospheric plates — Nazca, 
Caribbean, and South American — converge, and their movement pro- 
duces different types of geologic faults. Almost all of the country's 
many earthquakes in recent centuries have occurred in the mountain- 
ous and coastal regions. Recent major earthquakes include those in 
Popayan on March 31, 1983, and in the nation's coffee-growing belt 
on January 25, 1999; and one on March 6, 1987, on the border with 
Ecuador, measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale. Recent earthquakes that 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



struck Colombia's Pacific coast areas have included one accompa- 
nied by a tsunami in Tumaco, Narino Department, on December 12, 
1979, measuring 7.9 on the Richter scale, the largest in northwestern 
South America since 1942; another on November 15, 2004, with a 
magnitude of 6.7; and one on September 10, 2007, measuring 6.8. 
Although construction standards are high for new buildings in the 
main cities, smaller cities and rural zones are particularly vulnerable 
to earthquakes. 

Geography 

Colombia's most prominent geographical feature is the Andes, with 
its three nearly parallel, trident-like Cordilleras that divide the country 
from north to south between the coastal areas to the west and northeast 
and eastern Colombia. Although geographers have devised different 
ways to divide Colombia into regions, Colombian geographers prefer 
to divide the mainland territory into five major geographic or natural 
regions: the lowland Caribbean and Pacific regions; the Andean 
region, which includes the high Andes Mountains, the intermontane 
high plateaus, and the fertile valleys that are traversed by the country's 
three principal rivers; the llanos region, lying to the east of the Andes 
Mountains and bordered on the east by the Orinoco; and the Amazo- 
nian region, which is the tropical rainforest {selva) south of the llanos 
and the Ariari and Guaviare rivers that includes but is not limited to 
Amazonas Department (see table 3, Appendix). Colombia also has a 
very minor, sixth, insular region consisting of Isla de Malpelo and the 
Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y Santa Catalina. 

Caribbean Lowlands 

The Caribbean lowlands consist of all of Colombia north of an 
imaginary line extending northeastward from the Golfo de Uraba to 
the semiarid Peninsula de La Guajira in the northern extremity of the 
Cordillera Oriental adjoining the Venezuelan border, an area bearing 
little resemblance to the rest of the region. The Caribbean lowlands 
form roughly a triangular shape, the longest side being the coastline. 
Most of the country's foreign trade in general moves through Ba- 
rranquilla, Cartagena, Santa Marta, and the other port cities along the 
Caribbean coast. Inland from these cities are swamps, hidden 
streams, and shallow lakes that support banana and cotton planta- 
tions, countless small farms, and, in higher places, cattle ranches. 
The Caribbean lowlands region merges into and is connected with 
the Andean highlands through the two great river valleys of the 
Magdalena and the Cauca; it is the second most important region in 
economic activity. Most of the Caribbean lowlands population is 



71 



Colombia: A Country Study 

concentrated in the urban centers and port cities, especially Barran- 
quilla, Santa Marta, Cartagena, and Valledupar. 

Swamps separate the Caribbean lowlands from the base of the 
Isthmus of Panama. What is sometimes referred to as the Atrato 
swamp — in Choco Department adjoining the border with Panama — is 
a deep marsh, about 100 kilometers in width, that for decades has 
challenged engineers seeking to complete the Pan-American High- 
way. This stretch where the highway is interrupted is known as the 
Tapon del Choco. Environmentalists have warned that the thick jun- 
gle of the Darien region, a lush rainforest with one of the highest 
degrees of biodiversity in the world, provides an essential natural buf- 
fer zone between Colombia and Panama. Although the Tapon del 
Darien (Darien Gap) is currently protected in both countries by its 
national reserve status, powerful free-trade lobbies have been pres- 
suring for paving the gap in the highway. The Norwegian Refugee 
Council, a private foundation known for accurate reports, stated in 
April 2007 that "paramilitary groups have displaced thousands of 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities such as the Embera 
and Waounan people in northwestern Choco to pave the way for proj- 
ects such as a planned transoceanic canal, an inter-American high- 
way, oil-palm plantations, and logging." Opponents argue that, in 
addition to its adverse regional environmental consequences, com- 
pleting the highway gap will only provide an easier route for smug- 
gling drugs through what will still be an effectively lawless area. In 
2008-9 Colombian guerrillas were increasingly retreating into Pan- 
ama's Darien region to seek refuge, smuggle drugs overland, and 
recruit indigenous Panamanian youth. 

Pacific Lowlands 

The Pacific lowlands consist of a narrow, sparsely populated, 
coastal region of jungle and swamp with considerable, but little- 
exploited, potential in minerals and other resources. Population den- 
sity is no more than five inhabitants per square kilometer. The popu- 
lation is mostly (80 percent) black, with the remainder consisting of 
mestizos (mixed white European and Amerindian ancestry), mulat- 
toes (mixed black and white ancestry), and whites. Buenaventura is 
the only port of any size on the 1,306-kilometer coastline, making it a 
popular corridor for illegal narcotics shipments. On the east, the 
Pacific lowlands are bounded by the Cordillera Occidental, from 
which numerous rivers run. Most of the rivers flow westward to the 
Pacific, but the largest, the navigable Atrato, flows northward to the 
Golfo de Uraba, making the riverine settlements accessible to the 
major Atlantic ports and commercially related primarily to the Carib- 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



bean lowlands hinterland. To the west of the Atrato rises the Serrania 
de Baudo, an isolated chain of low mountains that occupies a large 
part of the region. Its highest elevation is less than 1,800 meters, and 
its vegetation resembles that of the surrounding tropical forest. 

Andean Highlands 

The Andean highlands region includes three distinct Cordilleras, 
which constitute 33 percent of the country's land area. The Andes 
divide into cordilleras near the Ecuadorian frontier. They extend 
northwestward almost to the Caribbean Sea and in the northeast 
toward Venezuela. Elevations reach more than 5,700 meters, and 
some mountain peaks are perennially covered with snow. The ele- 
vated basins and plateaus of these ranges have a moderate climate 
that provides pleasant living conditions and in many places enables 
farmers to harvest twice a year. Torrential rivers on the slopes of the 
mountains are the source of major hydroelectric power potential and 
add their volume to the navigable rivers in the valleys. On the nega- 
tive side of the ledger, Colombia's mountains provide a place of ref- 
uge for illegal armed groups that are associated with the cultivation 
of illicit crops, such as coca and poppy. 

The Cordillera Occidental, which extends from the Ecuadorian 
border to the Golfo del Darien, is the lowest and least populated of 
the three main cordilleras. Its western slope is not as steep as that of 
the Cordillera Oriental. Summits are only about 3,000 meters above 
sea level and do not have permanent snows. Few passes exist, 
although one that is about 1,520 meters above sea level provides the 
major city of Cali with an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. The relatively 
low elevation of the Cordillera Occidental permits dense vegetation, 
which on its western slopes is truly tropical. The eastern side of the 
Cordillera Occidental, however, is a sheer wall of barren peaks. 

The Cordillera Central also begins at the Ecuadorian border, 
where several volcanoes are located, including the 4,276-meter Ga- 
leras, which erupted most recently in February and June 2009. The 
Cordillera Central is the loftiest of the mountain systems. Its crystal- 
line rocks form an 800-kilometer-long towering wall dotted with 
snow-covered mountains, all of which are volcanoes. There are no 
plateaus in this range and no passes under 3,300 meters. The highest 
peak in this range, the Nevado del Huila, reaches 5,439 meters above 
sea level. The second highest peak, Nevado del Ruiz, erupted on 
November 13, 1985, and more recently on April 15, 2008. Like the 
Cordillera Occidental, the Cordillera Central at its northern end sep- 
arates into two smaller sierras, or serramas, in the shape of two- 
pronged forks. 



73 



Colombia: A Country Study 

The Cordillera Oriental begins farther north, branching off from 
the Cordillera Central at Las Papas node, in the general area where 
the Caqueta rises. The length and width of the Cordillera Oriental 
make it the largest of the three Andean chains, although, with eleva- 
tions generally between 2,500 and 2,700 meters, not the highest. Far- 
ther north, around Cucuta, near the border with Venezuela, the 
Cordillera Oriental makes an abrupt turn to the northwest. The high- 
est point of this range, the Sierra Nevada de Cocuy, rises to 5,493 
meters above sea level. The northernmost region of the range is so 
rugged that historically it has been easier to maintain communica- 
tions and transportation with Venezuela than with the adjacent parts 
of Colombia. Abutting the Caribbean coast to the east of Barranquilla 
rises the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, an isolated, lofty mountain 
system; its slopes generally are too steep for cultivation. This range, 
which is a detached continuation of the Cordillera Oriental, includes 
Colombia's highest point at Pico Cristobal Colon (5,776 meters). The 
other branch of the Cordillera Oriental tapers out at the Peninsula de 
La Guajira. 

The intervening high plateaus and fertile valley lowlands are 
where about 95 percent of the Colombian population resides. This 
intermontane region is traversed mainly by three river systems: the 
Atrato, Sinu, and Magdalena. The Cordillera Occidental is separated 
from the Cordillera Central by the deep rift of the 1,350-kilometer- 
long Cauca valley, which has an elevation of 1,000 meters. The 
1,0 13 -kilometer-long Cauca, which is the major tributary of the 
Magdalena, rises within 200 kilometers of the border with Ecuador 
and flows through some of the best farmland in the country. After the 
two cordilleras diverge, the Cauca valley becomes a deep gorge all 
the way to the Caribbean lowlands, where the Cauca finally flows 
into the Magdalena. 

Between the Cordillera Central and the Cordillera Oriental flows 
the Magdalena, which is considered a world-class river. It rises in 
southwestern Colombia about 1 80 kilometers north of Ecuador at an 
elevation of 3,685 meters, where the Cordillera Oriental and the Cor- 
dillera Central diverge. It runs for 1,612 kilometers through 18 of the 
country's 32 departments before reaching the Caribbean Sea, provid- 
ing a major transportation artery and the only natural source of inter- 
regional connection. The Magdalena's spacious drainage basin, which 
covers 257,438 square kilometers, or 24 percent of Colombia, is fed 
by numerous mountain torrents originating at higher elevations. (As a 
result of global warming, the once-prevalent snowfields at these 
higher elevations are rapidly disappearing.) The Magdalena is gener- 
ally navigable for 990 kilometers, from its mouth in Barranquilla as 



74 




The agricultural village ofVillapinzon, Cundinamarca Department 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (David Mangurian), 

Washington, DC 

Characteristic red-tiled roofs in Boyacd Department 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 



75 



Colombia: A Country Study 

far as the town of Neiva, deep in the interior in Huila Department, but 
is interrupted midway by the rapids of Honda in Tolima Department, 
from which it becomes Colombia's principal riverine outlet to the 
Atlantic. The largest of the intermontane valleys, the Magdalena val- 
ley has a very deep floor that runs no more than about 300 meters 
above sea level for the first 800 kilometers from the river's mouth, ris- 
ing to about 400 meters over the rest of the Magdalena's length. 

As much as 79 percent of Colombia's population, including that 
of the country's four largest cities, listed in order of popula- 
tion — Bogota, Medellfn, Cali, and Barranquilla, as well as Bucara- 
manga — is located in the Magdalena watershed. Thus, this basin has 
a high demographic density of 120 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Bogota is located in the Cundinamarca subbasin on the western side 
of the Cordillera Oriental, at an elevation of 2,650 meters above sea 
level. In the Cordillera Oriental, three large fertile basins and a num- 
ber of small ones provide suitable areas for settlement and intensive 
economic production. To the north of Bogota, on the densely popu- 
lated plateaus of Chiquinquira and Boyaca, are fertile fields, mines, 
and some of the large industrial establishments that produce much of 
the national wealth. Still farther north, in the department of San- 
tander, the valleys on the western slopes are more spacious, and agri- 
culture is intensive in the area around Bucaramanga. Finally, the 
Cordillera Oriental, which separates the Magdalena valley from the 
llanos, has on its eastern slope one of the most biologically rich areas 
on the planet, helping to make Colombia one of the world's 10 most 
biologically diverse countries. 

Eastern Llanos and Amazonia 

The vast llanos and jungle areas east of the Colombian Andes total 
about 63 1 ,000 square kilometers, or 54 percent of the country's area, 
but Colombians view the eastern regions almost as alien zones. 
Despite the extensive size of eastern Colombia, less than 3 percent of 
the total population resides in the nine eastern lowlands departments, 
with a population density of less than one person per square kilometer. 

In the northern part of eastern Colombia, the eastern plains, also 
known as the llanos or Orinoco region, total about 310,000 km 2 . 
This region is unbroken by highlands except in Meta Department, 
where the Macarena Sierra, a branch of the Andes, is of interest to 
scientists because its vegetation and wildlife are believed to be remi- 
niscent of those that once existed throughout the Andes. Raising cat- 
tle is by far the most common economic activity in the piedmont 
areas of the llanos near the Cordillera Oriental. However, although 
the llanos region was traditionally used to raise cattle, it is now the 
main oil-producing region. 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



The southern half of eastern Colombia, measuring 315,000 km 2 , 
consists of the selva, or Amazonia. This region was of little eco- 
nomic interest until the emergence of the cocaine trade and the 
expansion of tropical coca-growing areas. In the Amazon basin, pop- 
ulation density is only 0.24 inhabitants per square kilometer. 

Many of the numerous large rivers of eastern Colombia are navi- 
gable and, in the Amazonian region, are the principal means of trans- 
portation. The Ariari and Guaviare rivers divide eastern Colombia 
into the llanos subregion in the north and the selva subregion in the 
south. In the llanos region, the Guaviare and the rivers to its north 
drain northeast into the basin of the Orinoco, the largest river in Ven- 
ezuela. The rivers to the south of the Guaviare flow southeast into 
the basin of the Amazon, which originates at an elevation of 4,300 
meters near Pasco, at Lauricocha, a Peruvian lake. 

Climate 

Being situated on the equator, Colombia has a striking variety in 
temperatures, mainly as a result of differences in elevation. Temper- 
atures range from very hot at sea level to relatively cold at higher 
elevations but vary little with the season. Breezes on the Caribbean 
coast, however, reduce both heat and precipitation. The habitable 
areas of the country are divided into three climatic zones: hot (tierra 
caliente), below 900 meters in elevation and with temperatures usu- 
ally between 24°C and 27°C (a minimum of 1 8°C and a maximum 
near 38°C); temperate {tierra templada), 900 to 2,000 meters, with 
an average temperature of 18°C; and cold {tierra fria), from 2,000 
meters to about 3,500 meters, with annual temperatures averaging 
13°C. In the high, bleak, treeless mountain areas (usually referred to 
as the paramos) above 3,000 meters, there are very cold tempera- 
tures, often between -17°C and -13°C. Some of Colombia's moun- 
tains are perennially covered with snow and ice above 4,600 meters. 

Average monthly minimum and maximum temperatures range 
from 9°C to 21°C in March (the hottest month) and 8°C to 19°C in 
July and August (the coldest months). At low elevations, tempera- 
tures may vary between 24°C and 38°C. Changes in these tempera- 
tures (not rainfall) determine the seasons. There are alternating dry 
and wet seasons corresponding to summer and winter, respectively, 
although in Colombia the dry summer iyerand) and wet winter {invi- 
erno) do not coincide with the North American seasons of the same 
names. 

About 86 percent of the country's total area lies in the hot zone. 
Included in the hot zone, and interrupting the temperate area of the 
Andean highlands, are the long and narrow northern valley extensions, 



77 



Colombia: A Country Study 

including those of the Magdalena valley and the smaller Cauca valley. 
The tree line marks the approximate limit of human habitation. 

The temperate zone covers about 8 percent of the country. This 
zone includes the lower slopes of the Cordillera Oriental and the 
Cordillera Central and most of the intermontane valleys. The impor- 
tant cities of Medellm (1,487 meters) and Cali (1,030 meters) are 
located in this zone, where rainfall is moderate, and the mean annual 
temperature varies between 19°C and 24°C, depending on the eleva- 
tion. In the higher elevations of this zone, farmers benefit from two 
wet and two dry seasons each year; January through March and July 
through September are the dry seasons. 

The cold or cool zone constitutes about 6 percent of the total area, 
including some of the most densely populated plateaus and terraces 
of the Colombian Andes, such as Bogota itself and its environs. The 
mean temperature ranges between 10°C and 19°C, and the wet sea- 
sons occur in April and May and from September to December, as in 
the high elevations of the temperate zone. 

In Bogota average temperature ranges vary little, for example, 
10°C-18°C in July and 9°C-20°C in February. The average annual 
temperature is 15°C, and the difference between the average of the 
coldest and the warmest months is less than 1°C. More significant, 
however, is the average daily variation in temperature, from 5°C at 
night to 17°C during the day. 

Precipitation is moderate to heavy in most parts of the country; 
overall average annual precipitation is 3,000 millimeters. The heavier 
rainfall occurs in the Pacific lowlands and in parts of eastern Colom- 
bia, where rain is almost a daily occurrence and rain forests predomi- 
nate. Precipitation exceeds 7,600 millimeters annually in most of the 
Pacific lowlands, making this one of the wettest regions in the world, 
especially in Choco Department, which receives an average annual 
rainfall of nearly 10,160 millimeters. Extensive areas of the Carib- 
bean interior are permanently flooded, more because of poor drainage 
than because of the moderately heavy precipitation during the rainy 
season from May through October. In eastern Colombia, precipitation 
decreases from 6,350 millimeters in portions of the Andean piedmont 
to 2,540 millimeters eastward. In contrast, the Caribbean coastal La 
Guajira Department is the driest place in Colombia, with an average 
annual rainfall of only 254 millimeters. 

Environment 

In recent decades, Colombia has made important progress in pro- 
tecting its environment, not only by enacting laws and adopting new 
policies, but also by establishing a system of national parks and forest 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



reserves covering more than 25 percent of the country. Article 79 of 
the 1991 constitution establishes that "It is the right of the State to 
protect the diversity and integrity of the environment, conserve the 
areas of special ecological importance, and develop education to 
achieve these ends." A 1993 law created the National Environmental 
System and a Ministry of the Environment to manage it. Subse- 
quently, the requirements for obtaining an environmental license 
before starting any new infrastructure project were tightened. Also in 
the early 1990s, the government created more than 200 specially pro- 
tected zones, most of which are forest areas and national parks. In 
addition to promoting reforestation projects, the government adopted 
fiscal incentives for the use of alternative energy sources and imports 
to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. 

Although Colombia's CO 2 emissions are relatively low, they grew 
by 40 percent in the 1990s. As a non-Annex I Party to the Kyoto 
Protocol, Colombia is not bound by specific targets for greenhouse 
gas emissions. According to the Human Development Report 2007/ 
2008 of the United Nations Development Programme, Colombia, 
with 0.7 percent of the world's population, accounts for 0.2 percent 
of global emissions — an average of 1.2 tons of CO 2 per person. 
These emission levels are below those of other countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 

In the late 1990s, research by the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia showed that deep-rooted African 
grasses that are prevalent in the llanos region have enormous poten- 
tial for slowing the buildup of CO 2 , a major greenhouse gas, in the 
earth's atmosphere. The ability of these grasses to store large amounts 
of carbon in the soil means they can slow the global warming that has 
been linked to atmospheric buildup of CO 2 , according to CIAT 
researchers. Other harbingers of global warming include the spread of 
disease-carrying mosquitoes. Aedes aegypti mosquitoes that can carry 
dengue and yellow-fever viruses were previously limited to below 
1,006 meters of elevation but recently appeared at 2,195 meters in 
Colombia. 

Colombia's environmental protection measures have been weak- 
ened as a result of the Ministry of the Environment restructuring in 
late 2002, when the government renamed it the Ministry of Environ- 
ment, Housing, and Territorial Development and gave greater prior- 
ity to business interests. Despite the setbacks, environmentalists 
helped to pressure Alvaro Uribe Velez (president, 2002-6, 2006-10) 
into vetoing a forestry law approved by Congress (Congreso de la 
Republica) in December 2005 that had favored commercial exploita- 
tion of forests. 



79 



Colombia: A Country Study 



Air and water pollution is a growing health problem in Colombia, 
with half of the population living in cities of more than 100,000 
inhabitants. Air pollution exceeds acceptable standards in the indus- 
trial corridors of Bogota-Soacha, Cali-Yumbo, Medellin-Valle de 
Aburra, Sogamoso, and Barranquilla. Only about one-third of the 
country's 1,120 municipalities have adequate treatment systems for 
contaminated water. Of Colombia's cities in general, 20 percent 
lacked sewerage as of 2006, constituting a serious environmental 
problem for the country. Insufficient drainage in most built-up areas 
and the disposal there of garbage in natural channels have contrib- 
uted to frequent urban flooding. The Bogota, one of Colombia's 
most heavily polluted rivers, flows into the Magdalena at the port of 
Girardot, transporting chemical residues from the cut-flower indus- 
try and tanneries. Pollution of the Bogota has severely affected its 
fish population. In the 1970s, the annual catch of fish in the river was 
some 70,000 tons, but in the 1980s this amount shrank to 40,000 
tons, falling further in the 1990s to 20,000 tons, and by 2007, to only 
8,000 tons. 

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ranked 
Colombia second in Latin America and seventh in the world in terms 
of average annual renewable freshwater resources. Nevertheless, 
nearly 12 million Colombians have no access to clean water, and 4 
million have only limited access, such as a public faucet. According 
to a 2004 survey of the Residential Public Services Superintendency 
(SSPD), only 72 percent of those receiving public services had water 
of potable quality. In some places, the water supply system's pres- 
sure is not adequate, increasing the risk of bacterial contamination. 
Colombia's governmental Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and 
Environmental Studies predicts that, absent corrective action, 69 
percent of the Colombian population will suffer from a lack of clean 
water by 2025. According to government estimates, 65 percent of 
Colombia's municipalities could face water shortages by 2015 
because of soil erosion. 

Colombia's forests cover about half of its territory, and in Novem- 
ber 2007 the country had 11.6 million hectares in protected areas of 
the National Natural Parks System, or more than 10 percent of the 
national territory. Nevertheless, the country's abundant rivers and 
streams have long been degraded as a result of guerrilla sabotage of 
oil pipelines and the use of chemicals in the coca-refining process. 
Illicit drug crops grown by campesinos in the national parks of the 
Sierra de la Macarena and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta have con- 
tributed to deforestation and soil and water pollution. Herbicides and 
pesticides used to eradicate the coca crop have had an adverse 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 

impact on farmlands. Fumigation efforts have been criticized for 
harming the health of Colombians and Ecuadorians, killing legal 
crops along with the illegal ones, poisoning the soil and water, and 
jeopardizing the growing of legal crops in the future. Ironically, 
spraying reportedly has the least effect on coca, and farmers often 
can resow coca only six months after spraying. The Human Rights 
and Displacement Consultancy (Codhes), an authoritative non- 
governmental organization (NGO) that works with Colombia's 
desplazados, claimed in early 2006 that at least 17,000 people had 
been displaced (perhaps only temporarily) by United States-backed 
aerial spraying of coca plantations. The U.S. Department of State 
reported that 171,613 hectares of coca and poppy crops were fumi- 
gated in Colombia in 2006. 

Spraying also has had significant diplomatic consequences. It has 
heightened border tensions with Ecuador, in particular because of 
claims that Colombian spraying in the border area has damaged 
Ecuadorian land and imperiled human health. The densest concen- 
tration of coca cultivation for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) in Colombia is reportedly in Narino, next to the 
Ecuadorian border. Ecuador has demanded that Colombia cease aer- 
ial spraying within 10 kilometers of the border. Although the Uribe 
government has insisted that spraying drug crops with the toxic her- 
bicide glyphosate is harmless, Ecuador's protests forced the Colom- 
bian government to revert to manual eradication of coca bushes in 
2007. 

Also of concern to environmentalists is timber exploitation in the 
jungles of the Amazon region and Choco Department, which are 
estimated to contain up to 10 percent of the world's known species 
of flora and fauna. Moreover, average reforestation rates are low 
compared with other Latin American countries with big timber 
industries. Mining activity and clearing of land for cultivation and 
converting it to pasture for cattle raising are other causes of defores- 
tation. Increased mining of gold, marble, and emeralds in tributaries 
of the Magdalena, such as the Cauca basin, have resulted in rapid 
soil erosion and increasing sediment loads. All these factors have 
contributed to the Magdalena being one of the top 10 rivers in the 
world in terms of sediment load. Studies of the Magdalena basin and 
other assessments of land-cover change in Colombia have shown a 
clear correlation between forest loss and expansion of agricultural 
land. Deforestation in the Magdalena basin is estimated to be among 
the highest in the world. It is considerably higher than the national 
average, which was estimated at 1.4 percent per year between 1985 
and 1995. The percentage of forest cover in the Magdalena basin 



81 



Colombia: A Country Study 

was estimated to have declined from 46 percent in 1970 to 27 per- 
cent in 1990, at an annual deforestation rate of 1.9 percent. Between 
1990 and 1996, total forest cover in the basin declined by 15 percent, 
for an average annual loss of 2.4 percent. 

Race and Ethnicity 

Indigenous Peoples 

Present archaeological evidence dates the earliest human habita- 
tion of South America to as early as 43,000 B.C. Anthropologist Tom 
D. Dillehay dates the earliest hunter-gatherer cultures on the conti- 
nent at almost 10,000 B.C., during the late Pleistocene and early 
Holocene periods. According to his evidence based on rock shelters, 
Colombia's first human inhabitants were probably concentrated along 
the Caribbean coast and on the Andean highland slopes. By that time, 
these regions were forested and had a climate resembling today's. 
Dillehay has noted that Tibito, located just north of Bogota, is one of 
the oldest known and most widely accepted sites of early human 
occupation in Colombia, dating from about 9,790 B.C. There is evi- 
dence that the highlands of Colombia were occupied by significant 
numbers of human foragers by 9,000 B.C., with permanent village 
settlement in northern Colombia by 2,000 B.C. 

Colombia's indigenous culture evolved from three main groups — 
the Quimbayas, who inhabited the western slopes of the Cordillera 
Central; the Chibchas; and the Caribs. When the Spanish arrived in 
1509, they found a flourishing and heterogeneous Amerindian popu- 
lation that numbered between 1.5 million and 2 million, belonged to 
several hundred tribes, and largely spoke mutually unintelligible dia- 
lects. The two most advanced cultures of Amerindian peoples at the 
time were the Muiscas and Taironas, who belonged to the Chibcha 
group and were skilled in farming, mining, and metalcraft. The 
Muiscas lived mainly in the present departments of Cundinamarca 
and Boyaca, where they had fled centuries earlier after raids by the 
warlike Caribs, some of whom eventually migrated to Caribbean 
islands near the end of the first millennium A.D. The Taironas, who 
were divided into two subgroups, lived in the Caribbean lowlands 
and the highlands of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. The Muisca 
civilization was well organized into distinct provinces governed by 
communal land laws and powerful caciques, who reported to one of 
the two supreme leaders. 

The complexity of the indigenous peoples' social organization 
and technology varied tremendously, from stratified agricultural 
chiefdoms to tropical farm villages and nomadic hunting and food- 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



gathering groups. At the end of the colonial period, the native popu- 
lation still constituted about half of the total population. In the agri- 
cultural chiefdoms of the highlands, the Spaniards successfully 
imposed institutions designed to ensure their control of the Amer- 
indians and thereby the use of their labor. The colonists had orga- 
nized political and religious administration by the end of the 
sixteenth century, and they had begun to proselytize among the 
Amerindians. 

The most important institution that regulated the lives and welfare 
of the highland Amerindians was the resguardo (see Glossary), a 
reservation system of communal landholdings. Under this system, 
Amerindians were allowed to use the land but could not sell it. Simi- 
lar in some respects to the Native American reservation system of 
the United States, the resguardo has lasted with some changes even 
to the present and has been an enduring link between the government 
and the remaining highland tribes. As land pressures increased, how- 
ever, encroachment of white or mestizo settlers onto resguardo lands 
accelerated, often without opposition from the government. 

The government generally had not attempted to legislate in the 
past in matters affecting the forest Amerindians. During the colonial 
period, Roman Catholic missions were granted jurisdiction over the 
lowland tribes. With the financial support of the government, a series 
of agreements with the Holy See from 1887 to 1953 entrusted the 
evangelization and education of these Amerindians to the missions, 
which worked together with government agencies. Division of the 
resguardos stopped in 1958, and a new program of community 
development began to try to bring the Amerindians more fully into 
the national society. 

The struggle of the indigenous people on these lands to protect their 
holdings from neighboring landlords and to preserve their traditions 
continued into the late twentieth century, when the 1991 constitution 
incorporated many of the Amerindian demands. New resguardos have 
been created, and others have been reconstituted, among forest tribes 
as well as highland communities. The 1991 constitution opened spe- 
cial political and social arenas for indigenous and other minority 
groups. For example, it allowed for creation of a special commission 
to design a law recognizing the black communities occupying unset- 
tled lands in the riverine areas of the Pacific Coast. Article 171 pro- 
vides special Senate (Senado) representation for Amerindians and 
other ethnic groups, while Article 176 provides special representation 
in the House of Representatives (Camara de Representantes): two 
seats "for the black communities, one for Indian communities, one for 
political minorities, and one for Colombians residing abroad." Article 



83 



Colombia: A Country Study 

356 guarantees Amerindian territorial and cultural rights, and several 
laws and decrees have been enacted protecting them. Article 356 
refers somewhat vaguely to both "indigenous territorial entities" and 
indigenous resguardos. 

By 1991 the country's 587 resguardos contained 800,271 people, 
including 60,503 families. The general regional distribution of these 
resguardos was as follows: Amazonia, 88; llanos, 106; Caribbean 
lowlands, 31; Andean highlands, 104; and Pacific lowlands, 258. 
They totaled 27.9 million hectares, or about 24 percent of the national 
territory. Colombia today may have as many as 710 resguardos in 27 
of the 32 departments. 

Descendants of indigenous people who survived the Spanish con- 
quest live primarily in scattered groups in remote areas largely out- 
side the national society, such as the higher elevations of the 
southern highlands, the forests north and west of the Cordilleras, the 
arid Peninsula de La Guajira, and the vast eastern plains and Amazo- 
nian jungles, which had only begun to be penetrated by other groups 
in the twentieth century. The Amerindian groups differ from the rest 
of the nation in major cultural aspects. Nevertheless, although some 
continue to speak indigenous languages (about 80 Amerindian lan- 
guages survive), Spanish, introduced by missionaries, is the predom- 
inant language among all but the most isolated groups. 

Anthropological studies and political interests relating to Amer- 
indian issues have generated data about the ethnic groups that exist 
in Colombia. More than 80 identified ethnic groups or tribes remain, 
scattered throughout the departments and national territories. 
According to the Dallas, Texas-based SIL International (previously 
known as the Summer Institute of Linguistics), in 2005 Colombia 
had 101 known indigenous languages that fell into 14 linguistic fam- 
ilies; 80 were living languages, and 21 were extinct. The Paez (also 
known as Nasa Yuwes) constitute the largest ethnic group, with 
about 123,000 people. Although routed, the Paez survived the Span- 
ish conquest by retreating to their rugged mountain homeland in 
Cauca Department in the southwest of the country. The Wayuus 
(also known as Wayus or Guajiros) make up the next-largest group, 
with 73,000 people living in the semidesert of the Peninsula de La 
Guajira in the country's extreme north. The Paez form a patriarchal 
society, whereas the Wayuus have a matrilineal system that deter- 
mines descendancy, inheritance, property, and residence. The 
15,000-member Embera group forms another important community, 
living in the humid jungle of the Golfo de Uraba region in Choco 
Department in the west near Panama. These three communities 
account for 56 percent of Colombia's Amerindian population. The 



84 




A Wayuu woman at work in the salt reserves of 
Manaure, La Guajira 
Copyright Santiago Harker 

other 44 percent is made up of 77 different groups, many of which 
are in Amazonia; among them are several families that some might 
consider tribes sharing some cultural characteristics. They may num- 
ber about 50,000 people speaking a considerable number of lan- 
guages. The Amerindians from the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta are 
another important group and one that shows strong social cohesion. 
They include the Arhuacos, Armarios, Coguis, and Cunas. 

Although all Amerindian peoples in Colombia have had some 
contact with outsiders, the degree and effect have varied consider- 
ably. Some tribes, such as the Makus, Chiricoas, Tunebos, and 
roughly 3,000 remaining members of the Yagua tribe in the Amazo- 
nia rainforest, have remained very primitive nomadic hunting and 
fishing groups. One of the more isolated and hostile Amerindian 
groups, the Motil ns, in the northeastern lowlands, have been known 
to greet missionary groups and oil company employees encroaching 
in their territory with poisoned arrows and darts. Yet other groups 
are settled farmers with well-developed handicraft industries, and 
some of the most successful tribes have developed effective methods 
of raising cattle. Nonetheless, it was long difficult for Amerindians 
to retain land that they traditionally held, especially in the highlands 
where the competition for cultivable land is keenest. 



85 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Even the indigenous people in Amazonia have not remained 
immune from Colombia's armed conflict. Also, assassins have sin- 
gled out Wayuu leaders in northeastern Colombia. A few tribes, 
most notably the Paez in southern Colombia, have managed to drive 
out the armed intruders using nonviolent civil-resistance tactics 
involving large groups. However, across the country tens of thou- 
sands of Amerindians have become refugees. By the end of 2007, in 
order to escape forced recruitment by the FARC, 406 members of 10 
ethnic groups, mainly in the Mini area along the Vaupes in Amazo- 
nia, had fled into neighboring Brazil, raising the total number of 
Colombian refugees seeking refuge in Brazil s border region over 
the previous four years to 4,000. According to the United Nations, 
some of the smaller tribes are on the verge of disappearing. 

Racial Distinctions 

Colombia's population is descended from three racial groups — Amer- 
indians, blacks, and whites — that have mingled throughout the last 500 
years of the country's history. Some demographers describe Colombia as 
one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the Western Hemisphere, 
with 85 different ethnic groups. Most Colombians identify themselves 
and others according to ancestry, physical appearance, and sociocultural 
status. Social relations reflect the importance attached to certain charac- 
teristics associated with a given racial group. Although these characteris- 
tics no longer accurately differentiate social categories, they still help 
determine rank in the social hierarchy. 

Colombia officially acknowledges three ethnic minority groups: 
the Afro-Colombian, indigenous, and gypsy (Rom, or Romany) pop- 
ulations. The Afro-Colombian population consists of blacks, mulat- 
toes, and zambos (a term used since colonial times for individuals of 
mixed Amerindian and black ancestry). A 1999 resolution of the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice acknowledged the gypsy population 
as a Colombian ethnic group, although gypsies were not recognized 
in the 1991 constitution (unlike the Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
populations). Estimates vary widely, but the 2005 census found that 
the ethnic minority populations had increased significantly since the 
1993 census, possibly owing to the methodology used. Specifically, 
it reported that the Afro-Colombian population accounted for 10.5 
percent of the national population (4.3 million people); the Amer- 
indian population, for 3.4 percent (1 .4 million people); and the gypsy 
population, for 0.01 percent (5,000 people). 

The 2005 census reported that the "nonethnic population," con- 
sisting of whites and mestizos (those of mixed white European and 
Amerindian ancestry, including almost all of the urban business and 



86 



Bogota pedestrians of various ethnicities 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 

political elite), constituted 86 percent of the national population. The 
86 percent figure is subdivided into 49 percent mestizo and 37 per- 
cent white. 

The census figures show how Colombians see themselves in 
terms of race. The actual percentage of Colombians of primarily 
European ancestry may be closer to 20 percent, but many people 
may identify themselves as white when they actually belong in the 
mestizo category. In any case, more than half of Colombians are 
mestizo. Moreover, those recognized as white do not necessarily 
have direct Spanish lineage. Rather, their whiteness is attributed to 
their self-perception of being white. Indeed, according to the late 
Colombian anthropologist Virginia Gutierrez de Pineda, whitening 
(blanqueamiento) is a recurrent practice for social climbing (hier- 
archized mestizaje). She explained that frequently the mix of blacks 
and Amerindians with whites produces a loss of black and Amer- 
indian phenotypic features that facilitates the assimilation into the 
"white tree." 

The various groups exist in differing concentrations throughout the 
nation, in a pattern that to some extent goes back to colonial origins. The 
whites tend to live mainly in the urban centers, particularly in Bogota 
and the burgeoning highland cities. The populations of the major cities 
are primarily white and mestizo. The large mestizo population includes 



87 



Colombia: A Country Study 

most campesinos of the Andean highlands where the Spanish conquer- 
ors had mixed with the women of Amerindian chiefdoms. Mestizos had 
always lived in the cities as well, as artisans and small tradesmen, and 
they have played a major part in the urban expansion of recent decades, 
as members of the working class or the poor. 

According to the 2005 census, the heaviest concentration of the 
indigenous population (22 to 61 percent) is located in the departments 
of Amazonas, La Guajira, Guainia, Vaupes, and Vichada. The second- 
ary concentrations of 6 to 2 1 percent are located in the departments of 
Sucre, Cordoba, Choco, Cauca, Narino, and Putumayo. Amerindian 
communities have legal autonomy to enforce their own traditional 
laws and customs. Despite its small percentage of the national popula- 
tion, the indigenous population has managed to obtain nearly a quarter 
of the country's land titles under the 1991 constitution. 

The black and mulatto populations have largely remained in the 
lowland areas on the Caribbean and Pacific coasts and along the 
Cauca and Magdalena. The Afro-Colombian population is concen- 
trated primarily (2 1 to 74 percent) in the department of Bolivar and 
in the lowland parts of Cauca, Choco, and Valle del Cauca depart- 
ments, with secondary concentrations (16 to 20 percent) in Atlanti- 
co, Cauca, Cordoba, Magdalena, Narino, and Sucre departments. In 
the Choco region, they have largely replaced the Amerindians and 
constitute about 80 percent of the population. 

A minute percentage of the insular population originated in Scot- 
land and Syria. The population of the Archipielago de San Andres, 
Providencia y Santa Catalina, which Colombia inherited from Spain 
after the Spanish had overcome an initial British settlement, is 
mostly Afro-Colombian, including several thousand raizal (those 
with roots) blacks. Despite the length of time during which Colom- 
bia has had jurisdiction over them, most raizales on these Caribbean 
islands have retained their Protestant religion, have continued to 
speak an English-based Creole as well as English, and have regarded 
themselves as a group distinct from mainland residents. Indeed, a 
nonviolent raizal separatist movement has been growing increas- 
ingly vocal in this archipelagic department. 

Since independence both Amerindians and blacks have continued 
to reside on the outskirts of national life, as much because of their 
class and culture as their color. As a group, however, blacks have 
become more integrated into the national society and have left a 
greater mark on it for several reasons. First, they had been a part of 
Spanish society since the Middle Ages, whereas Amerindians were 
new to Spanish social structures. The Spanish had long possessed 
Africans as personal servants and did not find them as alien as the 



The Society and Its Environment 



Amerindians they encountered in the New World. Moreover, it was 
more difficult for the blacks to maintain their original culture 
because, unlike the indigenous people, they could not remain within 
their own communities and did not initially have the option of 
retreating into isolated areas. Moreover, the blacks came from differ- 
ent areas of Africa, often did not share the same language or culture, 
and were not grouped into organized social units on arrival in the 
New World. Despite slave revolts, no large community of escaped 
slaves survived in isolation to preserve its African heritage, as did 
the maroons in Jamaica. 

Finally, despite their position on the bottom rung of the social lad- 
der, black slaves often had close relations — as domestic ser- 
vants — with Spaniards and were therefore exposed to Spanish 
culture much more than were the Amerindians. Thus, blacks became 
a part — albeit a peripheral one — of Colombian society from the 
beginning, adopting the ways of the Spanish that were permitted 
them and learning their language. By the end of the colonial period, 
the blacks thought of themselves as Colombians and felt superior to 
the Amerindians, who officially occupied higher status, were nomi- 
nally free, and were closer in skin color, facial features, and hair tex- 
ture to the emerging mestizo mix. 

Many blacks left slave status early in Colombian history, becom- 
ing part of the free population. Their owners awarded freedom to 
some, others purchased their liberty, but probably the greatest num- 
ber achieved freedom by escape. Many slaves were liberated as a 
result of revolts, particularly in the Cauca valley and along the 
Caribbean coast. The elimination of slavery began with a free-birth 
law in 1821, but total emancipation was enacted only in 1851, 
becoming effective on January 1, 1852. 

Those blacks who achieved freedom sometimes moved into 
Amerindian communities, but blacks and zambos remained at the 
bottom of the social scale and were important only as a source of 
labor. Others founded their own settlements, mainly in unsettled 
lands of the Pacific basin where they were called cimarrones 
(maroons). Those regions were very unhealthy, inhospitable, and 
dangerous. A number of towns, such as San Basilio del Palenque in 
the present department of Bolivar, and Ure in southern Cordoba, 
kept the history of revolt alive in their oral traditions. In the Choco 
area, along the Pacific, many of the black communities remained rel- 
atively unmixed, probably because there were few whites in the area, 
and the Amerindians became increasingly resistant to assimilation. 
In other regions, such as the Magdalena valley, black communities 
had considerable white and Amerindian admixtures. 



89 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Descendants of slaves have preserved relatively little of their 
African heritage or identification. Some place-names are derived 
from African languages, and some traditional musical instruments 
brought into the country by slaves are used throughout the country. 
Religion in the black communities remains the most durable link 
with the African past. Wholly black communities have been disap- 
pearing, not only because their residents have been moving to the 
cities but also because the surrounding mestizo and white popula- 
tions have been moving into black communities. Eventual absorp- 
tion into the mixed milieu appears inevitable. Moreover, as blacks 
have moved into the mainstream of society from its peripheries, they 
have perceived the advantages of better education and jobs. Rather 
than forming organizations to promote their advancement as a group, 
blacks have for the most part concentrated on achieving mobility 
through individual effort and adaptation to the prevailing system. 

Afro-Colombians are entitled to all constitutional rights and protec- 
tions, but they continue to face significant economic and social dis- 
crimination. According to the 2005 census, an estimated 74 percent of 
Afro-Colombians earned less than the minimum wage. Choco, the 
department with the highest percentage of Afro-Colombian residents, 
had the lowest level of social investment per capita and ranked last in 
terms of education, health, and infrastructure. It also continued to 
experience some of the country's worst political violence, as paramili- 
taries and guerrillas struggled for control of the department's key 
drug- and weapons-smuggling corridors. 

Population and Urbanization 

Population Growth Trends 

At the outset of the twentieth century, Colombia's population was 
only 4 million. By 1950, however, after growing by 2 percent annu- 
ally in the 1940s, it had nearly tripled to 1 1 million. Between the late 
1950s and the late 1960s, Colombia had one of the highest popula- 
tion growth rates not only in Latin America but in the world — more 
than 3 percent annually, peaking at 3.4 percent in the 1950s. Since 
then it has had one of the sharpest declines. A contributing factor 
was a quiet government-funded contraception campaign, which the 
Roman Catholic Church tacitly agreed to tolerate as long as the gov- 
ernment did not promote it openly (see Demography, this ch.). 
According to the 2005 census, the population growth rate during 
2001-5 was 1.6 percent. In 2008 it was only 1.4 percent and was 
predicted to remain at this rate through 2010. 

With an estimated population of 45.3 million in early 2010, 
Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin America, after 



90 





A mestizo agricultural worker 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (David Mangurian), 

Washington, DC 

An Afro-Colombian man in front of a bicycle-repair shop 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC 



Brazil and Mexico. According to the most recent national census 
conducted by the National Administrative Department of Statistics 
(DANE), the national population was 42,799,491 on June 30, 2005. 
This adjusted figure took into account geographical coverage omis- 
sions but did not include Colombians living abroad, who totaled 
3,331,107. By 2015 the population is projected to total 53.2 million. 

Estimates of national population density (inhabitants per square 
kilometer) have varied, ranging from 34.5 per km 2 to approximately 
39 per km 2 in 2006, but population distribution throughout the coun- 
try varies widely. By 2005 the most populated departments were 
Atl ntico in the Caribbean region (700 inhabitants per km 2 ) and 
Quind o (332 per km 2 ), Risaralda (248 per km 2 ) Valle del Cauca 
(205 per km 2 ), and Cundinamarca (98 per km ) in the Andean 
region. The least-dense departments are those in the llanos, generally 
having between one and 12 inhabitants per km 2 , and the departments 
in Amazonia, the least-populated region of Colombia, with less than 
one person per km 2 . 



91 



Colombia: A Country Study 
Immigration 

Colombia has experienced little foreign immigration since the 
colonial period. Spain discouraged the admission of non-Spaniards 
into its colonies. After independence, civil wars and a lack of eco- 
nomic prospects deterred immigration. Colombia has had the fewest 
non- Spanish immigrants relative to the size of its population, espe- 
cially few non-Roman Catholic ones, of any of Spain's former colo- 
nies, with the possible exception of Bolivia. Thus, Spanish values 
have influenced Colombian society throughout its history. For 
instance, the 1886 constitution, which remained in force with some 
amendments until 1991, aimed at strengthening hispanidad, and 
some critics even argued that it attempted to replicate the Spain of 
Philip II (king of Spain, 1556-98). This constitution was very inhos- 
pitable to non-Spanish, non-Roman Catholic immigrants, because it 
allowed the Roman Catholic Church to monopolize many civil pro- 
cedures and to control public education. It is also significant that 
Colombia is one of the countries where it is most difficult to obtain a 
work permit and to become a naturalized citizen. The spouse of a 
Colombian citizen, for example, can easily acquire a resident's visa, 
but that does not allow the person to work. 

The country generally lacked a clear policy on immigration but 
never favored it on a large scale. Those who entered from abroad 
came as individuals or in small family units. After World War II, the 
country tried to encourage the immigration of skilled technicians, 
but immigration laws gave preference to persons who supposedly 
would not jeopardize the social order for personal, ethnic, or racial 
reasons. Germans, Italians, and some other educated foreigners 
found acceptance in the upper class and frequently married into the 
white group. Spanish immigrants — many of them until recently 
members of the clergy — continued to trickle into the country. Resi- 
dents from the United States were mainly in business or missionary 
work and without intention to naturalize. The government began to 
organize immigration in 1953, ostensibly to settle underdeveloped 
regions of the country, and, in 1958, specified procedures for the 
admission of refugees. Little was done, however, to implement these 
measures. 

During the early twentieth century, Colombia's Caribbean coastal 
region experienced immigration coming from Europe and the Middle 
East, mostly from Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Turkey. A second 
wave of immigrants from these countries took place during World War 
II. The Arab immigrants, mainly Maronite Christians from Lebanon, 
gradually began to settle inland, except for Antioquia. About 45 per- 
cent of the inhabitants of cities such as Barranquilla, Cartagena, Mai- 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



cao, and Santa Marta have Arab ancestry. The country's Arab 
population, which reportedly numbers about 200,000, has produced 
several members of Congress and the 1978-82 president, Julio Cesar 
Turbay Ayala, who is of Lebanese descent, as well as pop star Shakira. 

Regionalism 

The Spaniards who settled Colombia came shortly after seven cen- 
turies of warring with the Moors and from a region of Europe where 
medieval traditions remained strong. Traditional premodern Spanish 
values were not conducive to respect of central government laws or 
authorities, and the isolation of many of the descendants of the con- 
quistadors allowed them to remain fairly autonomous from the central 
government and to maintain many of their independent, antigovern- 
ment traits. These historical factors help to explain why Colombia 
long remained remote from modernizing ideas and technologies. 

As a country of five distinct mainland geographic regions, 
Colombia is, not surprisingly, highly regionalist. The Colombian 
state gradually took shape during the nineteenth century as a loose 
coalition of four semiautonomous regions: the central Andean high- 
lands, greater Antioquia, the Caribbean coast, and greater Cauca. 
The latter included the city of Popayan, long known as a center of 
elitist literary culture. In more recent times, as during La Violencia 
and the rise of the illicit drug industry, regionalism was reinforced 
through significant rural-rural migration that extended into the 
"empty lands" {tierras baldias), where many settlements were estab- 
lished outside state control. A diverse geography and resultant 
regionalism thus exacerbate the lack of communal feelings among 
the masses and provide little basis for national cohesion within any 
of their social groups. 

Even with rapid urbanization and modernization, regionalism and 
regional identification continue to be important reference points, 
although they are somewhat less prominent today than in the nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Whatever their class, Colom- 
bians are identified by their regional origins, within which are 
relatively well-defined ethnocultural groups; each of these groups 
has distinctive characteristics, accents, customs, social patterns, and 
forms of cultural adaptation to climate and topography that have dif- 
ferentiated it from other groups. A highland inhabitant of Boyaca 
and Cundinamarca departments, which are dominated by urban mes- 
tizos of Spanish heritage and have an elitist literary culture, is called 
a cundiboyacense. Someone who is from Antioquia, Caldas, 
Quindio, or Risaralda departments, a region known for its egalitarian 
and independent traditions, is a paisa. Prominent paisas include 



93 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Belisario Betancur Cuartas (president, 1982-86), Cesar Augusto 
Gaviria Trujillo (president, 1990-94), and President Alvaro Uribe, 
whose family moved to Antioquia when he was 10 years old. A resi- 
dent of the ethnically diverse Caribbean or Pacific departments is a 
costeno. Colombia's Nobel Prize-winning novelist, Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez, is a costeno (although he was educated in Bogota), who 
fictionalized the Magdalena town of Aracataca as Macondo in his 
classic 1967 novel Cien anos de soledad (One Hundred Years of Sol- 
itude). An inhabitant of Norte de Santander or Santander depart- 
ments is a santandereano; inhabitants of these two departments tend 
to have more white than Amerindian blood and to share Venezuelan 
social characteristics, at least in the north. Someone from the llanos 
region is a llanero. And a resident of Cauca or Valle del Cauca, 
where most people are of Afro-Colombian or indigenous origin, is a 
vallecaucano. Residents of Huila and Tolima are also considered a 
separate group, as are residents of Narino, but they are referred to by 
their departmental monikers. 

Migration and rural or urban residence can also determine a per- 
son's status. A dark-skinned mulatto who because of wealth and pres- 
tige would be a member of the local elite in a rural area along the coast 
would not be so considered outside this region. Conversely, movement 
from a larger to a smaller town might enhance an individual's status. 
Usually, the only Colombians whose status is invariable are the 
national elite, Amerindians, and blacks (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 4). 

Urbanization Trends 

Unlike most of its Andean neighbors, Colombia is a nation of cit- 
ies. It has a largely urban population and has had one of the highest 
urbanization rates of any Latin American nation. The transition of 
Colombia from a largely rural country to an urban one had occurred 
by the mid-1960s. By 1964 the rural percentage of the population 
had dropped to 47.2, from 61 percent in 1951. During the 23-year 
period from 1951 to 1973, the figures reversed, with the urban popu- 
lation increasing to 61 percent and the rural declining to 39 percent. 
Urban growth during 1951-73 was dominated by the growth of the 
four largest cities — Bogota, Medellfn, Cali, and Barranquilla — all of 
which were already large metropolitan areas of several hundred 
thousand people in 1951. The share of total population in these four 
cities quintupled from 5 percent in 1951 to 25 percent in 1973, com- 
pared with an increase in the total urban share of less than 50 percent 
during the same period. 

In the new millennium, migration from rural to urban areas has 
continued to be prevalent. Although the rates of both population 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



growth and urbanization fell during the 1980s, the proportion of the 
population living in urban areas increased from 57.5 percent in 1970 
to 76.6 percent in 2005. Between 2000 and 2005, the urban popula- 
tion grew 2.1 percent. By some estimates, the urbanized population 
reached 78 percent in 2007. 

By 2007 about 35 percent of the total population was concentrated 
in the four main cities. According to official Colombian statistics, the 
cities with more than 1 million inhabitants in 2007 were: Bogota (7 
million; Greater Bogota, 8.2 million), Medellin (2.5 million; Greater 
Medellin, 3.4 million), Cali (2.1 million; Greater Cali, 2.7 million), 
and Barranquilla (1.1 million; Greater Barranquilla, 1.8 million). 
Bogota remains smaller than five other Latin American cities: Mex- 
ico City, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Lima. Accord- 
ing to the 2005 census, 16.4 percent of Colombia's 42 million people 
lived in Bogota. Twenty-two other Colombian urban centers had pop- 
ulations of between 200,000 and 800,000. Among them are four 
medium-size cities with populations of more than 500,000: Carta- 
gena, Cucuta, Bucaramanga, and Soledad. Greater Bucaramanga 
actually exceeds 1 million inhabitants. According to a 2008 Central 
Bank study, the cities with the greatest inequality are Bogota and 
Quibdo (the capital of Choco Department), while those with the most 
even distribution of income are Pereira, Cali, Bucaramanga, Cucuta, 
Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta. 

Population Displacement 

During the twentieth century, specifically during La Violencia and 
at the end of the century, when the internal armed conflict intensified, 
violence generated massive rural-urban migrations and human dis- 
placements throughout the country's territory. The move to urban 
areas reflects not only a shift away from agriculture but also a flight 
from guerrilla and paramilitary violence. In recent decades, the insur- 
gency and counterinsurgency have caused massive displacement of 
the rural population, accelerating migration to the cities. According to 
a 2007 report, Drop by Drop: Forced Displacement in Bogota and 
Soacha, over the 2001-6 period Bogota received an average of 93 
displaced people, or 23 families, per day as a result of Colombia's 
internal conflict, and more than 235,000 people from 29 of the coun- 
try's 32 departments sought refuge in Bogota and neighboring Soa- 
cha, on the capital's southern edge. The majority (64 percent) of these 
refugees arrived from departments that surround Bogota, such as 
Caqueta, Cundinamarca, Huila, Meta, and Tolima. Between 1985 and 
2006, a total of 624,286 people, or 16 percent of all the displaced per- 
sons nationwide in the same period, took refuge in Bogota. 



95 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Codhes noted that the FARC guerrillas and the United Self- 
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) right-wing militias were pri- 
marily responsible for the exodus. Roughly 53 percent of the dis- 
placed families who relocated to Bogota and Soacha blamed the 
FARC for their current situation, while 34 percent held the paramili- 
taries responsible. Another 4 percent attributed their plight to the 
smaller pro-Cuban National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Maoist 
Popular Liberation Army (EPL). Of the displaced families, 3 percent 
accused the Colombian army, 4 percent pointed to unspecified other 
groups, and 2 percent said they had been victims of unknown perpe- 
trators of violence. The same report warned that "there is concern 
over an eventual urbanization of the armed conflict in Bogota and 
Soacha, where there have been reports of the presence of paramili- 
tary groups, guerrilla bands, and the eruption of forms of violence, 
especially against young people and social leaders." 

Colombia's desplazados are far less visible than those in countries 
such as Sri Lanka and Sudan because they settle in slums or shanty- 
towns on the fringes of cities and society, interspersed among other 
indigent communities, instead of living in tented refugee camps. One 
salient effect of violence-induced migration is the loss of links 
between migrants and their original communities, which are often 
destroyed. Many rural-urban migrants lost whatever social links and 
constraints they had, and their predicament caused them in turn to be 
extremely resentful. 

Among the essentially social — as distinct from politico-military 
or economic — effects of the illicit drug industry, the greatest was its 
contribution to two roughly opposite population movements. One of 
these involved people moving from towns and cities and established 
farming areas to seek work on the frontiers of settlement, where 
there are most coca plantings and processing laboratories. The other 
was made up of mostly poor rural Colombians, who became despla- 
zados when driven from their homes as a result of the conflicts rag- 
ing in the country and sought refuge in the larger cities or even in 
Panama, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In some cases, these people had 
been caught in the crossfire between guerrillas, paramilitaries, 
narco-traffickers, and armed forces. Others were escaping the attack 
or threatened attack of armed groups who rightly or wrongly accused 
them of giving aid to rival bands. Still others were forced off their 
land by criminal elements, commonly narco-traffickers, who coveted 
the land for themselves. Whatever the immediate cause of their pre- 
dicament, population displacement constitutes one of the most criti- 
cal social problems in Colombia today. 

As of the end of 2007, more than 4.2 million Colombians had 
been internally displaced since 1985, according to Codhes (see table 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



4, Appendix). By United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
estimates, the number is 3 million, still the second highest popula- 
tion of internal refugees in the world, after Sudan. Many of these 
desplazados left areas where fighting intensified under Plan Patriota, 
a large government offensive against leftist guerrillas and drug traf- 
fickers (see United States-Colombia Security Cooperation and Plan 
Colombia, ch. 5). According to the 2005 census, 1,542,915 Colom- 
bians were victims of forced displacement between 1995 and 2005, 
but NGOs report that the actual number may be between 2 and 3 mil- 
lion. Codhes has estimated that about 1.5 million people have been 
displaced since the government of President Alvaro Uribe took 
office in 2002. Government figures on desplazados tend to be lower 
than those of Codhes, but since 2000 the yearly figures of both have 
become more similar as a result of methodological improvements. 

When desplazados cross into a neighboring country, the problem 
is no longer essentially social or purely Colombian but becomes one 
of international relations. Whether or not the ultimate destination is 
within Colombia, it is impossible to say in what proportion of cases 
narco-traffickers are the ones forcing people to leave their homes, 
and some reports suggest that in the great majority of cases they are 
not directly involved. However, in light of their willing or unwilling 
financing of both guerrillas and paramilitaries, it is safe to conclude 
that the narco-traffickers, at least indirectly, share responsibility 
more often than not. Narco-traffickers' direct involvement is clearest 
when drug lords seek to accumulate land as both an investment and a 
means of acquiring social and political influence, because they often 
use force or the threat of force to evict the occupants. Eviction is 
facilitated if the current occupants lack clear title to the land, allow- 
ing the new tenants (or third parties in whom title is now vested) to 
claim that nothing irregular has happened and making it more diffi- 
cult to seek redress. 

An increase in the landownership concentration that was already a 
serious problem in Colombia is one result of the displacement pro- 
cess. Moreover, a common pattern is to convert former cropland to 
pasture, which is easier to manage and increases the rate of eviction 
of prior inhabitants. But a particularly notorious example has been 
the taking of lands in the far northwest (Choco primarily) that had 
been claimed as ancestral homeland by Afro-Colombian communi- 
ties, and introducing plantations of palm trees for the extraction of 
exportable oil. The Afro-Colombians theoretically could have stayed 
on as hired hands, but most became desplazados instead. 

The Uribe administration has demobilized thousands of paramili- 
tary fighters under legislation that includes provision for the victims 



97 



Colombia: A Country Study 

of their abuses to obtain reparations, such as the return of lands ille- 
gally taken from them (see Peace Processes, ch. 5). There have been 
repeated instances, however, of violence and intimidation used to 
prevent victims from denouncing the perpetrators; even when formal 
petitions for redress are presented, the task of investigating and act- 
ing upon them is so overwhelming that for most victims the pros- 
pects of success are highly questionable. Nor would even successful 
claimants necessarily want to return to the scene of their misfortune. 
Thus, for most desplazados the displacement is likely to be perma- 
nent. They join the ranks of those already subsisting in the informal 
sector of the economy and continue to place an added strain on urban 
social services. The deficiencies in education and health care are 
inevitably compounded in the process (see Health and Welfare; Edu- 
cation, this ch.). 

Emigration 

A large emigration wave also has limited population growth. 
Many Colombians have been fleeing the civil conflict and economic 
difficulties. Some of those who left the country reportedly have 
begun to return, but most who fled are illegal immigrants where they 
have sought sanctuary, and only a fifth, at most, are registered at 
Colombian consulates. It is thus difficult to estimate total numbers, 
but it appears that owing to problems of security and unemployment, 
a total of 1.2 million Colombians abandoned the country during 
2000-5 and have not returned. According to the 2005 census, more 
than 3 million Colombians were living abroad, but other estimates 
suggest that the actual number could exceed 4 million, or almost 10 
percent of the country's population. 

External migration is primarily to Ecuador, the United States, and 
Venezuela. In 2003 North America was the destination for 48 percent 
of Colombian emigrants; Latin America and the Caribbean, 40 per- 
cent; Europe, 1 1 percent; and Asia, Oceania, and Africa, 1 percent. 
The population movement in recent years toward North America and 
Europe in particular has been motivated in some cases by the threat of 
violence but more typically by the search for greater economic oppor- 
tunity. Colombians living abroad — 1.5 million of whom departed 
during the economic downturn between 1996 and 2002 — have had a 
positive effect on the balance of payments thanks to remittances to 
family and friends at home. But external migration to the United 
States or Europe has represented a definite loss of talent and energy 
because migrants to the developed world tend to be better educated 
and in the prime of working life. Some estimates would have roughly 
half the physicians trained in Colombia during certain years, at great 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



expense to fellow Colombian taxpayers, now working in the United 
States. Then, too, there are communities (as in Mexico, for example) 
that have been so drained of young workers that they find themselves 
dependent on the flow of remittances. Several municipalities in the 
vicinity of Pereira in western Colombia, hard hit by troubles in the 
coffee industry and the competition of cheap Asian labor in garment 
exporting, exemplify the latter phenomenon. 

Demography 

The Colombian experience is remarkable for the abruptness and 
magnitude of the declines in fertility and mortality after 1966. 
Between then and 2000, total fertility fell by about 45 percent. A 
variety of factors combined to produce the decline, and, as in most 
countries, fertility patterns varied widely among Colombian socio- 
economic groups, whose composition shifted substantially during 
the period. In the late 1960s, for example, Colombian women living 
in rural areas who had not completed primary education had a total 
fertility rate of eight children, compared with 3.4 children for urban 
women with at least a full primary education. 

Family-planning programs did not initiate the rapid fertility 
decline, because such programs started after its onset. Nevertheless, 
Colombia's well-organized family-planning programs helped to 
keep the population growth rate down. Information about contracep- 
tives and use of them increased rapidly after 1969, when the govern- 
ment began to support family planning. In that year, the Liberal 
Party (PL) administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (president, 
1966-70) began providing subsidized family-planning services in 
local health centers through the maternal- and child-health program 
of the then Ministry of Public Health. In 1972-73 the Conservative 
Party (PC) government of Misael Eduardo Pastrana Borrero (presi- 
dent, 1970-74) extended services to postpartum cases in about 90 
hospitals throughout the country. Urban areas had substantially more 
access to family planning than rural areas, most of it through the pri- 
vate sector in urban areas; overall, private entities provided as much 
as 50 percent of the services. The government also subsidized the 
cost of contraceptives. Between 1969 and 1976, according to one 
survey, the proportion of women with knowledge of contraceptives 
rose from 51 to 72 percent. By 1976 about 95 percent of married 
women had this knowledge, and 59 percent were using contracep- 
tion, compared to 34 percent in 1969. The drop in the birthrate since 
the mid-1960s has been among the most dramatic experienced in any 
country, falling from 44.2 births per 1,000 in 1960 to 19.9 per 1,000 
population in 2008, according to an unofficial estimate. 



99 



Colombia: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 



Total Estimated Population in 2008 = 45 million' 

*Not including 3.3 million Colombians living abroad. 




POPULATION IN MILLIONS 



Source: Based on information from Colombia, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 

Estadistica, "Censo General 2005: Datos desagregados por sexo" [2005 General Cen- 
sus: Data Disaggregated by Sex], Boletin (Bogota), http://www.dane.gov.co; and U.S. 
Census Bureau, Population Division, International Data Base, http://www.census.gov. 



Figure 3. Population Distribution by Age-group and Sex, 2008 



Beginning in the 1980s, other changes have taken place relating to 
family size, age distribution, gender, marital status, education levels, 
and economic activity of heads of family. The average family size 
fell 20 percent from 5.1 in 1979 to 4 in 2000. In 1960 each woman 
had on average seven children, a figure that fell to five in the 1970s, 
four in the 1980s, three in the 1990s, and to 1.9 in the first years of 
the new millennium, according to the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean and the Latin American and Carib- 
bean Demographic Center. The 2005 census found that approxi- 
mately 66.7 percent of Colombian homes had four or fewer persons, 
and the average number was 3.9. It also determined that 44.9 percent 
of Colombians were single, 23 percent were married, and 23.1 per- 
cent were living together as unmarried couples. These trends reflect 
the new social and cultural roles of women and their increased edu- 
cation, which have changed their expectations. 

According to the World Health Organization, Colombia's infant 
mortality rate (under one year of age) declined from 68 per 1,000 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



live births in 1970 to 19.5 in 2008, the under-five mortality rate 
dropped from 105 per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 26 in 2008, and 
annual estimates for life expectancy at birth during the 2000-5 
period averaged 72.3 years. The latter figure for 2008 was 72.5 
years. Overall life expectancy at birth in 2008 was 72.5 years (males, 
68.7 years; females, 76.5 years). In 2006 the adult mortality rate per 
1,000 population between 15 and 60 years of age was 176 for males 
and 87 for females. Not surprisingly, in a country as violent as 
Colombia, men are twice as likely as women to die prematurely. The 
greater number of male homicide victims accounts for the significant 
differences in the probability of dying for men and women. 

Colombia has a relatively young population; the median age in 
2008 was estimated at 26.8 years (25.9 years for males and 27.8 years 
for females). Less than 6 percent of the population is older than 64 
years; less than 30 percent, under 15 years of age; and 77 percent, 
under age 45. According to the 2005 census, 48.8 percent of the pop- 
ulation was male and 51.2 percent female (see fig. 3). 

Social Strata Division 

Since the sixteenth century, Colombian society has been highly 
stratified, with social classes generally linked to racial or wealth dis- 
tinctions, and vertical mobility has been limited. The proportion of 
white ancestry has been an important measure of status for the mixed 
groups since the colonial era. In the nineteenth century, Colombia's 
rugged terrain and inadequate transportation system reinforced 
social and geographic distance, keeping the numerically superior but 
disunited masses fragmented and powerless. The nascent middle 
class lacked a collective consciousness, preferring to identify indi- 
vidually with the upper class. Except in certain instances of urban 
artisans and some Amerindian communities, the elite was the only 
social group with sufficient cohesion to articulate goals and make 
them known to the rest of the society. In the twentieth century, the 
society began to experience change, not so much in values or orien- 
tation as in broadening of the economic bases and an expansion of 
the social classes. Improvements in transportation, communications, 
and education — coupled with industrialization and rapid urban 
growth — opened Colombian society somewhat by expanding eco- 
nomic opportunities. These advances, although mixed, have contin- 
ued during the first decade of the present century. 

The many terms for color still being used reflect the persistence of 
this colonial pattern and a continuing desire among Colombians to clas- 
sify each other according to color and social group. These terms also 
cut across class lines so that persons at one level define themselves as 



101 



Colombia: A Country Study 

being racially similar to those at other levels. The confusion over clas- 
sification has affected most Colombians because most of them do not 
define themselves as being white, black, or Amerindian, which are dis- 
tinct and mutually exclusive groups, but as belonging to one of the 
mixed categories. In addition to racial and wealth factors, Colombia's 
classes are distinguished by education, family background, lifestyle, 
occupation, power, and geographic residence. Within every class, there 
are numerous subtle gradations in status. Colombians tend to be 
extremely status-conscious, and class identity is an important aspect of 
social life because it regulates the interaction of groups and individuals. 
Social-class boundaries are far more flexible in the city than in the 
countryside, but consciousness of status and class distinctions contin- 
ues to permeate social life throughout Colombia. 

The upper class is very successful in maintaining exclusivity and 
controlling change through a system of informal decision-making 
groups called roscas — the name of a twisted pastry. Such groups 
exist at different levels and across different spheres and are linked 
hierarchically by personal relationships. Their composition varies 
according to level — municipal, departmental, or national — but each 
group tries to include at least one powerful person from every 
sphere. A rosea is a vitally important system in both the social and 
the political context because it is at this level of interaction that most 
political decisions are made and careers determined. Only as a mem- 
ber of such a group can an individual be considered a member of the 
upper-middle or upper class. Indeed, the listed names of past presi- 
dents reflect how power has remained the purview of a small number 
of elite families instead of a meritocracy (see table 2, Appendix). 

The official strata division provides another look at social classes. 
A 1994 law provides "an instrument that allows a municipality or dis- 
trict to classify its population in distinct groups or strata with similar 
social and economic characteristics." The law was framed this way to 
establish cross-class subsidies that would help those in the lower 
strata pay for utilities. Housing characteristics, such as a garage, a 
front yard, and quality of the neighborhood, are the main criteria 
used. Depending on the diversity and quality of housing, there could 
be six strata: level one is lower-low, two is low, three is upper-low, 
four is medium, five is medium-high, and six is high. Most cities have 
all six, but there are towns that have only three. This national classifi- 
cation identifies groups with similar socioeconomic characteristics. 
Although strata are not a direct reflection of social class, they provide 
useful information beyond income measures. 

The lower-middle class, constituting the bulk of the middle class, 
comes primarily from upwardly mobile members of the lower class. 
A large number are clerks or small shopkeepers. Many have only a 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



precarious hold on middle-class status and tend to be less concerned 
with imitating upper-class culture and behavior than with making 
enough money to sustain a middle-class lifestyle. Such families tend 
to be just as concerned as those at higher social levels with giving 
their children an education. Many hope to send at least one of their 
children through a university, regardless of the financial burden. 

In 2007 Colombia had an abundance of families that belonged to 
the middle-class sector of society and were struggling between the 
need to survive and the desire to give their children a good educa- 
tion. Government agencies such as DANE and the National Planning 
Department (DNP) refer to Colombia's middle class, which consti- 
tutes about 30 percent of Colombians, as "stratum three." The gener- 
ous subsidies that the state once granted to stratum three have been 
gradually dismantled, and as a result millions of Colombians have 
had to live in hardship from day to day, forced to take out loans to 
make ends meet. According to DANE, the policy of creating social 
strata in Colombia is "a technical tool for categorizing the popula- 
tion... mainly for the purpose of charging for public services," 
which, in the case of stratum three, do not include government subsi- 
dies in the majority of cases. A majority of the 31 programs man- 
aged by the Social Action Agency focus on strata one and two and 
on displaced persons. 

The great majority of the population (89 percent) lives in strata 
one, two, and three, and on that basis, even if not by other criteria, is 
considered poor. Strata four, five, and six house only 6.5 percent, 1.9 
percent, and 1.5 percent of the population, respectively. In other 
words, only about 10 percent of the population lives in dwellings 
that are well built and located in well-developed neighborhoods with 
access to good utility services. 

The overlap between these official strata and social class is not 
perfect. It is possible to find very high-income people living in stra- 
tum three and some stratum-six residents who have strong affinity 
with the lower classes. There are several reasons for these coexisting 
disparities, the main one being perhaps the strong upward mobility 
allowed by the illegal-drug industry wealth that did not necessarily 
lead to a change in self-perception. The living expenses of this group 
of drug traffickers are very high, but they retain some of the cultural 
identity, education, and self-perceptions of the lower classes. 

Family 

The Colombian family traditionally has been an extended one, 
that is, a wide circle of kinship consisting of several generations. 
However, the decline of the patriarchal extended-family structure is 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

apparent in urban society, as increased geographic and social mobil- 
ity weakens kinship ties and offers greater independence to young 
people. Despite frequent claims that the "family is disappearing," 
what has happened is a change in family structure and the public 
illusions about it. The nuclear family that the state and the Roman 
Catholic Church have promoted since independence has changed as 
culture and society have changed. The new society has pushed for 
changes in legislation about inheritance, spousal rights, and the 
rights of women and children. Families at the bottom of the social 
ladder are adversely affected by geographic dislocation and are 
increasingly less cohesive. They continue to be characterized by a 
large number of consensual unions and matriarchal households. 

Social changes caused by industrialization, urbanization, political 
reforms, changes in labor markets, and modernization accelerated 
family change by the mid-twentieth century. Such changes are evi- 
dent in today's family legislation. For example, a 1982 law granted 
equal rights and obligations (including inheritance rights) to all chil- 
dren: legitimate, extramarital, and adoptive. 

Traditional elements of trust and mutual dependence among rela- 
tives, no matter how distant the relationship, are still strong. The 
already large circle of family relationships is extended through the 
institution of compadrazgo (see Glossary), a complex form of ritual 
kinship linked to Roman Catholic notions of baptismal godparent- 
hood. Ties with relatives and compadres (godparents) continue to be 
important in political and business activities and provide the person 
of low status with a wide circle of mutual assistance. 

The nuclear family unit in general continues to be authoritarian, 
patriarchal, and patrilineal. Legal reforms have extended equal civil 
and property rights to women, but tradition dominates male-female 
relations, and roles and responsibilities in marriage are still relatively 
clear-cut. In the lower class, in which the father is frequently not a per- 
manent member of the household, the mother often assumes the role of 
chief authority and family head, but in all other cases the father unques- 
tionably occupies this position. Within the household, the wife is con- 
sidered the husband's deputy and the chief administrator of domestic 
activities. Her first duty is to bear and raise children. She is also 
expected to keep the household running smoothly and efficiently. In her 
relations with her husband, she traditionally is supposed to be deferen- 
tial, thinking of his wishes and needs before considering her own. 

Men of the upper and middle class have always been paternal and 
protective toward their dependents, trying to shelter their wives and 
children from undesirable outside influences. The activities of 
women were for many years severely circumscribed because of the 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



male concern for the honor and virtue of the wife and unmarried 
daughters. Women in the upper and middle classes traditionally were 
not permitted to work outside the home except for volunteer work. 

In the upper and middle classes, the social life of women, particu- 
larly of unmarried young women, was limited to home, school, 
church, and well-chaperoned parties and dances. Today, with those 
same unmarried young women going to university, partying without 
chaperones, and enjoying career options of their own even if they do 
marry, the situation is fast changing; it simply has not evolved quite 
as far as in North America and Europe. 

Far fewer restrictions traditionally applied to lower-class or lower- 
middle-class women than to upper-class women. Formal chaperonage 
was always impossible to maintain because of family instability, eco- 
nomic need, the frequent absence of the husband and father, and 
moral standards differing somewhat from those of the upper social 
levels. The lower-class woman usually has had to be employed and 
contribute her salary to the family's subsistence or work in the fields 
beside her male relatives. Her economic contribution has given her a 
degree of equality. The husband's and father's control over her has 
been further limited by the matrilocal nature of much lower-class 
life — the custom for a husband to live with his wife's family. 

There are, increasingly, exceptions in urban society to the tradi- 
tional concept of a woman's role. Many women in the middle and 
upper social levels are well educated and may pursue careers in 
many fields; the availability of relatively inexpensive domestic ser- 
vice is a factor favoring this trend. Indeed, Colombian women are 
considered among the most politically active in Latin America. 
Many of them hold high elective or appointive offices. One promi- 
nent example is Noemi Sanfn Posada, who began her distinguished 
career as a lawyer and businesswoman and, since the 1980s, has held 
ministerial portfolios and ambassadorships (she became Colombia's 
ambassador to the United Kingdom in 2008); she has also run for 
president twice (in 1998 and 2002). At the same time, women who 
engage in these activities are considered exceptional by the general 
population. Most upper-class and upper-middle-class women do not 
take on full-time work after marriage but rather devote themselves 
primarily to their homes, families, and church groups. 

The Roman Catholic Church is the single most important force 
affecting marriage and family life, and Roman Catholic marriage is 
recognized as the ideal and the preferred legal, social, and sexual 
basis of the family. Nearly all formal marriages take place within the 
church, and most other turning points in the life of the individual 
family member are marked by religious rites. However, in 1973 a 



105 



Colombia: A Country Study 

new agreement replaced the 1887 concordat with the Holy See, 
opening the way for increased acceptance of civil marriages. 
Regardless of the increasing acceptability of civil weddings, most 
middle-class and upper-class families still try to provide their chil- 
dren with the most elaborate church wedding they can afford. 

Despite the efforts of the church to encourage legal marriage 
within the lower class, people in this group generally regard a reli- 
gious marriage as a heavy social and economic burden. Thus, both 
the religious and the civil marriage ceremonies are commonly for- 
gone in the lower-class, consensual union. In rural communities with 
traditional lower-class standards, formal marriage is regarded as nei- 
ther important nor essential. Although other kinds of union are more 
prevalent within the lower class, Roman Catholic marriage often 
connotes superior social status and prestige. 

Some Colombians, especially those in the middle class, regard 
marriage as one of the best means of facilitating upward social 
mobility, and conversely members of the upper class are generally 
reluctant to marry persons of lower social position. With the increas- 
ing independence of young people and the declining authority of the 
family, marriages between relatives have become less common, but 
intermarriage between families of similar aristocratic background is 
a custom that most young people still honor. 

The institutions of marriage and family are ruled by a combina- 
tion of nineteenth-century civil code and twentieth-century constitu- 
tional law. The 1873 Civil Code, which has undergone many 
changes since 1932, has governed relations between couples and 
spouses and between parents and their children. Equality between 
husband and wife in personal relations within marriage was achieved 
only by the 1974 Civil Code reform; until then there was a legal 
requirement for women to obey their husbands. Until 1970 women 
had to take their husbands' last names. Today, according to a 1988 
decree, wives can choose whether to add it, but if they so choose, the 
husband's name has to be preceded by the preposition de. Today, 
both parents have authority over their children, which was a paternal 
prerogative until 1968. Article 42 of the 1991 constitution estab- 
lishes several norms for the family based on parental equality. 

Divorce in Colombia has also increased. After decades of debate, 
in 1976 Colombia adopted a divorce law permitting the dissolution 
of the civil marriages entered into by non-Roman Catholics or by 
Roman Catholics who simply defied clerical directives. Non-Roman 
Catholics and Roman Catholics who officially renounce their faith 
have the alternative of civil marriage. Until the 1991 constitution 
changed the matrimonial regime, divorce was not allowed for 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 

Roman Catholic marriages. Under subsequent regulations, a legal or 
de facto separation of more than two years was accepted as grounds 
for divorce. Then, on June 9, 2005, the Congress approved the 
Express Divorce Law in an effort to eliminate paperwork and delays, 
which previously took an average of six weeks and required the ser- 
vices of a judge and lawyers. Under the new law, the two parties 
need only appear before a notary public and do not require a lawyer. 

Prenuptial agreements are rare. Under the Civil Code, net-worth 
increases that occur during the marriage are divided between hus- 
band and wife, and each spouse has control over his or her assets and 
their yields. When a marriage dissolves, the net- worth increases that 
were created during the marriage are distributed in accordance with 
civil law. 

Traditionally, Colombia's family structure was rigidly hierarchi- 
cal and male-dominated, giving men economic power over women. 
However, as a result of judicial changes made in the 1960s and 
advances in women's participation in the labor market, this power 
has been drastically reduced. Today, the average marital relationship 
is more egalitarian. Article 43 of the 1991 constitution gives men 
and women equal rights and specifically recognizes a female head of 
household. Parents now share power over their children, and even 
the latter participate in some decisions. Since the 1980s, data on 
household composition and the economic activities of their members 
are more available, and female heads of households have become 
more visible. Indeed, households headed by single women increased 
from 27 percent of all households in 1979 to 31 percent in 2000. 
Nevertheless, the nuclear family is still dominant, accounting for 
almost 60 percent of Colombian families in 2000, according to 
DANE. 

These modernization trends in the composition of the family have 
been more evident in the cities than in rural areas. In Bogota the new 
family forms and the new roles of their members are more accept- 
able than in the rest of the country. In Antioquia Department, for 
example, and the southwest region of the country, strong religious 
and patriarchal traditions are intertwined with the new family 
dynamics. 

Income Distribution 

In recent years, Colombia has achieved respectable if unspectacu- 
lar economic growth — an average rate of 4.75 percent per year dur- 
ing the twentieth century as a whole, or 2.3 percent in per-capita 
terms; yet the benefits have not been shared equally. Just how 
unequal the distribution has been depends on the study methods and 



107 



Colombia: A Country Study 

indicators chosen. Economists with ties to Colombia's amorphous 
"establishment" — a catchall term conventionally used without pre- 
cise definition to refer to business and government leaders, wealthy 
families, and members of such presumably influential groups as the 
church hierarchy — tend to paint a brighter picture than do indepen- 
dent academics. Nevertheless, there is general agreement on the 
broad outline. 

Despite fluctuations from year to year and significant differences 
between urban and rural sectors, it is clear enough that income distri- 
bution has been highly skewed in favor of the wealthiest Colombians 
at the expense of the lower and middle social strata. Using the Gini 
Coefficient (see Glossary) as a standard measure of inequality, aver- 
ages of some widely varying estimates from 1970 to 2007 range 
from 0.49 (at the lowest, in 1990) to 0.58 (four years later, in 1994), 
with 0.59 the result for 2007. All these estimates are far removed 
from the point of perfect equality, which would be 0.0, and the high- 
est is a bit high even for Latin America, the region of the world most 
renowned for uneven income distribution. (By contrast, most devel- 
oped European nations tend to have Gini coefficients between 0.24 
and 0.36, whereas that of the United States is above 0.4). Another 
approach is to compare the proportion of total income received by 
the top 10 percent or so of the population with that received by the 
bottom 10 percent. Here again there is fluctuation, but a clear picture 
of inequality emerges: during the final decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury, the share going to the top decile went from 12.14 times that of 
the bottom 10 percent in 1978 to 11.50 in 1988 but rose again to 
14.38 in 1999. 

Vast numbers of Colombians must be classified as "poor," by any 
possible measurement, and the inequality of income distribution appears 
resistant to major change, yet the official poverty index — based on the 
number of households whose income amounts to less than the cost of 
two "basic" food baskets — has been falling steadily if not precipitously. 
The same is true of the standard measure of "indigence," defined as 
income not even equal to one such basket. In rural poverty and overall 
indigence, there was a slight increase during the economic recession at 
the turn of the century, but by 2005 the overall poverty index had 
declined about 8.0 points to 46.8 percent of the population, and the over- 
all indigence index had fallen about 6.5 points to 20.2 percent of the 
population. 

The reduction in poverty resulted primarily from economic 
growth rather than specific antipoverty programs, although increased 
education spending was a factor that certainly helped, for example, 
by preparing unskilled Colombians to move up to, at least, semi- 



108 



A hillside urban tugurio in MedelUn 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (David Mangurian), 

Washington, DC 

skilled employment. In the 1990s, the Colombian economy under- 
went a series of adjustments that diminished some of the formal 
protections enjoyed by labor and increased the premium for skilled 
workers. For much of that decade, world conditions were also, on 
balance, unfavorable, and unemployment in the late 1990s reached a 
peak of more than 20 percent. Even when economic growth resumed 
in the early 2000s, unemployment declined somewhat but remained 
a serious problem, while many of the new jobs created were lower 
paying and less likely to carry benefits than those that had been lost. 

The gap between upper and lower social strata is, of course, noth- 
ing new; however, qualitatively it is greater now than at indepen- 
dence, when the material comforts and luxuries of a Colombian 
aristocrat were comparable to those of a middle-class English person. 
Thanks to the development of the Colombian economy itself and to 
the greater ease of importing whatever that economy does not pro- 
duce, wealthy Colombians can now quaff the best French wines and 
pamper themselves with fancy cars and electronic gadgetry almost as 
easily as in Europe or North America. In 2007 one also could read of 
a booming trade in first-class air tickets to Paris. At the same time, 
thanks to advances in both transportation and communications and to 



109 



Colombia: A Country Study 

the proliferation of mass media, the stark differences in living stan- 
dards between the highest and lowest social strata are more visible 
than they had been, fueling social discontent. And one factor still lim- 
iting conspicuous consumption by wealthy Colombians is the fear of 
drawing the attention of kidnappers. 

Rural Poor and Urban Poor 

Although statistical measurements of income distribution and 
poverty vary, they all show that the worst poverty is in rural areas. 
The rural poor, however, fall into distinct categories, one key differ- 
entiating factor being access to landownership. The minifundistas 
who do own land, located particularly in rugged Andean areas not 
suited to large-scale crop farming or cattle grazing, may not have 
enough land to support their families and thus need to accept occa- 
sional outside employment to supplement their income. That income 
is not much different from, indeed often less than, that of day labor- 
ers. Nevertheless, they enjoy higher social status than sharecroppers 
or tenants, and their situation is hard to compare with that of landless 
workers because they themselves produce part of what they con- 
sume. Coffee growers were hard hit by the fall in the price of coffee 
after the 1970s and increasingly have turned to different crops 
(including coca) or to other employment. As for the rural workers 
wholly dependent on wages, their incomes increased notably in the 
1970s as a result of the spike in world coffee prices during those 
years, as well as the growing urban employment that pulled agricul- 
tural workers into the cities and thereby lessened the supply of labor 
in the countryside. Since then, there have been fluctuations in coffee 
prices, without, apparently, much basic change. 

In urban areas, the living conditions of organized industrial work- 
ers might cause them to be classified as poor in a developed country, 
yet they form a labor elite in Colombia. They are also a declining 
proportion of the urban labor population because of the slow pace of 
manufacturing growth and an increasing tendency of industrial firms 
to contract out part of the production process. The result has been an 
increase in low-paid, nonunion, often part-time employment. Con- 
struction work is an attractive alternative, but a volatile one. In any 
case, the greatest numbers of urban poor are people with little or no 
education, who can be found in service work and retail trade, includ- 
ing the large informal economy, where people do odd jobs or sell 
things from their homes and at street corners, without observing offi- 
cial regulations, and, of course, without regular access to social ben- 
efits. Among the most desperate are the millions of desplazados. 
Ending up in the cities as they usually do, these migrants from rural 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



Colombia generally start their urban life in makeshift housing and, at 
best, marginal employment. Particularly in the Caribbean coastal 
region, families of the urban poor, desplazados or not, tend to be 
headed by a single parent, almost always a woman, who is at a disad- 
vantage as she juggles domestic and outside work responsibilities. In 
the cities, however, at least it is easier than in the countryside to 
increase total household cash income by combining the earnings of 
several family members. 

Income Effects of Narco-Trafficking 

The complexity of the changes in income distribution can be illus- 
trated by looking at the impact of a particular activity, such as narco- 
trafficking. The rise of the illicit drugs industry has obviously cre- 
ated thousands of new jobs in cultivating, processing, and exporting, 
of which the greatest number are in cultivating the coca plant. Work- 
ers may be hired hands or independent farmers, often on new fron- 
tiers of settlement, where the weakness or absence of legal authority 
favors the activity. Earnings are as much as double what they could 
be in the production of legal crops, even though, for coca growers, 
income is still probably less than that of the average construction 
worker. At the same time, the investment of illicit-drug profits in 
construction projects and the like has created new jobs, for urban 
workers especially. By mid-2008, U.S. government alternative- 
development initiatives were supporting the cultivation of more than 
238,000 hectares of legal crops; more than 291,000 families in 18 
departments had benefited from these programs, according to the 
U.S. Department of State. 

Any income advantage for the growers of illicit crops is offset in 
whole or in part by the higher cost of living in most production areas 
and by the relative inaccessibility of social services. Moreover, the 
income received by cultivators is much less than that accruing to 
processors, whose earnings are comparable to those of midlevel pro- 
fessionals. Official Colombian sources calculate that members of the 
narco-trafficking elite of exporters earn 20 times as much as those 
categorized as regular "employers." Income distribution in the pro- 
duction and sale of illicit drugs is therefore even more skewed than 
in the economy as a whole. The net contribution of narco-trafficking 
to the overall income pattern is not great, but it still must be counted 
as one more negative aspect of the illicit drug industry. 



Ill 



Colombia: A Country Study 



Health and Welfare 

Resources and Organization 

Health care in Colombia was long sharply divided between the 
practice of formal medicine and the popular or folk medicine that 
was the only care available to a majority of the population. The 
Roman Catholic religious orders originally ran the hospitals, and 
they still play a part, but both private secular institutions (including 
both those that charge and charitable ones) and the state have 
assumed a steadily larger share of the burden. Medical care at for- 
profit hospitals in the major cities today is comparable to that found 
in the United States or Western Europe; indeed, patients have even 
come from across the Atlantic for treatment at Bogota's noted eye 
clinic, La Clfnica Barraquer; and Diego Armando Maradona, the 
Argentine soccer legend, had a successful gastric bypass in Carta- 
gena. But for most Colombians, the picture is somewhat different. 

In 2005 Colombia had approximately one physician for every 
1,000 inhabitants, which is a little more than half as many as in 
Chile. Although a somewhat respectable number by Latin American 
standards (1.5 per 1,000 average in 2005), Colombia's average was 
well below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel- 
opment (OECD) average of 3.1 per 1,000 in 2006. To train its physi- 
cians, Colombia has 35 medical faculties (not to mention additional 
health-care training programs in other institutions), though quite a 
few of the faculties are of marginal quality, and many medical stu- 
dents go abroad for at least part of their training. However, despite 
the assorted guarantees of health care as a fundamental right of all 
citizens that were written into the 1991 constitution — and in line 
with the maldistribution of so many other goods and services in 
Colombia — there is an excessive concentration of physicians in the 
major cities. The same is true of the availability of hospital beds, a 
category in which Colombia, with 1.1 beds per 1,000 inhabitants in 
2003, is not much better off than some of the poorest Latin American 
countries and is outclassed even by Paraguay. 

Both national and local authorities play an important role in the 
health-care system, and in the provision of local services such as pota- 
ble water and sewerage, the role of the national government has been 
primarily that of facilitator. Departmental governments have long 
operated lotteries, ostensibly for the support of medical and other wel- 
fare programs. But with positions in the lottery administrations often 
awarded as political spoils rather than for technical competence, mis- 
use of the funds collected has been all too common. Municipal gov- 
ernments, for their part, mostly lack sufficient funds and expertise to 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



make much difference, although they deserve some credit for the 
increase in the number of homes having piped potable water and 
sewer connections. In the major cities, the coverage of the water and 
sewerage systems is now almost universal, with private enterprise 
since the 1990s also deserving some of the credit for improvement. In 
the main cities, 97 percent of households have adequate water sup- 
plies, and 92 percent have sanitation. 

The involvement of private firms in water supply and sewerage led 
not just to better quality of service and greater efficiency but also to 
some sharp rate increases. However, the impact on poorer Colom- 
bians was minimal because the country for some time had a policy of 
charging higher utility rates to upper-income consumers in order to 
subsidize the service provided to poor families. In rural Colombia, 
unfortunately but not surprisingly, much remains to be done; as of 
2004, potable water reached only 72 percent of homes — slightly 
down from 1990 — and significantly less than a nationwide figure (by 
one calculation) of 93 percent. Sewerage connections reached 54 per- 
cent of rural homes, as against an estimated 86 percent nationwide. 

From 1953 until late 2002, the government had a Ministry of Pub- 
lic Health, but it merged along with the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security into the Ministry of Social Protection. Thus, the organiza- 
tion that formerly had ministry status is now known as the National 
Superintendency of Health (SNS), an entity of the Ministry of Social 
Protection. Various other agencies whose missions, often poorly 
coordinated, touch on aspects of public health are also under this 
ministry. Whether through the SNS or through the ministry's other 
official agencies, such as the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, 
the national authorities have conducted vaccination campaigns, 
worked to control communicable diseases, and provided food subsi- 
dies to improve the nutrition of poor children. An overriding objec- 
tive, strongly supported by international agencies as an essential part 
of any overall national development plan, has been to bring health 
benefits to as many Colombians as possible. For this purpose, the 
government has worked to expand the coverage offered through two 
other entities of the Ministry of Social Protection: the Social Secu- 
rity Institute (ISS) and the National Social Pension Fund (Cajanal). 
Cajanal serves state employees, as do certain pension or welfare 
funds catering to particular groups of state employees such as the 
police, military, and railroad workers. 

The ISS has provided a measure of health insurance for private-sec- 
tor employees, thus supplementing plans offered by various private 
organizations. Since 1954 a notable example of the latter has been the 
network of Family Compensation Funds (CCFs). Since the 1960s, the 



113 



Colombia: A Country Study 

CCFs have been authorized to provide a broad range of benefits that 
are financed through a percentage of affiliated firms' payroll costs. 
The benefits include payment for treatment at hospitals and other 
health-care facilities, vacations at resort hotels, and funding for atten- 
dance at cultural or educational programs; but the beneficiaries are 
chiefly the employees of large firms in major cities — obviously they 
do not include people in the informal sector of the economy. Another 
economic association (gremio) that is a health-care provider is the 
National Federation of Coffee Growers (Fedecafe), which serves 
essentially the coffee-growing regions. Yet, by the 1980s there were 
still a great many Colombians with no coverage at all. Moreover, since 
the care offered even to those who do have access is often of poor 
quality, many middle-income and well-to-do Colombians opt to take 
out individual prepaid medical insurance policies. 

In an effort to bring some order into the existing patchwork of 
state and private programs, the administration of Cesar Gaviria in 
1993 sponsored the ambitious reform measure known as Law 100. 
Like other neoliberal initiatives of that government, the aim of the 
law was to carve out a larger role for private enterprise in medical 
insurance (and also in pension benefits). It established two basic 
forms of subscription, which between them were supposed to cover 
the entire population, as enrollment was obligatory. One form is the 
contributive regimen, whereby individuals with sufficient means 
join health insurance companies (EPS), which are basically fund 
administrators, receiving the quotas paid by members and then con- 
tracting with health-care providers (IPS) for services to their affili- 
ates as needed. The other basic division is the subsidized regimen, 
for those unable to pay a full monthly quota, in which state subsidies 
help cover the payments due from members, with the money going 
to Administrators of the Subsidized Regime (ARS), which like the 
EPS contract with providers to meet members' needs. 

Some further changes have been made since 1993, but the basic 
program set forth in Law 100 remains in effect. In 2007 DANE 
reported that 78 percent of the population had access to the health- 
care system. However, all this was achieved with some deterioration 
in quality of the care given, for the government made a deliberate 
decision to sacrifice the latter to the extent necessary to maximize 
coverage. Longer waiting times for appointments and procedures are 
just part of the problem; many of those enrolled in the subsidized 
program, especially in rural districts, simply do not have reliable 
access to modern diagnosis or treatment. The program generates 
many complaints, not just over the quality of care but also over 
numerous instances of administrative confusion, inefficiency, and 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



outright corruption. Many of these complaints are only to be 
expected in dealing with a new and rather complex program. Public 
hospitals have been hard hit, as they no longer receive direct financ- 
ing from the state but must compete for patients and then be paid by 
an EPS or ARS for services rendered. Moreover, the ARS, as it turns 
out, often set up their own clinics and other care providers, bypass- 
ing the existing hospitals. 

Health expenditures as a percentage of total gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) rose sharply: from 2.6 percent in 1993, they 
already had reached 4.7 percent in 1997, as a result of the higher quo- 
tas and other payments made by users as well as an increase in public 
expenditures. The latter rose from a meager 1.3 percent of GDP in 
1990-91 to almost 6 percent in 2003. Clearly, however, deficiencies 
remain in the health-care system, despite the extended coverage. A 
report in 2004 suggested that the proportion of patients served ade- 
quately by the system declined from 84 percent in 1997 to 77 percent 
in 2003. The decline resulted from the closure of hospitals and other 
health-service institutions because of financial difficulties that have 
been blamed on both the structure of the new system and misuse of 
funds. The system's resources also suffer from a high level of evasion, 
estimated at around one-third of all contributions due. The govern- 
ment passed a reform in 2006 aimed at reducing inefficiency and cor- 
ruption in the provision of services (particularly for low-income 
groups) by increasing competition; at the same time, it raised employ- 
ers' contributions. Any final assessment of the impact of Law 100 will 
have to recognize at least a quantitative improvement in health cover- 
age since the law was enacted, but there will be continuing disagree- 
ment as to whether even greater improvement might have occurred 
under a different system. Meanwhile, for critics of the government and 
of all neoliberal privatization measures, Law 100 has become a favor- 
ite example of everything wrong in Colombia today. 

Current Health Overview 

Although income distribution has been resistant to change, and 
decline in the poverty index has been at times erratic, there are a 
number of clear indications of improving conditions of life for the 
Colombian population in recent decades. The Human Development 
Index (HDI) — devised by United Nations experts to present a more 
balanced picture of well-being than strictly economic measure- 
ments — shows Colombia in 2005 with a ranking of 75, or somewhat 
better than the median, among all 177 countries thus measured. This 
result cannot be considered satisfactory, but it does reflect a process 
of slow but steady improvement that could be seen even in the first 



115 



Colombia: A Country Study 

half of the twentieth century, though the pace has increased mark- 
edly since 1950. 

People in the poorest regions and social strata suffer most from 
preventable diseases, such as gastrointestinal disorders and certain 
respiratory ailments, and they are the most likely to suffer from some 
form of malnutrition — if not from lack of calories, then from an 
excess of the sugar, starch, and cholesterol-prone fats in the Colom- 
bian diet. But they are relatively less afflicted by the degenerative 
and chronic diseases typical of urban and higher-income groups, 
such as coronary ailments and cancer. Nationwide, an increase in the 
latter diseases is related simply to a declining birthrate and increas- 
ing life expectancy, so the Colombian population is steadily aging: 
with an increasing percentage of Colombians over 45 years of age. 
the impact of geriatric issues must inevitably increase. 

It is also true that Colombia's record in the reduction of infant 
mortality from 35.2 per 1.000 live births in 1990-95 to 19.5 in 2008 
is mediocre by Latin American standards. Maternal deaths are like- 
wise high, at 1.3 per 1.000 births in 2005 as against 0.3 for Chile. 
Many of these maternal deaths are the result of induced abortions, 
performed outside the formal health system because of traditional 
religious and legal sanctions: only in 2006 was abortion finally legal- 
ized, and then only in very special cases. On the whole, it appears that 
health improvements have been least evident for infants and children, 
for while the infant mortality rate was 19.5 per 1.000 live births in 
2008. the overall death rate was an estimated 5.54 deaths per 1.000 
population. Roughly a third of Colombian children suffer from ane- 
mia. And a fifth of the infant and child deaths are linked either to 
diarrheal or respiratory ailments or to other diseases associated with 
lack of pure water and poor sanitation and living conditions — all 
more typical of rural areas. The benefits of better medical care and 
living conditions are thus concentrated both in the upper age-groups 
and in urban environments. And many of the adult deaths are the 
result of such social pathologies as homicide and vehicle accidents. In 
the 1990s, homicide became for a time the leading single cause of 
mortality in Colombia, reflecting not just the impact of political vio- 
lence and the illicit drug industry but also other social problems and 
generally poor standards of law enforcement. 

Tropical diseases, including malaria, are endemic still in certain 
areas; indeed, the currents of internal migration to or from the less- 
developed tropical hinterland have helped spread not just malaria but 
also yellow fever, which had once been considered almost extinct. In 
addition to cerebral malaria, parasitic diseases such as leishmaniasis 
are still endemic in lowland and coastal areas. The incidence of sex- 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



ually transmitted diseases is also high. Human immunodeficiency 
virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/ AIDS) is a grow- 
ing problem, although Colombia was slow to recognize its impor- 
tance, and for some years, the number of reported cases was 
undoubtedly far less than the actual total. As in various other coun- 
tries, reluctance to face the issue is due in part to cultural factors, 
including a strong rejection of homosexuality. By the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, there was more willingness to see HIV/ 
AIDS as a threat to the nation's health, and estimates of the affected 
population are more reliable. With an infection rate of approximately 
0.6 percent for the 15^49 age-group, the situation in Colombia 
remains less critical than in certain Caribbean countries and Brazil 
but still troublesome. 

One other public-health problem that has often received less than 
its due share of attention is drug addiction. No doubt many Colom- 
bians were inclined to minimize the adverse effects of the illicit 
drugs industry as long as the consumers were in some foreign coun- 
try, but addiction also became a health issue at home, even if less 
serious than in the main export markets. At the end of the twentieth 
century, cocaine users as a percentage of the population were 
roughly half as numerous in Colombia as in the United States. From 
an early date, traffickers had made use of low-quality coca paste not 
suitable for the export trade by dumping it on the domestic market, 
where, combined with tobacco or other substances, it became 
bazuco, the Colombian equivalent of crack cocaine. However, addic- 
tion did not remain a problem simply of the lower social classes but 
spread to the middle and upper strata just as in North America, based 
on the use of a more refined cocaine. For the benefit of Colombian 
consumers, the Constitutional Court declared that possession of 
small personal dosages must be allowed even if large-scale traffick- 
ing is not. However, the administration of President Alvaro Uribe 
and conservative elements generally have sought to maintain penal- 
ties for personal use, and the issue remains unresolved. 

The Pension Conundrum 

The Colombian social security system has long been an egre- 
gious example of an inordinately complex and unfair redistributive 
mechanism that takes from the poor to give to the middle class and 
wealthy. For much of the twentieth century, Cajanal, created to 
administer benefits for different categories of state employees, and 
the ISS, created to offer retirement coverage to a small number of 
private-sector employees, were institutional landmarks, but for a 
minority of Colombians. In 1993 new legislation authorized the 



117 



Colombia: A Country Study 

establishment of private funds based on the Chilean model, in 
which pensions are financed from individual accounts into which 
both employees and employers make direct contributions, and the 
primary role of the state is to supplement pensions of the lowest 
earners. 

The 1993 reform resulted in large part from the previous disarray 
and gross inequity in retirement benefits. A multiplicity of funds 
offered pensions that often bore no relation to the contributions 
made by the employees and their employers (public or private), so 
that general tax revenues covered more than three-quarters of the 
total cost of pensions. Because a majority of Colombians were still 
not covered — most obviously those in the informal sector, but a 
great number of others as well — many of the poor who themselves 
lacked coverage were subsidizing through their taxes retirees from 
the upper social strata, most of whom were actually covered. More- 
over, the retirement ages — originally set at 55 for women and 60 for 
men — took no account of the fact that Colombians were now living 
longer. The worst abuse concerned the special pension regimes for 
particular groups of employees — teachers, the military, members of 
Congress, and so forth — which often had scandalously high payouts. 
In principle, the rate of payroll contributions was to have been raised 
steadily, but this did not happen, so that the total cost of pensions for 
the Colombian treasury was rapidly becoming unsustainable. 

The Cesar Gaviria administration made the first serious effort to 
reform pensions as a key part of Law 100. The reform did not elimi- 
nate the ISS but gave workers the option of having what in effect 
were individual savings accounts, administered by private funds that 
would eventually pay the pension benefits. However, the state still 
promised to provide whatever was needed in order for the pensions 
of low earners to meet a minimum standard. For anyone who chose 
to remain with the ISS retirement system, contributions were 
increased moderately, as was the number of weeks required to work 
and contribute in order to earn a pension. The law provided for 
retirement ages to rise to 57 for women and 62 for men, effective in 
2014. As things turned out, there was a rush to join the private sys- 
tem, which came to have approximately 5 million workers affiliated 
(albeit with only half as many contributing at any given moment) as 
against 2 million in the ISS. But many special retirement funds for 
privileged groups remained in operation, and under the terms of the 
law some of its provisions would not take full effect until 2013. 

In 2005 a new reform again raised contributions, reduced the 
period for changes to take effect, and made other adjustments. Some 
unreasonably high entitlements still exist, and the jurisprudence of 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Constitutional Court, which tends to favor litigants with a vested 
interest in preexisting arrangements, poses a continuing threat to the 
effectiveness of reforms so far accomplished (see The Judiciary, ch. 
4). By 2005 the cost to the state of ISS pensions, together with retire- 
ment benefits for which Cajanal is responsible and pensions for 
those enrolled in the separate special retirement systems, amounted 
to 30 percent of total tax receipts — all going to 3 percent of the 
Colombian population. That last figure will inevitably increase, as 
more people subscribe to a pension and as more retire. In 2008, how- 
ever, a system both fiscally supportable and socially equitable was 
still a long way off (see The Pension System, ch.3). 

Religion 

Religion no longer plays as important a role in Colombian society 
as it once did, and neither does the Roman Catholic Church, despite 
close ties to the state and a firm hold on popular sentiment and 
belief. Church-state relations do not add fuel to political disputes as 
they did from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth cen- 
tury, when heated arguments over such topics as the role of religious 
orders and the alleged hostility or subservience of political leaders 
toward high clerics were among the factors spurring Liberals and 
Conservatives to civil war. Such issues have not been resolved, but 
they are no longer so controversial. Judging from the steadily falling 
birthrate, Colombians pay little attention to the church's condemna- 
tion of artificial birth control — and indeed it is unlikely that the main 
reason for previous high rates of population increase was strictly 
theological. Similarly, priests complain that nowadays few come to 
confession, whereas not too long ago, at least during Holy Week, one 
could see long lines in front of the confessionals. 

However, the church does not lack influence. Colombians (espe- 
cially women) are more religiously observant than a majority of 
other Latin Americans, as measured by attendance at mass and sim- 
ilar indicators. The institutional church, if not all-powerful, is still a 
significant force in national life. Although Martin Scorsese's con- 
troversial 1988 film, The Last Temptation of Christ, could not be 
shown in Colombia for some years because of its seeming disre- 
spect for fundamental tenets of the Christian religion, in 2008 such 
a restriction on people's right to view what they wanted would have 
been almost unthinkable. 

Opinion polls continue to show a higher degree of public confi- 
dence in the Roman Catholic Church than in politicians, journalists, 
and other institutions. Moreover, not only do the great majority, 
almost 90 percent, of Colombians still consider themselves Roman 



119 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Catholics, but also the Roman Catholic Church maintains a far more 
impressive institutional structure than any other religious body in the 
country. The Colombian Roman Catholic Church is divided adminis- 
tratively into 77 dioceses, of which 13 are archdioceses headed by 
archbishops. Eleven others are technically classified as apostolic 
vicariates; 12 of them are located in remote areas, but one is the 
Ministry Ordinariate of Colombia. The archbishop of Bogota is just 
one of three Colombians who, by appointment of the pope, belong to 
the College of Cardinals. The Colombian Episcopal Conference 
(CEC) represents the hierarchy as a whole. The Roman Catholic 
priesthood numbers, in total, about 8,000, including roughly 5,700 
parish priests and 2,300 who belong to religious orders. There are 
also slightly more than 1 ,000 unordained brothers in religious orders 
and more than 17,000 Roman Catholic sisters. The ratio of Roman 
Catholic priests to total population, at one in 5,575, is not really ade- 
quate to meet the needs of the church but is among the highest in 
Latin America, and, unusually for the region, members of the clergy 
are predominantly Colombian natives. 

The church further maintains an extensive network of schools to 
educate the children of its members and any others whose parents care 
to send them, although they might well need to pay tuition. The CEC 
even has its own department of education to coordinate education pol- 
icy and to defend church interests in the field of education. Both regu- 
lar clergy and religious orders operate universities, including the 
Jesuits' Javeriana University in Bogota, which is one of the country's 
finest. Technically speaking, lay persons run other institutions of 
higher education that have close ties to the church, in some cases 
through organizations, such as Opus Dei. The church also continues to 
operate charitable institutions, such as orphanages and hospi- 
tals — alongside programs of social welfare and action that often 
receive additional support from other sources, including state agencies. 

Just as in other aspects of social and cultural life, there are important 
differences in religious faith and practice from one class or geographic 
region to another. Upper-class Colombians, with few exceptions, expect to 
be married in and buried from a Roman Catholic church, have their chil- 
dren baptized, and treat first communion as an important rite of passage. 
However, in between these family landmarks and the principal festive 
occasions of the church calendar, they are not always faithful in their reli- 
gious practice. The intellectual elite, as in so much of the Western world, 
is largely agnostic, although its members may still observe some of the 
formal ceremonies out of a respect for cultural tradition, to satisfy more 
devout family members, or simply for the festive value of the events. The 
upper-middle class tends to be more observant, and the same can be said 



120 




A religious artifacts store, Bogota 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 



of the peasant populations in Antioquia, the eastern highlands, and certain 
other regions, commonly with an admixture of folk religion that the 
ordained clergy may not be quite sure whether to accept as harmless or try 
to root out. Among rank-and-file lay Roman Catholics, an emphasis on 
prayer and ritual acts to gain the intercession of the Virgin and saints, in 
solving immediate problems, takes precedence over the finer points of 
doctrine and church teaching. But be that as it may, in almost any Colom- 
bian small town, the parish church, facing the main plaza, overshadows all 
other buildings, and the priest is a figure to whom the inhabitants look for 
more than just spiritual leadership. Indeed, he is likely to be involved even 
in various state-sponsored social and development programs. 

The Colombians who are least observant of official Roman 
Catholicism are the rural and urban population groups of the Carib- 
bean and Pacific lowlands, where the presence of the institutional 
church is weakest. Moreover, because free unions and households 
headed by women tend to outnumber conventional family units in 
the lowlands, a formal Roman Catholic church marriage is more the 
exception than the rule. Religious belief nevertheless remains strong, 
but again with a major strain of folk religion, including elements 
drawn from the African heritage of so many coastal inhabitants. 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

Church, State, and Society 

The Colombian Roman Catholic clergy had and still has the repu- 
tation of being more conservative, politically and theologically, than 
Latin American clergy in general. During the 1960s and 1970s, fol- 
lowing the Second Vatican Council, the church in Colombia, as else- 
where, felt the need to modernize its outlook and at the same time 
work for the amelioration of social problems. Indeed, a recognizable 
minority of the Colombian clergy was attracted to the tenets of liber- 
ation theology (see Glossary), while also espousing a more rapid 
pace of social and economic change. A fraction of this minority actu- 
ally joined the guerrillas, Camilo Torres Restrepo being the best- 
known example. However, although Father Camilo, who was killed 
in battle in 1966, became a leftist folk hero, his actions and those of 
the few others who chose the same path served to discredit the liber- 
ationist movement within the clergy, whose only supporter within 
the hierarchy was Bishop Gerardo Valencia Cano of Buenaventura. 
The latter 's death in a plane crash in 1972 was a serious blow, after 
which the radical movement among the Colombian clergy attracted 
steadily less attention. The elevation of John Paul II to the papacy 
further assured that orthodox clerical and lay figures would fill key 
positions. And with a moderate liberal democracy as the country's 
political system, it was easy for the bulk of the Colombian clergy to 
be politically conformist while tending to pastoral duties. In fact, 
starting at the time of the bipartisan National Front (1958-78), the 
Roman Catholic Church as a whole in Colombia assumed what can 
only be described as a remarkably low profile. 

Naturally, there were exceptions. The Research and Public Edu- 
cation Center (Cinep), for example, a think tank based at the Javer- 
iana University, churned out reports highly critical of Colombia's 
social system (although without giving any express comfort to 
advocates of violent revolution) and thereby earned a reproof from 
the hierarchy. Yet toward the end of the century, there was a modest 
increase of political and other activism that is hard to categorize 
under the usual labels. The clergy led a successful campaign to 
make sure that the 1991 Constituent Assembly did not omit men- 
tion of God in the preamble to the new constitution, and it has con- 
tinued to lobby against any form of legalized abortion, euthanasia, 
or recognition of homosexual partnerships. On these issues, liberal 
and conservative clerics and lay leaders are for the most part united, 
in defense of traditional morality. At the same time, however, 
though with slightly less unanimity, the church has participated in 
various efforts to facilitate peace in the country's internal conflicts 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



(with certain bishops even engaging in direct negotiations with 
guerrilla fronts) and in campaigns for the defense of human rights. 

Things changed again after President Uribe launched his Demo- 
cratic Security Policy, which reduced the emphasis on searching for 
a negotiated peace with the guerrillas in favor of more active resis- 
tance to the insurgency (see Internal Armed Conflict and Peace 
Negotiations, ch. 4; Democratic Security Policy, ch. 5). He received 
strong if not quite uncritical support from Pedro Rubiano Saenz, the 
cardinal-archbishop of Bogota, and from most but definitely not all 
of the Colombian church hierarchy. Representatives of all political 
persuasions in Colombia could thus find reasons from time to time to 
condemn clerical involvement in politics. Likewise, the clergy has 
suffered its share of outrages and assassinations inflicted by both 
guerrillas and paramilitaries, including the murder of two bishops by 
the guerrillas. 

Divorce is an issue that reflects as well as anything the ambiguities 
and also long-term decline in the power of the church and of tradi- 
tional religious values (see also Family, this ch.). Divorce became 
legal in Colombia in 1976, but with a glaring exception: Roman 
Catholic Church weddings could be dissolved only by ecclesiastical 
annulment. However, the pressure to obtain such annulments grew 
steadily, as did social acceptance of de facto separations and of for- 
eign divorces that technically had no validity in Colombia. At least in 
the cities, the act of shedding or changing spouses no longer drew 
much attention. That in the 1990 presidential election, the Conserva- 
tive Party, once a stalwart champion of Roman Catholic values, nom- 
inated a divorce, Rodrigo Lloreda Caycedo, who was remarried to a 
divorcee, was symptomatic of the change in attitude (but the Liberal 
Party easily won the election). Finally, the 1991 Constituent Assem- 
bly declared that all marriages are subject to the civil law and can 
therefore be legally terminated. 

Although the assembly did not remove the mention of God from the 
constitution and vigorously rejected a move to legalize abortion, it 
underscored the increasing secularization of Colombian society, not 
just by its handling of divorce but also by omitting any reference to 
Roman Catholicism as the national religion. The constitution now 
guarantees strict legal equality of all religious denominations. A few 
years later, the Constitutional Court would put an end to the traditional 
yearly ceremony consecrating the republic to the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus. In May 2006, the same court, meeting beneath the crucifix that 
adorns the wall of its chamber, declared that abortion cannot be pro- 
hibited in extreme cases, such as following incest or rape. Despite pro- 
tests by the clergy and traditionalists, with threats to excommunicate 



123 



Colombia: A Country Study 

any doctor who carried out such an operation, the decision was not 
subject to appeal, and the first legal abortions in Colombian history 
soon took place. 

The Growth of Protestantism 

Until recently, Colombia's Protestant churches — taking that label 
in a broad sense to include denominations that might prefer to be cat- 
egorized simply as evangelical or Pentecostal — played no significant 
role in national life. Formal religious toleration and the first Protes- 
tant (Presbyterian) missionary activity date back to the mid- 1800s, 
but roughly 100 years later Protestants still comprised less than 1 
percent of the total population. Even such small numbers often suf- 
fered severe repression during the years of La Violencia; their expe- 
rience attracted attention and sympathy to the Protestant groups and 
actually seems to have won them new members. However, their 
main growth has occurred since the 1960s, associated with the rapid 
social and cultural changes taking place in the country that among so 
much else weakened habitual allegiance to Roman Catholicism. 
During this process of expansion, the role of North American and 
European Protestant missionaries became steadily less important, as 
Colombians took over the leadership of congregations and other reli- 
gious bodies; indeed, some of the current evangelical and Pentecos- 
tal denominations are of purely Colombian origin. 

The growth of Protestantism in Colombia is still less than in many 
other Latin American countries, but Protestants now make up about 
10 percent of the population. The denominations with longstanding 
roots in Colombia, such as Presbyterians and Methodists, have not 
been the main beneficiaries of growth. Instead, as in Latin America 
generally, the most explosive expansion has been that of the 
churches commonly called Pentecostal — even if the Pentecostal 
movement was slower to take hold in the Colombian case — with 
others classified simply as evangelical having moderate growth. The 
older, established denominations have their greatest strength within 
the middle sectors of society, whereas the Pentecostal churches, 
whose style of worship has something in common with the emo- 
tional and magical aspects of Latin American popular Roman 
Catholicism, have had notable success in attracting upwardly mobile 
members of the working and lower-middle classes. Protestant 
churches of one sort or another are to be found in all parts of the 
country, including some traditional Amerindian communities for- 
merly regarded as a special preserve of the Roman Catholic religious 
orders. The Protestants have built schools, just as the Roman Catho- 
lic Church has done, and some denominations are deeply involved in 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



social services, for nonmembers as well as their own congregations. 
In 1989 a broad range of Protestant churches joined forces to create 
the Evangelical Confederation of Colombia, which does not include 
every denomination but does to a large extent speak for the Protes- 
tant churches generally. 

More unusual was the creation of explicitly evangelical political 
parties to take part in elections for the 1991 Constituent Assembly: 
the Christian Union and the Christian National Party. Presenting a 
joint ticket, they elected two of the 70 members of the assembly, and 
one of their delegates was named to head a key committee. Their par- 
ticipation, however, was for the most part narrowly focused on the 
issue of religious liberty and legal equality of all denominations, and 
the final constitutional text ostensibly satisfied these demands. From 
the Protestant standpoint, there did remain a few objectionable ves- 
tiges of the Roman Catholic Church's previous official status, in the 
appointment of chaplains for official institutions such as the police, 
military, or hospitals, and in certain other areas, but these matters 
were satisfactorily resolved by a decree of Ernesto Samper Pizano 
(president, 1994-98), in 1998. For the rest, the Colombian Menno- 
nites and a few other Protestant churches became deeply involved in 
movements for the defense of human rights and for a peaceful solu- 
tion to the country's armed conflicts, and activists have suffered inju- 
ries and death in the process. Protestant parties also have continued 
taking part in elections, with occasional success. However, various 
other Protestant groups are resolutely apolitical, and since the time of 
the Constituent Assembly, the Protestant community has not made its 
weight felt on major national issues in the way that the Roman Catho- 
lic Church does through the CEC or otherwise. 

Other Religious Expressions 

Religion in Colombia of course consists of more than Roman 
Catholics and Protestants and interaction between the two. African 
and Amerindian religious rites and beliefs have survived among the 
Afro-Colombian and Amerindian populations, generally in some 
combination with Christian elements. Indeed, there are distinct con- 
gregations that expressly identify themselves in terms of syncretism. 

There is a small Jewish community, most of which has its origin 
in the limited and restricted immigration of European Jews during 
the second quarter of the twentieth century. By 2005 the community 
numbered only about 4,200, down from about 25,000 in the 1980s. 
Many emigrated because criminal and terrorist groups targeted the 
relatively well-off Jewish community for kidnappings for ransom. 



125 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Colombia likewise has Muslim citizens, some of them the product 
of Middle Eastern immigration, even though most of the Syrians and 
other Arabs who came to Colombia were Christian; others are the 
result of proselytizing initiated by a follower of Malcolm X from the 
United States among Afro-Colombian communities of the Pacific 
coast. Lebanese — usually referred to as Turks (turcos) or Syrians 
because they came from the Christian Lebanese part of Syria that 
formerly belonged to Turkey — are active in commerce, particularly 
in the port cities of Barranquilla, Buenaventura, and Cartagena. 
Some Lebanese married into the Wayuu indigenous population. Esti- 
mates of Colombia's Muslim population range from an improbable 
low of 10,000 to a likely 200,000. 

Education 

Although individual Colombians have excelled in literature and 
other fields of intellectual endeavor, the country is not renowned for 
the quality of its public and private educational institutions. With a 
few temporary exceptions, public education of the lower-income 
masses has not received high priority. Over the years, formal educa- 
tion instead catered to the middle and upper social strata, with 
emphasis on preparing their children for the more prestigious profes- 
sions (law in particular). As good an indicator as any of the lack of 
broad educational achievement was a persistently low rate of adult 
literacy, albeit close to the norm for Latin America. Roughly a third 
of Colombians 15 years of age or older could read in 1900, and the 
rate barely exceeded one-half of the population in 1930. Moreover, 
as late as 1950 only 1 percent of Colombians received exposure to 
university-level training. Almost all of them were males because 
only since the 1930s had women been allowed to enter Colombian 
universities. 

Basic Education 

Under the 1991 constitution, the basic education cycle is free and 
compulsory for all Colombian children between the ages of five and 
15 and consists, at a minimum, of one year of preprimary education 
(kindergarten), five years of primary school, and the first four years 
of secondary education. However, the schooling offered does not 
always meet these guidelines, especially in rural areas. Primary 
education is provided for children between six and 12 years of age. 
For those who have completed the primary cycle successfully, sec- 
ondary education lasting up to six years is theoretically available. 
Following completion of a first cycle of four years, secondary 



126 




A classroom scene at a primary school in the mountain town of Armenia, 
the capital of Quindio Department, where an earthquake killed 
1,000 residents on January 25, 1999 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (Daniel Drosdoff), 

Washington, DC 



pupils may pursue a further two years of study, leading to the bacca- 
laureate examination. 

All standard indicators show significant advances over the last half- 
century in providing Colombians with at least the bare rninimum of 
skills required to function effectively as members of contemporary soci- 
ety. At the most basic level, adult literacy, Colombia has done even bet- 
ter than Cuba, where the campaign to extirpate illiteracy was justly 
celebrated but began from a much higher starting point. By the begin- 
ning of the twenty-first century, the rate of illiteracy had fallen (naturally 
depending on the definition used) to 8 percent, still more than twice the 
figure for Cuba or for Argentina but better than Brazil (above 12 per- 
cent) and of an order wholly different from the figure at mid-twentieth 
century. Also positive was the trend in coverage of primary education, 
whether gross coverage (the relation between total school attendance 
and the population of primary school age) or net coverage (referring 
only to the attendance of children actually of primary age). The former 
of these two measurements went from 43 percent in 1950 to 87 percent 
in 1970 and, after relapsing in the 1980s because of fiscal crises and 
other distractions, reached 110 percent at the beginning of the twenty- 
first century. By the latter date, net coverage — that is, disregarding the 



127 



Colombia: A Country Study 

older or younger children who were nevertheless enrolled in primary 
grades — came to approximately 90 percent. Less striking was the 
increase in the actual years of schooling received by Colombians now 
older than 15 years of age, from an average of slightly more than five at 
mid-twentieth century to somewhere still between five and six years in 
the 1980s. Naturally, this figure reflects among other things the fact that 
many present-day Colombians had already reached adulthood before 
the recent increase in educational opportunity. 

The statistics on literacy and primary coverage also need qualifica- 
tion, as they obscure significant regional and social differences. In 
major cities, literacy is close to universal, and net coverage in the pri- 
mary grades is not far behind. In rural Colombia, the picture is differ- 
ent. Some rural families simply live too far from the nearest school, 
while others still do not see the benefits to be gained by formal 
schooling. Another factor of equal or greater importance is the failure 
of local authorities in many places to provide sufficient schools and 
adequately staff them with teachers — whether for sheer lack of 
resources, inefficiency, or outright corruption. The national govern- 
ment itself oversees all education in Colombia and provides most of 
the funding for public schools, whether directly from the Ministry of 
National Education or in the form of revenue transfers to departments 
and municipalities as required by the constitution of 1991. However, 
as a result of the decentralization begun in the 1980s and accelerated 
under the terms of the 1991 constitution, the ministry now shares con- 
trol of the schools with regional and local bureaucracies, frequently 
beholden to entrenched political machines, whose record of perfor- 
mance varies widely. Considerable confusion as to responsibilities in 
educational administration continues, even though the 1994 Educa- 
tion Law put the Ministry of National Education ultimately in charge 
of public and private education. 

For most of the time since independence, it is safe to say that 
although the state took the chief responsibility for primary education 
and for universities, private schools (religious and otherwise) were 
dominant at the secondary level. Moreover, because the private 
schools charged tuition, which most Colombians could not pay, sec- 
ondary education functioned as a bottleneck that severely limited 
upward mobility. Today, the picture is somewhat different, as far as 
secondary and higher education are concerned, but the state is, if 
anything, even more dominant in the primary sector. 

In public primary education, there have been some promising 
advances, such as the introduction in the 1970s of the New School 
(Escuela Nueva) program, which features the establishment of multi- 
grade rural schools emphasizing parent participation and modern, 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



flexible teaching methods; some schools in this program have out- 
performed urban schools in test scores. There are also some highly 
questionable private schools set up in improvised quarters by enter- 
prising citizens with no particular educational training — known in 
Colombia as colegios de garage, or garage schools — the term cole- 
gio as used in Colombia covering a much wider gamut than the Eng- 
lish college. Nevertheless, the overall quality of private education is 
in most cases superior to public. And there is an even greater differ- 
ence, perhaps, in the prestige of attending one or the other, so that 
domestic servants, for example, will sometimes undergo real hard- 
ship for the sake of sending a child to a private colegio. 

The superiority of private schools results in considerable part 
from the same factors — inadequate resources and mismanagement 
of those available — that still limit overall public education coverage, 
especially in rural areas (where virtually all schools are public). 
Although all public-school students are supposed to receive free 
textbooks, that does not always happen in practice. Despite consider- 
able progress since the 1960s, when rapid expansion of the school 
system was just getting underway and the shortage of qualified 
teachers was extreme, there are still some teachers whose formal 
education extends barely beyond the grades they are teaching. Fur- 
ther improvements are at times made more difficult by the strength 
of the Colombian Federation of Educators (Fecode), which is the 
largest labor union in the country. Fecode has been unhappy with the 
government's recent emphasis on decentralization, finding it easier 
to exert pressure at the national level; and it tends to resist anything 
that might resemble a purge of ineffective classroom teachers. 

In percentage terms, the expansion of secondary education since 
the mid-twentieth century is even more impressive than that of pri- 
mary schooling, from gross coverage of less than 5 percent in 1950 to 
35 percent in 1980 and 70 percent by the century's end. Although dif- 
ferent methods of calculation may give higher or lower figures, the 
trend is unmistakable. Noteworthy also is the changing balance in 
enrollments, between public and private institutions. Whereas private 
schools had long absorbed a majority of secondary students, by 2000 
some two-thirds were enrolled in state schools. This shift, together 
with the quantitative increase in secondary education, means that the 
secondary level is no longer quite the bottleneck impeding upward 
mobility that it once was. At the same time, a significant number of 
students from families of lesser means received aid from the state or 
certain private sources so that they could attend private institutions. 

Secondary schools of any variety are overwhelmingly located in 
urban areas, however, and the private institutions, although now 



129 



Colombia: A Country Study 

enrolling a minority of secondary students, continue to offer gener- 
ally higher-quality training (as well as conferring more prestige). 
Some state schools, it is true, match the standards of the better pri- 
vate schools, while in the private sector there are colegios de garage 
offering secondary as well as primary classes. Nevertheless, private 
institutions are still at the apex of the education system, especially 
those associated with particular foreign communities such as the 
Colegio Anglo-Colombiano or the Colegio Nueva Granada. The lat- 
ter, established in Bogota on the model of a U.S. preparatory school, 
caters both to resident North Americans and to Colombians hoping 
to send their sons or daughters to a university in the United States. 
Many upper-class Colombians do go abroad, to Europe or North 
America, for university education. 

University, Technical, and Vocational Education 

The Colombians who go on to higher education in their own 
country are both far more numerous than before and faced with a 
remarkably increased range of institutions to choose from. Today 
Bogota alone hosts 113 main tertiary education institutions. By 2000 
the percentage of Colombians attending a university or other institu- 
tion of higher education had risen to 22 percent. Net coverage or 
attendance of university-age students was lower, but a majority were 
now women. Until the 1940s, students could go to the National Uni- 
versity of Colombia and a few other state universities in the rest of 
the country; to a network of normal schools and teacher-training 
institutes; and to a few private universities, such as the Javeriana 
University in Bogota and the Pontifical Bolivarian University, of 
more recent foundation, in Medellin. In the immediate postwar 
period, these institutions were joined by the University of the Andes 
(Uniandes), founded in Bogota in 1948 as a nonsectarian, nonparti- 
san institution designed to provide higher education on the model of 
the better North American private universities. It enjoyed critical 
support from the business community and from moderate elements 
of the two political parties. With a select student body, small classes, 
and well-qualified professors, it soon consolidated a reputa- 
tion — inside and outside Colombia — as the country's most distin- 
guished institution of higher learning. Today Colombia has 30 public 
universities (seven national and 23 departmental). 

The explosive growth of private universities came a bit later, 
beginning in the 1 960s, as a result of the excessive politicization of 
the National University of Colombia and other public universities, 
whose students seemed at times more interested in demonstrating for 
left-wing causes than in studying. By no means were all students 



130 




131 



Colombia: A Country Study 

political activists, but when serious unrest of any sort caused a uni- 
versity to be closed for a length of time, as repeatedly happened, all 
students suffered. The closures offered opportunities to new private 
universities, ranging from substandard universidades de garage to 
others that sought to emulate the rigorous standards of Uniandes, 
such as the University of the North in Barranquilla. Private universi- 
ties are now much more numerous than public ones and enroll the 
largest share of the university-age population. Of the main private 
universities, 14 are Roman Catholic and 26, nonsectarian. Both pub- 
lic and private institutions are now endeavoring, with varying 
degrees of success, to adapt the U.S. model of higher education to 
Colombian circumstances. There has been a significant general 
advance of studies in economics, engineering, and business adminis- 
tration at the expense of studies in law and medicine, while pure and 
applied natural sciences have continued to lag. 

Colombia also has a variety of technical and vocational institu- 
tions that mostly operate at the secondary level but sometimes 
extend into higher education, which in Colombia tends to be broadly 
defined. They include secretarial schools (mainly private), regional 
normal schools, the National Apprenticeship Service (Sena), the 
National Institutes of Diversified Intermediate Education (INEMs), 
and assorted others. Sena, established in 1957 and supported by lev- 
ies on larger business enterprises, provides courses to upgrade the 
skills of industrial and other workers and to improve the training of 
supervisors as well, but in recent years, it has become increasingly 
involved in technical and technological training. Since 1969 the 
INEMs, some of which are really excellent, have provided some 
training similar to that offered by Sena, along with general education 
courses. Both Sena and the INEMs have made a positive contribu- 
tion, not simply to the advancement of education as such but also to 
Colombian economic development. 

Continuing Problems 

The most obvious deficiency of the education system is that 
despite recent progress, and efforts to achieve universal coverage at 
the primary level, provision at all levels still lags behind that of many 
Latin American countries, to say nothing of the developed-world 
standards that Colombia aspires to achieve. This lag is compounded 
by the continuing gap in access to education among regions and 
social classes and by the poor quality of so much of the education on 
offer from primary through university levels. Public spending on edu- 
cation in 2005 came to 4.5 percent of GDP, a higher figure than for 
Argentina and Chile but still lagging behind the standards of coun- 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



tries belonging to the OECD. By comparison, Colombian govern- 
ment expenditures on education in the 1999 budget represented 19.7 
percent of total spending. 

Social Movements 

From a societal as well as purely economic standpoint, the most 
important structural problem facing Colombia today is clearly the high 
rate of inequality, which ultimately also accounts for most of the short- 
comings in health care and education. Among critical problems, the 
plight of the desplazados, which is hard to deal with and difficult for 
some Colombians to comprehend, is the most urgent. But other mem- 
bers of Colombian civil society have sought to confront these and 
other challenges with everything from ad hoc mobilizations to new 
formal organizations, all these activities being conventionally lumped 
together under the broad heading of "social movements." New move- 
ments, focusing on human rights; the environment; or issues of ethni- 
city, gender, and sexual orientation now preoccupy Colombians, 
alongside older issues, such as the student, labor, and peasant move- 
ments (see Other Parties and Political Movements, ch. 4). 

As in other Latin American countries, the university students' move- 
ment in Colombia enjoyed special prestige because of the supposed 
idealism of its young members. Since the dissolution in the 1960s of 
the National University Federation, students have lacked one primary 
nationwide organization and instead have gathered in congeries of sep- 
arate student organizations along political, regional, gender, or ethnic 
lines, or following some other particular orientation. Since the 1970s, 
there has been a decline in radical activism on university campuses, 
even though it certainly has not disappeared. However, student groups 
can still make their weight felt. Student marches, most involving sec- 
ondary students from private institutions, helped convince the govern- 
ment to convoke the 1991 Constituent Assembly. And any serious 
project to reform the public universities can be counted on to bring 
forth a slew of protest demonstrations that may or may not abort the 
proposal. 

Organized labor, for its part, reached a high point in membership 
during the National Front era, when the unions enrolled approxi- 
mately 15 percent of those Colombians who might potentially have 
joined one. Since then, however, there has been a steady decline, 
which the unification in 1986 of most of the labor movement under 
the banner of the United Workers' Federation (CUT) was unable to 
stem. By 1990 membership had fallen to 8 percent, although total 
numbers had not changed much because of the increase in popula- 
tion. The proportion today would be about 5 percent, with most 



133 



Colombia: A Country Study 

unionized workers concentrated in the public sector. Along with the 
decline in membership, strike actions have become less frequent and 
the role of organized labor in politics less significant. The election of 
former CUT leader Luis Eduardo ("Lucho") Garzon as mayor of 
Bogota in 2003 might have seemed to mark a labor revival, but his 
victory was more a personal triumph and that of a promising new, 
leftist party. 

One frequent explanation given for the declining fortunes of orga- 
nized labor is that the state and private business interests have 
worked hand in hand to undermine the unions' strength. There have 
been cases in which the former Ministry of Labor (now part of the 
Ministry of Social Protection) too readily declared a given strike ille- 
gal, which presumably had the further effect of deterring some other 
unions from trying to use the strike weapon. This explanation also 
highlights instances of murder and other violence against union 
activists, in which respect Colombia has the unenviable distinction 
of leading all Latin American nations by a wide margin. To be sure, 
state security agents or employers' hit squads do not necessarily 
orchestrate these attacks, however much government critics like to 
imply that they do. More important, in any event, as a cause of orga- 
nized labor's decline, are changes in the economy, such as the rela- 
tive decline of industries in which organized labor once was strong 
(Colombian railroads being here an extreme example) and the high 
unemployment, particularly since the mid-1990s, which weakened 
labor's bargaining power. Reduced union strength is another feature 
that Colombia shares with other countries in the modern world. 
Moreover, a host of other social movements strongly support the 
causes that labor holds dear, such as the defense of its own organiz- 
ers or opposition to neoliberal economic policies (see also Labor 
Unions, ch. 4). 

The main peasants' organization, the National Association of 
Peasant Land Users (ANUC), had its peak in the early 1970s, when 
it enrolled 40 percent of the economically active agrarian population, 
but from that peak the organization suffered a far more precipitous 
decline than the labor unions. A contributing factor was the advance 
of mechanized commercial agriculture at the expense of more labor- 
intensive traditional farming, but a greater problem was the mere 
fact that the countryside was the main arena of the armed conflicts 
being waged in Colombia. Peasant leaders and followers were 
caught in the crossfire of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and armed forces, 
while even those who tried desperately to distance themselves from 
the parties in conflict were liable to come under suspicion as sympa- 
thizers of a given armed band and suffer violence at the hands of its 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



adversaries. ANUC itself, under intense pressure from both the gov- 
ernment and its supporters and the leftist guerrillas, was torn by dis- 
sension and split into two main branches, neither of which could 
speak with unquestioned authority on behalf of Colombian peasants. 
Indeed, the fragmentation continued, although the splinter groups 
still were able to stage protests against human rights abuses and 
demonstrations in favor of land redistribution. 

Agrarian protests often were staged in coordination with groups 
representing the indigenous population, among them the Cauca 
Regional Indigenous Council, itself formed in 1971 under ANUC 
auspices. The Amerindian movement was not immune to the tug and 
intrusions of opposing political forces, but with ethnic identity as an 
organizing principle, its members were strongly inclined to avoid 
entanglement as far as possible in the quarrels of non- Amerindians. 
Lack of agreement led to disunity among those who thought in terms 
of a Colombia-wide indigenous community, those who identified pri- 
marily with a subnational ethnicity (or "tribe," as non-Amerindians 
might put it), and others who chose to emphasize the strictly local 
level. But whatever sense of identity the Amerindians preferred, it 
was inevitably sharpened in reaction to the unwelcome presence of 
non- Amerindian armed bands on or adjacent to their lands. Moreover, 
an umbrella organization, the National Indigenous Organization of 
Colombia (ONIC), was founded in 1982. In addition to providing 
some coordination among different sectors of the Amerindian move- 
ment, ONIC has sought to represent indigenous interests generally in 
dealing with the Colombian state and also through participation in 
certain government programs. 

The Amerindian communities were awarded a special quota of 
representation (two out of 70 seats) in the 1991 Constituent Assem- 
bly, and the resulting new constitution provided for special treatment 
in future elections. The constitution likewise guaranteed indigenous 
communities the secure possession of ancestral lands and respect for 
traditional customs. Central to their agenda since then has been the 
demand that these provisions be properly implemented; to that end, 
their organizations have made effective use of both lobbying and 
judicial action. Indigenous communities also have taken part in some 
campaigns of highly marginal significance to their own interests, 
such as when they joined demonstrations against a proposed free- 
trade treaty with the United States. Most noteworthy, however, has 
been their struggle against the depredations of guerrillas and para- 
militaries, as well as opposition to unwelcome attention from the 
nation's security forces. In certain well-publicized cases from the 
Cauca region especially, this has taken the form of a Gandhian kind 
of unarmed civil resistance. 



135 



Colombia: A Country Study 

The Afro-Colombian population is several times larger than the 
Amerindian but, with the main exception of certain isolated commu- 
nities, has less of a sense of distinct identity. It has been more open to 
assimilation and has long enjoyed legal equality with other Colom- 
bians. Nevertheless, Afro-Colombians are naturally aware of de facto 
inequalities, and in the closing decades of the twentieth century, black 
intellectuals took the lead in demanding greater recognition; one of 
them, novelist Juan Zapata Olivella, even made a symbolic run for 
the presidency in 1980. In the new constitution, Afro-Colombians, 
like Amerindians, are guaranteed political representation and respect 
for their lands and traditions, although in practice few took the step of 
explicitly identifying themselves as members of an Afro-Colombian 
community in order to take advantage of the special voting jurisdic- 
tion created for them. Both within and outside the political system, 
Afro-Colombians continued denouncing instances of mistreatment, 
many of them by-products of rural conflict, or apparent land grabs by 
narco-paramilitaries at their communities' expense. 

A somewhat special case is that of the raizal population of the 
Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y Santa Catalina, which 
feels threatened by an influx of mainland Colombians and by 
increasing attention from the authorities in Bogota that results at 
least in part from a desire to show the flag in Colombia's territorial 
dispute with Nicaragua. Some have gone so far as to raise a call for 
independence, although such an aim is scarcely practicable, not least 
because the raizales are no longer an actual majority of the islands' 
population. 

The concerns of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities 
coincide with those of "green" activists, who are mostly urban-based, 
in defense of the environment against the degradation inflicted by 
guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the state itself. Two obvious examples 
are the pollution of streams and rivers by the favorite guerrilla tactic of 
blowing up oil pipelines, and the government's aerial spraying of coca 
plantings with herbicides, the long-term effects of which are subject to 
debate, but which inevitably spill over onto legal crops as well. Then 
there are all the common environmental problems that stem from 
activities of modern civilization, whether the building of roads 
through pristine natural settings or the inadequate disposal of used 
chemical inputs (a practice particularly associated with the illicit drugs 
industry). Colombia can boast a comprehensive body of regulations 
designed to protect the environment, but the bureaucratic machinery 
and even the will to enforce them are often lacking. Strong U.S. sup- 
port for aerial spraying has resulted in an unusually broad swathe of 
anti-U.S. protesters when demonstrations against the policy have been 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



held, and these are no doubt partly responsible for the erratic stop-and- 
go application of spraying. Yet the environmental effects of armed 
conflict pose an even greater challenge, and one impossible to fully 
meet while the conflict drags on (see Environment, this ch.). 

The women's movement, for its part, would seem already to have 
achieved its main objectives: women's right to vote came late to 
Colombia (in 1954), but even before the constitution of 1991, 
women had obtained, in effect, full formal equality with men. 
Women have been well represented in appointive positions up to and 
including the ministries of communications, national defense, and 
foreign relations, although their representation in Congress remains 
low; and they still do not have the full reproductive freedom that 
activists identify with an unrestricted right to abortion. In practice, 
however, women's groups in recent years have been concerned 
above all to protest the prolongation of armed struggle in the coun- 
try, the violation of human rights, and, in particular, the widespread 
violence against women not just as part of armed conflict but also in 
the home and neighborhood, where not all ordinary males have taken 
to heart the notion of equality between the sexes. 

Gender issues also are involved in one of the newest social move- 
ments of all, that of the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgen- 
der) community, whose members have become increasingly vocal in 
their demands for respect and for access to such things as the partner 
benefits normally extended only to those in heterosexual relation- 
ships. So far, there has been little progress on the matter of benefits, 
but the Sunday following June 28 has become the date of an annual 
gay pride parade in Bogota that would have been unthinkable in 1990. 
Nothing else, perhaps, so forcefully symbolizes the ongoing changes 
from a society steeped in Roman Catholic tradition to one that 
increasingly takes its cues from the global media — and from the spirit 
of renovation sanctioned for better or worse by the 1991 constitution. 

* * * 

Raymond Leslie Williams and Kevin G. Guerrieri's Culture and 
Customs of Colombia provides a general introductory overview of 
Colombian society, including topics beyond the scope of this chapter, 
such as social customs, daily life, and the arts. Alberto Gerardino 
Rojas's Colombia: Geografia is a particularly useful reference 
source. On environmental issues, the most comprehensive and infor- 
mative source is Environmental Priorities and Poverty Reduction: A 
Country Environmental Analysis for Colombia, edited by World 
Bank staffers Ernesto Sanchez-Triana, Kulsum Ahmed, and Yewande 



137 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Awe. The Web site of the National Administrative Department of Sta- 
tistics (DANE) at http://www.dane.gov.co/censo/ is the reference for 
demographic findings of the Colombian census of 2005, although 
nonregistered users have only very limited access to DANE data. 
Carmen Elisa Florez Nieto's Las transformaciones sociodemogra.fi- 
cas en Colombia durante el sigh XX is a general discussion of socio- 
demographic changes in Colombia during the twentieth century. Gota 
a Gota: Desplazamiento forzado en Bogota y Soacha is a recent in- 
depth report on displacement, especially as it has affected Bogota, by 
the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (Codhes) and 
Bogota's Migrants' Care Foundation (Famig) of the Arquidiocesis de 
Bogota. Peter Wade's Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of 
Racial Identity in Colombia is a good English work on race and infor- 
mal discrimination in Colombia. For an official report on the coun- 
try's ethnic diversity, the best source is Colombia, una nacion 
multicultural: Su diversidad etnica, by DANE. 

Dated but still useful scholarly works in English on Colombian 
society include T. Lynn Smith's Colombia: Social Structure and the 
Process of Development, which provides an overview of the pro- 
found changes in the country's traditional agrarian social structures 
during the twentieth century up to the mid- 1 960s, and Orlando Fals- 
Borda's Peasant Society in the Colombian Andes: A Sociological 
Study of Saucio, a classic case study of the impact of modernization 
on Colombia's rural communities in the 1950s and early 1960s. Vir- 
ginia Gutierrez de Pineda's La familia en Colombia: Trasfondo 
histdrico provides an excellent overview of the evolution of family 
structures. 

Albert Berry and Miguel Urrutia's Income Distribution in Colom- 
bia explores how the benefits of Colombia's rapid economic growth 
after World War II were distributed by regions and strata in the mid- 
1970s, whereas Urrutia's Winners and Losers in Colombia's Eco- 
nomic Growth of the 1970s revises and updates his earlier work with 
Berry through the end of the decade. Recent standard works on 
income distribution and related issues are Alejandro Gaviria Tru- 
jillo's Los que suben y los que bajan: Educacion y movilidad social 
en Colombia and Armando Montenegro and Rafael Rivas's Las 
piezas del rompecabezas: Desigualdad, pobreza y crecimiento. For 
monographic chapters on all aspects of recent Colombian develop- 
ment, one may turn to the multivolume Nueva historia de Colombia 
edited by Alvaro Tirado Mejia. On public-health conditions and 
trends since the 1990s, La salud estd grave: Una vision desde los 
derechos humanos by Victor de Currea Lugo, Mario Hernandez 
Alvarez, and Natalia Paredes Hernandez is informative. Daniel 



138 



The Society and Its Environment 



Levine discusses the changing role of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Colombia in the twentieth century in Religion and Politics in Latin 
America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia. For 
more recent developments as well as broad and detailed analyses on 
the evolution of religion in Colombia, one may consult the work 
edited by Ana Maria Bidegain and Juan Diego Demera Vargas, Glo- 
balizacion y diversidad religiosa en Colombia, and Bidegain's His- 
toria del cristianismo en Colombia: Corrientes y diversidad. 
Rebecca Pierce Bomann's Faith in the Barrios: The Pentecostal 
Poor in Bogota, covers its subject well. The basic reference on edu- 
cation is Aline Helg's La educacion en Colombia; a more recent 
overview is provided in an article by Alfredo Sarmiento Gomez, 
"Equity and Education in Colombia." (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



139 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Top: An indigenous geometric design for a gold earring, decorative motif, 
Calima archaeological area 

Bottom: An indigenous geometric design for a gold earring, decorative 
motif, Muisca archaeological zone 

Courtesy Museo del Oro, Banco de la Republica; Banco del Pacifico 
(Ecuador); and Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana Benjamin Carrion, El oro 
de Colombia: Homenaje al Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador, 1982, 72-75 



FOLLOWING A LONG TRADITION of heavy state intervention in 
and active management of the Colombian economy, the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s were years of wide-ranging, 
market-oriented reforms aimed at promoting private-sector participa- 
tion, enhancing trade, improving the performance of the financial 
sector, and making labor and product markets more efficient. A new 
constitution enacted in 1991 also had broad implications for the econ- 
omy, in particular for monetary and fiscal policy, through the estab- 
lishment of an independent Bank of the Republic (Banrep; hereafter, 
Central Bank) and the promotion of fiscal decentralization. 

These changes have made present-day Colombia a more diversified 
national economy and better integrated with the world economy. The 
service sector has continued increasing its proportion of the nation's 
gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary). Mineral exports and 
remittances have become an important source of foreign exchange. The 
country's longtime dependency on revenue from coffee has signifi- 
cantly diminished. National and foreign private-sector entrepreneurs 
now have greater involvement in the provision of public services and in 
the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Domestic con- 
sumers have gained access to greater varieties and qualities of a wide 
range of goods and services. In the meantime, the government has 
strengthened its role as a market regulator. 

The heavy burden on the fiscal accounts that resulted from imple- 
menting fiscal decentralization led to a significant increase in the vul- 
nerability of the economy to international shocks. Together with a very 
unsettled domestic security situation, these shocks severely compli- 
cated and delayed the achievement of several of the goals expected 
from the broader market-oriented reforms. As a result, the second half 
of the 1990s was a period of diminished and more volatile growth, 
including, in 1999, the first and only recession since 1931. Overall, the 
years between 1995 and 2000 were a period of disappointing economic 
performance and deterioration of many social indicators. 

During 2000-7 achievements in domestic security, a more prudent 
fiscal policy, and a more benign international environment allowed the 
economy to recover, unemployment to shrink, and economic prospects 
to improve. Inflation decreased from more than 30 percent per year in 
1990 to 5.7 percent per year in 2007, a level close to that of developed 
countries. By 2005 Colombia ranked as a lower middle-income coun- 
try, with a per capita income of US$2,735 and with a GDP that was the 
fifth largest in Latin America, behind Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and 



143 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Venezuela. Still, Colombia remains a nation with very high poverty 
levels — 49.5 percent in 2005, according to the government of Alvaro 
Uribe Velez (president, 2002-6, 2006-10) — and with one of the most 
uneven income distributions in Latin America and the world. 

Economic History, 1819-1999 

Growth and Structure of the Economy, 1819-1989 

Colombia first became an exporting region in the sixteenth cen- 
tury, under the Spanish system of mercantilism (see Colonial Society 
and Economy, ch. 1). Spanish imperial rule defined much of Colom- 
bia's social and economic development. The colony became an 
exporter of raw materials, particularly precious metals, to the mother 
country. With its colonial status came a highly structured socio- 
economic system based on slavery, indentured servitude, and limited 
foreign contact. Colombia's contemporary economy, based on coffee 
and other agricultural exports, did not emerge until after indepen- 
dence in 1819, when local entrepreneurs were free to capitalize on 
world markets other than Spain. 

Although colonialism fostered minimal domestic economic 
growth, small entrepreneurial efforts began to take shape, so that by 
the nineteenth century well-defined economic enterprises existed. 
The economy at that time was based primarily on mining, agricul- 
ture, and cattle raising, with contributions also by local artisans and 
merchants. 

Socioeconomic changes proceeded slowly; the economic system 
functioned as a loosely related group of regional producers rather 
than as a national entity. Land and wealth were still the privileges of 
a minority. Forced labor continued in the mines, and various labor 
arrangements existed on the haciendas, such as sharecropping and 
low-wage labor. In each case, those owning the land benefited exces- 
sively, whereas those working the land remained impoverished. 

In the late nineteenth century, tobacco and coffee export indus- 
tries developed, greatly enlarging the merchant class and leading to 
population expansion and the growth of cities. The concentration of 
economic activity in agriculture and commerce, two sectors that 
focused on opening channels to world markets, continued slowly but 
steadily throughout the nineteenth century. 

Following the War of the Thousand Days (1899-1902), Colombia 
experienced a coffee boom that catapulted the country into the mod- 
ern period, bringing the attendant benefits of transportation, particu- 
larly railroads, communications infrastructure, and the first major 
attempts at manufacturing (see A New Age of Peace and Coffee, 



144 



The Economy 



1904-30, ch. 1). The period 1905-15 has been described as the most 
significant growth phase in Colombian history, characterized by an 
expansion of exports and government revenues, as well as an overall 
rise in the GDP. Coffee contributed most to trade, growing from only 
8 percent of total exports at the beginning of the 1870s to nearly 75 
percent by the mid- 1920s. Beyond its direct economic impact, the 
expansion of coffee production also had a profound social effect. In 
sharp contrast to mining and to some agricultural products such as 
bananas, which were grown on large plantations, coffee production in 
Colombia historically developed on very small plots of land. As a 
result, it generated an important class of small landowners whose 
income depended on a major export commodity. Unprecedented 
amounts of foreign capital found their way into both private invest- 
ment and public works during this period because of the strong per- 
formance of coffee and other exports. 

The rapid growth and development of the economy in the early 
twentieth century helped to strengthen the country so it was largely 
resistant to the Great Depression that began in 1929. Colombia con- 
tinued to produce raw materials, and, although coffee prices collapsed 
during the Depression, output continued to expand. Nonetheless, 
social and economic improvements were uneven. 

The expansion of the coffee industry laid the groundwork for 
national economic integration after World War II. During the course 
of the postwar expansion, Colombia underwent a distinct transforma- 
tion. Before the 1950s, because of the steep terrain and a relatively 
primitive transportation network, local industries that were only 
loosely linked to other regional businesses dominated the manufac- 
turing sector. Improved transportation facilities, financed directly and 
indirectly by the coffee industry, fostered national development. 
Greater economic integration soon became evident with the heavier 
concentration of industry and population in the six largest cities. Cof- 
fee's success, therefore, led ultimately to a reliable transportation net- 
work that hastened urbanization and industrialization. 

In addition to coffee production, economic expansion of both the 
rest of the industrial sector and the services sector took place in two 
distinct stages. From 1950 until 1967, Colombia followed a well- 
defined program of import-substitution industrialization, with most 
manufacturing startups directed toward domestic consumption that 
previously had been satisfied by imports. After 1967 planners in both 
government and industry shifted the economic strategy to export pro- 
motion, emphasizing nontraditional exports, such as clothing and 
other manufactured consumables, in addition to processed coffee. 

From 1967 to 1980, the Colombian economy, and particularly the 
coffee industry, experienced sustained growth. Because of severe 



145 



Colombia: A Country Study 

weather problems affecting the world's largest exporter, Brazil, cof- 
fee prices reached unprecedented levels in the mid-1970s. High 
prices prompted an important expansion in coffee production in 
Colombia. This expansion involved a significant increase in the har- 
vested area and, more importantly, the introduction of a high-yielding 
coffee variety. In just over a decade, Colombia's coffee production 
doubled. The expansion of production and exports boosted the 
income and purchasing capacity of the thousands of households 
involved in coffee cultivation, thereby increasing consumption rap- 
idly and allowing the GDP to expand at an average annual rate of 
more than 5 percent during this period. Strong export earnings and a 
large increase in foreign-exchange reserves were the most noticeable 
results of this economic expansion. At the same time, the Central 
Bank had to use a variety of policies and instruments at its disposal in 
order to prevent inflation from accelerating. 

Most of the second half of the twentieth century, at least until the 
late 1980s, saw Colombia's economy being managed in a reasonably 
conservative way. By all accounts, and contrary to most other coun- 
tries in the region, the government did not indulge in populist macro- 
economic policies. The fiscal accounts were never seriously out of 
balance, and, as a result, public debt remained at comfortable levels. 
Foreign finance flowing to the region diminished significantly at the 
beginning of the 1980s, and Colombia was the only major Latin 
American economy that did not default on or restructure its public 
debt. This prudent policy stance resulted in rather stable if modest eco- 
nomic performance, despite a wide range of international shocks, 
including shifts in the prices of coffee and oil, the international debt 
crisis, and swings in the economic performance of its main trading 
partners. 

In the 1980s, the government played a simultaneous role as a leg- 
islator, regulator, and entrepreneur, particularly in the provision of 
public utilities and in the exploitation of major natural resources, 
such as oil and coal. Colombia also used diverse trade -policy tools, 
such as tariffs and quotas, in order to promote import substitution, 
supplemented after 1967 by export promotion and economic diversi- 
fication. To encourage exports, a competitive exchange rate became 
a centerpiece of macroeconomic policy, together with several export 
subsidies, including tax exemptions and subsidized credit. The initial 
export-promotion strategy did not include import liberalization as 
one of its components. A prominent feature of the export-promotion 
strategy was that the Central Bank stood ready to vary the fixed but 
adjustable exchange rate to compensate for domestic inflation, in 
order to maintain the competitiveness of domestic producers. As a 



146 



The Economy 



result, the exchange rate became indexed to the rate of inflation, and 
it did not take long for a vicious circle to develop, one in which 
inflation fed into the exchange rate and vice versa. Consequently, 
and notwithstanding a tradition of prudent fiscal policies, for a long 
period Colombia was characterized by a moderate, albeit stable, rate 
of inflation. Widespread indexation mechanisms, particularly for 
wages, public utilities, and mortgage-interest rates, blurred most 
income-redistribution effects generally associated with inflation. 

The financial sector became highly regulated, and the Central 
Bank established a range of subsidized credit lines. The government 
intervened heavily in the foreign-exchange markets by setting prices 
and controlling access to foreign exchange. The Central Bank had a 
monopoly over the purchase and sale of all foreign exchange. Traders 
had to surrender export proceeds to the bank, and importers had to 
meet all their foreign-exchange requirements through the Central 
Bank. Consequently, a black market for foreign exchange emerged, 
which would eventually be the vehicle of choice to bring back to 
Colombia part of the proceeds flowing from the sale of illicit drugs in 
the United States and Europe. Strict regulations also governed inter- 
national capital flows, and foreign direct investment became highly 
regulated. International agreements among the Andean Community 
of Nations (see Glossary) members prohibited foreign investment in 
the financial sector. 

Because the fiscal position remained broadly under control, 
Colombia managed to service its foreign debt during the debt crisis of 
the 1980s. Average growth was not very high, but, unlike other 
regional economies, no sharp recession occurred either. Likewise, 
inflation was stable at moderate levels. On the negative side, in the 
late 1980s Colombia had grim prospects for productivity growth. The 
expansion of the labor force and increases in the capital stock engen- 
dered economic growth, but both factors were exploited very ineffi- 
ciently. The government and the international financial institutions, 
especially the World Bank, concluded that the lackluster performance 
and bleak prospects for productivity growth to a great extent reflected 
the economy's inadequate exposure to foreign competition and the 
prevalence of government intervention in the economy. In addition, 
the increasing internal conflict, in which guerrilla groups, paramilitar- 
ies, and drug cartels were major players, had negative economic 
effects, primarily by displacing legal and productive agricultural 
activities. The insecurity fostered huge investments in sectors incon- 
ducive to economic efficiency, such as low-density cattle raising on 
some of Colombia's most productive land, and created a very unfa- 
vorable environment for domestic and, especially, foreign investors. 



147 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Thus, in common with other developing countries, particularly in 
Latin America, the late 1980s and early 1990s in Colombia were years 
of major changes. Some of the changes, particularly at the initial stages 
of the reform process, were geared toward enhancing competition and 
making several markets more efficient. These changes included mean- 
ingful trade liberalization in 1989 and labor, financial, and foreign- 
exchange reforms beginning in 1989 and 1990 (see Macroeconomic 
Policies and Trends, this ch.). 

The 1990s: A Decade of Economic Reform 

In 1991 the country elected a Constituent Assembly in order to 
write a new constitution that would replace the 1886 charter. The drive 
toward this major change was not related to economic issues. Rather, 
it took place within a complex political scenario, including a peace 
process with the Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19) guerrilla 
group and the debate over how to bring major drug lords to justice. 

Important provisions in the 1991 constitution would have lasting 
effects on the economy, particularly the articles that aided the over- 
arching goal of facilitating progress toward long-awaited peace and 
political reconciliation. Of particular importance were the promotion 
of fiscal decentralization and the social role of the state. The aim of 
fiscal decentralization was to complement the process of political 
decentralization that had been initiated in the mid-1980s, with the 
popular election of city mayors. The social role of the state was 
deemed a necessary supplement to recent economic reforms, in order 
to ensure that the benefits resulting from these reforms would reach 
the vast majority of the population. The manner in which these criti- 
cal issues were eventually handled had profound implications for the 
constant increases in public expenditure. Inasmuch as the growth in 
government outlays was not matched by increases in taxes or other 
government revenue, the fiscal provisions in the constitution had a 
negative effect on the public debt. The new constitution also made the 
Central Bank independent, with a mandate to strive for a low and sta- 
ble rate of inflation. 

Between 1989 and 1992, Colombia went through an unprece- 
dented period of change in economic policy and institutions. These 
reform processes, which might not seem particularly ambitious when 
compared with other experiences in Latin America, were rather 
exceptional within Colombia, given the country's long tradition of 
moving very slowly and cautiously on reforms. One set of poli- 
cies — including trade liberalization, labor and financial sector 
reform, and Central Bank independence — was geared toward pro- 
moting trade and competition, enhancing flexibility, and increasing 



148 



The Economy 



productivity. Another set of policies — especially fiscal decentraliza- 
tion and the constitutionally mandated social role of the state — was 
mostly driven by political and social considerations. In the context of 
a favorable international environment, these principles served the 
country well until 1995. However, after 1996 several factors con- 
spired to make the two sets of policies somewhat inconsistent and 
quite costly. Furthermore, the reform momentum had largely evapo- 
rated, so that several of the identified policy inconsistencies were not 
addressed. 

Colombia enjoyed a fairly good economic performance in the first 
half of the 1990s because of an initial increase in public spending, 
and the wealth effect resulting from increased oil production, which, 
however, peaked in 1999, and a greater role for the private sector. 
However, continuous fiscal deficits led to higher public debt, and the 
increases of both private and public foreign debt made the country 
vulnerable to negative international shocks. Furthermore, a profound 
political crisis emerged because of allegations that drug traffickers 
had partially financed the presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper 
Pizano (president, 1994-98; see Public Administration, ch. 4). The 
political crises that ensued had two serious consequences for eco- 
nomic policy. On the one hand, the government tried to enhance its 
popular support through initiatives that were very costly in fiscal 
terms, including significant wage increases for civil servants, partic- 
ularly for members of the very powerful teachers' union. On the 
other hand, the government's ability to engage the Congress of the 
Republic (Congreso de la Republica) in meaningful reform van- 
ished. As a result, a much-needed push to enhance public revenues, 
including thorough changes to the tax code, did not happen. 

Unsurprisingly, in the midst of the Asian and Russian economic 
crises of the late 1990s, Colombia had its first economic recession in 
more than 60 years. The exchange rate came under severe pressure, 
and the Central Bank devalued the exchange-rate band twice. The 
sudden stop in international lending led to an abrupt adjustment in 
the current account, which meant a large contraction in aggregate 
demand. Increases in international interest rates together with expec- 
tations of devaluation of the peso (see Glossary) caused rises in 
internal interest rates, contributing to the contraction of GDP. The 
recession and the bursting of a real-estate bubble also resulted in a 
major banking crisis. The savings and loan corporations were espe- 
cially affected. The government took over a few private financial 
institutions and forced others to close. Public banks and private 
mortgage banks were hard hit, and the subsequent government inter- 
vention to aid some of the distressed financial institutions added 
pressures on public expenditure. 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

In late 1999, the government and the Central Bank undertook a 
major policy decision: the exchange rate would be allowed to float 
and be determined by market forces, and the Central Bank would no 
longer intervene in the foreign-exchange market. Inasmuch as this 
change in policy came when confidence in the peso was very low, 
there was a distinct possibility that the currency would weaken to an 
extent that could make foreign debts — both of the government and 
of the private sector — unpayable. 

To prevent such an event from occurring, Colombia signed a 
three-year extended-fund facility arrangement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to boost confidence in the economy, 
prevent the exchange rate from collapsing once it was allowed to 
float, and return economic reform to the agenda, with fiscal sustain- 
ability and inflation control. This agreement, with minor variations, 
was extended twice and served as an important guiding framework 
for economic policy making, particularly in reestablishing Colom- 
bia's reputation as a fiscally sound economy, a long-standing posi- 
tive tradition that was lost in the 1990s. Signing the extended- fund 
facility with the IMF demonstrated that the government and the Cen- 
tral Bank were willing to make needed major policy decisions. In the 
context of the agreements with the IMF, the Central Bank allowed 
the exchange rate to float in 1999 and concentrated on reducing 
inflation. The government also introduced several tax-enhancing 
reforms and partial reforms of the public pension system, amended 
the fiscal decentralization regime, strengthened the financial system, 
and once again privatized several financial institutions that the gov- 
ernment had taken over during the crises. 

Economic Structure and Sectoral Policies 

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Colombia needed to foster 
productivity by enhancing the economy's exposure to foreign compe- 
tition, make the labor market more efficient, strengthen the financial 
sector, and reinforce the role of the government as a regulator. Eco- 
nomic policy did not generally promote certain sectors at the expense 
of others. To reach its policy objectives, the government adopted sev- 
eral reforms at the sector and the aggregate macroeconomic levels. 
Important developments, including the collapse of the international 
coffee agreement and the discovery of significant oil reserves, also 
played a key role in reshaping the structure of the Colombian econ- 
omy. Thus, the structure has changed quite significantly in the late- 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, in line with developments 
in other middle-income countries. In 1945 agriculture represented 47 
percent of the nation's GDP, services 27 percent, industry 22 percent, 



150 



Colombia: A Country Study 

and mining 4 percent. Since then the nation has gone from a predom- 
inantly agricultural economy with a nascent manufacturing sector to 
one dominated by the services sector (see fig. 4). 

Agriculture 

The share of agriculture in GDP has fallen consistently since 
1945, as industry and services have expanded. However, Colombia's 
agricultural share of GDP decreased during the 1990s by less than in 
many of the world's countries at a similar level of development, even 
though the share of coffee in GDP diminished in a dramatic way. 
Agriculture has nevertheless remained an important source of 
employment, providing a fifth of Colombia's jobs in 2006. 

The most relevant policy instrument affecting the recent evolution of 
the agricultural sector has been the price bands that Andean countries 
introduced to protect agriculture in the context of the trade-liberalization 
program of the early 1990s. According to the mechanism, when interna- 
tional prices decrease, import tariffs increase and vice versa. These 
price-band ranges remain, despite domestic controversy regarding the 
level of protection that they provide. This is mainly because of pressure 
from interest groups and because of the difficulties in identifying clearly 
the impact on international prices of the subsidies and internal supports 
given to producers in the developed world. 

Public policy toward the agricultural sector also has included the 
establishment of subsidized sources of credit. Since 1990 such 
mechanisms have included the Fund for the Finance of the Agricul- 
tural Sector (Finagro). Other policy instruments have included mini- 
mum price guarantees, import quotas, subsidized credits and tax 
exemptions, campaigns to promote consumption, incentives for new 
investments and for forestry plantations, and more recent exchange- 
rate or currency-hedging options. 

In 2006 Colombia's most important agricultural products were cat- 
tle, accounting for 45 percent of agricultural output; coffee, 9.5 per- 
cent; fruits, 15.2 percent (including plantains, 5.2 percent; and 
bananas, 2.8 percent); rice, 4.9 percent; flowers, 4.2 percent; vegeta- 
bles, 4.1 percent; and other agricultural products, 17.1 percent. This 
composition has remained basically the same since 1992, except for an 
increase in the share of cattle and fruits, and a decrease in the share of 
coffee. 

Cattle 

Cattle raising is the most widespread agricultural activity in Colom- 
bia, accounting for 74 percent of Colombia's agricultural land in 2005. 
Nevertheless, cattle traditionally were not a particularly important or 



152 



The Economy 



consistent net export for Colombia, and coffee's dominance within the 
country's agricultural exports remains largely unchallenged. 

Perhaps the most significant sectoral change in modern times was 
the creation of the National Livestock Fund (FNG) in 1993, adminis- 
tered by the Association of Colombian Stockbreeders (Fedegan). 
That fund has generated resources to tackle five major issues: sanita- 
tion, commercialization, research and development (R&D), training, 
and promotion of consumption. Although progress has been made on 
all five fronts, perhaps the most remarkable achievements have 
occurred in sanitation. A national program of vaccination against 
foot-and-mouth disease began in 1997. In 2009 the World Organiza- 
tion for Animal Health declared the country free of foot-and-mouth 
disease by vaccination. Significant progress also has been made in 
vaccination for brucellosis. These sanitation achievements are of 
major importance in increasing market access for Colombia's cattle 
exports. 

Coffee 

Coffee historically has been a major factor in the Colombian 
economy. Since the middle of the twentieth century, however, its rel- 
ative importance has been decreasing, largely as a natural outcome 
of the country's development process. The increase in the share of 
the services sector, as the nation has developed, corresponded to the 
reduction of coffee in both GDP and exports. Whereas in 1985 cof- 
fee exports represented 51 percent of total exports in value terms, 
they represented less than 6 percent in 2006. However, the relative 
decline in coffee's share of both GDP and exports should not imply 
that coffee has ceased to be a determining factor both in economic 
and social terms. The livelihoods of an estimated 566,000 families, 
some 2.3 million Colombians, depend entirely on coffee. 

The two most important increases in coffee's international price 
per pound since 1821 occurred after the signing of the Inter- American 
Coffee Agreement of 1940 and the International Coffee Agreement of 
1963. Such real price peaks occurred in 1954 and 1978, inducing 
increased production, enhancing inventories, and leading eventually 
to lower real coffee prices. 

In 2003 coffee registered a price of US$0.60 per pound, its lowest 
price since 1821, because of the collapse of the International Coffee 
Agreement of 1989, the expansion of production in Vietnam, and the 
reallocation of production in Brazil toward the northern milder areas. 
Moreover, between 1999 and 2002 Colombia shifted from being the 
second-largest to the third-largest producer of coffee in the world, 
behind Brazil and Vietnam. 



153 



Colombia: A Country Study 



GDP in 2007 = US$172 billion 

Agriculture 




Note— Figures are rounded. 

Source: Based on information from Colombia, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadistica, http://www.dane.gov.co. 

Figure 4. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 2007 

These developments in international markets mean that since 2002 
Colombia has restructured the institutional management of coffee. 
There have been significant changes at the National Federation of 
Coffee Growers (Fedecafe), one of the country's most traditional and 
important business organizations, which is owned and controlled by 
500,000 farmers who cultivate coffee on small farms. Before 2002 
Fedecafe had a large and diverse investment portfolio in shipping, 
airlines, and the financial sector. Since the reforms, Fedecafe has pur- 
sued three objectives: commercialization and output-purchase guar- 
antees; stabilization of coffee growers' income; and advancement of 
coffee institutions by funding R&D, improving the coffee growers' 
managerial skills, safeguarding Colombian coffee brands in interna- 
tional markets, and developing special coffees. Fedecafe launched the 
Juan Valdez coffee shops in Bogota in 2002 and in the United States 
in 2004. By 2008 it had more than 70 stores, including at least 60 in 
Colombia, eight in the United States, and others in Spain and else- 
where in South America (Chile and Ecuador). Through the Juan Val- 
dez coffee shops, Colombia is trying to expand its involvement in 
coffee consumption, not limiting itself to selling coffee beans to be 
roasted abroad and later sold at the retail level, but rather attempting 
to capture part of the coffee retail market itself, where most of the 
profits are made. 



154 



The Economy 



Bananas 

Colombian bananas (excluding plantains) are another export suc- 
cess story, in this case despite the violence that has long affected the 
producing regions. Banana exports, which amounted to about US$525 
million in 2006, are the third-largest legal agricultural export of the 
country, behind coffee and flowers. In 2005 Colombia was the tenth- 
largest producer, with 2.5 percent of the world's banana output, and 
the third-largest exporter, with 8 percent of the world's exports after 
Ecuador and Costa Rica. Output for export, mainly of the Cavendish 
Valerie variety, is highly productive compared to international stan- 
dards. The Uraba region in Antioquia and the northeast of Magdalena 
Department are the main areas producing bananas for export. Chiquita 
Brands International, Dole Food Company, and Del Monte Fresh Pro- 
duce are among the most important banana-marketing companies in 
Colombia. 

The main destination of Colombia's banana exports is the Euro- 
pean Union (EU), and the second is the United States. Given the 
importance of the EU's banana market for Colombia and for Latin 
America, the outcome of the continuing disputes at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) with regard to quotas and tariffs is a major 
issue to this sector. In November 2007, the WTO ruled against the 
dramatically increased duties imposed by the EU on its imports of 
Colombian bananas in January 2006. 

About 9 percent of Colombia's banana output is destined for the 
domestic market, and 70 percent of this production is located mainly 
in the departments of Valle del Cauca and Tolima. Production for 
domestic consumption is not as sophisticated in technological terms 
as that for export markets. Producers and exporters are organized in 
several associations, of which the best known is the Association of 
Colombian Banana Producers (Augura). Plantains are less important 
than bananas as a Colombian export but have a larger output share, 
representing 5.2 percent of agricultural GDP in 2006. 

Flowers 

Cut-flower production represented 4.2 percent of agricultural GDP 
in Colombia in 2006, generating 94,000 direct jobs and 80,000 indi- 
rect jobs, and it is estimated that about 1 million Colombians depend 
on income generated by the growth of flowers. Women account for 
60 percent of the workers in the flower industry, and their terms of 
employment are favorable in light of Colombia's overall labor mar- 
kets. Nevertheless, working conditions, which may include exposure 
to pesticide spray, are far from ideal. Flowers are produced by 300 
companies on 600 farms, 20 percent of which are owned by foreign 



155 



Colombia: A Country Study 

investors, located mainly in the Bogota savanna and the Rionegro 
region in the department of Antioquia. Most of the production con- 
sists of roses, carnations, mini-carnations, and chrysanthemums. 

The flower sector is an example of Colombian entrepreneurship in 
international markets, with little government involvement. Colombia 
has long been the second-largest cut-flower exporter in the world, 
behind the Netherlands, and continues to be the largest flower exporter 
to the United States. Colombia's flower exports in 2004 amounted to 
US$704 million, making flowers the country's second most valuable 
legal agricultural export, behind coffee and ahead of bananas and 
sugar. After the United States, which receives 82 percent of Colom- 
bia's flower exports, the second-largest market for Colombia's flowers 
is the EU, with 9 percent. 

The Colombian Association of Flower Exporters (Asocolflores) 
represents Colombian flower producers and exporters on trade policy 
and legal issues, mainly with the policy makers of Colombia, the 
United States, and the EU. Asocolflores also addresses sectoral 
issues, such as transportation, market intelligence, and R&D. 

Sugar 

Sugar production, which represented 2.5 percent of agricultural 
GDP in 2004, is concentrated in Valle del Cauca Department and is 
based on sugarcane output. Colombia has about 1,200 sugarcane pro- 
ducers, 14 sugar mills, and about 53 confectionary firms, the sector is 
one of the most productive for sugar in the world. 

The domestic market is highly protected through the Andean 
Price-Band System (see Glossary), and thus, domestic prices are 
higher than international prices, which has hurt consumers and pro- 
ducers using sugar as an input. In order to avoid extra sugar costs for 
the domestic confectionary industry competing in the international 
markets, a joint program between domestic confectioners and the 
sugar producers began in 1993, allowing the confectionary firms 
access to sugar inputs for its exports at more competitive prices. 

About half of Colombia's sugar output is exported, one-quarter is 
used for domestic consumption, and the rest is sold as an input to the 
industrial sector. Colombia is the seventh-largest exporter of raw 
sugar in the world and the fifth-largest exporter of refined sugar, 
with exports of US$369 million in 2006. The main export destina- 
tions for Colombian sugar are the Andean countries, the United 
States, and Russia. 

Government policies aimed at lowering dependence on fossil fuels 
and reducing pollution have boosted the production of ethanol derived 
from sugars. Vehicles have been using ethanol mixed with gasoline in 
Colombia's major cities since 2005. Thus, several sugar mills have 



156 



The Economy 



begun to build ethanol distilleries, and it now appears that about 40 
percent of sugar exports will be redirected to ethanol production by 
around 2010. 

Thirteen of the 14 Colombian sugar mills are members, along with 
a group of sugarcane producers, of the Association of Sugarcane 
Growers (Asocana), an influential business group. The Colombian 
Association of Sugarcane Producers and Suppliers (Procana) also 
represents sugarcane producers, and the Sugarcane Research Center 
of Colombia (Cenicana) has made a positive contribution to Colom- 
bia's sugarcane productivity. 

Palm Oil 

Oil-palm tree fruits, soybeans, cottonseeds, and sesame seeds are 
the main sources of Colombian vegetable oils. Colombia is a net 
importer of all of its vegetable oil needs except for oil-palm tree 
fruits, which grow in many regions of the country, including the 
departments of Meta, Cesar, Santander, Narino, and Magdalena. 

Palm-oil production was highly protected in the 1980s, but less so 
thereafter. An import tariff and a price band have remained as pro- 
tection mechanisms. The way the oil-palm tree industry operates is 
closely tied to the existence of a price-stabilization fund, which 
equalizes the higher domestic price with the lower export price, as a 
tool to promote palm-oil exports. 

Output of palm oil tripled between 1990 and 2006, putting 
Colombia among the world's top-five producing countries and mak- 
ing the country the largest producer in the Americas, although with a 
world-market share of only 2 percent in 2006. Production of palm oil 
is expected to increase further because it is an important component 
in Colombia's biodiesel industry, which began in 2008. It has been 
estimated that Colombia can produce biodiesel more efficiently than 
the United States and Europe, but further improvements are required 
because Colombia's biodiesel production is still not as efficient as 
that of world leaders Indonesia and Malaysia. The government nev- 
ertheless expects the demand for biodiesel to increase fourfold 
between 2008 and 2019, so there are plans to expand oil-palm tree 
cultivation from 330,000 hectares in 2007 to 1 million hectares, with 
partial funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(US AID). This planned increase in the production of oil-palm trees 
is both an alternative to the extensive use of land for cattle and its 
use for growing illegal crops, and a source of employment for former 
members of illegal armed groups. However, the latter have some- 
times displaced ethnic minority communities in taking over their 
land. 



157 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Mining and Energy 

Minerals — in particular coal, oil, and natural gas, but also emer- 
alds, gold, and nickel — have played an important role in Colombia's 
GDP and foreign trade in the last 20 years. Accounting for only 1.4 
percent of GDP and 13 percent of total exports between 1980 and 
1984, minerals represented about 5 percent of GDP and 42 percent 
of total exports in 2006. The minerals industry has compensated to a 
certain extent for the decreasing role of agriculture and has expanded 
the importance of commodities for the economy as a whole. Colom- 
bia is the world's leading source of emeralds, and illegal mining is 
commonplace. However, production of precious minerals is small- 
scale despite high international prices for minerals such as gold. 

Coal 

Colombia's coal output has increased consistently from 4 million 
tons in 1981 to 65.6 million tons in 2006, when it contributed 1.4 per- 
cent of the world's coal production. In 2006 Colombia accounted for 
8 1 percent of the total coal production in Central and South America. 
Furthermore, 94 percent of Colombia's coal is of very good quality 
and is classified as hard, with high heat-generating capacity. Coal has 
been Colombia's second-largest export since 2001. 

The largest coal mines — and the ones that generate the most 
exports — are located in the north of the country, in the departments 
of La Guajira and Cesar. Cerrejon is considered to be one of the larg- 
est open-pit coal mines in the world. There are also smaller coal 
mines scattered throughout the rest of the nation. 

Since 2000 government participation in the production of coal has 
been decreasing, and there has been a shift to private domestic and 
foreign investors. Major changes have occurred in the institutional 
framework of the coal industry in recent years. In particular, in 2000 
the government sold the stakes that Colombia Coal (Carbocol), a 
state-owned company, had in Cerrejon, and the new mining code 
introduced in 2001 led the government to concentrate on its role as 
regulator through the Ministry of Mines and Energy. 

Oil 

Colombia became an oil exporter in the mid-1980s and has 
remained so, as a result of policy changes made in 2003. Colombia 
exports about half of its production, most of it to the United States. 
Although the share of oil in GDP has remained between 2 and 4 per- 
cent since 1990, its share of total Colombian exports has been 
between 20 and 30 percent since 1995, and it has generated impor- 



158 



The Economy 



tant revenues for the nation's public finances. In 2006 oil and deriva- 
tives accounted for 26 percent of total exports (18.6 percent for oil 
and 7.4 percent for derivatives). Oil is particularly important because 
of its fiscal implications, which cut across several dimensions. 

The state-owned Colombian Petroleum Enterprise (Ecopetrol) is 
an important exporter and a highly profitable concern. The govern- 
ment also subsidizes gasoline and other fuels by selling them locally 
at a price below the comparable international market price, and this 
subsidy is channeled through Ecopetrol. In 2004 rough estimates 
suggested that while the central government was running a fiscal 
deficit of about 5 percent of GDP, Ecopetrol was producing — net of 
taxes and domestic subsidies — a surplus close to 3 percent of GDP. 
In addition, domestic fuel subsidies had a fiscal cost of between 1 
and 2 percentage points of GDP. 

Since 1974 Colombia has applied a system of association con- 
tracts, in which the profits from oil exploration are divided in half 
between the national government and private investors, both national 
and foreign. Within that framework, Colombia's oil production 
increased significantly in 1986, when the Cano Limon oil field 
began operating, and was further enhanced in 1995, when produc- 
tion began in the Cusiana and Cupiagua oil fields. 

A higher tax on oil production came in 1989, with further taxes on 
oil companies' profits in 1994. These measures, unfriendly to private 
investors, played a key role in reducing the rate of exploration. As a 
result, oil reserves, which increased 600 percent at their peak 
between 1978 and 1992, have been declining since then. Similarly, 
oil production, which increased more than 400 percent between 1979 
and 1999, when it peaked at 838,000 barrels per day (bpd — see 
Glossary), began a period of decline, totaling an estimated 529,000 
bpd in 2006. 

In 1999 this loss of private investors' interest led to a reduction in 
the share of the income accrued by the state, from 50 percent to 30 
percent of the total oil income. In 2000 the government modified the 
royalties system, with variable coefficients based on output and rang- 
ing from 5 percent to 25 percent. Although the tax system changed to 
encourage exploration, private-sector investment has been slow to 
rebound, among other reasons because the oil sector has been a direct 
target of insurgent groups. Although no new major discoveries have 
been announced and no new capacity was expected to be produced 
before 2010, oil production increased in 2008. 

The outlook for the oil supply is complex because of the trend of 
decreasing oil reserves and the sharp increase in international oil 
prices in 2008. The government was considering a variety of options 



159 



Colombia: A Country Study 

to ensure an appropriate supply of energy for the nation as a whole. In 
2003 important changes in oil policy were introduced that led to an 
increase in exploration, production, and reserves of oil and gas. 
Among those changes is the separation of state roles: Ecopetrol 
assumed a role as an operator with greater autonomy and more ability 
to compete. The new National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH) became 
a resource administrator. A contingency tax should give the govern- 
ment a share of profits when prices of oil are higher than a given 
threshold price. Compressed natural gas, biodiesel, and ethanol are 
also being promoted as options to increase the nation's domestic sup- 
ply of energy resources. 

In 2007 Ecopetrol began a public stock offering in order to 
finance its growth, increase accountability, and improve its capacity 
to compete with other oil companies. In the initial sale of 10.1 per- 
cent of the firm, almost 500,000 Colombian investors bought shares 
in the company, which was listed on the Colombian stock exchange 
that same year and is expected to sell an additional 9.9 percent of its 
shares before the end of the decade. As Colombia's largest firm, 
Ecopetrol should provide a significant boost to the overall level of 
transactions on the Colombian stock exchange. 

Natural Gas 

Colombia's production of natural gas in 2007 was entirely for 
domestic consumption, when it amounted to 7.7 billion cubic meters, 
or 0.3 percent of world output. In 2005 Colombia had an estimated 4 
trillion cubic feet of commercial natural gas reserves that should last 
until about 2022. This natural endowment has been used since the 
1990s, and monopolies on the Atlantic coast and in the eastern plains 
(llanos) control production. Several firms provide transport, 
although two — National Gas Company of the Atlantic Coast and the 
Colombian Gas Company — control the main pipelines. Except in 
Medellin, where the local public utilities company, Medellin Public 
Companies, distributes gas, distribution is generally by private firms. 
Coverage for residential use of natural gas in 2002 was 80 percent in 
Barranquilla, 70 percent in Bucaramanga, 60 percent in Bogota, and 
30 percent in Cali. Because of its high cost, the availability of natural 
gas in rural areas tends to be limited. 

Industry 

The share of industry in GDP has shifted significantly in the last 
few decades. Data from the World Bank show that between 1965 and 
1989 the share of industry — including construction, manufacturing, 
and mining — increased from 27 percent to 38 percent of GDP. How- 



160 



The Economy 



ever, since then the share has fallen considerably, down to approxi- 
mately 29 percent of GDP in 2007. This pattern is about the average 
for middle-income countries. 

The spirit of the 1991 constitution led to reform of the Industry 
and Commerce Superintendency (SIC) in order to foster competition 
and protect consumer rights by strengthening its capacity to prevent 
monopolistic activities and promote competition and market access. 
Offenses against free competition, collusion, and abuses of market 
power were defined, and the SIC gained the capacity to sanction 
individuals and firms for violations. The changes also strengthened a 
period of trade liberalization, increasing the degree of competition in 
domestic markets after a long period of import- substitution industri- 
alization and export-promotion policies (see Trade Policy and Trade 
Patterns, this ch.). 

Before 1990 it was common to have subsidized sources of credit for 
industries, mainly through the Central Bank, the Industrial Develop- 
ment Institute (IFI), and the Export Promotion Fund (Proexpo). Finan- 
cial subsidies declined significantly at the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. Although the role of the Central Bank as pro- 
moter of industry transferred to the IFI in 1992, in 2003 the IFI entered 
into liquidation. In 2002 the Ministry of Foreign Trade merged with 
the Ministry of Development and became the Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, and Tourism. The government created Proexport Colombia, 
an export-promotion agency, and Proexpo became the Foreign Trade 
Bank of Colombia (Bancoldex), an export-import bank that now pro- 
vides financing alternatives for Colombian producers of all sorts in 
commerce, industry, and tourism. 

Colombia has not had a significant tradition of R&D. In 2003 the 
country spent only 0.3 percent of its GDP on R&D. In 2004 public 
institutions and universities spent more than 80 percent of all the 
resources devoted to R&D, while private firms and private research 
centers invested less than 20 percent. 

The National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), the country's 
most important entrepreneurial organization, represents more than 
650 member firms from a variety of sectors, including the manufac- 
turing, financial, agro-industrial, and services sectors. Since its cre- 
ation in 1944, ANDI has been actively promoting the strengthening 
and competitiveness of private enterprise, state-owned companies, 
and public organizations. In addition to taking a leading role among 
manufacturing organizations in Colombia, ANDI actively lobbies the 
executive and legislative branches of government. Besides represent- 
ing its members at regional, national, and international levels, ANDI 
is also a leader among business organizations in Colombia. 



161 



Colombia: A Country Study 
Construction 

Colombia's construction sector has represented between 5 and 7 
percent of GDP and between 5 and 6 percent of total employment in 
recent decades. About 60 percent of the population owns homes. 
However, financial intermediation (see Glossary) in the housing 
industry traditionally has been low by world standards; total mort- 
gages were 5 percent of GDP in 2008 and have never been more than 
11 percent of GDP. Because of Colombia's strong rural-urban 
migration, more than 70 percent of the population lives in urban 
areas, but serious problems in housing quality, size, and access to 
public services have created a housing deficit estimated at more than 
40 percent. For many years, governments have played a major role 
in the promotion of social-interest housing. In order to foster con- 
struction, in 1972 the government introduced the Unit of Constant 
Purchasing Power (UPAC). Based on it, a mortgage system in which 
debts and interest payments originally were indexed to inflation 
came into being and was quite successful in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The UPAC increased private savings and thus the resources available 
to finance mortgages, boosting the construction sector. 

The construction sector boomed between 1990 and 1994 because 
of a combination of factors, including greater competition and fewer 
restrictions in the financial markets, increased capital inflows, 
relaxed regulation and supervision of financial institutions, and a 
loose monetary policy. The resulting housing-price hike, with 
increases of 70 percent in real terms between 1990 and 1994, also 
led to significant mortgage expansion during those years. 

With the financial market reforms at the beginning of the 1990s, 
mortgage companies faced stiffer competition from other financial 
institutions, and, in order to compete on equal terms, demanded the 
indexation of the UPAC to prevailing interest rates. Moreover, as 
real interest rates increased sharply in the second half of the 1990s, 
among other things as a response to the Asian and Russian economic 
crises when the value of housing assets began falling, many mort- 
gage holders were exposed to negative equity, eventually losing their 
homes. 

The lack of demand and the excess supply of houses precipitated 
a sharp fall in real prices. In 1998 house prices had dropped to 1991 
levels. This situation further depressed the quality of mortgages and 
loan guarantees in general, leading to a bust in the housing market 
between 1997 and 2000. The UPAC was replaced in 2000 by the 
Real Value Unit, which is indexed — just as the UPAC initially 
was — to inflation rather than to interest rates. Since then there has 
been a slow recovery of housing prices and an even slower recovery 
of mortgage volume. 



162 



Upscale hillside housing in the north of Bogota 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 
A cobblestoned street in Bogota 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC 

Innovations in housing finance have included Colombian Titling, 
an institution that turns mortgages into capital-market instruments in 
order to improve the liquidity of mortgage lenders. Such instruments 
also improve the matching between the duration of loans and the 
commitment of resources received by mortgage-lending institutions. 
Colombian Titling is part-owned by several domestic financial 
groups, as well as by the International Finance Corporation, an orga- 
nization of the World Bank Group. 

Infrastructure construction in recent years has focused on electric- 
ity projects and urban mass-transportation systems. Because of fiscal 
constraints, the government has promoted greater involvement of the 
private sector in maintaining and developing infrastructure. 

The production of cement and other nonmetallic building products, 
which have a share of 4 percent in manufacturing output and employ- 
ment, is closely linked to the changes in the construction sector. In 
Colombia cement output is highly concentrated, with three main eco- 
nomic groups controlling more than 90 percent of total output. The 
cement sector survived the housing crises between 1996 and 2000 by 
reorienting production toward export markets, including the United 
States. As a result, in 2003 Colombia provided 5 to 6 percent of U.S. 
imports of cement and clinker. 



163 



Colombia: A Country Study 
Man ufacturing 

A key feature of Colombian manufacturing has been the high con- 
centration of location and ownership. Some 30 percent of output in 
2005 was produced in Bogota, 15 percent in Medellin, 11 percent in 
Cali, 7 percent in Cartagena, and 5 percent in Barranquilla. Thus, 
these five cities produced 68 percent of the nation's total manufactur- 
ing output. 

Three main Colombian economic groups control a significant share 
of manufacturing output: the Antioquia Entrepreneurial Group (GEA) 
focuses on food products, as well as cement, energy, and finance; the 
Santo Domingo Group, on beer, soft drinks, and other investments; 
and the Ardila Lulle Organization, on soft drinks, sugar, and other 
related businesses. Manufacturing output in chemicals, motor vehi- 
cles, and paper is concentrated in multinational firms. Public-sector 
manufacturing consists mainly of oil refineries and alcoholic drinks. 
Colombia has three official sizes of smaller companies: micro (those 
with fewer than 11 workers), small (with 11 to 49 employees), and 
medium (with 50 to 199 employees). These smaller firms produce 28 
percent of Colombia's output and hire 46 percent of the workers in 
manufacturing. In 2006 the most important manufacturing sector by 
value of output was refined petroleum products, followed by chemi- 
cals and chemical products, beverages, basic iron and steel products, 
and milled and prepared animal-food products. 

In 2005 the most important manufacturing sector for employment 
was textiles and clothing, followed by chemicals and chemical prod- 
ucts, plastic products, cement and other nonmetalic goods, and bever- 
ages. Colombia's textile industry represented 9 percent of output and 
23 percent of employment in manufactures in 2005, although the share 
in output has been falling steadily since 1990. Between 2001 and 
2003, Colombia was a net importer of textile inputs, while it was a net 
exporter of apparel. The United States is the main export market for 
Colombian textiles and apparel, followed by the members of the 
Andean Community and Mexico. The sector has been one of the main 
beneficiaries of the Andean Trade Preference Act and the Andean 
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. The United States 
extended these trade preferences to Colombia and other Andean coun- 
tries because of their continuing fight against the production and dis- 
tribution of illegal drugs. Colombia's designer clothing is a segment of 
the industry that has received international recognition in recent years. 

Colombia's chemical industry is composed mainly of petrochemi- 
cals and agrochemicals. The petrochemical industry includes plastics, 
synthetic fibers, paint, and rubber. Petrochemical production accounted 
for 27 percent of manufacturing GDP and 10 percent of manufacturing 



164 



The Economy 



employment in 2005. However, Colombia imports more than double 
the quantity of petrochemicals and agrochemicals that it exports. The 
United States is the main source of Colombian imports, while the 
Andean countries are the main destination of Colombian exports in this 
sector. 

Two main economic groups have had control of the largest shares in 
the beverages market, which in 2005 represented 9 percent of manu- 
facturing GDP and 3 percent of employment in manufacturing. The 
Ardila Lulle Organization is the largest producer of soft drinks and the 
Santo Domingo Group, of beer. The Santo Domingo Group had a con- 
trolling stake in Grupo Bavaria, the tenth-largest beer company in the 
world, until SABMiller acquired a major interest in Bavaria in 2005, 
in a deal worth US$7.8 billion. As a result of this merger, the Santo 
Domingo group obtained a 15 -percent share in SABMiller (see Busi- 
ness Associations, ch. 4). 

In 2005 paper, paper products, lithography, and printing accounted 
for about 7 percent of Colombia's manufacturing output and 8 per- 
cent of manufacturing employment. Input production of pulp and 
paper is highly concentrated in a few firms, while book publishing is 
more dispersed. Colombia is a net importer of pulp and paper and has 
been a net exporter of printed products for many years. 

Vehicle assembly and vehicle components represent 2 percent of 
manufacturing GDP and employment, and those shares have been fall- 
ing in recent years. Colombia has automobile-assembly plants linked to 
Chevrolet (the market leader), Renault, Mazda, and Toyota; motor- 
cycle-assembly plants have links to Kawasaki, Yamaha, and Suzuki. 
Vehicle assembly represents 70 percent of this subsector's GDP, while 
vehicle components represent 30 percent. Since 1990 there has been 
greater international competition in vehicle assembly, leading to 
increases in the number of available vehicle brands and models. Over- 
all, Colombia is a net importer of vehicles, mainly from Japan, the 
United States, and South Korea. Its main export markets are the 
Andean countries, especially Venezuela and Ecuador. 

Services 

The services sector dominates Colombia's GDP, contributing 58 per- 
cent of GDP in 2007, and, given worldwide trends, its dominance will 
probably continue. The sector is characterized by its heterogeneity, 
being the largest for employment (61 percent), in both the formal and 
informal sectors. 



165 



Colombia: A Country Study 
Commerce 

The share of commerce in Colombian GDP fluctuated between 10 
and 12 percent in the period 1994-2006, very similar to the share of 
commerce in developed countries, which tends to be about 11 or 12 
percent of GDP. Data from the National Administrative Department 
of Statistics (DANE) show that commerce has provided around 25 
percent of total employment, more than half of which is in the infor- 
mal sector and the remaining one-quarter in the formal sector (see 
The Informal Economy, this ch.). 

In the last few years, Colombia has seen the appearance of large 
retail establishments, as has happened in other developing countries, 
and as occurred in many developed countries some years ago. Such 
large retail establishments, boosted by trade and investment liberal- 
ization, have included national companies such as Olimpica and Exi- 
to's Carulla Vivero. They have also included international firms such 
as Casino, which in 2007 became the major shareholder in Exito, 
and Carrefour (France), Makro (the Netherlands and South Africa), 
and Falabella (Chile). Although the process of creating large retail 
establishments may be far from complete, it has already resulted in 
increased concentration in the retail business, the beginning of own- 
brand developments, and technological improvements in informa- 
tion. It also has shifted some market power from producers to large 
retailers. 

Public Utilities 

At the end of the 1980s, public services in Colombia were of low 
quality; the charges made to consumers were determined politically 
and were insufficient to finance the operation of those services. Fur- 
thermore, the cost structures were highly inefficient. A deficient legal 
framework and the monopolistic role played by the state since the 
beginning of the twentieth century created this unfortunate situation. 

The constitution of 1991 gave private initiative a major role in pro- 
viding public utilities and allowed the government to regulate the sec- 
tor. The government made improving the provision of public utilities 
to the vulnerable sectors of society a key goal. These general objec- 
tives became the responsibility of the Public Utilities Regime, which 
provides for increasing coverage, promoting privatization of utilities, 
developing a tariff regime, and giving consumers a supervisory role. 
The regime created three regulatory commissions (for electricity, 
telecommunications, and water and sanitation) and an organization 
for the promotion, supervision, and control of competition called the 
Residential Public Services Superintendency (SSPD). 



166 



A typical restaurant, open to the streets and passersby, 
in Bogota s Candelaria district 
Market stands such as this one are found in towns throughout Colombia. 

Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 



167 



Colombia: A Country Study 

As a result of the reforms, which naturally generated resistance in 
certain sectors of society, particularly among union workers, provi- 
sion of all services has improved significantly. For example, between 
1990 and 2003 electricity coverage increased from 80 to 95 percent 
of the population; drinking water, from 67 to 87 percent; sewerage, 
from 50 to 72 percent; and local telephone service, from 8 to 22 per- 
cent. Natural gas service began in the mid-1990s, and coverage 
increased from 20 percent in 1997 to 35 percent of the population in 
2003. One possible explanation for the comparatively low coverage 
in natural gas is that expanding its rural availability is very expensive. 
The quality of ancillary services has risen, and today it is possible to 
pay most public-utility charges by phone or Internet. 

Throughout the process, rates for most public utilities, including 
drinking water and electricity, have gone up in real terms. This 
increase in charges has meant lower dependency on public funds to 
cover the cost of supplying these services. It also has meant that con- 
sumption has fallen as a result of the higher prices, delaying the need 
for further investments in order to increase installed capacities of 
different services. Some rates also have gone down, as in the case of 
waste collection for multiple users (for example, buildings or hous- 
ing complexes), and of international phone calls. Despite these 
improvements, there is a need for much more progress in improving 
the regulatory framework, fostering competition, reducing produc- 
tion costs, and allowing consumers to benefit more from some of 
these efficiency gains. 

Electricity 

Before 1990 public monopolies provided electric service. As a 
result of significant expansion of electricity-generation capacity 
between 1970 and 1990 — financed mostly by foreign loans — and the 
inefficiencies in the provision of this service, by 1990 about one-third 
of the nation's public foreign debt was associated with the electricity 
sector. The debt originated not only from mismanagement but also 
from the cost of replacing the electric-power infrastructure sabotaged 
by the guerrillas. In 1992, as a result of severe drought, Colombia 
resorted to electricity rationing. 

The reforms of the 1 990s broke down this monopolistic structure 
by encouraging the participation of private enterprise in the genera- 
tion, transmission, and distribution of energy and by creating the 
Energy and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG). CREG has regu- 
lated natural monopoly stages, such as transmission and distribution, 
through price caps, while competition has played an increasing role 
in generation and commercialization. Interconnection with Andean 
and Central American countries is presently being considered as a 



168 



The Economy 



means of improving competition and providing better protection 
against future rationing in the region. 

Potable Water and Sewerage 

In 2000 the Water and Basic Sanitation Regulatory Commission 
(Cra) formalized the requirements for public and private companies 
to provide drinking water and sewerage. The main objectives were to 
promote competition and new investments, while increasing trans- 
parency and reducing regulatory risk. 

As private companies — foreign and national — have taken over 
water-supply services in various Colombian cities, charges have 
increased, and the financial deficit in the provision of drinking water 
has been reduced from 45 to 10 percent. As prices have increased, 
consumption has decreased by at least 1 3 cubic meters a month per 
household to 16.9 cubic meters a month per household in 2004. 

This reduced consumption in response to higher prices has gener- 
ated efficiency gains by lowering expansion requirements and vari- 
able costs. Increased efficiency also has brought about a smaller 
workforce and reduced the number of employees for every 1,000 
subscribers in major cities. For example, between 1995 and 2000, 
the number of employees per 1,000 subscribers dropped from 6.8 to 
3.7 in Barranquilla, and from 3.2 to 2.3 in Bogota. 

Waste Collection 

Bogota began transferring responsibility for waste disposal to pri- 
vate firms even before the existence, since 1994, of the SSPD. Since 
then private participation in waste disposal has increased. The SSPD 
has more than 500 waste-collection firms registered, about 20 per- 
cent of which are private. Approximately 80 percent of the users of 
waste-disposal services regarded the service as good. Public cam- 
paigns and economic incentives exist to increase public awareness of 
the need for recycling, and some progress has been made, but there 
is still a long way to go in promoting its environmental benefits. 

Tourism 

Colombia has major attractions as a tourist destination, such as Car- 
tagena and its historic surroundings, which are on the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World 
Heritage List; the insular department of San Andres, Providencia y 
Santa Catalina; and Santa Marta and the surrounding area. Fairly 
recently, Bogota, the nation's capital, has become Colombia's major 
tourist destination because of its improved museums and entertainment 
facilities and its major urban renovations, including the rehabilitation of 



169 



Colombia: A Country Study 

public areas, the development of parks, and the creation of an extensive 
network of cycling routes. With its very rich and varied geography, 
which includes the Amazon and Andean regions, the llanos, the coasts, 
and the deserts of La Guajira, and unique biodiversity, Colombia also 
has a major potential for ecotourism. 

In the early to mid-1990s, international tourism arrivals in Colom- 
bia reached nearly 1 .4 million per year. Although they decreased by 
more than half thereafter, they have recovered at rates of more than 
10 percent annually since 2002, reaching 1.9 million visitors in 2006. 
Tourism usually has been considered a low-growth service industry 
in Colombia because of internal violence, but in 2006 the country 
earned US$2 billion from international tourism. Tourists visiting 
Colombia from abroad came mainly from the United States (24.5 per- 
cent), followed by Venezuela (13.4 percent), Ecuador (9.1 percent), 
Spain (6.4 percent), and Mexico (4.9 percent). Approximately 90 per- 
cent of foreign tourists arrive by air, 10 percent by land transporta- 
tion, and a tiny share by sea. 

The recovery of tourism has been helped by the Democratic Secu- 
rity and Defense Policy of Alvaro Uribe Velez (president, 2002-6, 
2006-10) and the so-called tourist caravans {caravanas turisticas), 
in which military forces provide reinforced protection on previously 
scheduled days to roads reaching major holiday attractions. The 
Democratic Security Policy, as it is known, is aimed at reestablishing 
control over all of the nation's territory, fighting illegal drugs and 
organized crime, and strengthening the justice system (see Internal 
Armed Conflict and Peace Negotiations, ch. 4; Democratic Security 
Policy, ch. 5). The government also has been working toward gener- 
ating a significant recovery in international tourism through Pro- 
export Colombia, the public export-promotion agency. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Colombia's geography, with three Cordilleras of the Andes running 
up the country from south to north, and jungle in the Amazon and 
Darien regions, represents a major obstacle to the development of 
national road networks with international connections. Thus, the basic 
nature of the country's transportation infrastructure is not surprising. 

In the spirit of the 1991 constitution, in 1993 the Ministry of Pub- 
lic Works and Transportation was reorganized and renamed the Min- 
istry of Transportation. In 2000 the new ministry strengthened its 
role as the planner and regulator within the sector. 



170 



A street vendor at the entrance to a plaza in Cartagena 

Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 

Air Transportation 

Colombia was a pioneer in promoting airlines in an effort to over- 
come its geographic barriers to transportation. The Colombian Com- 
pany of Air Navigation, formed in 1919, was the second commercial 
airline in the world. It was not until the 1940s that Colombia's air 
transportation began growing significantly in the number of compa- 
nies, passengers carried, and kilometers covered. In the early 2000s, 
an average of 72 percent of the passengers transported by air go to 
national destinations, while 28 percent travel internationally. One 
notable feature is that after the reforms of the beginning of the 1990s, 
the number of international passengers tripled by 2003. 

In 1993 the construction, administration, operation, and main- 
tenance of the main airports transferred to departmental authorities 
and the private sector, including companies specializing in air trans- 
portation. Within this process, in 2006 the International Airport 
Operator (Opain), a Swiss-Colombian consortium, won the conces- 
sion to manage and develop Bogota's El Dorado International Air- 
port. In addition to El Dorado, Colombia's international airports are 
Palo Negro in Bucaramanga, Simon Bolivar in Santa Marta, Ernesto 



171 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Cortissoz in Barranquilla, Rafael Nunez in Cartagena, Jose Maria 
Cordova in Rionegro near Medellin, Alfonso Bonilla Aragon in Cali, 
Alfredo Vasquez Cobo in Leticia, Matecana in Pereira, Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla in San Andres, and Camilo Daza in Cucuta (see fig. 5). 
In 2006 Colombia was generally reported to have a total of 984 air- 
ports, of which 103 had paved runways and 883 were unpaved. The 
Ministry of Transportation listed 581 airports in 2007, but it may 
have used a different methodology for counting them. 

Perhaps the most significant infrastructure development since 
1990 has been the construction of the new Jose Maria Cordova Inter- 
national Airport, which provides services for large commercial air- 
craft flying to and from Medellin. Another important new asset is the 
second runway at El Dorado International Airport. Avianca has been 
the airline with the largest market share in Colombia of both national 
and international flights; it held 36 percent of the domestic market 
and 44 percent of the international passenger market in 2003. In that 
same year, Aero Republica, founded in 1993 with a lighter labor 
structure than Avianca and competing low prices, already held one- 
quarter of the local market. In 2003 American Airlines held 1 1 per- 
cent of the international passenger market, followed by Copa Air- 
lines, with 9 percent; and Continental Airlines and Iberia, with 4.5 
percent each. In 2003 international air cargo had a much larger share 
of the total (77 percent) than national cargo (23 percent), a trend that 
has been reinforced with the greater opening of the economy. 

Because of difficult times in the air industry at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century and complex internal problems within the 
firms, Colombia's main airlines — Avianca, SAM, and ACES — have 
made a cooperative effort to survive. However, the final outcome of 
the strategy involved the disappearance of ACES and the takeover of 
Avianca by a Brazilian entrepreneur in 2004. Moreover, in 2005 
Copa Airlines acquired a majority shareholding of Aero Republica. 
Since then both companies have modernized their fleets and 
expanded and improved their services. 

At the end of 2007, and after major restructuring within the estab- 
lished airlines, EasyFly, Colombia's first low-cost airline, began ser- 
vice, focusing initially on the domestic market. The company began 
with domestic shareholders owning two-thirds of the firm, and for- 
eign investors owning the remaining shares. As a result of an open- 
skies policy and a bilateral air transport agreement between the 
countries, signed in the last quarter of 2007, a significant increase in 
flights between Colombia and the United States, and of airlines cov- 
ering such routes, was expected. 



172 



The Economy 



Inland Waterways 

Before the twentieth century, Colombia's rivers offered the main 
means of transportation, mostly linking regions with the Atlantic 
coast, and the means by which vast parts of the country had contact 
with the outside world. Colombia has four major basins around the 
Magdalena, Amazon, Orinoco, and Atrato rivers (see Geography, ch. 
2). Overall, the country has 24,725 kilometers of inland waterways, 
74 percent of which are navigable. Of the navigable waterways, 39 
percent allow for permanent major navigation, while 23 percent allow 
for temporary major navigation. Inland waterways have been consis- 
tently underutilized in Colombia. For example, in 2002 only 3 per- 
cent of total cargo and only 5 percent of passengers were transported 
by inland waterways. 

Colombia's main river, the Magdalena, still provides services for 
transportation, although stiffer competition from rail transportation 
and especially from roads has meant that the Magdalena has special- 
ized in transporting high-volume and low-cost-per-unit-weight 
goods. In 2002 hydrocarbons transported on the Magdalena repre- 
sented 80 percent of the total cargo transported via inland waterways. 
The main transshipment ports on the Magdalena are La Dorada, 
Puerto Salgar, Puerto Berrio, Barrancabermeja, Estacion Acapulco, 
and Gamarra. The main specialized ports along that river are Imarco 
(for cement) and Barrancabermeja (for hydrocarbons). A second 
interoceanic canal system, to be built by dredging the Atrato and 
other rivers and digging short access canals, has been proposed peri- 
odically over the years but had not materialized by 2009. 

Ports 

Seaports traditionally have been Colombia's gateway for interna- 
tional trade. In the 1950s, the main ports — all publicly owned and 
operated — were Buenaventura, Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Santa 
Marta. Major changes occurred after the port reforms of 1991, when 
the public organization in charge of ports was abolished, and private 
agents were given authorization to build, operate, and maintain 
ports. 

Because ports have been and are the main entry and departure point 
for international trade, their development has been linked closely to 
trends in exports and imports. The production of bananas in the Uraba 
region in the mid-1960s and the expanded exports of coal and oil in 
the mid-1980s led to the privately funded construction of some spe- 
cialized ports. For example, on the Caribbean coast, the need for a 
coal-export port resulted in the construction of Puerto Bolivar, and 



173 



Colombia: A Country Study 




International boundary 

® National capital 

• Populated place 
^— ^— Pan-American Highway 

Proposed highway route I 

Major road 

h — i — i — >■ Railroad 

<J> Major airport 

vj, Major port 
1 00 200 Kilometers 
100 200 Miles 



PERU 



j-- v. 

\ 

/ 

Leticia- 

Boundary representation . w !v 
not necessarily authoritative ~ 



Figure 5. Transportation System, 2008 



Mamonal serves as the principal outlet for hydrocarbons and fertilizers 
shipped up the Magdalena. 

Between 1999 and 2003, about 96 percent of Colombia's export 
volume went through ports; 3 percent by road; and 1 percent by air. 
Some 57 percent of the tonnage exported was of coal. And of the 
total number of tons of imports, 89 percent was moved through 
ports, 10 percent on roads, and 1 percent by air. 



174 



The Economy 



Railroads 

Colombia's transport system developed at the end of the nine- 
teenth century with the construction of a rail network, aimed initially 
at connecting regions with the Magdalena and Cauca rivers. The rail 
system contributed to the development of the coffee industry, and the 
growth of the coffee industry encouraged the development of the rail 
network. 

However, Colombia never managed to complete its rail network, 
and technical incompatibilities prevented the nation from making 
better use of the existing railroads. The development of Colombia's 
road system also hampered further improvements in rail services. In 
recent decades, rail services have tended to specialize. For example, 
a specially designed railroad transports coal from the mine at Cerre- 
jon. Certain lines also remain active, such as the one between Bogota 
and Sogamoso, where major steel and cement industries are located. 
In 2006 Colombia had 3,304 kilometers of rail, of which almost 
2,000 kilometers had service managed by private companies; the 
remainder were inactive. With the exception of 150 kilometers of 
standard gauge, most of the rail lines are narrow gauge. 

Road Transportation 

Colombia's road system originated in the first half of the twen- 
tieth century. Transport by rail or river used to be oriented toward 
exports, imports, and communication with the outside world. The 
road network, in contrast, was designed to improve communications 
across the country and locally. Road transport has had the largest 
volume increase of the main forms of transportation, while train and 
river transport lag far behind. This disparity can be explained partly 
by the country's topography, the increasing size of Colombia's inter- 
nal market, and by the road network being designed for domestic 
convenience. Other reasons for the faster development of road trans- 
port are the flexibility of road systems and some mistakes in rail- 
road- and river-transport policy. 

As of October 2008, Colombia had 164,257 kilometers of roads, of 
which 13,467 kilometers, or about 8 percent, were paved, according to 
the National Institute of Highways. Of the paved roads, 55.5 percent 
were in good condition, 30.3 percent in bad condition, and 14 percent 
in very bad condition (the remaining minute percentage was considered 
in very good condition). Some 8,787 kilometers of Colombia's paved 
roads were designated as part of the national highway network, of 
which 46.9 percent were considered in good condition, 33.2 percent in 
regular condition, 19.5 percent in bad condition, and the remaining 0.4 



175 



Colombia: A Country Study 

percent in very bad condition. The remaining 150,790 kilometers of 
unpaved roads were secondary and tertiary roads, of which 42.3 per- 
cent were considered to be in regular condition, 36.6 percent in bad 
condition, 20 percent in good condition, and the remaining 1 percent or 
so in very good condition. 

The country has six major highway networks, three of which (tron- 
cales) run from south to north on either side of the Cordillera Central 
and alongside the Cordillera Oriental. The Western Highway (form- 
ing part of the Pan-American Highway) begins at the border with 
Ecuador and passes near Cali on its way north through Medellin to 
the Caribbean coastal city of Cartagena. The Magdalena Highway 
separates from the Western Highway near Popoyan, passing by Neiva 
all the way to Cienaga, near Santa Marta, and the Central Highway 
runs north from Bogota to Cucuta and the border with Venezuela and 
on northwest to Valledupar and Cartagena. 

The fourth, fifth, and sixth major highway networks {trans- 
versales) run east-west. The Caribbean Highway, which begins at 
Paraguachon, on the Venezuelan border in La Guajira Department, 
runs through the northern Caribbean lowlands, circumvents the 
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, and passes by Santa Marta, Barran- 
quilla, and Cartagena all the way to Turbo in Antioquia Department. 
Another highway runs from Bogota to Medellin, and a third horizon- 
tal link goes from Puerto Gaitan in the eastern llanos (Meta Depart- 
ment), passes through Villavicencio, Bogota, and Cali, and ends in 
Buenaventura on the Pacific coast. 

The Darien rainforest, also known as the Atrato swamp, prevents 
the Pan-American Highway from linking Colombia and Panama. 
Located in Choco Department adjoining the border with Panama, it is 
a deep swamp about 100 kilometers in width that has challenged 
engineers for years. The highway is interrupted for 100 kilometers, 
terminating on the Colombian side a few kilometers beyond the Rio 
Atrato at Lomas Aisladas, near Guapa, and on the Panamanian side at 
Yaviza. Planning efforts to remedy this missing link in the Pan-Amer- 
ican Highway began in 1971, with the help of U.S. funding, but 
halted in 1974. Another effort to build this part of the road began in 
1992 but was also abandoned. Among its benefits, the project would 
allow transportation by road throughout the Americas, reducing costs 
and promoting the trade of goods and services. Among its problems 
are environmental and health issues, including the theory that the 
Darien rainforest has prevented the spread of cattle diseases into Cen- 
tral and North America, and cultural concerns primarily for the 
Choco and Cuna indigenous peoples. As a result, bridging the gap in 
the Pan-American Highway is a project that remains in the planning 
stage. 



176 



The Economy 



The issue resurfaced in 2005, when President Uribe strongly 
advocated the construction of the highway through the Darien. How- 
ever, a coalition of indigenous groups, environmental activists, and 
business and political leaders in Panama apparently succeeded in 
pressuring the Panamanian government not to endorse the Colom- 
bian proposal. In any case, as of January 2006 Panama and Colom- 
bia were planning to build an electricity transmission line to link 
their power grids through the Darien rainforest, a project that would 
require cutting a path at least 40 meters wide through virgin jungle. 
However, that project also has stalled. 

Growing fiscal constraints have led to fostering private enterprise, 
and private companies have been granted leases to maintain high- 
ways since the mid-1990s. In 2009 major projects with private- sector 
participation planned for the near future included the tunnel to cross 
the central branch of the Andes in La Linea and the highways 
between Bogota and Cajamarca, which would improve mobility 
between Bogota and the southern, central, and western regions of the 
country. When the 8. 5 -kilometer- long La Linea Tunnel opens around 
2013, it is expected to save heavy vehicles 80 minutes and private 
automobiles 40 minutes off the previous route by connecting the 
departments of Tolima and Quindio. These new highway projects 
include one that will link Bogota with Buenaventura, the main 
Colombian port on the Pacific Ocean. Other projects with private par- 
ticipation include the Bogota-Santa Marta Highway, linking the capi- 
tal city with the Atlantic coast, and the Bogota-Sogamoso Highway, 
connecting Bogota with the department of Boyaca. 

Bogota still had major and long-lasting traffic congestion in 2007, 
because the number of private and public vehicles exceeded the 
capacity of the street infrastructure. In order to overcome the prob- 
lems generated by a whole range of market failures, including per- 
verse incentives for bus owners and drivers, poorly defined property 
rights of streets and sidewalks, and environmental pollution and con- 
gestion, Bogota has a massive new transport system called Trans- 
Milenio. It is an integrated bus rapid- transit system, using dedicated 
lanes for articulated buses, stations and terminals adapted for large- 
capacity buses, and fare-integrated operations with smaller buses on 
the outskirts of the city. The city grants contracts to private compa- 
nies that provide and operate the buses in this system, and fees are 
based on distance traveled. In 2009 the TransMilenio network was 
far from complete, so it was too early to fully assess its impact. Still, 
in 2001, only two years after TransMilenio began operations, the 
duration of the average trip in Bogota decreased from 44 minutes to 
35 minutes, while the average speed of cars increased from 27 kilo- 
meters per hour to 32 kilometers per hour. 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

The TransMilenio system has become a reference point for similar 
future projects, both in Colombia and abroad, mainly because of its 
cost-effectiveness compared to alternatives such as underground metro 
systems. Currently, these massive transport systems are also in devel- 
opment for Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Cali, Cartagena, Medellin, 
Pereira, and Soacha. The systems include financial support from the 
national government as long as the local authorities demonstrate the 
financial capacity to support the project during construction and opera- 
tion. In 2008 Samuel Moreno Rojas took office as major of Bogota 
with a popular mandate to build a metro line. In 2009 this proposed 
project and its links to the other elements of the capital city's public 
transport system, including TransMilenio and a future regional train 
plan, were still under review. 

Telecommunications 

In the first half of the 1990s, several reforms promoted competi- 
tion in telecommunications by allowing both private and public 
firms to provide service. They included the introduction of the 
framework for cell-phone operations in 1993 and the creation, in 
1994, of the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (CRT). 

Before the reforms, the company known as Telecom had a 
monopoly on national and international long-distance calls. After the 
reforms, two more firms provided service — Orbitel and the Bogota 
Telephone Company (ETB). In 2003 Telecom went into liquidation, 
and a new firm, Colombia Telecommunications, also with the acro- 
nym Telecom, took over its businesses. 

The number of telephone landlines per 1,000 people increased 
from 70 in 1990 to 180 in 2002. As of 2007, Colombia had fewer than 
8 million fixed telephone lines. Since 1990 many value-added ser- 
vices have been introduced in telecommunications, including answer- 
ing service, caller ID, conference calls, call waiting, call transfer, 
abbreviated dialing, and more. Cell phones were introduced in 
Colombia in 1994. Initially, two companies provided mobile-phone 
service (Comcel and Bellsouth), and subsequently Tigo (formerly 
known as Ola) became a provider following decisions on the bids for 
personal communications service (PCS), a digital mobile-phone tech- 
nology. Tigo is a consortium that includes ETB and the Medellin 
Public Companies (EPM). Since 2006 Millicom International Cellu- 
lar, a European multinational company, has held a majority share- 
holding in Tigo. These operators are free to compete in pricing. In 
December 2007, Colombia had 32.3 million active cell-phone users, 
two-thirds of them served by Comcel. According to the SIC, the 
Colombian mobile market reached 40.7 million subscriptions at the 



178 



Bogota s innovative Trans Milenio mass-transportation 
system uses dedicated lanes for articulated buses. 

Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 

179 



Colombia: A Country Study 



end of 2008, bringing the penetration rate to 91 percent. The data 
showed a growth rate of 20 percent for mobile subscriptions, higher 
than the 14 percent increase reported for 2007. Colombia also has a 
mobile communication services company, Avantel, based on another 
mobile-phone technology called trunking. 

Colombia obtained its direct connection to the Internet on June 4, 
1994, after a joint effort made by several local universities through a 
process that had begun in 1990. By the end of 2007, Colombia had 
as many as 12.1 million Internet users. Thus, 23 percent of the popu- 
lation had access to the Internet — above the world average of 1 9 per- 
cent — and the government is determined to increase this access 
share in a significant way in the next few years. Of those connected, 
about 80 percent were households, and the rest were corporate sub- 
scribers; moreover, 80 percent of Internet users had dedicated 
access. Wireless connections, although still not widespread, were 
increasing at a very significant rate by 2007, almost doubling each 
year. Trade through the Internet had begun, including financial ser- 
vices, news services, retail shopping, and a variety of other 
exchanges and services. The government has also accelerated the 
automation of a wide range of information, procedures, and services, 
such as tax payments, through the central Gobierno en Linea (Gov- 
ernment Online) Web site. In 2008 Colombia had an estimated Inter- 
net penetration rate of 32.3 percent and broadband penetration rate 
of 3.9 percent. 

Television broadcasting began in 1954 as a publicly provided ser- 
vice. However, financial difficulties led to a private-public partner- 
ship arrangement in the mid-1960s, in which the private sector was 
allowed to program and produce television materials, while the state 
kept control of the stations. In the mid-1980s, the government autho- 
rized regional channels and leases for subscription channels. In 2008 
Colombia had five national channels. Caracol Television, S.A., and 
National Radio Network (RCN) were private channels, and three 
(Canal Uno, Senal Colombia, and Senal Institucional) were state 
operated. There was also a range of regional, local, and community 
channels. Colombia also had 76 registered providers of cable televi- 
sion services and one television company broadcasting by satellite 
(DIRECTV). In 2008 bidding opened on a license for one additional 
private channel. 

Radio broadcasting began in 1929, and since 1933 Colombia has 
had various private firms providing the service, along with the public 
stations and, since 1997, community -based broadcasting companies. 
A variety of broadcasting companies and programs exist. Among the 
major broadcasting companies are Caracol, in which the Spanish 

180 



The Economy 



investment group Prisa has a majority stake; RCN; Olympic Radio 
Organization (ORO); and Todelar Radio. 

In 2004 almost two-thirds of the nation's 1,292 radio stations 
broadcast in frequency modulation (FM), while the rest broadcast in 
amplitude modulation (AM). Of the 167 public-interest broadcast- 
ers, most served municipalities, the armed forces, universities, and 
indigenous groups. 

Financial Regulation and Financial Markets 

At the end of the 1980s, Colombia's financial system was small, 
overregulated, and highly specialized, and it encompassed several 
state-owned institutions. For the most part, the gap between the 
interest charged by banks for loans they made and the interest paid 
by the banks for the deposits they received — the so-called intermedi- 
ation spread — was high. This situation resulted from banks being 
rather inefficient, with high administrative costs in relation to assets, 
high taxes on financial intermediation, and a less-than-competitive 
environment. Thus, the productive sector had limited access to rela- 
tively expensive domestic credit, while access to foreign credit was 
highly constrained. 

In the 1 990s, reforms under the administration of Cesar Augusto 
Gaviria Trujillo (president, 1990-94) promoted competition, creat- 
ing a more efficient financial system that would support the transfor- 
mation of Colombia's productive sector. The new measures eased 
the entry of firms into the financial sector; improved regulation; and 
encouraged bank business by simplifying mergers, conversions, and 
breakups and by allowing foreign investment. The reforms also 
privatized several public banks, liberalized interest rates, and 
changed the emphasis of the financial markets from specialization to 
a system of multipurpose banking. They also allowed the inter- 
national best-practice standards for the financial sector — known as 
Basel rules — to be applied along with enhanced supervision by the 
Banking Superintendency. In addition, Gaviria 's reforms reduced 
reserve requirements, which were no longer used as primary mone- 
tary policy tools; and encouraged financial institutions to participate 
in the foreign-exchange market and offer a wider range of products. 

These measures improved competitiveness so that new banks 
could enter the market more easily, but they also increased the size 
of banks and the capital backing of financial institutions. Eventually, 
however, the positive effects of greater competition were neutralized 
by the higher risk caused by a poorer economic performance and the 
subsequent deterioration in the creditworthiness of finance compa- 
nies. Intermediation spreads therefore remained at a high level. 



181 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Throughout the 1990s, the financial sector grew, as measured by 
total credits to both the public and the private sector, from 24 percent 
of GDP in 1988 to 41 percent of GDP in 1999. A sharp increase in 
capital inflows fueled this growth. In the late 1990s, and as a result 
of a combination of adverse exogenous shocks, including the Asian 
and Russian financial crises, a weak fiscal position, and an end to the 
boom in the housing market, the economy suffered a deep recession, 
and the banking sector underwent a severe crisis. Total credit alloca- 
tion as a share of GDP diminished significantly and in 2003 had lev- 
els of 35 percent — similar to those of 1993 — despite the substantial 
increase in public borrowing since 1997. 

The financial crisis of the late 1990s affected mainly the public 
financial institutions, which were less efficient and had invested in 
lower-quality loans, and the savings and loan corporations, locally 
called CAVs, which had loans supported in housing assets that had 
shrunk significantly in value after the boom years. As a result, the 
financial system had large losses between 1998 and 2001. The depth 
of the financial crisis was due in part to the cyclical nature of finan- 
cial regulation, which was lax during economic booms and strict 
during economic recessions. 

In response to the financial crisis, the government took prompt and 
effective but fiscally expensive action. New regulations in 1999 meant 
that commercial banks could absorb the former mortgage institutions. 
These strict regulations during the crisis were because the government 
needed to reduce the financial sector's risk exposure from the boom in 
the first years of the 1990s and particularly to help public financial 
entities and the mortgage owners. Between 1998 and 2000, the worst 
years of the crisis, the loans of private financial institutions were of 
higher quality than those of public financial institutions and the CAVs. 
However, not all policy interventions strengthened the financial sector. 
In 1999 the weak fiscal position forced the government to introduce a 
financial transaction tax, initially a temporary tax at a rate of 0.2 per- 
cent, increased to a permanent 0.3 percent in 2000, and increased fur- 
ther to 0.4 percent in 2004. 

Colombia's Banking Superintendency developed the Credit Risk 
Management System (SARC) so that there would be systematic 
supervision to evaluate credit risk. Institutions such as the IMF have 
acknowledged SARC as a pioneering effort in financial supervision. 
By using statistical techniques, an appropriate technological plat- 
form, and different levels of internal and external controls, SARC 
improves the quality of data. 

As the economy slowly recovered from the recession, and the dif- 
ferent policy measures began to take effect, the health of the finan- 



182 



Bogota s new financial district on 72 Street 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 

cial sector improved quite significantly. In a financial-stability report 
published in mid-2004, the Central Bank acknowledged that the 
financial system showed highly satisfactory indicators of profitabil- 
ity, credit, and liquidity risk. In 2005 public and private banks, both 
domestic and foreign, were all delivering healthy profits. This recov- 
ery allowed the government to sell back to the private sector several 
financial institutions. Despite these improvements, financial institu- 
tions still had a very high exposure to public-sector debt, on average 
a third of their assets. 

Some of the changes introduced in the 1990s have contributed to 
the development of Colombia's capital markets, which are now 
much more sophisticated than a decade ago. The increasing role of 
the domestic market in the financing of the public deficit, the cre- 
ation of private pension funds, and the securitization of mortgage- 
backed loans all have contributed to such development. In 2004 pen- 
sion funds had accumulated assets equivalent to 12 percent of GDP, 
half of it invested in Colombian public debt. However, the loss of 
investment grade in 1999 during the recession meant that important 
funds, such as the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS), the largest pension fund in the United States, have not 
been allowed to allocate funds in Colombia. As a result of CalPERS 
not investing in Colombia, other institutions that base their decisions 



183 



Colombia: A Country Study 

on the CalPERS restricted list of countries where funds can be 
invested also held back. 

To strengthen the operating basis of Colombia's capital markets, in 
2005 a new law gave the Capital Markets Commission greater power 
as a regulator and allowed the government to produce a legal frame- 
work setting out the main rules that apply to the capital markets. 
These steps were designed to improve the transparency of financial 
information, clearing and settlement, protection of investors, and 
sanctions. At the end of 2005, the banking and capital markets super- 
intendences merged into the Colombian Financial Superintendency 
(SFC or Superfinanciera). In 2006 Colombian capital markets were 
stronger than they had been between 1995 and 1998, when Colombia 
had investment grade, although there is still a long way to go in their 
development. 

In 2007 Colombia had 60 financial establishments: 16 banks, 33 
leasing and finance corporations, and 11 public specialized institu- 
tions. In 2006 domestic banks held approximately 80 percent of the 
financial-sector assets and foreign banks, 20 percent. The largest 
Colombian investor was the Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo Organi- 
zation. Other major domestic entities included the Agrarian Bank of 
Colombia, which is publicly owned and provides financial services 
to the rural sector, with more than 700 offices nationwide; Banco 
Caja Social Colmena (BCSC); Bancolombia, which has various for- 
eign affiliates, such as the Bancolombia financial group in El Salva- 
dor; and Davivienda. Foreign multinational institutions included 
Citibank and Spain's Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria (BBVA) and 
Banco Santander. 

Trade Policy and Trade Patterns 

In the 1990s, speculative import delays and significant private 
capital flows — within a crawling-peg system (see Glossary) — fueled 
domestic inflation and forced acceleration of the removal of trade 
barriers. In response, policy makers adopted decisive measures to 
promote trade liberalization. During that period, the percentage of 
tariff-free goods in total imports rose from 67 to 76, average tariffs 
declined from 34 to 12 percent, and a simplified tariff structure oper- 
ated with just four tariff levels (0 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent, and 
15 percent). 

Colombia and other Andean nations received unilateral and pref- 
erential Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) access to the 
European Community (later the EU) in 1990 in recognition of their 
fight against illegal drugs. These countries also received preferential 
GSP access to the United States in 1 992 for the same reasons, in a 



184 



The Economy 



program that became known as the Andean Trade Promotion and 
Drug Eradication Act. Both the European and the U.S. preferential 
schemes are unilateral and subject to periodic appraisal and renewal. 

Colombia also participates in a number of regional trade agree- 
ments. It signed a free-trade agreement with Chile in 1993; Mexico, 
Colombia, and Venezuela formed a regional agreement known as the 
G-3 (for Group of Three) in 1994; Colombia was a founding mem- 
ber of the Andean Pact, which became the Andean Community in 
1997; and in 2004 Colombia negotiated a free-trade agreement with 
the members of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur — see 
Glossary). In 2007 Colombia signed a free-trade agreement with the 
Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador). In February 2006, the negotiation of a free-trade agree- 
ment between Colombia and the United States called the United 
States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement was finalized, and it 
was signed on November 22 of that year. The agreement — similar to 
the pact signed by the United States with Peru and with the Central 
American countries — liberalized most trade between the two coun- 
tries and dealt with issues including foreign direct investment, com- 
petition policy, property rights, workers' rights, and environmental 
protection. Although the Colombian Congress and Constitutional 
Court initially approved the agreement and a reform protocol in 
2007, the actual adoption of such an agreement was pending the 
approval of the U.S. Congress. 

Colombia began negotiations in 2007 — along with Peru — for a 
free-trade agreement with Canada and the European Free Trade 
Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). 
Together with the Andean Community, Colombia also started free- 
trade negotiations with the EU. Furthermore, Colombia has commit- 
ted to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). On the multilat- 
eral front, Colombia approved the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993 and was a founding 
member of the World Trade Organization in 1995. 

Commodities traditionally have dominated the composition of 
Colombia's exports. However, the pattern has changed over the past five 
decades. Coffee, which represented about 85 percent of Colombia's total 
exports in 1959, represented less than 6 percent in 2006 — less than the 
share that it had in the 1 870s. Oil and coal have become Colombia's two 
major export products, representing, respectively, 18 percent and 12 per- 
cent of the nation's total exports in 2006. The so-called nontraditional 
exports (new export products other than coffee, oil, coal, and nickel), 
which constituted 30 percent of total exports in 1970, increased their 
share to about 52 percent of total exports by 1991 and have fluctuated 



185 



Colombia: A Country Study 

around that level to date. Overall, and despite its dependence on com- 
modities, Colombia's export basket is today more diverse than in 1990. 
The main exported manufactures include chemicals and refined oil 
products, processed foods, basic metallurgical products, clothing, and 
vehicles. 

In 2006 the United States was the destination of 40 percent of 
Colombian exports; Venezuela received 1 1 percent; Ecuador, 5 per- 
cent; Mexico and Peru, 3 percent each; and Germany, Japan, and 
Belgium, 2 percent each. These eight countries were the destination 
of 68 percent of Colombia's total exports. The fact that the United 
States is Colombia's most important trade partner explains why the 
negotiation of the free-trade agreement with the United States has 
been a major economic and political issue for Colombian officials 
and for many of the nation's main pressure groups. In order to 
enhance security and improve efficiency in its trade with the United 
States, Colombian export companies have been allowed to partici- 
pate in the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program 
of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency. 

In 2006 some 25.5 percent of Colombia's exports were from the 
Caribbean coast, that is, the departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, 
Cordoba, La Guajira, Magdalena, and Sucre, as well as Colombia's 
Caribbean department of San Andres, Providencia y Santa Catalina; 
16.9 percent were from Bogota and Cundinamarca Department; 12.9 
percent were from Antioquia; and 7.4 percent were from Valle del 
Cauca Department. 

Colombia's import bill rose by 26 percent to US$30.1 billion in 
2006. Of these imports, 80 percent consisted of capital goods and 
industrial raw materials and inputs, and 20 percent of consumption 
goods. In that same year, the United States provided 26 percent of 
Colombian imports; China and Mexico, 9 percent each; Brazil, 7 per- 
cent; Venezuela, 6 percent, Germany and Japan, 4 percent each; Ecua- 
dor, 3 percent; and Spain, 1 percent. These nine countries were the 
source of 69 percent of Colombia's total imports. 

Foreign Investment Regulation and Outcomes 

Before the reforms of the 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
was highly restricted both nationally and within the Andean Pact. Dur- 
ing those years, FDI was not allowed in principal financial services, 
infrastructure, and public utilities, although Colombian governments 
exercised some discretion. The change in the economic model that 
occurred in the 1990s led to a range of policy measures to foster FDI, 
simplify its procedures, and remove impediments to investment in spe- 
cific sectors, except for national security or serious environmental con- 



186 



The Economy 



cerns. The Colombia Investment Corporation, a national FDI- 
promotion agency, came into being and later merged with Proexpo. 
Colombia became a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis- 
putes, in order to establish political risk-management mechanisms. 

Colombia's FDI increased from an annual average US$2.4 billion 
between 1994 and 2004 to an annual average US$8.5 billion between 
2005 and 2007. In 2005 the United States had the largest share of FDI 
in Colombia with 16.3 percent, followed by Spain and the United 
Kingdom with 12.2 percent each, and Panama with 10.4 percent. The 
tax havens in the Caribbean, such as the British Virgin Islands and the 
Cayman Islands, have been significant sources of outward FDI for 
Colombia. FDI to these tax havens may be explained to some extent 
as investment by Colombian citizens using front companies as tax- 
evasion maneuvers, or as wealth-protection measures, given the high 
levels of violence and insecurity that have prevailed in Colombia for 
many years. 

Between 1994 and 2007, the leading sectors attracting FDI were 
manufactures, mining, petroleum, financial services, and transport 
and communications. Increasing oil prices worldwide and domestic 
requirements have meant that there has been an increasing interest 
on the part of foreign investors in the exploration of new oil fields 
and in the production of biodiesel and ethanol in Colombia. 

FDI patterns from the United States were led by financial services 
between 1993 and 2000, represented by investment companies such 
as Citigroup and Liberty Mutual Insurance, and the sector accounted 
for 21 percent of all inflows from the United States. Telecommunica- 
tions and information technology played a major role between 2001 
and 2004, with companies including Dell, Oracle, Computer Associ- 
ates, Sun Microsystems, and others responsible for 65 percent of all 
FDI inflows from the United States. In 2007 General Electric bought 
a 39 percent share of a large bank, Colpatria Red Multibanca (Colpa- 
tria Multibank Network). 

Among the most important FDI transactions by firms not from the 
United States are the merger between Grupo Bavaria and SABMiller, 
which has been followed by new investments in its beer business; and 
the acquisition of a controlling share in Casa Editorial El Tiempo 
(CEET), which owns Colombia's largest newspaper, with a signifi- 
cant investment in CEET's associated television channel, City TV, by 
the Spanish Grupo Planeta. The Spanish Grupo Fenosa has made 
major investments in electricity generation. French and Chilean com- 
panies have also been important foreign investors in Colombia. 

Foreign-investment funds have been able since 1991 to invest in 
Colombia through their portfolios. The Colombian assets of these 



187 



Colombia: A Country Study 



funds increased to more than US$1 billion between 1996 and 2000, 
then depreciated steadily, and by 2003 had fallen to less than 
US$700 million. In order to minimize the effects of speculative 
financial flows on exchange-rate volatility, since December 2004 
such investments must remain in Colombia for at least one year. 

Foreign investments by Colombian companies have increased sig- 
nificantly in the last two decades, from US$59 million in 1992 to more 
than US$1 billion since 2005. They have invested, for example, in 
cement producer group Argos and the ceramics and plumbing Corona 
Group in the United States; the Corona Group in Mexico; the Peruvian 
state oil company Ecopetrol; the Grupo Empresarial Interconexion 
Electrica S.A. in Brazil, Panama, and Peru; Compania Nacional de 
Chocolates in Peru and other Latin American countries; and the Ban- 
colombia financial group in El Salvador. A wide range of smaller 
Colombian firms are also making investments abroad in sectors such as 
apparel and fashion design, food products, and restaurants. 

Illegal Drugs 

The illegal drug problem appeared in the 1970s, intensified in the 
1980s, and has continued unabated since then. The Colombian gov- 
ernment has tried many different policies since 1 990 to fight the ille- 
gal drug trade. Gaviria put his administration's policy emphasis on 
countering narco-terrorism — the combination of illegal drug busi- 
nesses and terrorism. After the 1991 constitution banned extradition, 
the government adopted a program allowing major traffickers to do 
jail time in Colombia in return for lenient sentences, and eventually 
a group of drug lords headed by Pablo Escobar Gaviria took part in 
it. As there was clear evidence that justice was neither thorough nor 
impartial, the government attempted to transfer Escobar away from 
the comfortable so-called prison that he had built for himself near 
Medellfn; Escobar and several of his associates escaped. This situa- 
tion forced the Colombian government to make major efforts to cap- 
ture, dead or alive, key figures of the Medellin Cartel. Eventually, 
several of those drug lords were put back into prison, or, like Esco- 
bar, were killed. After serious allegations that the Cali Cartel had 
financed his presidential campaign, Ernesto Samper's administration 
captured the heads of the cartel, reestablished extradition in 1997, 
and introduced court powers in order to allow the state to take pos- 
session of properties obtained with funds from illegal activities. 

The 1990s were years of significant increase in the area of coca- 
crop cultivation, from 40,100 hectares in 1990 to 163,300 hectares in 
2000. The 1990s also saw the start of opium-poppy cultivation, with a 
production area in 1994 of 15,000 hectares. Besides, the Cali and 



188 



Growing to a height of two or three meters, the coca shrub 
is a member of the family Erythroxylaceae. Its leaves 
contain cocaine alkaloids, a basis for cocaine. 
The opium poppy, of the family Papaveraceae, is an annual 
herb cultivated in Colombia for heroin production. 
Courtesy Narcotics Affairs Section Office, U.S. Embassy, Bogota 



189 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Medellin cartels were gradually replaced by the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia (AUC) as major players. 

To confront these issues, the administration of Andres Pastrana 
Arango (president, 1998-2002) designed a largely U.S. -financed pro- 
gram called Plan Colombia, which has been in operation since then. 
Plan Colombia strengthens the state presence in drug-producing 
regions and is combined with a range of social and environmental 
measures. Given that a significant amount of illegal drugs leaves 
Colombia by sea, in 1997 Colombia and the United States signed a 
maritime agreement to strengthen procedures and cooperation in 
coordinating maritime interdiction. In 1999 the two countries also 
signed a bilateral air interdiction agreement with resources from the 
Air Bridge Denial program. According to local authorities, both of 
these interdiction programs have contributed significantly to restric- 
tion of the flows of illegal drugs out of the country. 

Recent policies and eradication programs have contributed to 
reducing the production areas of drug crops. For example, in 2006 
the production area of coca crops fell to 78,000 hectares; the opium- 
poppy production area fell to 1,023 hectares; and the number of ille- 
gal processing labs destroyed rose from 317 in 1999 to 2,217. Fur- 
thermore, the government of President Alvaro Uribe initiated 
procedures for bringing to justice the main leaders of the AUC and 
in 2008, when several of them would not cooperate with the pro- 
gram, for extraditing them to the United States. The FARC also lost 
in 2008 three members of its seven-member Secretariat, including 
FARC founder Pedro Antonio Marin (also known as Manuel Maru- 
landa Velez, or "Tiro Fijo" — Sure Shot). Many of the other members 
of the AUC and the FARC have been killed, captured, or have demo- 
bilized through specially designed programs. 

Despite many efforts, reductions in production areas have been 
accompanied by increases in productivity. As such, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that in 2006 the 
potential coca production of Colombia passed from 463 metric tons in 
2001 to 610 metric tons in 2006. Even allowing for changes in mea- 
surement methodologies, these numbers are a sign of concern about 
the effectiveness of the policies adopted so far. According to UNODC, 
in 2006 Colombia supplied 62 percent of the world's cocaine; an esti- 
mated 67,000 households were involved in coca farming; and 83 per- 
cent of cultivation took place in the departments of Putumayo, 
Caqueta, Meta, Guaviare, Narino, Antioquia, and Vichada. 

Colombia has been the main supplier of cocaine and an important 
supplier of heroin to the U.S. market, and a major supplier of these 



190 



The Economy 



drugs to the EU. The importance of Colombia as a supplier of illegal 
drugs, however, does not necessarily mean that Colombia as a whole 
has profited from such trade. Data gathered by U.S. authorities show 
that a significant share of the revenues generated by this illegal trade 
accrues mainly at the retail level and remains in developed countries 
because the price of cocaine increases dramatically during the com- 
mercialization process. It has been estimated that the retail price in the 
United States is 200 times the price paid for the equivalent product at 
the farm level in Colombia and eight times the price received by who- 
ever makes the wholesale export into the U.S. market. Inasmuch as 
retail sales in the United States are undertaken mainly by persons who 
are not Colombian nationals, most of the profits from the drug trade go 
to foreigners. Furthermore, the profits generated in consumer coun- 
tries that do end up in the hands of Colombian nationals are not neces- 
sarily transferred back to Colombia, at least not entirely. Although the 
annual value of processed cocaine and other exported illicit drugs is 
believed to exceed US$5 billion, only about one-half of this amount 
actually returns to Colombia. Despite counternarcotics efforts since 
the mid-1980s, drugs are currently as available as ever, of better qual- 
ity, and at lower prices. 

The economic effect of the illegal drug trade also includes the dis- 
tortional effects that foreign-exchange revenues from such activities 
have on legal production of goods and services. Furthermore, drug 
proceeds foster corruption, fund contraband and money laundering, 
jeopardize political stability, and weaken institutions. They have also 
stoked Colombia's internal conflict. Recent estimates indicate that 
Colombia's GDP growth rate has been diminished by about 2 per- 
cent per year because of the deleterious effect that the drug-fueled 
internal conflict has had on investment and productivity. The overall 
effect of drug trafficking on the Colombian economy remains nega- 
tive even though certain sectors, particularly the housing industry in 
certain cities, may have received a boost from this illegal activity. 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
between 1995 and 2006 the share of illicit drugs in GDP fell (see 
The Rise of Drug Trafficking Organizations, ch. 1 ; Drug Trafficking 
and the Origins of Paramilitarism, ch. 5). 

Macroeconomic Policies and Trends 

Until the end of the 1980s, Colombia was widely acknowledged 
as a remarkably stable economy in the Latin American context, char- 
acterized by moderate inflation and growth. The country's public 
finances and foreign debt were in good health, and exchange-rate 



191 



Colombia: A Country Study 

policy was based on a crawling-peg system, supported by a wide 
range of exchange controls. 

Following international trends, at the beginning of the 1990s 
Colombia began a conscientious effort to reduce inflation. Likewise, 
the government decided to remove many of the inefficient and ineq- 
uitable exchange-rate controls. Both of these goals led to a series of 
institutional changes and policy adjustments. However, at the same 
time that new measures came in to boost the private sector, the 1991 
constitution brought about important changes that called for addi- 
tional fiscal expenditure. In the absence of adequate compensatory 
taxes and spending controls, the increased spending eventually 
weakened the fiscal position and made the economy more vulnerable 
to exogenous shocks. The pledge to reduce inflation was quite costly 
to GDP growth, given a weak fiscal position and the shock effects of 
the Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s. Following a deep 
recession and financial crises in 1999, Colombia had low and stable 
inflation in 2006 and 2007 and some improvement in its fiscal policy 
stance, for which a close engagement with the IMF is partly respon- 
sible. In 2004 Colombia became the second Latin American 
nation — after Uruguay — to sell bonds denominated in local currency 
in international markets. It also has reduced the share of external 
debt in total public debt to about 35 percent in 2006 and increased 
the average duration of its loans. However, Colombia can still be 
characterized as a vulnerable economy, with a high public-debt bur- 
den of about 52 percent of GDP in 2006, higher than the 43.3 level it 
had in the crisis year of 1999. 

Monetary Policy and Inflation 

From 1963 until 1991, a monetary board headed the Central 
Bank. Its members included the ministers of finance, agriculture and 
livestock, and economic development and the director of the Insti- 
tute of Foreign Trade. The control of the executive branch over mon- 
etary policy meant that there were constant pressures to use 
monetary policy to promote certain sectors of the economy. This 
configuration resulted in an average rate of inflation of 20 percent 
between 1963 and 1990. 

Under the 1991 constitution, the Central Bank is the authority in 
charge of monetary policy, including the role of lender of last resort 
for financial institutions, and responsible for management of the 
country's exchange rate and foreign reserves. More importantly, the 
1991 constitution also gives the Central Bank significant autonomy 
from the executive. A board of directors headed by the minister of 
finance and public credit replaced the monetary board. Six board 



192 



The Economy 



members elect the bank's general manager for a four-year term. The 
five other board members are appointed by the president of the 
republic for four-year terms. Every four years, the government may 
change two of the appointed board members and must reappoint the 
other three. No member may serve for more than three terms. Loans 
from the bank to the government and to the nonfmancial private sec- 
tor are severely restricted. 

The new constitution establishes that the Central Bank's mandate 
is to guard price stability and that its policies have to be made in 
coordination with overall economic policy. The 1991 charter gives 
the Central Bank political and financial autonomy, but the Central 
Bank has to present a biannual report on its activities to Congress to 
ensure accountability. Despite sporadic debates about the objectives, 
structure, operation, and independence of the Central Bank, since the 
reforms were introduced in 1991, Colombia has managed to reduce 
its inflation rate from 32.4 percent in 1990 to 4.5 percent in 2006. 
However, the trend had been slightly reversed by 2008, a year in 
which inflation reached 7.7 percent. 

Normally, reducing inflation comes at a price, and for Colombia 
the price was especially high in 1999, when the Asian crisis affected 
its economy negatively, while the country was vulnerable because of 
its public and foreign debt burden. In that year, GDP fell 4 percent, 
and unemployment reached levels of almost 20 percent. 

Since 1999, and in the context of a floating exchange rate, mone- 
tary policy has been formulated through an inflation-targeting frame- 
work. Accordingly, the Central Bank establishes an inflation target 
for the year and an indicative target for the medium term. The inter- 
mediate target for monetary policy is the Central Bank's overnight 
interest rate. Therefore, and contrary to its pre- 1999 practices, the 
Central Bank no longer announces targets for monetary aggregates. 
As part of the inflation-targeting structure, the Central Bank now 
issues quarterly inflation reports, a most valuable source for analysis 
and data on macroeconomic developments in Colombia. 

Exchange-Rate Policy and the Balance of Payments 

After the collapse of the gold standard in 1931, the Central Bank 
began controlling transactions in foreign exchange, maintaining dif- 
ferent exchange rates and relatively free international movements of 
capital. However, a 1967 law gave the Central Bank a monopoly on 
all foreign-exchange transactions made in the official foreign- 
exchange market, introduced the crawling-peg system of gradual 
devaluations, and unified the exchange rate. In order to make those 



193 



Colombia: A Country Study 

changes operational, the bank implemented a wide range of capital 
controls. 

In 1991 the government abolished the 1967 law as part of Colom- 
bia's promarket reforms and removed many restrictions on capital 
movements. It also allowed the exchange rate to float within a 
band — informally until 1994, formally until 1999. In that year, the 
large public and private foreign debt made the country vulnerable, 
and speculative attacks led the Central Bank to twice devalue the 
foreign-exchange band and then to allow the exchange rate to float, 
once a precautionary three-year extended-fund facility had been 
agreed with the IMF. However, the bank reserved the right to inter- 
vene in the foreign-exchange market, with a range of fairly transpar- 
ent and publicly known instruments, in accordance with its policy 
objectives. 

Significant devaluations of the Colombian peso occurred in 2002 
and 2003 with the floating exchange rate. Following international 
patterns, between 2004 and 2007 the Colombian peso experienced 
both significant nominal and real appreciation against the U.S. dol- 
lar. This appreciation caused groups involved in exports to press 
government officials and the Central Bank to design measures to 
alleviate their position. These pressures demonstrated, at least in 
part, that by 2004 Colombian entrepreneurs were still not properly 
prepared to live under a floating exchange-rate system and rarely 
used financial-coverage mechanisms to protect themselves against 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. 

A careful analysis of the real exchange-rate index shows that in 
2007 the Colombian peso was quite overvalued, compared to its pat- 
terns since 1990, and that it was about 10 percent stronger compared 
to 1994. The net foreign reserves expressed in total debt payments 
within the next year increased substantially from 0.9 in 1999 to 1.6 
in 2006, a level considered a sign of a healthy balance of payments. 

Since the early 1990s, Colombia's balance of payments has 
shown some consistent patterns. Exports have grown in line with 
imports. Colombia consistently has been a net importer of services, 
especially in transport, travel, insurance, finance, entrepreneur ship, 
and construction. Colombia also has had negative net-factor income, 
with outlays consistently above revenues, mainly on interest pay- 
ments, profits, and dividends, as would be expected given the 
increase in foreign debt and foreign-investment inflows that 
occurred during the period. The growing importance of remittances 
as a source of foreign exchange is a fairly new and striking feature of 
the Colombian economy, resulting from the high emigration levels 
that occurred in the second half of the 1 990s in response to the per- 



194 



The Economy 



sistent violence and the economic crisis of 1999. Remittances to 
Colombia rose from US$745 million in 1996 to US$3 billion in 
2003, equivalent to 90 percent of the nation's exports of oil and its 
derivatives, the country's largest exports. 

Despite the growing importance of remittances, Colombia has had 
a negative current account since 1993, resulting largely from the 
public sector's fiscal imbalance. The exceptions were the recession 
years (1999 and 2000), when there was a lack of international 
finance sources for Colombia in the midst of the Asian and Russian 
financial crises. 

The current-account deficit of recent years has been financed, 
except in 1999, with long-term financial inflows, such as FDI and 
long-term loans. These net long-term financial inflows have more 
than compensated for the net short-term financial cash outflows that 
have prevailed. Mirroring the current-account deficits, Colombia has 
reported a financial and capital-account surplus throughout the 
period. International reserves also generally have increased, most 
significantly in 2007, reaching record levels of more than US$20 bil- 
lion and representing about eight months of current imports of 
goods. 

During the debt crises of the 1980s, Colombia avoided foreign- 
debt rescheduling processes and was widely acknowledged as the 
Latin American country with the best creditworthiness. However, 
the unprecedented increase in public debt experienced in the country 
between 1990 and 2000 and generated by the country's structural fis- 
cal imbalance was accompanied by a large increase in foreign debt 
in both the public and the private sectors. This development was a 
key factor in the economic crises of 1999, as financial markets 
regarded Colombia as a vulnerable emerging market because of its 
high public- and foreign-debt exposure. 

The share of the private sector's foreign debt reached 19 percent of 
GDP in 1999 but by 2006 was estimated to have dropped to 10 percent 
of GDR The public-sector foreign debt as a share of GDP reached 30 
percent in 2003 but declined to 15 percent of GDP in 2007. By May 
2008, Colombia had US$45.7 billion in total foreign debt. 

Fiscal Policy and Public Finances 

The introduction of the 1991 constitution led to a rise in Colom- 
bia's public-sector expenditure from 20.4 percent of GDP in 1990 to 
33.7 percent of GDP in 2001. In 2002 government expenditure was 
3 1 percent higher than the average in Latin America. The decentral- 
ization process that began in the 1970s and accelerated under the 
new constitution largely explained the higher government spending. 



195 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Decentralization transferred funds from the central government to 
the territorial entities — departments, special districts, and municipal- 
ities — through several mechanisms. The decentralization of funds, 
however, was not accompanied by devolution of discretion in spend- 
ing these resources. The constitution and some subsequent legisla- 
tion restricted the use of the resources and left the departmental 
governments very limited in their expenditure decisions. Further- 
more, and perhaps more importantly in view of its adverse fiscal 
implications, the central government continued to undertake certain 
expenditure responsibilities that should have devolved to the 
regions, including health, education, and infrastructure. 

The constitution established that the territorial entities' share of 
central government revenues had to increase from 26 percent in 
1993 to 46.5 percent in 2002. Along with the greater resources, terri- 
torial entities increased their indebtedness throughout the 1990s. The 
debt of departments and departmental capitals increased from 0.9 
percent of GDP in 1990 to 2.8 percent of GDP in 1999. Their higher 
revenues and the lack of effective budgetary controls encouraged the 
increase in regional debt. Instruments such as the cofinance funds, 
which operated until 1998 and were designed to concentrate addi- 
tional funds from the central national government to finance projects 
at lower levels of government, also facilitated fiscal irresponsibility. 
Although the Education Compensation Fund (FEC) was created in 
1997 to promote efficiency in education, it eventually became a bail- 
out mechanism for the regions, increasing the perverse incentives 
even more. 

Colombia's untenable pension system further complicated the 
country's fiscal problems. In the latter part of the 1990s, Colombian 
policy makers became increasingly aware of the growing fiscal bur- 
den that the existing pension plans posed for public resources. Such 
pension payments increased from 0.8 percent of GDP in 1990 to 3.5 
percent in 2003. In order to address the problem, a series of pension 
reforms has taken place (see The Pension System, this ch.). 

Another source of pressure on Colombia's public revenues intro- 
duced by the 1991 constitution was the creation of the Constitutional 
Court as the legal entity in charge of preserving the integrity and 
supremacy of the constitution (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). The Consti- 
tutional Court's opinions are final, and its actions generally have been 
geared to ensuring that all constitutional provisions granting rights to 
the people are actually enforced. The Constitutional Court has made a 
literal interpretation of broad policy goals, such as "the right to fair 
wages" or "the right to decent housing," and in so doing has in effect 
ordered the government to satisfy those rights, regardless of the avail- 



196 



The Economy 



ability of fiscal resources. The more salient decisions of the Constitu- 
tional Court include the retroactive indexation of the wages of public- 
sector workers to maintain purchasing power and the extension of the 
fourteenth monthly wage (mesada 14), an additional payment (on top 
of the thirteenth monthly wage known as prima), originally designed 
to equalize unbalanced pension payments of certain workers (at a cost 
that has been estimated at 14 percent of the nation's GDP). In addi- 
tion, the court ordered the recalculation of mortgage payments, which 
generated regressive income distribution by not differentiating among 
debtors on the basis of wealth or indebtedness. 

These decisions have created tension between policy makers and 
the court. Policy makers point out that the Constitutional Court is not 
democratically elected and determines expenditures arbitrarily with 
no provision for the revenues to fulfill them. The members of the 
Constitutional Court claim that the executive and legislative powers 
have not built a minimum legal capacity for their own use and have 
not provided the court with enough resources for it to be in a position 
to make accurate judgments. 

The structural imbalance in public finances created since 1991, 
because of legal restrictions on increasing fiscal revenues at the same 
pace as public expenses, generated persistent fiscal deficits and sub- 
sequently a dramatic increase in public debt compared to most of the 
twentieth century. Thus, while between 1950 and 1990 total central- 
government debt averaged 13 percent of GDP, debt rose from 14 per- 
cent of GDP in 1995 to 54 percent in 2003. 

Colombia was traditionally a country with low levels of debt, and 
its public debt was awarded investment grade in 1995, but the seri- 
ous deterioration in economic health led to the downgrading of its 
investment status in 1999 and to successive standby agreements with 
the IMF between then and 2006. These agreements reflected a com- 
mitment toward structural reform and macroeconomic and financial 
stability, limiting the short-run temptations that had led successive 
governments to postpone resolution of fiscal problems. 

New requirements made departments and municipalities face their 
budget constraints and improve their efficiency and transparency. 
The new constitution and subsequent laws restricted their ability to 
increase their debt and limited the capacity of the central govern- 
ment to bail them out. Transfers became centralized under the Gen- 
eral Participation System, consisting of the funds that the central 
government is constitutionally required to transfer to the regions. In 
2001 transfers to departments and municipalities were temporarily 
capped until 2008, and in 2007 further reforms made transfers more 
consistent with a sounder and sustainable long-term fiscal policy. 



197 



Colombia: A Country Study 

These reforms have generated substantial savings to the central gov- 
ernment and will continue to do so, while still ensuring enough 
resources to reach universal coverage in the near future in primary 
and secondary education and in health. They will also contribute to 
the improvement in the quality of those services, and in the provi- 
sion of drinking water and sewerage services. 

To help finance the increasing public expenditures, Colombia has 
had a significant number of tax reforms since 1990 and a range of 
other measures taken by the government to start addressing fiscal 
problems. The tax-reform process has been so intense that some ana- 
lysts have identified more than 10 significant fiscal reforms between 
1990 and 2007. One reason for the repeated fiscal reforms and the 
almost insoluble fiscal imbalances is the greater political participation 
of Congress. Although congressional involvement fosters democracy, 
it hinders agreement. Other reasons are the lack of party discipline 
and the strong incentives for each administration to transfer responsi- 
bility for problems to its successor. This gradual approach to fiscal 
reform has resulted in a complex tax system, with regressive taxes, 
such as a tax on financial transactions, a high marginal income tax, 
and a small value-added tax (VAT) levied on a restricted set of goods. 
The Colombian VAT regime has many rates and exemptions, as well 
as a broad range of exemptions to income tax, which increases unnec- 
essarily the administrative burden of tax collection. 

Although Colombia had held most of its public debt in foreign 
markets, it has increasingly been placed with internal sources in 
order to mitigate the vulnerability of the country to significant 
changes in the exchange rate induced by foreign shocks and to avoid 
high appreciation of the exchange rate. As of 2006, about 65 percent 
of total public debt was being held domestically. During 2007 and in 
the midst of economic recovery and overall improvements in the 
finances of the public sector, Colombia's credit rating was upgraded, 
and it was likely that the country as a whole would soon recover 
investment grade. 

On balance, the macroeconomic reforms of the 1990s were well 
intentioned but ill conceived in some cases and contradictory in oth- 
ers, particularly in demanding increasing social responsibility from 
the state but without the necessary increase in public revenues. More- 
over, the Constitutional Court's decisions increased government 
expenditures and weakened some revenue-generating tax reforms. 
The combination of these factors led to more severe fiscal problems. 
Constitutionally mandated low inflation, competitive real exchange 
rate, and opening of the economy to trade in goods and services, 
while liberalizing the capital account, were somewhat conflicting pol- 



198 



The Economy 



icies. Their timing has had some unwelcome results, such as a long 
period of revaluation of the real exchange rate. 

Labor, The Informal Economy, Social Spending, 
and Pensions 

Throughout the twentieth century, Colombia achieved important 
improvements in human development and social protection. For 
example, between 1900 and 2008 life expectancy increased from 37 
to 72.5 years, and infant mortality fell from 204 per 1,000 live births 
to 19.5. According to the World Bank, by 2004 illiteracy had dropped 
from 58 percent to about 8 percent, poverty had declined from 92 per- 
cent to 52.6 percent, and income per capita had increased more than 
ninefold to US$5,515, at purchasing-power parity (PPP) in current 
international dollars. Nevertheless, the second half of the 1990s was a 
period of disappointing results overall for social indicators. The first 
decade of the twenty-first century has been a period of sluggish 
recovery. The social impact of Colombia's economic policy has been 
transmitted mainly through the labor markets, welfare expenditure, 
and the pension system (see also Health and Welfare, ch. 2). By 2008 
illiteracy had fallen to 7 percent and GDP per capita had risen to 
US$6,958 (at PPP). 

Labor Markets 

Demographic factors have shaped the Colombian labor force. In 
the last few decades, it has been characterized by fairly stable partic- 
ipation of men and increasing participation of women, an increase in 
rural-urban migration, and an increase in the average age of the pop- 
ulation as a result of a longer life expectancy and a decrease in the 
size of families. Another important feature of the Colombian labor 
force is that qualified workers — understood as those workers who 
completed secondary education — who at the beginning of the 1990s 
represented less than 40 percent of the urban labor force, represented 
almost 60 percent of the labor force at the beginning of 2006. 

System rigidities and nonwage payments of about 50 percent of 
the basic wage are other important characteristics of Colombia's 
labor markets. Such nonwage payments include holidays, pensions, 
health-care insurance, lay-off compensation, and labor-risk insurance. 
They also include contributions to family-welfare programs through 
the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, public workforce training 
programs through the National Learning Service, and family compen- 
sation programs through nonprofit entities called Family Compensa- 
tion Funds (CCFs). The state has allocated CCFs the role of granting 



199 



Colombia: A Country Study 

subsidies and services to lower-income families with resources com- 
ing from a contribution paid by employers and equivalent to 4 percent 
of the basic wages paid. Studies since 2000 have shown that nonwage 
payments in Colombia are close to the levels of developed countries 
and are among the highest in Latin America and the world. 

Colombia has not had particularly strong labor unions, and member- 
ship has decreased from 13 percent in 1965 to less than 5 percent in 
2005 (see Labor Unions, ch. 4). The three principal unions, in descend- 
ing order of importance, are the United Workers' Federation (CUT), 
the General Confederation of Democratic Workers (CGTD), and the 
Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC). These labor unions, the 
employers, and the government have bargained formally over wages 
for many years, especially at the end of every year. And between 1996 
and 2006, Colombia's minimum wage increased 24 percent in real 
terms, despite record levels of unemployment, the worst recession in 
decades, and no significant improvements in labor productivity. A 
nominal 7.7 percent rise in the minimum wage came into effect in Jan- 
uary 2009. Although Colombia's minimum wage is modest, its 
increases are important because they are a reference for wage increases 
in other segments of the labor market. 

The Colombian demand for labor has been influenced by the tech- 
nological changes that originated in the reforms of the 1990s, mainly 
through the opening of the economy, which led to an increase and an 
upgrade in the capital stock, an increase in the demand for higher 
skills, and a decrease in the demand for lower skills. In 1990 a labor- 
market reform reduced the cost of firing a worker, increased the 
range of alternatives to hiring workers, and brought down the non- 
wage payments to about 43 percent of the basic wage. However, the 
social security and health reform of 1993 increased payroll contribu- 
tions from 43 percent to 53 percent of the basic wage, more than 
reversing the earlier savings of nonwage costs. 

In the short term, perhaps the most important occurrence in 
Colombia's labor markets was the sharp increase in the unemploy- 
ment rate from 1994 to 2000, when it reached record levels of almost 
20 percent. The high unemployment was closely linked with the 
recession, which was accompanied by an increase in the participation 
of women and youngsters in the labor force, as households attempted 
to diversify their income sources. It was also accompanied by a dete- 
rioration in the quality of employment, measured by the size of the 
informal sector and the extent of underemployment. 

The increases in labor costs, however, both through minimum 
wage and nonwage payments, had a more lasting impact on Colom- 
bia's labor markets. The average unemployment rate between 1984 



200 




A seamstress in Bogota 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (Daniel Drosdoff), 

Washington, DC 

Flower vendors on the sidewalk at the entrance to Bogota s main cemetery 

Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 



201 



Colombia: A Country Study 

and 2006 was 12.4 percent, which is very high by world standards. 
The average unemployment rose from 1 1.4 percent between 1984 and 
1989 to 14.9 percent between 2001 and 2006 (with a change in mea- 
surement methodology in the latter period). The increase in the aver- 
age level of unemployment has been accompanied by an increase in 
the variance of unemployment. Recent studies show that in Colombia 
unemployment hits women and young workers, mainly those with 
only secondary education, the hardest. Unemployment also increases 
as the level of income falls, affecting primarily the poorest groups of 
the population. 

The recovery of the economy meant that by 2006 some improve- 
ments in the labor markets had occurred, notably a fall in the rate and 
duration of unemployment, an improvement in the quality of employ- 
ment, and an increase in the number of jobs for young workers. The 
benefits of the 2002 labor reform were still under scrutiny, and it was 
too early to judge its full effectiveness. The aim of this reform was to 
reduce employment costs and labor-market rigidities and to promote 
the hiring of apprentices and vulnerable groups of society. It also 
introduced an unemployment subsidy financed through a further 
increase in the nonwage costs. Nevertheless, the high level of unem- 
ployment remained one of Colombia's most serious economic and 
social problems. 

The Informal Economy 

The high rigidities in the country's labor markets and the high non- 
wage costs mean that Colombia has a large informal economy. 
Although employment in the informal sector had decreased until 
1996, the recession of 1999 and the sharp increase in forced displace- 
ment because of the internal conflict reversed this trend. Between 
2000 and about 2006, the informal economy accounted for some 50 
percent of total GDP and 60 percent of employment in the cities. 
Although informal employment in the rural sector has not been as 
well documented as in urban areas, some estimates indicate that in 
rural areas it has been as high as 90 percent of total employment. 

Within cities and towns, the most important informal-sector work 
is in services (75 percent of such employment), followed by industry, 
with 16 percent, and construction, with 6 percent. Informal-sector 
workers are most likely to be in the younger and older segments of 
the population. About 90 percent of employees under 1 8 years of age 
and 74 percent of employees older than 55 years of age work in the 
informal sector. The informal sector involves women more than men 
as a result of the later entry of women into the labor force, the prefer- 
ence of women for more flexible working conditions, and outright 



202 



The Economy 



discriminatory practices by formal-sector employers. Also, informal- 
ity becomes less likely the larger a company is and the greater the 
number of years that it has operated. 

Estimates suggest that in 2005 male workers in the informal sec- 
tor could earn approximately 52 percent less than what they would 
have earned in the formal sector, while female workers earned about 
60 percent less working in the informal sector than in the formal sec- 
tor. In that same year, an estimated 14 percent of informal workers 
made contributions toward retirement pensions, while 46 percent 
had some form of health coverage. 

Given the large size of the informal economy in Colombia, it is 
not surprising that this sector has been very heterogeneous. Informal 
workers can be classified in three groups: direct subsistence, infor- 
mal salaried, and small entrepreneurs. A study of the urban informal 
sector in employment has shown that these groups have different 
patterns of behavior. Whereas the number of direct-subsistence 
workers has tended to increase in recessions and to decrease in eco- 
nomic booms, the number of informal salaried workers and small 
entrepreneurs has tended to decline in recessions and to rise in eco- 
nomic booms. 

Social Expenditure 

During the 1990s, Colombia saw an increase of more than 50 per- 
cent in its public spending, particularly in social spending. Health and 
education each increased their shares of resources from 4 percent of 
GDP in the early 1990s to 8 percent of GDP in the latter part of the 
decade. Perhaps the main achievement was the increase in health- 
insurance coverage. In 1993 some 25 percent of the population was 
affiliated with some health-care insurance system, as compared with 
53 percent of the population in 2000. Moreover, in 1993 the poor had 
no health-care coverage, whereas in 2000, about 55 percent of the 
poor did. 

Progress in education has not been so encouraging. Public expen- 
diture on education increased 500 percent between 1995 and 2000, 
while coverage for primary (110 percent because of the participation 
of over-aged students in primary education), secondary (82 percent), 
and tertiary education (20 percent) were hardly affected. Studies 
have shown that a significant portion of the increase in expenditure 
went to raise the wages of teachers, and that during the 1990s real 
public-sector wages increased 70 percent. Studies also have shown 
that teachers' wages increased 8 percent per year more than other 
public-sector workers, mainly because of changes in rankings and 
pension benefits. Public-sector teachers traditionally have not been 



203 



Colombia: A Country Study 

evaluated, and promotion has been based on seniority rather than 
performance. Furthermore, between 1993 and 1997 public expendi- 
ture on education was not a key determinant of educational quality. 

A positive aspect in education has been the growing national and 
international recognition of the success of the New School programs 
for rural education that developed across the country during the 
1970s and the 1980s. These programs are characterized by the use of 
very flexible plans that allow students to make progress according to 
their own capabilities and restrictions, reducing the dropout rate and 
improving results. International reports have shown that Colombia is 
the only Latin American nation in which students from the rural 
New School program obtain better grades in mathematics and lan- 
guage than students from urban areas outside the largest cities (see 
Education, ch. 2). 

Despite the sharp increase in public spending, in the mid-1990s 
the poverty and extreme-poverty rates began to worsen for the first 
time in many years. Social assistance programs (excluding educa- 
tion, health, and pensions) received about 1 percent of GDP during 
the same period, although the spending share tended to increase 
slightly when the economy was doing well and to decrease slightly 
in leaner times. Despite the large number of reforms carried out in 
the 1990s, spending on social assistance programs stagnated during 
those years. 

The deterioration of the poverty indicators in recent years led in 
2004 to a heated debate on the measurement of this variable. Regard- 
less of the different arguments in the measurement debate, poverty 
remains one of the main economic problems in Colombia, and it is 
perhaps its major challenge for the near future. In 2007 Colombia 
ranked 75 out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index 
rankings from the United Nations Development Programme. 

Colombia's conservative management of the economy and its 
remarkable economic stability had served for many years as a social 
safety net. However, when the 1999 recession occurred, the country 
had no structured safety net in place to alleviate the impact of the 
recession on poverty and the subsequent high unemployment. The 
incumbent national government tried to respond to the social crisis, 
creating a number of family, youth, and employment programs, ini- 
tially designed to be temporary, to support the most vulnerable mem- 
bers of society. Not surprisingly, though, the response to the social 
crisis was very slow. 

One major problem has been the lack of focus of social spending. 
Some 40 percent of Colombia's social spending is for pensions, but 
the system covers very few of the retired population and does not 



204 



The Economy 



reach the most vulnerable sectors of society. Programs target formal- 
sector workers, as does the minimum wage, ignoring the informal- 
sector workers, who are by definition more vulnerable. Lack of focus 
also has been a problem with the main welfare program, the System 
for the Identification and Selection of Beneficiaries of Social Pro- 
grams (Sisben). Information is outdated, the program does not reach 
enough people, and there are serious doubts about what data should 
be gathered, as well as how data should be used to target different 
social groups. 

The results of a check on the percentage of poor households out- 
side the poverty trap that benefit from social spending in Colom- 
bia — known as inclusion errors — confirm how such spending has 
serious focus problems. For example, the errors in inclusion have 
been estimated at 93.9 percent in pensions, 76.3 percent in family- 
compensation companies, 72.6 percent in higher education, and about 
48 percent in most public services. 

Another problem has been the inefficiency and weakness of social 
protection programs as a result of their dispersion and the duplication 
in some of their functions. And finally, the lack of consistent and 
broad information on social spending remains a handicap in attempt- 
ing to evaluate the effectiveness of the wide range of existing pro- 
grams and in planning a coherent social network. 

The increase in public expenditure that led to a very significant 
increase in public debt reduced the margin for countercyclical expen- 
diture (that is, increasing expenditure in bad times and reducing it in 
good times). Consequently, the 1999 recession caused the loss of 
about 10 years of improvements in social indicators. Given the 
increase in the volatility of economic indicators that has occurred 
since 1990, a recent World Bank study has highlighted the role of 
sound macroeconomic policies in alleviating poverty. The country's 
greater macroeconomic volatility also implies that Colombia's social 
safety net requires measures to protect transient vulnerability. 

Another problem has been the increase in forced displacement in 
Colombia. Although data on this problem are subject to controversy, 
different sources acknowledge that such displacement averaged 
about 150,000 victims per year between 1985 and 2004 (see table 4, 
Appendix). Forced displacement has increased significantly since 
the mid-1990s, reaching peak levels of about 400,000 victims in 
2001; even though the level diminished between 2005 and 2008, it 
remains very high (see Population Displacement, ch. 2). 

Major deficiencies remain in child care, sanitation, health care, and 
insurance for adverse events such as those generated by the internal 
conflict, economic recessions, and natural disasters. Tertiary education 



205 



Colombia: A Country Study 

also has low coverage, but it is expensive, and public expenditure on it 
tends to be regressive for income distribution. Given Colombia's fiscal 
constraints, improving access to credit for tertiary education remains a 
major future challenge. In 2009 Colombia still needed a social protec- 
tion system that is better targeted, more focused, well financed, and 
with the capacity to operate in a countercyclical way. Furthermore, 
Colombia has one of the worst income distributions in the world. 
Although income distribution has improved in the twenty-first cen- 
tury, its inequality is another challenge for Colombia to add to the dif- 
ficulties posed by poverty (see Income Distribution, ch. 2). 

The Pension System 

Pensions in Colombia began as a pay-as-you-go system, with more 
than 1,000 pension funds created since 1946 for public-sector workers, 
which meant that pension conditions were determined in a dispersed 
and isolated manner. The pay-as-you-go model for private-sector 
workers began in 1967 and was supplemented in 1990 by the estab- 
lishment of a parallel and fully funded private-pension system. A 1993 
reform allowed for the creation of individual savings accounts. As a 
result, the country now has a very complex pension structure, making 
it hard to establish accurate measures of the extent and efficiency of 
coverage. 

For many years, pension contributions were very low compared to 
benefits, and the number of years required for contributions was also 
low — about 20 years, and as low as 10 years in some cases. Life 
expectancy in Colombia has increased, but the retirement age has not 
increased in proportion and is currently 55 years for women and 60 
years for men and set to increase in 2014 to 57 years for women and 
62 years for men. 

Colombia's pension system has a solidarity component in which 
workers with sufficiently high incomes make contributions to a soli- 
darity pension fund, thereby contributing to ensure minimum pen- 
sions for low-income workers covered by the system and subsistence 
payments to elderly and low-income citizens, who are not covered at 
all. Overall estimates suggest that the government subsidizes about 
70 percent of pension payments from public funds, and the accumu- 
lated pension debt is more than 1 60 percent of GDP. 

The system has low coverage, with only 25 percent of Colom- 
bians of retirement age actually receiving a pension. It also has been 
estimated that 94 percent of pension payments go to people who are 
not poor. The high share of pension payments financed from public 
funds means that about 40 percent of Colombia's social expenditure 
is spent on badly targeted pensions with low coverage. 



206 



The Economy 



Because of these flaws, there have been several pension reforms 
since the beginning of the 1990s, but none have solved Colombia's 
pension problems, mainly because of the high political cost of pen- 
sion reform. Even after Congress approved tough measures, the 
Constitutional Court reversed some of them — decisions that have 
entailed fiscal costs of more than 17 percent of GDP. An important 
and recent pension reform was Law 1 of 2005, which, among other 
provisions, eliminated one of the two extra monthly payments and 
created a mechanism to control pensions obtained unlawfully. It also 
established that most privileged pension regimes will be active only 
until 2010 — except for the president and the armed forces — and that 
future agreements between labor unions and employers will not be 
allowed to set conditions different from those stated in the law. 

Approximately half of all those paying into pensions now do so 
through the fully funded pension system created in 1990 and com- 
posed of the so-called Pension Funds Administrators (AFP). The fully 
funded private pension system does not have as many weaknesses as 
the pay-as-you-go system. By definition, the former's funding is col- 
lected retroactively, and it too involves a solidarity component. How- 
ever, the transition from the pay-as-you-go system to the fully funded 
system has been a financially challenging process, involving high fis- 
cal costs. The latter arise mainly because the pay-as-you-go system 
lost a significant amount of (young) contributors but retained most of 
the workers who were closer to retirement. In short, many observers 
regard Colombia's pension system as Colombia's most serious fiscal 
problem (see The Pension Conundrum, ch. 2). 

Outlook 

After experiencing a severe downturn in the second half of the 
1990s, Colombia began forcefully addressing many of its most press- 
ing problems in 2000. Since Alvaro Uribe became president in 2002, in 
addition to implementing the Democratic Security Policy, the govern- 
ment also has attempted to improve respect and protection of human 
rights and to involve the international community in the process of 
reestablishing peace, law, and order in the country. During this period, 
there has been improvement in indicators such as reductions in the 
number of guerrilla attacks in urban areas, the number of homicides 
and kidnappings, and the amount of land devoted to the production of 
illegal crops. There also have been increases in the amount of traffic on 
intercity highways and a reduction in attacks on the electric-power grid 
and oil pipelines. Although all these indicators have generated an 
improved social, political, and economic environment, it is not entirely 



207 



Colombia: A Country Study 

clear yet whether such improvements will be sustainable in the long 
term. 

As a result of these strategies, in the early twenty-first century the 
deteriorating trend in the fiscal accounts has been reversed, and the 
public-debt burden has been reduced. Likewise, economic growth has 
picked up significantly from its depressed levels of the late 1990s to 
7.5 percent per year in 2007, the highest growth rate in 30 years, 
although growth has not yet remained at a high enough level for long 
enough to provide adequate employment to a growing population. 
Thus, unemployment, while lower than in 1999, is still quite high (9.9 
percent in 2007), and poverty indicators, though improving, are still 
at very high levels. Notwithstanding the progress in recent years, 
many challenges remain, including the need to create the conditions 
to reduce poverty further and to improve income distribution. 

Among the most important economic achievements of the last 15 
years are the reduction in the rate of inflation to single digits, close to 
the levels prevailing in developed countries. This was no small 
achievement for a country that had sustained moderate two-digit infla- 
tion for almost 30 years. Other achievements include an improved 
allocation of resources in some sectors, such as electric energy and 
fuel, and the greater quantity, quality, and variety of goods and ser- 
vices available to Colombian nationals thanks to the increasing activ- 
ity of the private sector as entrepreneur and of the state as a market 
regulator. Economic diversification has been impressive and not easily 
matched by other countries in the region. In only a few decades, 
Colombia went from an economy heavily dependent on coffee to a 
country with a fairly diversified export base. Even at extraordinarily 
high prices, oil, the leading export, accounted for just 26 percent of 
total exports in 2006. 

Although the economy has recovered its momentum, many chal- 
lenges lie ahead. In particular, Colombia's potential rate of GDP 
growth must increase substantially if there is to be a meaningful and 
lasting reduction in the still very high levels of poverty. Enhancing the 
rate of potential GDP growth will imply challenges in several areas, 
including strict adherence to macroeconomic discipline, further prog- 
ress on the structural reform agenda, and continued improvements in 
security. The main challenge to maintaining macroeconomic stability 
has to do with fiscal policy. Although the share of public debt over 
GDP has begun to fall, it remains high. Thus, fiscal and pension 
reforms will be key challenges in the next few years. Changes to the 
tax code, a reduction in revenue earmarking, a better distribution of 
expenditure responsibilities among levels of government, and a con- 
tinuous updating of the reach of the pension system to better reflect 



208 



The Economy 



demographic changes will be integral elements of any strategy to 
maintain sound public finances. 

Colombia will also have to continue striving to become a more 
diversified economy, better integrated to international markets. In 
that vein, and besides taking an active part in all multilateral trade 
negotiations, the government is planning to broaden the scope of its 
preferential trade agreements, benefiting from the progress made 
during the negotiation of a free-trade agreement between Colombia 
and three other Andean countries and the United States. 

Important progress has been made in recent years, yet there is 
ample room for further improvements in the business environment. 
Colombia's government remains legislator, regulator, and entrepre- 
neur in several sectors, such as oil and public utilities. These roles, 
which sit ill together, have developed despite some effort to create 
more transparency. Steps include the creation of the National Hydro- 
carbons Agency (ANH) and the sale of Colombia Coal (Carbocol). 
Despite some progress, there is much to be done in further improv- 
ing the business environment, including developing the capital mar- 
ket, simplifying and stabilizing the tax regime, and strengthening 
and consolidating the financial sector. 

Colombia will need greater integration with the world economy 
and further infrastructure development: better roads and improved 
ports and airports. In particular, better highways will be needed to 
connect Bogota and other major cities and regions, other internal con- 
nections, and to link Colombia to Venezuela and Ecuador, and better 
local roads within the country. Colombia also needs improved options 
and infrastructure to reach Panama, Peru, and Brazil. The construc- 
tion of the tunnel at La Linea remains a major challenge, currently 
being addressed, but making better use of Colombia's rivers for trans- 
portation and optimizing the possibilities of its railroads are changes 
that remain necessary. 

Clearly, enhancing physical capital will not be enough, and Colom- 
bia also will need to increase its human capital significantly. This chal- 
lenge, which is not unique to any country, becomes even more 
pressing in a more highly integrated global economy. Even though 
Colombia has increased education funding and equity, improvements 
in efficiency are sorely needed. The application of international stan- 
dardized tests is not generalized; the development of bilingual public 
education is in very early stages; and significant resources for tertiary 
education subsidize supply, rather than the removal of credit con- 
straints on students on the demand side. 

Improvements in information on (and focus, coverage, and effi- 
ciency of) Colombia's social protection policies remain major chal- 
lenges as well, despite the natural institutional barriers that operate 



209 



Colombia: A Country Study 

under any democratic regime, and that are particularly strong in this 
area. Improving the quality of information in general will be a major 
challenge because it is not uncommon to find divergence in the data 
provided by different institutions, such as the World Bank and 
DANE. 

Consolidation of peace and minimal security conditions within the 
country will be important to restore consumer and investor confi- 
dence across all sectors of the economy, and a boost for international 
tourism as a source of foreign exchange. As such, a major question is 
whether President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy, which so far 
has yielded a short-term boost to the national morale as a result of its 
major breakthroughs — such as the submission to justice of the main 
paramilitary leaders; the deaths of three members of the FARC's Sec- 
retariat in the first half of 2008; and the death, capture, or demobiliza- 
tion of many of the other members of the AUC and FARC — can 
become a nonpartisan and permanent policy, delivering long-lasting 
results. 

In 2005 the Colombian government proposed a long-term program 
to commemorate the second centenary of independence in 2019. The 
program outlines long-term goals for 2019 and policies to significantly 
increase annual per capita income and to drastically reduce poverty, 
indigence, and unemployment. The process of achieving such goals is 
expected to eradicate illiteracy for people between the ages of 15 and 
24, and to vastly increase Internet usage with broadband access, 
expand seaport capacity, and increase public areas for people living in 
urban centers. Whether these goals can be achieved over several presi- 
dential terms, without a national political commitment, remains to be 
seen. 

* * * 

German Colmenares and Jose Antonio Ocampo's Historia 
econdmica de Colombia is a classic presentation of Colombia's eco- 
nomic history, revised in 2007 and covering the period from the 
beginning of the colonial era up to 2006. An Economic History of 
Colombia, 1845-1930 by William Paul McGreevey is another well- 
known economic history book. James Robinson and Miguel Urru- 
tia's Economia colombiana del siglo XX: Un andlisis cuantitativo is 
very well-documented, focusing on the twentieth century. Mauricio 
Cardenas Santa-Maria's textbook Introduccion a la economia 
colombiana, which examines Colombia's economic policies and 
institutions, using both theory and data, is a useful reference, espe- 
cially on labor markets, pensions, and the informal economy. 



210 



The Economy 



For a fairly contemporary analysis of a broad range of topics 
related to Colombia's economic activity and proposals for the future, 
mostly from international analysts, a valuable source is Colombia: 
The Economic Foundations of Peace, edited by Marcelo M. Giugale, 
Oliver Lafourcade, and Connie Luff. Institutional Reforms: The Case 
of Colombia, edited by Alberto Alesina, provides an overview of the 
major issues in Colombian politics and economics by highly qualified 
national and international researchers, with a broad range of propos- 
als to improve the institutional operation of the country. Alvaro 
Pachon and Maria Teresa Ramirez's La infraestructura de transporte 
en terrestre Colombia durante el sigh XX is an invaluable source on 
transportation. Hugo Lopez and Jairo Nunez's Pobrezay desigualdad 
en Colombia: Diagnostico y estrategias is an up-to-date and encom- 
passing reference for analysis and policy recommendations on pov- 
erty and inequality. 

These organizations and government entities have Web sites that 
are useful sources of documents and statistics on a wide range of 
areas of interest in Colombia: the Central Bank, the National Admin- 
istrative Department of Statistics (DANE), the National Planning 
Department (DNP), the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the World Bank. The reports of the 
Central Bank to Congress (http://www.banrep.gov.co) are key 
sources of information on current economic affairs, with a solid tech- 
nical background and focus on monetary and exchange-rate issues. 
The National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF), the Eco- 
nomic Development Studies Center (CEDE), and the Foundation for 
Higher Education and Development (Fedesarrollo) are think tanks 
that generate useful information on a wide range of topics. World 
Development Indicators Online at http://web.worldbank.org is the 
World Bank's annual compilation of data about development. 

A site that is useful for petroleum data is British Petroleum's "Statisti- 
cal Review of World Energy 2008" at http://www.bp.com/productlanding. 
do?categoryId=6929&contentID=7044622. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit's annual Country Profile: Colombia is a good source for updated 
summaries and statistics regarding the country's economy. The Proexport 
Web site at http://www.proexport.com.co/ is a useful source of informa- 
tion on international trade-related issues and foreign investment. For infor- 
mation related to Colombia in general and to the public sector in 
particular, the Government Online Web site at http://www. gobiernoen- 
linea.gov.co provides access to a broad range of institutions and informa- 
tion. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



211 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Top: An indigenous geometric design, C. Jaramillo Collection, Pasto 
Bottom: An indigenous geometric design, private collection, Pupiales 
Courtesy Carlos Arturo Jaramillo Giraldo, Murmullos del lenguaje Uik: 
La practica del mopa mopa: De lo recolector a lo sedentario, MedelUn, 
1986, 87, 89 



THE COEXISTENCE OF FORMAL DEMOCRACY and pro- 
longed internal warfare constitutes the distinguishing feature of the 
Colombian political system. Political violence in Colombia is largely 
attributed to a complex history of political exclusion, repression of 
opposition groups, social and economic inequality, absence of the 
rule of law, and drug trafficking. 

When Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (president, 1990-94) took 
office, Colombia was also in the midst of a campaign of narco- 
terrorism (see Glossary) inaugurated by the country's drug cartels in 
order to impede the extradition of their leaders to the United States. 
In August 1989, gunmen hired by the Medellin Cartel had assassi- 
nated Liberal Party (PL) presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan. 
For Gaviria, narco-terrorism — and the social, economic, and politi- 
cal costs associated with it — constituted a primary threat to Colom- 
bia's democracy. The government subsequently enacted a plea- 
bargaining provision, under which those individuals accused of 
drug-related crimes would receive reduced jail sentences in 
exchange for their voluntary surrender and confession of their 
crimes. Nearly a year later, the Constituent Assembly, under signifi- 
cant pressure from the country's drug-trafficking cartels, voted to 
prohibit the extradition of Colombian citizens altogether. 

The Constituent Assembly was convened in 1991, partly because 
it appeared that the National Front (Frente Nacional, 1958-78), a 
bipartisan power-sharing arrangement created to end violence and 
conflict between the PL and the Conservative Party (PC), had failed 
to resolve the economic and social problems at the root of the coun- 
try's ills. Indeed, some observers have noted that power sharing 
between the Liberals and the Conservatives had become part of the 
problem. The 1991 constitution, which replaced the 1886 charter, 
aimed to restore the legitimacy of the political system by expanding 
citizens' basic rights, increasing the participation of civil society in 
various decision-making processes, incorporating previously mar- 
ginalized groups, including indigenous and black communities, and 
bringing illegal armed factions, such as the Nineteenth of April 
Movement (M-19), into the political fold. Although the new charter 
formally enhanced channels of political inclusion, in practice many 
of Colombia's structural problems remained intact. 

The 1991 constitution coincided with the implementation of a 
neoliberal economic model in Colombia. Neoliberalism (see Glos- 
sary) facilitated an economic opening, reduced inflation, and helped 



215 



Colombia: A Country Study 

rationalize the bureaucratic structure of the state. However, as else- 
where in Latin America, Colombia's introduction of this model 
brought a weakening of the judicial and legislative branches and a 
strengthening of the executive branch in order to facilitate approval 
of the measures needed to implement the model. In addition, by con- 
centrating macroeconomic planning in the hands of a small circle of 
technocrats, Colombia's neoliberal policies have constrained the 
effective participation of civil society. Neoliberal reform and the pol- 
icy of economic opening that accompanied it produced several nega- 
tive social and distributive outcomes, including increased under- 
employment and informal- sector employment, poverty, and inequal- 
ity. An acute crisis in agriculture, largely a result of the neoliberal 
program, made poverty in rural areas, where armed violence is 
largely concentrated, particularly pronounced. 

Optimism surrounding the new charter gradually gave way to 
skepticism regarding the country's future, further fueled by eco- 
nomic uncertainty, alarming levels of political violence and human 
rights abuses, and weakening law and order. This situation was 
aggravated by the questionable circumstances surrounding the 1 994 
presidential election campaign of Ernesto Samper Pizano (president, 
1994-98), who allegedly received financial contributions from the 
Cali Cartel. A drawn-out series of accusations and denials concern- 
ing this allegation polarized the country and irrevocably damaged 
the legitimacy and credibility of the Samper administration. 

On assuming office, Andres Pastrana Arango (president, 1998-2002) 
took charge of a country plagued by a deep economic recession, high 
levels of corruption, the intensification of the internal armed conflict, 
and a flourishing narcotics trade that increasingly involved illegal armed 
groups. Pastrana pledged to put an end to the war by negotiating with 
the country's two main guerrilla organizations, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army 
(ELN). He also actively sought out international support in resolving the 
country's crisis. During the Pastrana administration, U.S. financial assis- 
tance to Colombia rose to approximately US$500 million annually, 
largely for the antinarcotics effort. Following the end of the peace pro- 
cess with the FARC in early 2002, Pastrana portrayed the organization 
as a terrorist group, thereby inserting the Colombian internal armed con- 
flict into the United States-led "war on terror." Consequently, Washing- 
ton lifted restrictions associated with its aid package to Colombia in 
order to contribute to counterinsurgency efforts. 

Alvaro Uribe Velez (president, 2002-6, 2006-10) was the first 
presidential candidate in Colombian history to win a majority vote in 
the first round of elections. In both the 2002 and 2006 elections, 
Uribe won on a hard-line platform, promising to win the war against 



216 



Government and Politics 



the insurgents and terrorism in general. A cornerstone of Uribe's 
security strategy has been his Democratic Security and Defense Pol- 
icy, or Democratic Security Policy, through which he has declared an 
all-out war against terrorism. Close relations with the United States 
and a strong antiterrorist stance have characterized his foreign pol- 
icy. In contrast to his first term, Uribe's second term has been 
marked by a number of challenges and setbacks related to the demo- 
bilization of Colombian paramilitary groups, the negotiation of a 
humanitarian exchange with the FARC guerrillas, links between the 
armed forces and drug-trafficking groups, and growing tensions with 
the U.S. Congress, which has taken issue with the Uribe govern- 
ment's human rights record. In particular, the U.S. Congress has 
been concerned over Colombia's "parapolitics" scandal, which 
began in 2006 and was still a preoccupation three years later and 
which implicated dozens of members of the Congress of the Repub- 
lic (Congreso de la Republica) in supporting paramilitary activities 
in the country. 

The Governmental System 

The Executive 

As in most Latin American countries, strong presidential govern- 
ment characterizes the Colombian political system. The president of 
the republic is the chief of state, head of government, supreme 
administrative authority, and commander in chief of the armed 
forces. For about a century, until 2005, the president was elected for 
a nonrenewable four-year term. The Congress then passed legisla- 
tion authorizing reelection for a single consecutive term, and the 
Constitutional Court approved it in October 2005. This new legisla- 
tion made possible the reelection of Alvaro Uribe for a second term 
in May 2006. The vice president is elected on the same ticket as the 
president and succeeds him or her in the event of the president's 
death, illness, or resignation. The president of the republic must be 
more than 30 years of age, Colombian by birth, and a legal citizen of 
the country. The national government also includes the ministers and 
the directors of the administrative departments (see fig. 6). At the 
departmental level, the executive branch includes the governors, the 
mayors, and the heads of various public establishments, including 
superintendencies, and state industrial and commercial companies. 

The President of the Republic 

The president oversees the executive branch and exercises appointive 
powers to freely select the cabinet and the directors of all administrative 



217 



Colombia: A Country Study 



POPULAR VOTE 



THE EXECUTIVE 



PRESIDENT OF 
THE REPUBLIC 



VICE PRESIDENT 



ADMINISTRATIVE 
DEPARTMENTS (6) 



CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT 



THE LEGISLATURE 



X 



SUPERIOR 
JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL 



CONGRESS OF 
THE REPUBLIC 



r THE JUDICIARY 



SENATE 



HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 



I— MINISTERIAL CABINET 



AGRICULTURE AND RURAL 

DEVELOPMENT 
COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, AND 

TOURISM 
COMMUNICATIONS 
CULTURE 

ENVIRONMENT, HOUSING, AND 

TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC CREDIT 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
INTERIOR AND JUSTICE 
MINES AND ENERGY 
NATIONAL DEFENSE 
NATIONAL EDUCATION 
SOCIAL PROTECTION 
TRANSPORTATION 



SUPREME 
COURT OF 
JUSTICE 




COUNCIL 
OF STATE 







ATTORNEY 
GENERAL 



ADMINISTRATIVE 
COURTS 



DISTRICT SUPERIOR 
COURTS 



CIRCUIT COURTS 



ORDINARY AND OTHER 
LOWER COURTS 
(INCLUDING INDIGENOUS) 



DEPARTMENTAL GOVERNORS (32) 




DEPARTMENTAL 


AND MAYOR, CAPITAL DISTRICT 




ASSEMBLIES 



*— | MAYORS (1,120 MUNICIPALITIES) | — | MUNICIPAL COUNCILS 



CONTROL ENTITIES 



AUDITOR GENERAL 



INSPECTOR GENERAL 
(PUBLIC MINISTRY, INCLUDING 
HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN) 



COMPTROLLER 
GENERAL 



ELECTORAL ORGANIZATION 



- | NATIONAL REGISTRAR! — 



DEPARTMENTAL 
AND MUNICIPAL 
COMPTROLLERS 



NATIONAL ELECTORAL 
COUNCIL 



Figure 6. Structure of the Government, 2009 



agencies. As head of government, the president, in consultation with the 
cabinet, is responsible for maintaining law and order and declaring a 
state of internal commotion, a state of emergency, a state of external 
war, with the consent of the Senate of the Republic (Senado de la 
Republica), or a state of exception. A state of emergency can be a state 



218 



Government and Politics 



of social emergency, a state of ecological emergency, or a state of eco- 
nomic emergency. As chief of state, the president is also responsible for 
establishing national macroeconomic policies and signing treaties with 
other nations, with the consent of the Congress. The 1991 constitution 
(Article 189) also authorizes the president, as commander in chief of the 
armed forces, to defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
constitutional order, as well as guarantee the conditions required for the 
exercise of public rights and freedoms. The vice president replaces the 
president during temporary or permanent absence and may be appointed 
by the president to any office in the executive branch or to any other spe- 
cial assignment. During recent years, the office of the vice president has 
been particularly involved in advising national agencies on issues 
related to human rights and, to a lesser degree, the illegal drug trade. 
From early 1990, a series of presidential advisories (consejerias presi- 
denciales) have briefed the president on specific issue areas, including 
international affairs. 

In addition to administrative powers, the president enjoys consid- 
erable legislative authority. On request, the Congress may grant the 
president extraordinary powers to create laws on specific matters not 
necessarily related to problems of public order. Additional legisla- 
tive powers are derived from the government's constitutional role in 
presenting legislation and from its responsibility for drafting the 
national development plan and overseeing economic policy. 

The 1886 constitution authorized the president to invoke a state of 
siege, under which the president could issue legal decrees and sus- 
pend laws that contravened the maintenance of public order. In prac- 
tice, declarations of a state of siege did not distinguish between cases 
of external warfare and internal armed conflict and could be pro- 
longed indefinitely. The 1991 constitution, in contrast, establishes 
clear differences between a state of external war and instances of 
internal commotion, while also preserving the concept of the state of 
social emergency contemplated in a constitutional reform adopted in 
1968. Article 215 of the 1991 constitution provides for a state of 
emergency. 

Under Article 212, the Senate must authorize a declaration of a 
state of external war, and the executive must inform the Congress 
regularly as events occur and must report the specific content of the 
decrees issued. The Congress has the right to modify or reject these 
presidential decrees. In cases of disruptions in public order that 
threaten the security of the state or society, Article 213 empowers the 
president, with the approval of the cabinet, to declare a state of inter- 
nal commotion for a 90-day period, during which time the president 
acquires legislative decree powers. The Senate can authorize two 
extensions of the state of internal commotion. However, given that 



219 



Colombia: A Country Study 

the constitution also stipulates in Article 214 that constitutional con- 
trol of state authority is to remain in effect throughout the duration of 
these exceptional states, and that any suspension of human rights and 
fundamental liberties is expressly prohibited, the Constitutional 
Court must certify that the state of internal commotion does not vio- 
late the constitution. As a result, during the Gaviria government and 
for the first time in Colombian history, Congress overturned a decla- 
ration of a state of internal commotion. It also declared unconstitu- 
tional President Uribe's second request in mid-2003 for an extension 
of a state of internal commotion. 

The Superior Council on National Defense and Security (CSSDN), 
formed by the executive branch in 1992, is an advisory body on 
defense and security matters. Chaired by the president, the CSSDN 
counts as its members the minister of national defense, the general 
commander of the armed forces, the director general of the National 
Police, the director of the Administrative Security Department (DAS), 
the minister of interior and justice, the minister of foreign relations, 
and the heads of two congressional committees — constitutional affairs 
and defense and international relations. The CSSDN advises on the 
planning and execution of defense and security policy and is responsi- 
ble for coordinating the various civilian and military entities involved 
in national security. 

Ministries 

The ministerial cabinet coordinates and implements government 
policy. In December 2002, several ministries merged as part of the 
Uribe government's plan to modernize the public administration appa- 
ratus. The Ministry of Interior (previously the Ministry of Govern- 
ment) and the Ministry of Justice and Law became the Ministry of 
Interior and Justice. The Ministry of Foreign Trade (created by the 
1991 constitution) and the Ministry of Economic Development 
became the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism. The Minis- 
try of Labor and Social Security and the Ministry of Health merged 
into the Ministry of Social Protection. And the Ministry of Environ- 
ment, also created by the 1991 constitution, became the Ministry of 
Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development. Since 2007 there 
has been some talk of once again dividing the two components of both 
the Ministry of Interior and Justice and the Ministry of Social Protec- 
tion, but neither ministry has reverted to its former organization. 

The ministries are responsible for drafting legislation in their 
respective areas and for maintaining communications between the 
president of the republic and the other branches of government. In 
addition to the ministries already mentioned, there are ministries of 
Agriculture and Rural Development; Communications; Culture (cre- 



220 



Government and Politics 



ated in 1997, following intense political debate concerning its rele- 
vance); Finance and Public Credit; Foreign Relations; Mines and 
Energy; National Defense; National Education; and Transportation. 

The ministries have varying degrees of influence or importance 
depending on their respective budgets, the particular issue areas they 
address, their role in an administration's policies, and the personal rela- 
tionship of each minister with the president. Based on these factors, the 
ministries can be ranked in three basic groups, corresponding to high, 
intermediate, or inferior levels of significance. Among those exercising 
high levels of influence, the Ministry of Interior and Justice carries con- 
siderable political weight because of its role in managing relations 
between the executive branch and the Congress, the country's regional 
departments and municipalities, and the judiciary. The intensification 
of the Colombian internal armed conflict and the increased role of the 
United States in matters related to the war have led to the ascendency of 
the Ministry of National Defense in both domestic politics and foreign 
relations (see Ministry of National Defense, ch. 5). The Ministry of 
Finance and Public Credit and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and 
Tourism also are relatively powerful, given their roles in economic 
planning and foreign trade, respectively. And the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations, although exercising little tangible influence on crucial 
issues, such as relations with the United States, security, drugs, human 
rights, and trade, has formal responsibility for conducting the country's 
external affairs and thus continues to enjoy a high to intermediate level 
of importance. 

Administrative Departments 

A series of executive-branch administrative departments came into 
being following a 1945 constitutional reform in order to professionalize 
specific governmental and public services and to separate them from 
the politically driven environment characterizing the ministeries. 
Unlike the ministries, these departments do not represent the president 
politically, and their primary objective is to formulate and adopt gov- 
ernmental policies, programs, and projects corresponding to their given 
sectors. In 2009 the six departments included the Administrative 
Department of the Presidency of the Republic (DAPR), the lead 
agency; the Administrative Department of the Public Function 
(DAFP); and the National Administrative Department of Economic 
Solidarity (Dansocial), which is headed by former M-19 guerrilla and 
senator Rosemberg Pabon Pabon. The other three departments were the 
National Planning Department (DNP), the National Administrative 
Department of Statistics (DANE), and the Administrative Security 
Department (DAS). Technocratic expertise provided by such agencies, 



221 



Colombia: A Country Study 

in particular by DNP, has enabled the executive to increase its legisla- 
tive capacity vis-a-vis the Congress, which lacks the specialized knowl- 
edge required to develop complex, technical legislation, particularly on 
budgetary and economic matters. However, their semiautonomous, 
apolitical nature also means that administrative agencies operate with 
relative independence. Such independence occasionally has led to con- 
flict with the president or specific ministers. For example, the director 
of DANE resigned in September 2004, alleging that the office of the 
president had pressured him to delay the release of a joint DANE-DNP 
study on perceptions of citizen security in the country's principal cities. 
The study apparently contradicted executive-branch statistics indicat- 
ing that the Democratic Security Policy had achieved significant suc- 
cess. A second DANE director resigned in September 2007 under 
similar circumstances. 

Territorial Government 

Organization and Administration 

Colombia's territorial and administrative organization encom- 
passes departments, districts, municipalities, and indigenous entities 
(see Special Jurisdictions, this ch.). The constitution recognizes 32 
administrative departments (including nine new ones, which for- 
merly had been four intendancies and five commisaryships), plus the 
Distrito Capital de Bogota (see fig. 1). The primary function of a 
department is to coordinate and promote local and departmental 
development. In 2007 Colombia had 1,120 municipalities (up from 
1 ,096 in 2005), four of which are categorized as a district mayoralty 
(alcaldia distrital) because of significant population or cultural or 
economic importance: Bogota (the national capital), Barranquilla, 
Cartagena, and Santa Marta. Unlike the departments, the number and 
size of municipalities are subject to administrative change. 

At the departmental and municipal levels, the governor and the 
cabinet secretary, and the mayor and the cabinet secretary, respec- 
tively, administer local government. Each department has a popu- 
larly elected departmental assembly. The assembly may range from 
11 to 31 members, who complete four-year terms. The head of the 
departmental administration is the governor, who is also popularly 
elected for a four-year, nonrenewable term. Each municipality (or 
district) also has a popularly elected administrative body, the munic- 
ipal council (or district council), with a membership ranging from 
seven to 2 1 . The mayor, elected by popular vote for a nonrenewable, 
four-year term, heads the municipal administration. Large cities such 
as Bogota also are subdivided into localities governed by administra- 



222 



Government and Politics 



tive boards, whose members are popularly elected. Each one also has 
a local mayor, who is appointed by the mayor of the city. The Uribe 
government was planning to introduce a bill that would allow for the 
immediate reelection of local officials. 

During the last year of the presidency of Belisario Betancur Cuar- 
tas (1982-86), a law strengthened local government in Colombia by 
authorizing the direct election of mayors and other steps designed to 
achieve greater decentralization. Increasing civic protest in the mid- 
1980s against political corruption and inadequate public services at 
the local level had led to the adoption of these measures. A number 
of administrative functions previously controlled by the central gov- 
ernment transferred to the local level, although the scarcity of 
resources, lack of technical and administrative skills, and low level 
of social participation made decentralization difficult to implement. 

The 1991 constitution accelerated and enhanced the process of 
devolution by identifying decentralization, departmental autonomy, 
and citizen participation as three fundamental principles of the 
administrative organization of the country. The popular election of 
governors and municipal mayors, previously appointed by the presi- 
dent of the republic and departmental governors, respectively, gave 
Colombian citizens under the 1991 constitution a direct means of 
intervention in the control and execution of local public affairs. 
Departments and municipalities for the first time had the right to 
exercise self-government, to administer their own taxes, and to 
receive and spend state income. 

To this end, legislation provided for a series of resource transfers 
from the national level to the departments and municipalities to 
finance the provision of education and health services, particularly 
for the poorest sectors of the population. State social spending grew 
from 8.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) in 
1990 to 14.4 percent in 1998, slightly surpassing increases in total 
public spending. Spending on education, health, and water and sew- 
erage services increased in many departments. However, in 2000 
President Andres Pastrana signed an extended-fund facility fiscal- 
adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund, in 
which the Colombian government promised to reduce regional mon- 
etary transfers. Consequently, the executive branch presented a con- 
stitutional reform bill that the Congress approved in 2001. In June 
2007, the legislation on transfers changed again. Opposition parties, 
labor unions, indigenous groups, and representatives of other social 
sectors have proposed a referendum on reforms of the articles of the 
constitution related to local transfers, arguing that the cutbacks in the 
general system of participation have been overly severe. These 



223 



Colombia: A Country Study 

opposition groups, including the Liberal Party and the Alternative 
Democratic Pole (PDA), demanded the return of the old transfers 
regime, which fixed the funds distributed to regions to the increase 
in the national government's current income. The Uribe government 
warned that if the reforms won approval in a proposed referendum, 
then new taxes would have to be created, requiring another new tax 
reform (see Fiscal Policy and Public Finances, ch. 3). 

Special Jurisdictions 

Local justices of the peace have a special jurisdiction created by 
the 1991 constitution. These judges are ordinary members of a given 
community, who are appointed by civic and popular organizations 
on the basis of their familiarity with the area's problems and their 
social prestige. Justices of the peace are common individuals without 
any legal training; they do not charge for their services; they conduct 
oral, informal hearings on everyday, local matters; and their rulings 
are based on considerations of equity according to the needs of the 
community. The presence of justices of the peace nationwide has 
improved local processes of conciliation and conflict resolution and 
has provided the country's communities with important tools for 
solving their own conflicts expeditiously and in accord with their 
own social practices. 

The constitution explicitly recognizes the collective rights of 
Colombia's indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. It grants 
them seats in the Congress, requires the state to consult with tribal 
groups before exploiting natural resources located in their territories, 
and grants indigenous territories (resguardos) municipal status, 
enabling them to administer their own resources. The constitution 
recognizes the right of indigenous authorities to exercise judicial 
functions within their respective territories, as long as specific norms 
and procedures corresponding to the preservation of indigenous 
practices and customs do not violate the constitution or other Colom- 
bian law. Legal decisions made by the resguardo authorities have the 
same weight as those made by ordinary judges. In practice, however, 
legal norms pertaining to issues of public order normally have legal 
priority over the protection of indigenous practices and customs, par- 
ticularly when these are considered to protect a constitutional value 
superior to the principle of ethnic and cultural diversity, such as the 
protection of life or property. 

Clientelism 

Before 1991 the departments were the cornerstone of a spoils sys- 
tem used by regional Liberal and Conservative political bosses to 



224 



Government and Politics 



reinforce their local power. Clientelism (see Glossary), or the private 
appropriation of public goods for political gain, has been particularly 
entrenched at the regional and local levels in Colombia, where state 
resources, jobs, and bureaucracies traditionally have been appor- 
tioned in exchange for political loyalty. The incapacity of the 
Colombian state, until only recently, to exercise a physical presence 
in vast portions of the national territory and its unresponsiveness to 
popular needs explain why clientelism has been a primary source of 
political adhesion and legitimacy in Colombia. The 1991 constitu- 
tion acknowledges the right to local direct elections and seeks to 
counteract the danger of abuse of fiscal and administrative autonomy 
in departments and municipalities (particularly increased access to 
public finances and bureaucracy by regional political entities) by 
making elected officials more accountable. 

Following the start of direct mayoral elections in 1988, the presence 
of "outsiders," that is, political parties and movements unaffiliated 
with the Liberal or Conservative parties, grew considerably at the 
local level. Such movements achieved important victories in the 1988, 
1990, and 1992 local elections, and in 1994 outsiders actually won the 
mayoralties of many of Colombia's larger cities, including Bogota. 
This trend has continued. However, in smaller cities and municipali- 
ties where clientelistic practices have been much more prevalent, the 
Conservative and Liberal parties have maintained local power. 

Decentralization in Colombia coincided with the unprecedented 
growth of the membership and territorial presence of the FARC and 
the ELN. The municipality became a key area in which these groups 
pursued the military, economic, and political strategies that accom- 
panied this expansion; the insurgents saw local decentralization and 
autonomy as offering new opportunities for influence in both rural 
and urban areas. Between 1986 and 2000, for example, the active 
guerrilla presence at the local level grew from 400 to approximately 
650 municipalities. In 1994 the FARC had 105 operations in 569 
municipalities, compared with only 17 combat fronts operating in 
remote areas of the country in 1978. By 2006 the FARC operated on 
60 to 80 fronts with a total fighting force of up to 16,000 members 
(see Internal Armed Conflict, ch. 5). By the end of 2008, however, 
the FARC was down to about 9,000 members, according to some 
reports. 

The guerrilla organizations have particularly wanted to penetrate 
local administrative and governmental institutions. The FARC and 
the ELN target those municipalities managing important economic 
resources derived from oil, coal, gold, bananas, and coffee, and, from 
the mid-1990s, coca leaf, given their potential for creating revenues 



225 



Colombia: A Country Study 

for the guerrillas and their significance for the national economy. 
Armed clientelism, consisting of the hiring of guerrilla sympathizers 
in public offices, the retention of a percentage of their salaries, the 
assignment of public-works contracts, and the enforcement of local 
"taxes" in exchange for guerrilla services, became the preferred 
means of exercising influence. 

The success of this form of clientelism has been largely dependent 
on the delivery of tangible goods to those municipalities experienc- 
ing a guerrilla presence. However, contrary to the traditional spoils 
system, guerrillas also practice violence and intimidation against the 
local population to achieve their goals. According to the Colombian 
Federation of Municipalities (Fedemunicipios), 69 mayors were 
murdered between 1998 and 2007, when another 102 mayors were 
kidnapped, and many others were simply forced to resign. During 
the October 1997 elections, 75 municipalities had no candidates for 
mayor, 20 lacked candidates for the city council, and 1 8 had no can- 
didates for either because of pressures exerted by the guerrillas. 

The paramilitary groups in Colombia also experienced phenome- 
nal expansion. Between 2000 and 2004, their numbers grew from 
5,000-6,000 to approximately 13,500, and they gained an active 
presence in 35 percent of the national territory. Given that one of the 
stated objectives of the paramilitaries was to eliminate the country's 
guerrilla organizations, those municipalities in which the guerrillas 
had gained dominance became susceptible to paramilitary violence 
and to the same types of armed clientelism practiced by their ene- 
mies. For example, of 1,071 municipalities that existed in 2002, 
Fedemunicipios reported that illegal armed groups had threatened 
more than half the mayors, some of whom were still under threat. 

In mid-2007 the New Rainbow Corporation, a nongovernmental 
organization (NGO), in collaboration with three private Bogota univer- 
sities and a think tank, the Democracy and Security Foundation, 
released a report on municipal and departmental elections held between 
2000 and 2006 that questioned their transparency in 950 municipalities 
(equivalent to 86 percent of the national territory) because of the infil- 
tration of illegal armed groups and irregularities such as the extensive 
purchase of votes. The electoral risk maps published by this coalition of 
organizations and the United Nations Development Programme during 
the 2007 electoral process suggested that in 576 municipalities local 
elections continued to be threatened by the violent actions of both guer- 
rillas and demobilized paramilitaries. This electoral observation mis- 
sion also registered 29 homicides of candidates, 8 kidnappings, 23 
attacks, and 91 threats. 



226 



Government and Politics 



The Legislature 

Colombian legislative authority resides in a bicameral Congress, 
consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives (Camara 
de Representantes). Members of Congress are popularly elected for 
four-year terms beginning on July 20 and can be reelected indefi- 
nitely. Candidates are selected from multiple-name lists correspond- 
ing to members of specific political parties or movements. The 
Council of State can remove members of Congress from office for 
misconduct, the existence of conflicts of interest, or absenteeism 
(see The Judiciary, this ch.). The next candidate on the respective 
congressional member's electoral list fills the vacancy resulting 
from such action. 

Congress meets twice annually, from July 20 until December 16 
and from March 16 to June 20. The president of the republic also 
may convene Congress for extraordinary sessions to deliberate on 
legislation presented by the government. Each house has a president 
and two vice presidents, who are elected for a one-year, nonrenew- 
able period starting July 20, and a general secretary elected for two 
years. Members of each house are assigned to one of seven perma- 
nent committees (comisiones) that conduct the first round of debates 
on all legislative proposals. Each committee has a president and a 
vice president who preside over its debates. The internal regulations 
of the Congress also provide for some additional subcommittees. 

The joint responsibilities of the two houses include proposing, 
interpreting, reforming, and repealing legislation; reforming the con- 
stitution; approving the national development plan; approving and 
rejecting international treaties; determining the general internal 
demarcation of the national territory and the national administrative 
structure; granting extraordinary decree powers to the president; and 
establishing the legal national currency. This last responsibility does 
not, however, permit the Congress to interfere in the making of 
national currency policy by the Central Bank. Congress also has 
responsibility for granting amnesties or general pardons for political 
crimes, establishing the salary regime in the public sector, and regu- 
lating public education. 

The Senate consists of 102 members, who must be more than 30 
years of age, Colombian by birth, and legal Colombian citizens. The 
Senate's functions include accepting the resignation of the president or 
the vice president of the republic, trying government officials that the 
House of Representatives accuses of misconduct, approving the pro- 
motion of high-ranking military officials, and granting the president a 
temporary leave of absence. Other functions include approving the 
passage of foreign troops through the national territory, authorizing the 



227 



Colombia: A Country Study 

government to declare war on another nation, electing from lists pre- 
sented by the president the members of the Constitutional Court and 
the Council of State, and electing the inspector general. 

Members of the House of Representatives, who numbered 166 in 
2009, must be more than 25 years of age and legal Colombian citi- 
zens. The total number of representatives is fixed according to the 
national population census. In addition to electing the human rights 
ombudsman {defensor del pueblo), the House of Representatives is 
responsible for electing the judges of the disciplinary branch of the 
judiciary, studying and approving the budgetary and treasury general 
accounts, investigating high-level goverment officials, and pressing 
charges of misconduct. 

After a legislative initiative is presented in either house of Con- 
gress, it is published in the Diario Oficial, and the president of the 
respective house refers it to one of the seven committees and desig- 
nates one of its members to present the bill. If approved by the com- 
mittee in the first debate, the bill goes to a plenary session of the 
same house, where it can be approved, rejected, or modified. Bills 
that have been approved by the plenary session proceed to the other 
house, where they undergo the same process. Differences between 
the specific contents of each house's version of a bill go to confer- 
ence for resolution. Once approved by the two houses, the bill goes 
to the president of the republic. If the president objects to the bill on 
constitutional or political grounds, it is returned to Congress. If abso- 
lute majorities of both houses approve the bill again, it is sent either 
to the Constitutional Court (if the presidential objection was for con- 
stitutional reasons) or directly to the president, who must sign the 
bill without further objections. 

Although, historically, political dynamics within the Congress 
have mirrored the country's bipartisan system, driven mainly by cli- 
entelism and party accommodation, political parties in Colombia 
have experienced high degrees of fragmentation and disorder inter- 
nally. They generally have low identification with the party platform 
and ideology, low levels of party discipline in legislative and voting 
practices, and low degrees of articulation of regional, local, and 
national policies. Institutionalizing an opposition strategy within the 
legislature is improbable, given the erratic nature of voting patterns. 
For example, dissident factions within the government party often 
exercise opposition, while sympathetic sectors within supposedly 
oppositional parties regularly collaborate with the government. The 
growing presence after 1991 of "independent" parties and political 
movements claiming to represent an alternative to the Liberal Party 
and the Conservative Party has altered this situation very little. How- 



228 




Plaza de Bolivar and the National Capitol, 
seat of the Congress of the Republic 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 

ever, on specific matters perceived to directly affect the interests of 
distinct parties and movements, temporary political alliances at 
times operate effectively. 

Concern over the functional deficiencies of the Congress as well 
as over its lack of public legitimacy was a key factor leading to the 
new constitution in 1991. Although the basic structure of the legisla- 
tive branch remained the same, several significant changes occurred. 
These included the creation of special voting districts to guarantee 
the representation of ethnic and other minorities as well as the 
Colombian diaspora, stricter rules on conflicts of interest for con- 
gressional members, the partial reduction of corruption through the 
elimination of institutionalized parliamentary pork barrels (auxilios 
parlamentarios), and the grant to both houses of the right to greater 
political control over government action through a vote of censure. 

Notwithstanding such modifications, the Congress still lacks a 
dynamic legislative role or fiscal power, while its independence 
from the executive branch is relatively limited for a number of rea- 
sons. Firstly, executive leverage in negotiations with the Congress, 
in particular when issues of vital interest to the government are at 
stake, continues via bureaucratic prerogatives and political favors. 
Secondly, the motion of censure, although in principle guaranteeing 



229 



Colombia: A Country Study 

congressional oversight, has never been applied successfully to any 
government official. An attempt in May 2007 to censure the minister 
of national defense arose from the government's illegal phone tap- 
ping of the political opposition, journalists, academics, and civil 
society representatives. 

Congress initiates more bills than the executive branch; however, 
the latter is much more effective in obtaining support for its bills, 
and thus more legislation initiated by the executive is passed into 
law. The legislature is also poorly equipped to modify the content of 
budget and treasury bills presented by the executive, given the com- 
plex nature of such initiatives, the lack of technical expertise of most 
legislators, and the absence of congressional research units. 

High rates of turnover exist among members of Congress, particu- 
larly in cases where the political machinery of the traditional parties 
or clientelism continue to be prevalent. The elimination of the alter- 
nate system in 1991 gave way to even higher rates of rotation, 
because legally rotation can take place until the entire number of 
candidates on a given electoral list has occupied the same congres- 
sional post. Congressional rotation occurs for several reasons: it 
allows multiple individuals to obtain sizeable congressional pen- 
sions, it works as political payoff for votes obtained by candidates 
occupying different levels on the electoral lists, and it helps position 
these candidates politically for future congressional elections. 
Absenteeism is also a chronic problem and often prevents voting on 
legislative proposals. 

The Electoral System 

The National Registrar of Civil Status (RNEC), or National Reg- 
istrar's Office, and the National Electoral Council (CNE) are respon- 
sible for the electoral process in Colombia. The first institution, 
which is headed by the judicially selected national registrar of civil 
status for a four-year term, organizes the elections. The second 
counts the popular vote and oversees compliance with the laws regu- 
lating political parties and movements. Congress elects its nine 
members for four-year terms. 

In order to vote, a citizen must be at least 18 years old and must 
register to vote in his or her assigned municipal district during dates 
preceding scheduled elections that are established by the National 
Registrar's Office. Voter registration normally occurs in the same 
localities where people will cast their votes during the elections or in 
the immediate vicinity. Colombians living abroad vote at the Colom- 
bian embassies or consulates nearest to their place of residence. In 



230 



Government and Politics 



order to vote, they must have a valid passport and be registered as 
electors either abroad or in Colombia, but not both. 

Congressional and presidential elections take place every four years 
within two months of each other. The constitution prohibits the two 
elections from occurring simultaneously. Every four years, local and 
departmental elections are held to elect governors, mayors, council 
members, assembly members, and local administrators and must be 
held on dates other than the presidential and congressional contests. 
Local and departmental elections also may not be held simultaneously. 
A simple majority vote decides gubernatorial and mayoral races. 

Given historically high voter-abstention rates, a law to stimulate 
voter participation passed in 1997. It provides those who vote with a 
10-percent reduction in the annual fees if they are students enrolled 
in public institutions of higher education and one day off work for 
people who are public-sector employees. 

The election of the president usually requires two rounds of vot- 
ing, unless one of the candidates obtains an absolute majority in the 
first vote. Since 1991, when this measure was adopted, the only can- 
didate to win the presidency in the first round of elections has been 
Alvaro Uribe. In the event of a second round, one of the two candi- 
dates obtaining the highest number of votes in the first round is 
elected president by a simple majority. 

Since 1932 congressional elections have been conducted using 
proportional representation. The 1991 constitution stipulates that 
100 senators be elected nationwide and two more be chosen by the 
country's indigenous groups. The 32 departments and the Distrito 
Capital de Bogota elect the members of the House of Representa- 
tives. Each district, irrespective of its population size, elects two rep- 
resentatives, and an additional representative is apportioned for each 
250,000 inhabitants or fraction above 125,000 after the first 250,000. 
Of the 33 electoral districts existing in 2008, three are large in size 
(with more than 10 representatives), six are medium (ranging from 
six to 10 representatives), 12 are small (between three and five repre- 
sentatives), and 12 have the minimum number of two representa- 
tives. A special provision created by the constitution also enables 
indigenous ethnic groups, Afro-Colombians, and Colombians resid- 
ing abroad to elect a total of up to five representatives. 

Senatorial elections, which are based on a single nationwide elec- 
toral district, have led to the underrepresentation of those departments 
with small populations. In 2005, for example, 13 out of 33 electoral 
districts had no senator in the congressional term that ended in 2006. 
In contrast, the method used to elect the members of the House of 
Representatives tends to overrepresent the smaller departments. 



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Colombia: A Country Study 



Candidates appear in a given order on lists corresponding to dif- 
ferent political parties and movements. The constitution prohibits 
laws that regulate the internal organization of political groups, so the 
general tendency has been for each party and movement to sponsor 
as many candidate lists as possible in order to win more seats in the 
Congress. Congressional seats are distributed to candidates in the 
same order that their names appear on their respective electoral lists. 
The electorate used to vote for a given list. However, a political 
reform law approved by the Congress in 2003 grants voters the right 
to exercise a preferential vote, meaning that in future elections they 
will have the option of selecting a specific candidate on an electoral 
list or designating a general vote for a list in the order in which the 
candidates' names appear. 

The electoral quotient and residuals (Hare) method was used until 
2003 to determine the winners of the elections for the House and the 
Senate, with the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of 
valid votes by the number of seats to be distributed. For example, if 
the quotient was 20,000 votes and a given list obtained 30,000, the 
first candidate on the list won the seat and the remaining 10,000 
votes competed for a second seat. During the congressional elections 
of 1994, 1998, and 2002, fewer than 15 electoral lists (less than 10 
percent of the total number) obtained enough votes to elect their first 
candidate through the quotient, meaning that most congressional 
seats were apportioned among those lists with the highest residuals 
below the electoral quotient. The system was criticized because it 
rewarded candidates winning low numbers of votes by granting 
them residual congressional seats, encouraged atomistic electoral 
behavior on the part of political parties and movements that pre- 
sented many lists in order to win as many residual seats as possible, 
and affected the proportionality of the system. The 2003 political 
reform approved the use of the d'Hondt method, or highest-average 
method, in future elections (see Political Party Reform, this ch.). The 
new law allows each political party or organization to present only 
one list of candidates and lets voters choose the candidate of their 
preference, independently of the order of a given list. Congressional 
seats will be distributed accordingly. 

The issue of campaign financing, which has both public and pri- 
vate origins, has been a particularly sensitive one in the Colombian 
context. The constitution obliges the state to contribute funding to 
electoral campaigns depending on the number of votes obtained and 
stipulates a limit to campaign expenditures and the maximum 
amount that any private interest may donate to a specific party or 
movement. The National Electoral Council supervises campaign 



232 



Government and Politics 



expenditures, sets the total limits and permissible amounts for indi- 
vidual contributions, and apportions public funding according to the 
number of votes obtained by each group in an election. In practice, 
however, oversight is lax, providing considerable leeway for private 
interests to contribute large donations to specific campaigns (see 
Corruption, this ch.). In addition to the regulation of political cam- 
paign contributions, a law of electoral guarantees went into effect in 
June 2007. In order to guarantee higher levels of fair play, the law 
limits the right of those holding political office to open new govern- 
ment contracts and spend state funds four months before elections 
are held. It also provides a certain amount of government financing 
of the presidential campaigns of candidates whose parties obtain 
more than 4 percent of the votes for the Senate. 

The Judiciary 

Although the suspension of rule of law happened formally only 
once, during the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1952-57), the 
frequent use of the state of siege during the subsequent three decades 
led to significant restrictions of many constitutional rights and prin- 
ciples. The existence of martial law and militias that applied their 
own forms of law and justice in many parts of the country meant that 
parallel systems tended to erode the credibility and effectiveness of 
the judicial branch. 

In the early 1980s, the members of the judicial branch began com- 
ing under increasing attack by drug-trafficking, paramilitary, and 
guerrilla organizations, undermining judicial administration and the 
ability to conduct important investigations. The creation of the Attor- 
ney General's Office (Fiscalia General de la Nation) strengthened 
the penal justice system. Constitutional interpretation, previously the 
mandate of the plenary committee of the Supreme Court of Justice, 
became the responsibility of the new Constitutional Court installed 
in February 1992. The judicial branch is divided into four distinct 
jurisdictions. 

The 1991 constitution also instituted a series of reforms in the 
judicial branch that modified its administrative structure and the 
application of constitutional oversight, transformed the penal sys- 
tem, recognized alternative mechanisms for resolving legal disputes, 
and introduced measures to protect the constitutional rights of the 
population. Basic rights were expanded primarily through a tutelary 
mechanism called a tutela, or writ of protection, which allowed citi- 
zens whose rights had been abused to seek redress against an offend- 
ing party. 



233 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Notwithstanding such measures, the judicial branch continues to 
be plagued by an absence of concrete modernization policies, insuf- 
ficient financial resources, extended judicial delays, poor conviction 
records, lack of personnel, and bureaucratic conflict among the judi- 
cial bodies. As an example of the latter, although the Supreme Court 
is the final arbiter on matters of civil law, the fact that all tutelas 
against civil legal sentences must be submitted to the Constitutional 
Court for their eventual revision has led to constant rifts between 
these two courts. On various occasions, the Constitutional Court has 
overturned sentences decreed by the Supreme Court. The adminis- 
tration of justice continues to be precarious: for every 100 homicide 
cases, an average of 1 suspects are arrested, and usually only one is 
found guilty and sentenced. General impunity levels are nearly 97 
percent. 

Supreme Court 

The 23 -member Supreme Court is the highest judicial body in 
charge of the country's civil jurisdiction. It acts as the court of final 
appeal; judges the president of the republic and other high executive- 
branch officials accused of wrongdoing; investigates and judges 
members of Congress; judges other government, diplomatic, and 
military officials; and reviews international agreements. It is divided 
into four chambers — agrarian and civil, constitutional, criminal, and 
labor. The Supreme Court administers a series of lower courts at the 
departmental and municipal levels and receives appeals on cases 
originally presented to them. District superior courts constitute the 
maximum judicial authority at the regional level. Circuit courts oper- 
ate at the municipal level and handle cases involving large sums of 
money and matters of considerable political importance. The lower 
court system also consists of ordinary courts with jurisdiction over 
civil, commercial, criminal, family, labor, and land cases; justice of 
the peace courts with jurisdiction over minor civil and criminal 
matters; and authorities of indigenous territories with jurisdiction 
over indigenous communities. 

The Supreme Court elects its own justices, who serve nonrenew- 
able, eight-year terms, from a list of candidates presented by the 
Superior Judicial Council (CSJ). The court elects the attorney general 
from a list of candidates proposed by the president of the republic, it 
selects two of the six judges of the CSJ administrative chamber, and it 
proposes one name for the list of candidates from which the Senate 
elects the judges of the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court sub- 
mits one of the names on the list of candidates from which the Senate 
elects the inspector general of the nation, and the Supreme Court pro- 



234 



View of the rebuilt Palace of Justice from behind the statue of 
Simon Bolivar. Photographs on the facade depict the 
11 Supreme Court justices murdered during the 
terrorist assault and military counterattack 
that destroyed the old building on November 6-7, 1985. 

Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 

poses the list of candidates from which the Council of State elects the 
auditor general of the republic, who monitors the budget of the comp- 
troller general of the republic and the territorial comptrollers and 
reports annually to the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Council 
of State. The Supreme Court's constitutional functions include 
reviewing the decisions of superior courts, trying the president of the 
republic and high-level public officials, and investigating and trying 
any member of Congress accused of wrongdoing. 

A particularly sensitive issue that falls within the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction is the approval of extradition requests, which have risen 
in number during the past 10 years. Since 2003 alone, 400 Colombian 
nationals have been extradited to the United States. Although 
requests presented by the United States for the extradition of drug 
traffickers constitute the bulk of all cases, the fact that Colombia has 
a weak immigration-control apparatus also makes it a haven for for- 
eigners seeking to escape from international police and justice. 
Supreme Court justices also spend a considerable amount of their 
time resolving cases of tutelas, which by law must receive priority 



235 



Colombia: A Country Study 

attention, creating backlogs of several years in the handling of other 
matters. In September 2006, the Supreme Court's decision to investi- 
gate allegations that a group of politicians from the Atlantic coast had 
signed an agreement with the right-wing paramilitary United Self- 
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) to ''recreate the Republic."' the 
Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement of July 15. 2003. boosted the court's 
legitimacy and judicial clout (see Peace Processes, ch. 5). Since the 
inception of this scandal, the nine justices of the court's criminal 
branch have handled all cases collectively in order to safeguard then- 
decisions against undue political influence from the government, 
implicated politicians, or illegal groups. 

Council of State 

The 27-member Council of State oversees the legality of the admin- 
istrative process, advises the government on administrative issues, and 
resolves conflicts between the public sector and society. More specifi- 
cally, the Council of State serves as the supreme tribunal of adminis- 
trative disputes; reviews the constitutionality of decrees issued by the 
national government that are not under the jurisdiction of the Constitu- 
tional Court; acts as the highest consultative body of the government 
on administrative matters; rules on the transit of foreign troops, war- 
ships, or military aircraft through the national territory: prepares and 
presents constitutional and other Legislative reforms; and reviews 
cases concerning the status of members of Congress accused of 
crimes. The Council of State, which is also the plenary body, is 
divided into three chambers (government, consultation and civil ser- 
vice, and administrative litigation). The Council of State selects its 
own judges for eight-year, nonrenewable terms from lists presented by 
the CSJ. As the supreme administrative tribunal, the Council of State 
hears complaints against the government and public officials. The 
Supreme Court also holds power of judicial review over the constitu- 
tionality of some adroinistrative decrees that do not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. A law passed in 1998 led to 
the creation, at least on paper, of a series of department-level adminis- 
trative courts and judges that the Council of State supervises. How- 
ever, by late 2009, they had not yet begun operating. 

Superior Judicial Council 

Prior to 1991, judges were elected directly by the country's judi- 
cial bodies themselves, but the judicial branch w as functionally sub- 
ordinate to the executive branch in administrative and budgetary 
terms. The CSJ has responsibility for administering and regulating 
the judicial system and came into being in an attempt to grant this 



236 



Government and Politics 



branch of the government greater administrative and budgetary 
autonomy. The 1 3 members of the council are elected for nonrenew- 
able, eight-year terms. The CSJ is divided into two chambers. The 
administrative chamber comprises six judges, who are elected by the 
Council of State (three judges), the Supreme Court (two), and the 
Constitutional Court (one). The jurisdictional discipline chamber 
consists of seven judges elected by the Congress from a list pre- 
sented by the government. The administrative chamber's primary 
functions include responsibility for the judicial branch's budget, 
determining the structure and personnel of the distinct judicial bod- 
ies and courtrooms, presenting lists of candidates for the Supreme 
Court and the Council of State, and administering the judicial career 
service. The jurisdictional discipline chamber investigates allega- 
tions of misconduct on the part of the members of the judiciary. 

Constitutional Court 

The nine-member Constitutional Court defends the constitution, 
and its decisions are binding on all other national judicial bodies. 
The Senate elects the court's judges for eight-year, nonrenewable 
terms from a list established by the Council of State, the Supreme 
Court, and the president of the republic, each of which proposes one 
candidate. The Constitutional Court's judicial functions include rul- 
ing on the constitutionality of laws, administrative and legislative 
procedures, constitutional reform proposals and popular referenda, 
and legislative decrees issued by the president. The court also 
reviews the decisions of other courts regarding tutelas of citizens' 
fundamental rights and rules on the constitutionality of international 
treaties. More specifically, it oversees the integrity and supremacy of 
the constitution by deciding on complaints of unconstitutionality 
made by citizens, the constitutionality of holding a referendum or 
establishing a constituent assembly to reform the constitution, the 
constitutionality of laws and national plebiscites, and the constitu- 
tionality of legislative decrees and other bills proposed by the gov- 
ernment, tutelas that relate to the national interest, and international 
treaties and laws. 

Since its creation in 1992, the Constitutional Court has issued 
judgments on a wide variety of highly sensitive political, economic, 
and social matters. Given that its decisions are binding on the other 
sectors of the judicial branch and the government, Constitutional 
Court pronouncements frequently generate considerable levels of 
public controversy. Until recently, cyclical conflict among the court 
members, other judges or judicial employees, and the other branches 
of government contrasted with the high levels of credibility that it 



237 



Colombia: A Country Study 

enjoyed with the Colombian public, which viewed the Constitutional 
Court as an independent body that interpreted and applied the 1991 
charter in a progressive manner. However, the court has become 
more conservative on key political, social, and economic matters; for 
example, its decision to approve the immediate reelection of Alvaro 
Uribe was widely criticized on legal grounds. In 2007-8 its impar- 
tiality came under question as a result of the appointment of its new- 
est member, the former legal secretary of the president's office. In 
2009 six more members were expected to be appointed to the court, 
leading to fears that it may lose its independence. 

Attorney General's Office 

The Attorney General's Office is an independent judicial organ 
with the primary roles of investigating criminal offenses and prose- 
cuting the accused. It consists of the attorney general, an assistant 
attorney general, delegates to other judicial entities, and departmen- 
tal and municipal offices. Specialized national investigative units 
also exist in particularly sensitive areas, including human rights, cor- 
ruption, money laundering, and drug trafficking. The Supreme Court 
elects the attorney general for a four-year, nonrenewable term from a 
list established by the president of the republic. 

On January 1, 2005, a new Code of Criminal Procedure took 
effect in Bogota and the Colombian coffee zone and began to be 
gradually applied throughout the whole country during 2008. The 
new code passes some investigatory responsibility to penal judges 
instead of the Attorney General's Office. The accusatory system, 
which replaces the Napoleonic Code, is based on the U.S. Penal 
Code in that it introduces an oral hearing into the process. Although 
it is too soon to evaluate the effects of this shift on the administration 
of justice, there is widespread consensus that the new system 
requires more and better-trained investigators, for which the United 
States has provided active support. 

Public Administration 

The 1991 constitution specifically identifies two control entities 
with administrative and budgetary autonomy — the Comptroller Gen- 
eral's Office and the Public Ministry. They are state institutions that 
do not belong to any of the three branches of government, and both 
have offices at the national, departmental, and municipal levels. 

The Comptroller General's Office (Contraloria General de la 
Republica) exercises fiscal control over state expenditures based on 
criteria of efficiency, economy, equity, and environmental cost. The 
comptroller is elected by the plenary of the Congress for a four-year, 



238 



Government and Politics 



nonrenewable period from a list presented by the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court, and the Council of State. Fiscal control is 
selective in that, although all state institutions are subject to scrutiny, 
only a certain number are chosen for examination in a given period. 
The budget of the comptroller general of the republic and depart- 
mental and municipal comptrollers is monitored by the auditor gen- 
eral of the republic, who is elected for a two-year term by the 
Council of State from a list of candidates proposed by the Supreme 
Court. 

The Public Ministry, a noncabinet-level ministry, promotes 
respect for human rights, defends the public interest, oversees com- 
pliance with the law and legal sentences, and investigates disciplin- 
ary misconduct by public officials and employees in general, 
including members of the state security forces. The inspector general 
of the nation {procurador general de la nacion) directs the Public 
Ministry and has the primary function of overseeing the correct con- 
duct of state employees. The Senate elects the inspector general for a 
nonrenewable term of four years. 

The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (Defensoria del Pueblo) 
operates under the direction of the Inspector General's Office within 
the Public Ministry, and its primary function is to oversee the promo- 
tion, exercise, and defense of human rights throughout the national 
territory. The House of Representatives elects the human rights 
ombudsman for a four-year, nonrenewable period from a list pre- 
sented by the president of the republic. 

Given acute problems of public order and systematic violation of 
human rights in the country, the human rights ombudsman has been 
involved in particularly sensitive aspects of Colombian political life 
since the creation of this position in 1991. The ombudsman has 
issued a number of reports, including denunciations of violations of 
the human rights of ethnic minorities, forced displacement and 
humanitarian crises in Colombia, the public health effects of the aer- 
ial fumigation of illicit drug crops, and public health conditions in 
the jails. 

District and municipal ombudsmen (personerias), supervised by 
the ombudsman of Bogota, are responsible for defending fundamen- 
tal rights and other community interests, such as environmental mat- 
ters and public services at the local level. The public role exercised 
by the ombudsmen is very important, given that they are in direct 
contact with local populations that are affected by the internal armed 
conflict. Personerias cooperate with the human rights ombudsman 
in promoting respect for human rights, implementing human rights 
policies, intervening with local authorities when the fundamental 
rights of the citizens in their respective districts are being violated, 



239 



Colombia: A Country Study 

and reporting human rights abuses. Their function appears to com- 
plement the local system of conflict resolution provided by the jus- 
tices of the peace. 

Political Dynamics 

The Weakening of the Bipartisan System 

The dominance of the Liberal and Conservative parties, their 
entrenchment in local personalistic, clientelist networks, and a sys- 
tem of representation based on special interests have been traits of 
the Colombian political landscape since the midnineteenth century. 
Traditionally, both parties have lacked discipline and failed to build 
intermediate party organizations capable of linking local and 
regional political processes with national-level entities. 

The National Front power-sharing agreement in place between 
1958 and 1978 weakened the two-party system, because it led to 
fragmentation of the two parties and reduced their capacity for inter- 
action with the national population. Urbanization and modernization 
had the additional effects of eroding traditional party loyalities and 
highlighting the incompetence of Liberals and Conservatives alike in 
responding to basic social needs. 

The 1991 constitution attempted to correct many of the political 
distortions of the bipartisan system by facilitating the creation and 
operation of new political parties and movements, reducing previous 
barriers to political participation, and granting Colombian citizens 
new rights to engage more actively in this process. However, the 
electoral system remained unchanged, and intraparty competition, 
fragmentation, and the presentation of multiple electoral lists 
belonging to the same party or movement continued. In the 1994 
congressional elections, the Liberal Party alone presented 134 lists 
for the Senate and 293 lists for the House of Representatives. 
Between 1991 and 2002, the total number of electoral lists that com- 
peted for seats in the Senate and the House grew by approximately 
45 percent and 55 percent, respectively. 

Notwithstanding the crisis of the traditional parties, since 1991 
the Liberal Party and, to a lesser degree, the Conservatives have 
maintained a significant presence in the Congress and in departmen- 
tal and local governments. Whereas in 1991 and 1994 the Liberals 
won more than 50 percent of the seats in the Senate, their share 
shrank to 48 percent and 28 percent in 1998 and 2002, respectively. 
During this same period, on average the Conservatives won approxi- 
mately 20 percent of the congressional seats. Both parties performed 
poorly in the 2006 congressional elections, although the two adopted 



240 



Alvaro Uribe Velez 
(president, 2002-6, 2006-10) 
Courtesy Embassy of Colombia, 
Washington, DC 




opposite strategies in order to counteract their waning political influ- 
ence. The Conservative Party allied itself with the pro-Uribe coali- 
tion in the Congress, while the Liberals began to exercise political 
opposition, often in alliance with the left-leaning Alternative Demo- 
cratic Pole (PDA). At first glance, this downward trend continued in 
the 2007 municipal and departmental elections. The Liberal Party 
took only 200 municipalities and nine governorships, compared to 
222 and 18, respectively, in 2002, while the Conservatives won the 
same number of municipalities and only five governorships. How- 
ever, the total number of votes accrued nationwide and the number 
of candidates elected to departmental assemblies and municipal 
councils indicated that both parties performed well. The two parties 
received the highest shares of the vote — the Liberals took 21.6 per- 
cent of the total vote and the Conservatives, 18.6 percent — suggest- 
ing that they continue to have strong support in many parts of the 
country. 

Other Parties and Political Movements 

One outcome of the decline in the prestige of the two main parties 
has been the upsurge of politicians who claim to be independents. 
Noemi Sanfn Posada, whose political career has been characterized 
by close collaboration with the Conservative Party, ran for the presi- 
dency in 1998 as an outsider, but, ironically, members of the political 



241 



Colombia: A Country Study 

and economic elite supported her. Both Andres Pastrana and Alvaro 
Uribe competed as independent candidates in the 1998 and 2002 
elections, respectively, and won the presidency on political plat- 
forms critical of the Conservatives and the Liberals. Ingrid Betan- 
court Pulecio, a presidential candidate who was kidnapped by the 
FARC on February 22, 2002, founded an "antipolitical" party, the 
Oxygen Green Party (PVO), which had sponsored her bid for the 
presidency. 

A second, related outcome has been the massive regrouping of 
traditional politicians into new political parties and movements. 
Such is the case of the Citizens' Convergence, the Democratic 
Colombia Party (PDC), the National Unity Social Party (PSUN), or 
Partido de La U, the Radical Change Party (PCR), and Team Wings 
Colombia (Equipo Alas Colombia). What distinguishes these new 
parties from the traditional parties is their lack of a single ideological 
base and their loose internal coherence. Indeed, most constitute mar- 
riages of political convenience and demonstrate unity that is largely 
grounded in loyalty to President Alvaro Uribe. In the 2006 congres- 
sional elections, this strategy allowed the pro-Uribe coalition to win 
an absolute majority in the legislature. One year later, the 2007 local 
and departmental elections also yielded favorable results for the 
coalition — 18 governorships and 714 mayoralities — although these 
newer parties obtained fewer votes overall than the Liberals or the 
Conservatives. 

The 1991 constitution was largely successful in broadening the 
Colombian political spectrum. Above all, the explicit recognition of 
ethnic, sociocultural, and religious diversity in the constitution's 
conceptualization of the nation encouraged indigenous and religious 
groups to participate more actively in political life. Modifications in 
the electoral system led to a proliferation of new political candidates 
of varied origins. The aim of partial state funding for political cam- 
paigns was to create at least minimal conditions of equality between 
the newer movements and the two traditional political parties, and to 
isolate both from potentially corruptive influences. There were new 
guarantees of equal access to electoral information and to media 
campaign coverage. 

The results of such modifications were telling. In the 1998 con- 
gressional elections alone, more than 80 parties and movements pre- 
sented candidates. Between 1991 and 2002, the total number of 
political groups that occupied a seat in one or both of the chambers 
of Congress increased from 23 to 62. 

The creation of a special indigenous district electing two members to 
the Senate and of a special ethnic district electing up to five members to 



242 



Government and Politics 



the House of Representatives is largely responsible for the growing 
political participation of Colombia's indigenous communities. Although 
no one political organization articulates the interests of the country's 
entire Amerindian population, three movements, the Indigenous 
Authorities of Colombia (Aico), the Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI), 
and the Colombian Indigenous Movement (MIC), have occupied seats 
in the Congress since 1991. Indigenous candidates also have established 
temporary political alliances in order to influence presidential and 
gubernatorial races, and to gain additional seats in the Congress. 

At the regional and local levels, the three indigenous movements 
have achieved significant victories in elections for municipal coun- 
cils, departmental assemblies, governors, and mayors. In the 1994 
elections, in addition to winning a list for the Cauca Departmental 
Assembly, the ASI presented 10 lists for various municipal councils, 
of which eight were elected. In 1997 the ASI and Aico successfully 
elected 152 council members, along with eight assembly members 
and 13 mayors. In 2000 Cauca elected an indigenous governor for 
the first time, while one-quarter of the members elected to that 
department's assembly also were representatives of the indigenous 
community. 

In the 1998 and 2002 elections, the country's Afro-Colombian 
communities also elected delegates for the seats to which they are 
entitled via the special minority voting district in the House of Rep- 
resentatives. A total of 23 candidate lists competing for two seats in 
2002 indicated the extreme levels of disaggregation characterizing 
Afro-Colombians. Colombians residing abroad, another community 
represented in the special district in the House, presented 28 lists that 
same year. 

By contrast, two alternative political parties, Democratic Action 
M-19 (AD M-19) and the National Salvation Movement (MSN), 
simply disappeared from the political scene after achieving impres- 
sive political victories in the early 1990s. In the 1990 presidential 
election, these two parties, representing former rebels of the Nine- 
teenth of April Movement (M-19) and a dissident faction of the 
Conservative Party, won 23.9 percent and 12.6 percent of the popu- 
lar vote, respectively. In the case of the AD M-19, this result was 
particularly noteworthy, given the assassination of the group's initial 
candidate, Carlos Pizarro Leongomez, prior to the election and his 
replacement by its lesser-known member, Antonio Navarro Wolff. 
However, after winning 26.9 percent of the total popular vote in 
elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1991, the AD M-19 
received 9 percent in the 1991 congressional elections, 3 percent in 
1994, and vanished in 1998. Several of its members, including Sena- 
tor Navarro Wolff and Deputy Gustavo Petro Urrego, continue to 



243 



Colombia: A Country Study 

occupy congressional seats but are affiliated with other political 
movements. Following MSN leader Alvaro Gomez Hurtado's assas- 
sination in November 1995, the MSN disappeared altogether, sug- 
gesting that it was essentially Gomez's personal electoral vehicle 
and was never intended to be an alternative to the Conservative 
Party. 

During the latter half of the 1980s, the FARC-sponsored leftist 
Patriotic Union (UP), founded in 1985, obtained highly impressive 
electoral success at the departmental and municipal levels, and rea- 
sonable levels of representation in the Congress. However, between 
1985 and 1996 the UP's members, including presidential candidate 
Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa in 1990 and Senator Manuel Cepeda Var- 
gas in 1994, were victims of a systematic purge — approximately 
3,000 were murdered. Consequently, the UP presence in the Colom- 
bian political system became marginal after the mid-1990s. In 1993 
the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights received a com- 
plaint filed on behalf of the families of more than 1 ,000 UP members 
killed, on grounds that the Colombian state had been negligent in 
preventing and investigating the alleged murders. In 1997 the case 
came before the commission, which recommended that the state 
reach a friendly agreement with the families, but conciliation 
between the sides has been impossible. While the case continued 
before the commission, in August 2007 the Attorney General's 
Office reopened hundreds of cases related to the UP murders. Testi- 
monies provided by several paramilitary leaders under the Justice 
and Peace Law have also helped to clarify their participation, as well 
as that of drug-trafficking organizations, in specific killings. 

Authentically independent outsiders also have achieved important 
electoral victories as a result of growing public criticism of traditional 
parties and conventional politics. Unlike Noemi Sanfn, with whom he 
ran as the vice presidential candidate in the 1998 elections, Antanas 
Mockus Sivickas, twice mayor of Bogota (1992-96 and 1996-2000), 
has developed his public career far removed from Colombia's political 
establishment. In order to do so, he has appealed consistently to the 
electorate's dislike of traditional political practice with provocative 
campaigns that demand little funding but have a highly visible impact. 
The Christian-based Independent Movement of Absolute Renewal 
(MIRA) has also achieved substantial recognition, earning two seats in 
the Senate and one in the House of Representatives in 2006, along 
with local-level positions of less importance. Former labor leader Luis 
Eduardo Garzon ran for the presidency in 2002 on an antipolitics plat- 
form and gained a considerable portion of the popular vote. His sup- 
porters included the Social and Political Front (FSP), a broad leftist 
coalition that includes the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) and 



244 



Government and Politics 



several labor movements, human rights and peace activists, indige- 
nous leaders, and other progressive parties and movements. A signifi- 
cant number of congressional candidates affiliated with the FSP also 
won seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Three FSP 
candidates, Antonio Navarro Wolff, former Liberal Party member 
Samuel Moreno Rojas, and former Constitutional Court justice and 
2006 presidential contender Carlos Gaviria Diaz, were elected to the 
Senate with more than 100,000 votes, placing them third, fourth, and 
fifth, respectively, in the tally of votes. 

Many FSP affiliates went on to create a larger leftist coalition 
within the Congress in 2003 called the Democratic Alternative (AD). 
In the 2003 departmental and municipal races, Garzon mobilized the 
political capital he had acquired in the 2002 presidential election to 
create a distinct political movement, the Independent Democratic 
Pole (PDI), whose membership supported Garzon's successful can- 
didacy for the mayoralty of Bogota, as well as the bids of several 
other candidates in some of Colombia's largest cities, including 
Medellin, Barranquilla, and Cali. In the second half of 2005, the AD 
and the PDI merged to create the PDA and agreed to choose a single 
candidate for the 2006 presidential election. 

Recent electoral successes by the PDA in the Congress and at the 
departmental and municipal levels have posed interesting challenges 
to the old system. The outcome of the 2006 congressional and presi- 
dential elections suggests that this trend will continue. In the legisla- 
tive elections, the PDA obtained approximately 10 percent of the 
popular vote for the Senate and 5 percent for the House of Represen- 
tatives. The presidential race, although resulting in a landslide vic- 
tory for President Alvaro Uribe (62 percent of the popular vote), 
gave PDA candidate Carlos Gaviria an impressive 22 percent of the 
popular vote, in comparison with only 12 percent obtained by Lib- 
eral Party candidate Horacio Serpa Uribe. In the 2007 elections, 
PDA candidate Samuel Moreno succeeded in holding on to the 
Bogota mayoralty (and the party won 19 other mayoralties), notwith- 
standing the strong track record of his opponent, the former mayor 
Enrique Penalosa Londono, and President Uribe 's active campaign 
against Moreno in the days preceding the election. The total number 
of votes accrued by the party nationwide suggests that its political 
base continues to expand. 

Political Party Reform 

Since the 1991 constitutional reform, two of the most visible char- 
acteristics of the Colombian party system have been the many inter- 
nal divisions of the country's two traditional parties and the 



245 



Colombia: A Country Study 

formation of a significant number of alternative parties and move- 
ments that also exhibit high degrees of fragmentation. Colombia's 
bipartisan system thus has been severely weakened, but establishing 
a multiparty system has been extremely difficult. The new political 
options have failed to translate into greater responsiveness to com- 
munity needs, given the extreme fragmentation of political parties 
and the subsequent absence of solid political majorities. Further- 
more, with several notable exceptions, the myriad new movements 
that have surfaced in Colombia since 1991 engage in many of the 
same practices that characterize the dominant political culture, spe- 
cifically clientelism and personalism, and therefore their emergence 
has had little impact on the political landscape. 

In order to address these problems, the Congress finally approved 
a political reform in 2003 that brought in the d'Hondt system, which 
requires a minimum of 2 percent of the total vote to obtain represen- 
tation in the Senate, and a minimum of 50 percent of the electoral 
quotient to obtain seats in the House and other bodies. Under this 
new system, each party or movement may present only one list of 
candidates in an election, the minimum requirements for constituting 
a legal political party have been raised, participation in multiple par- 
ties is prohibited, party discipline in the legislature is compulsory, 
and the preferential vote replaces the closed-list system. In the 2006 
congressional elections, this new set of rules led to a smaller number 
of electoral lists — 14, which was well down from 2002 — with fewer 
candidates each and to the creation of several new political parties, 
most notably, the National Unity Social Party and the Radical 
Change Party, both supportive of President Uribe. 

The political reform was at first relatively successful in enforcing 
unified party action in the Congress, departmental assemblies, and 
city councils, and in reducing the number of political parties operat- 
ing in the country. However, the October 28, 2007, departmental and 
municipal elections posed a relative setback, given that legislation 
allowing write-in candidates led many to bypass the new electoral 
law, resulting in a surge in the numbers of political parties and move- 
ments competing for political office to 244. 

Corruption 

The 1991 constitution adopted a series of articles designed to 
strengthen the state's capacity to punish corrupt practices, and it 
established new rules to regulate political activities. Anticorruption 
measures have been relatively effective in punishing corrupt public 
practices and making them more transparent. Since 1991 the Council 
of State has removed 42 members of Congress from office and 



246 



Government and Politics 



investigated more than 300 additional members. Between 2001 and 
2004, the Attorney General's Office investigated more than 3,000 
public officials, many of whom it charged with misconduct or abuse 
of power. By 2006 the Supreme Court had ruled on the charges 
against approximately 300 high-ranking officials of crimes against 
the public administration. 

Notwithstanding these efforts, corruption continues to be wide- 
spread in Colombia, especially at the local level. The persistence of 
clientelism, the lack of accountability between branches of govern- 
ment and between government and society, the general deterioration 
of political institutions, and the presence of drug-trafficking organi- 
zations and illegal armed groups largely account for pervasive mal- 
feasance. Administrative corruption, consisting of the illegal private 
use of public monies and goods, is the prevalent abuse. The primary 
types of administrative corruption in Colombia include bribery, 
favoritism in public contracts, the use of political influence to obtain 
public office, and the contracting of public- works projects that are 
either useless to the community or never completed. Fiscal losses 
due to such wrongdoing have been considerable. 

In 1994 the attorney general initiated Case 8,000, which revealed 
the extent to which corruption had penetrated the highest levels of 
political power. At the center of the case were allegations that the 
presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper had received financial con- 
tributions from the Cali Cartel. The attorney general presented for- 
mal charges against a number of members of Congress over the 
funding of their campaigns and other high-level government offi- 
cials also accused of receiving monies from drug-trafficking groups. 
Although the House of Representatives formally absolved Samper in 
June 1996, many other public servants and businesspeople were 
charged with being involved financially with the drug cartels. Case 
8,000 was a clear indication that the measures adopted by the 1991 
constitution were inadequate to prevent the illegal funding of elec- 
toral campaigns. 

The Colombian political system suffered another devastating blow 
in September 2006, when the Supreme Court began investigating 
allegations that significant numbers of politicians from the Atlantic 
coast and elsewhere had formed alliances with paramilitary groups. 
One month later, the attorney general formally accused Jorge Nogu- 
era Cotes, former director of the Administrative Security Department, 
of collusion with the paramilitaries while in office. In early 2007, the 
minister of foreign relations, Maria Consuelo Araujo, had to resign 
following the detention of her brother, Senator Alvaro Araujo Castro, 
and the filing of charges against her father, as a result of their involve- 
ment in the parapolitics scandal. By April 2008, 33 appointed and 



247 



Colombia: A Country Study 

elected officials had been jailed awaiting trial, while another 62 mem- 
bers of Congress had become official suspects. The list included a 
former minister, a serving minister, and a cousin of President Uribe. 
These tainted officials also included congressional deputies, senators, 
mayors, governors, and assembly and council members, many of 
whom belong to the political coalition that supports President Uribe. 
Five of the groups associated with this paramilitary alliance in the 
Congress — Colombia Alive, Citizens' Convergence, Democratic 
Colombia Party, Living Colombia Movement (MCV), and Team 
Wings Colombia — had the majority or all of their legislators linked to 
the scandal. 

Societal Institutions 

The Church 

Traditionally, Colombia's Roman Catholic Church has been one 
of the most powerful and conservative in Latin America. However, 
the 1991 constitution's explicit recognition of religious, ethnic, and 
sexual heterogeneity and diversity as the basis of the nation reduced 
the church's influence on the state. Moreover, the charter stipulates a 
strict separation of the church from the branches of political power 
and proclaims that religious education is not a requirement in public 
schools. The extensive growth of other religious communities in the 
last decade, most notably Protestant evangelism, gradually has 
eroded Catholicism's base, although the Roman Catholic Church 
itself continues to enjoy high approval ratings in public opinion. 

In many respects, the Roman Catholic Church continues to be very 
conservative. The church hierarchy has virulently opposed efforts to 
legalize abortion, euthanasia, and stem-cell research in Colombia and 
has been critical of the government's sex-education and birth-control 
policies. Nevertheless, members of the clergy also have been visibly 
active in seeking solutions to many of the most vexing problems faced 
by the country today, including the armed conflict, poverty and inequal- 
ity, and the drug trade. In August 1995, the president of the Colombian 
Episcopal Conference created the National Reconciliation Commission 
(CNN), an independent body seeking ways to resolve the warfare and 
facilitate negotiations between the state and the armed groups. The com- 
mission's membership represents all sectors of Colombian society and 
includes academics, politicians, human rights defenders, journalists, 
businesspeople, and labor union representatives. 

In addition to supporting international humanitarian law, the 
church has expressed profound concern over the fate of the displaced 
population. Many clergy members also have highlighted the need to 



248 



Government and Politics 



attend to problems of poverty and inequality as a precondition for 
peace. In those regions in which the economic survival of the rural 
community depends primarily on coca cultivation, bishops have 
opposed intrusive strategies such as aerial fumigation to eradicate 
illicit crops. 

In the many regions of Colombia in which rebel groups, in partic- 
ular the FARC, operate, members of the church have actively 
defended community rights and have taken measures to protect local 
populations against abuses committed by guerrillas. The fact that the 
church has become one of the most visible critics of armed political 
violence in the country has converted its members into political tar- 
gets, in particular of the FARC. Since 2002 armed groups have killed 
a dozen or more priests a year. According to Justice, Peace and Non- 
violent Action (Justapaz), a religious NGO, in 2006 alone 15 reli- 
gious leaders were killed, nearly 100 received death threats, and six 
priests were kidnapped (see Religion, ch. 2). 

News Media 

Although Colombian law enshrined freedom of expression and of 
the press before 1991, the new charter reformulated the constitu- 
tional bases of press freedom by prohibiting censorship, and by 
directly linking freedom of expression with freedom of information. 
However, extralegal restrictions on the media continue to be signifi- 
cant. The government attempts to manipulate information and to 
influence media reports by using family, personal, or political rela- 
tions. The important clout of Colombian economic groups in the 
media industry and the increasing acts of violence against members 
of the press by guerrillas and paramilitaries have placed considerable 
limitations on the media. 

The ownership structure of Colombian mass media has shifted signif- 
icantly since 1980. In particular, national radio, television, and newspa- 
per conglomerates controlled by the country's principal economic 
groups have replaced local media chains. Today, control over most 
Colombian media is divided among three multimedia companies: Cara- 
col Television, S.A. (Caracol), National Radio and Television of Colom- 
bia (RNC), and Casa Editorial El Tiempo publishing company. Grupo 
Bavaria and the Santo Domingo family owned Caracol (comprising a 
private television network, a radio station, and Bogota's El Espectador 
newspaper) until 2003, when the Spanish communications firm Prisa 
acquired a majority stake in it. The Ardila Liille Oranization owns RNC, 
consisting of the other private television network and a chain of radio 
stations broadcasting throughout the country. And the Casa Editorial El 
Tiempo, long owned by the politically and economically influential 



249 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Santos family, controls Bogota's local television channel, CityTV, sev- 
eral magazines, music stores, and, until recently, the largest daily 
national newspaper, El Tiempo, with a circulation of around 265,000 on 
weekdays and twice that number on Sunday. In August 2007, the Span- 
ish Grupo Planeta obtained majority ownership of El Tiempo. 

Colombia has approximately 25 regional newspapers, including 
several with a daily circulation of more than 50,000 copies. Those 
with the largest circulation outside Bogota are Medellfn's El Colom- 
biano (90,000 on weekdays), El Heraldo (Barranquilla and the Atlan- 
tic coast, with 70,000 on weekdays), and El Pais (Cali, with 60,000 on 
weekdays). Some of the larger regional newspapers have bought up 
the smaller ones. For example, Bucaramanga's Vanguardia Liberal is 
currently the owner of several other dailies, including El Pueblo 
(Pereira), El Universal (Cartagena), and El Liberal (Popayan). In addi- 
tion to daily newspapers, several weekly news magazines, most nota- 
bly, Semana and Cambio, with circulations of approximately 150,000 
and 20,000, respectively, are major sources of political analysis and 
debate. Since the parapolitics scandal was uncovered in 2006, the 
media have devoted much attention to this issue. 

The concentration of media ownership in Colombia has had a 
substantial homogenizing effect on coverage of specific national and 
international issues. The daily newspaper with the highest circula- 
tion nationally is El Tiempo, with a weekday circulation of at least 
300,000, rising to about half a million for the Sunday edition. The 
oldest newspaper in Colombia, El Espectador, a daily publication, 
became a weekly in September 2001 but returned as a daily in May 
2008, with a weekday circulation of 50,000 and a Sunday circulation 
of 250,000. In October 2008, El Espectador became one of the three 
major newspapers around the world to host the New York Times new 
weekly news supplement. Only two television news programs, 
"Noticias Uno" and "CM&," offer alternatives to the coverage pro- 
vided by Caracol and the National Radio Network (RCN). And three 
large, private radio chains share control over the majority of AM and 
FM stations: Caracol, RCN, and family-owned Todelar Radio. 

The concentration of media ownership, the continuing armed con- 
flict, and the impunity of perpetrators of crimes against journalists 
have acted to limit freedom of expression and opinion in Colombia. 
According to the Inter-American Press Society (SIP), Colombia is 
one of the most dangerous countries in the world in which to practice 
journalism, along with the Philippines and Iraq. During the 
1997-2007 period, more than 114 journalists were murdered. In 
August 1999, gunmen murdered nationally famous comedian and 
radio journalist Jaime Garzon in Bogota. Since 2000 assassins have 



250 




The Art Museum of the Central Bank in Bogota s Candelaria district 

Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 



killed 11 journalists because of their reports related to the drug traf- 
fic, paramilitary organizations, and corruption. In 2004 alone, two 
journalists were killed, three were kidnapped, 28 injured, and 25 
threatened. Self-censorship practiced by journalists perceiving or 
actually receiving threats has also constrained media reporting. 

Colombian Interest Groups 

Traditionally, clientelist practices and the closed nature of the 
Colombian political system largely constrained the development of 
national interest groups distinct from those directly related to the 
country's political and economic elites. In the 1980s, Colombia's par- 
ticipation in the cocaine industry facilitated the consolidation of pow- 
erful illegal organizations, in particular the Medell n and Cali cartels, 
which began to exercise systematic influence over government deci- 
sions through bribery and assassination. For example, the 1991 Con- 
stituent Assembly, under violent pressure from the drug-trafficking 
organizations, voted to prohibit the extradition of Colombian nation- 
als, although this decision was overturned during the Samper admin- 
istration. In the 1990s, the prevalent use of armed force in clientelism 
also resulted in further manipulation of the political process at all lev- 
els. Following the 2002 congressional elections, paramilitary leader 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

Salvatore Mancuso Gomez went so far as to claim that where the 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia had a substantial social and 
military presence, the group had successfully elected the candidates it 
supported. 

However, the institutionalization of assorted mechanisms of dem- 
ocratic participation and of political and fiscal decentralization by 
the 1991 constitution led to positive modifications in the political 
environment, given that citizens gained greater opportunities to par- 
ticipate in the discussion of local, regional, and national issues. As a 
consequence, since the early 1990s the role of a variety of new social 
and political movements has expanded considerably (see Social 
Movements, ch. 2). Growing citizen participation has taken place 
within an adverse domestic context, characterized by extreme 
inequality and poverty and the continuation of the internal armed 
conflict. Many interest groups have focused on issues related to 
these problems. A large majority of Colombia's NGOs collaborate 
with international counterparts and receive some type of funding 
from them. 

Nongovernmental Organizations 

In the late 1990s, Colombia's internal crisis spurred greater inter- 
national involvement in numerous issues in the country, including 
law and order, human rights, humanitarian protection, the environ- 
ment, and community development. Some of the most visible inter- 
national organizations were Amnesty International, Doctors Without 
Borders, Human Rights Watch, International Peace Brigades, Inter- 
national Red Cross, and Save the Children; most of them have estab- 
lished links with local civic organizations. 

The number of international and domestic nongovernmental orga- 
nizations operating in Colombia has expanded exponentially since 
2000. Although the activities of these organizations are extremely 
diverse, NGOs working in the areas of development, forced displace- 
ment, gender issues, human rights, and conflict have been particularly 
significant. In 2004 there were approximately 1,300 national NGOs 
registered with the Colombian Chamber of Commerce. The Colom- 
bian Confederation of NGOs, an umbrella organization created in 
1989, seeks to mediate between approximately 1,000 Colombian 
NGOs and regional federations and national and international organi- 
zations. The confederation also nurtures linkages between groups 
specializing in the same issues throughout the country. The National 
Network of Development and Peace Programs (Redprodpaz) is 
another national network grouping together about 15 different 
regional peace and development programs. 



252 



Government and Politics 



In the areas of armed conflict, forced displacement, and human 
rights, the most visible NGOs, both nationally and internationally, 
include the Alternative Social Development Association (Minga), 
the Research and Public Education Center (Cinep), the Colombian 
Commission of Jurists (CCJ), the Consultancy for Human Rights 
and Displacement (Codhes), and the New Rainbow Corporation. 
Their research on these topics has been largely incorporated into the 
reports of significant international and foreign governmental agen- 
cies, including the Organization of American States (OAS), United 
Nations (UN), and U.S. Department of State. 

In many regions of Colombia characterized by a precarious state 
presence and acute levels of poverty, NGOs have played key roles in 
publicizing and defending the social, economic, and political demands 
of local communities. The intensification of the internal armed con- 
flict in the mid-1990s led to increased violence against and intimida- 
tion of NGO representatives, particularly in those areas under dispute 
between guerrillas and paramilitaries. Between 1996 and 1998, there 
were 29 killings of human rights workers, while 17 sought asylum in 
third countries. During 2000-2005, at least 48 NGO activists were 
either assassinated or disappeared. Eleven human rights workers were 
killed in 2008. 

In response to this situation, as well as to the growing stigmatiza- 
tion that Colombian NGOs have been subjected to by both paramili- 
taries and the Colombian state, approximately 90 organizations 
created the Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy, and 
Development (Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, 
Democracia y Desarrollo). In the second half of 2003, this group 
published a controversial report entitled The Authoritarian Jinx {El 
embrujo autoritario), documenting the deteriorating human rights 
situation, the growing impunity of the military, greater involvement 
of the civilian population in the internal armed conflict, and the exis- 
tence of an intimidation campaign against human rights activists. 
Following the report's indictment of the Uribe administration, which 
was not nearly as severe as its title suggests, Uribe accused national 
and global NGOs working in the country of being terrorist sympa- 
thizers. The offices of several human rights organizations were 
searched illegally, and a number of NGO activists were detained or 
arrested on charges of aiding terrorists. The international community 
has criticized such actions harshly as placing NGO representatives at 
greater risk. Notwithstanding significant organizational advances in 
the past decade, Colombian NGOs also continue to contend with the 
dispersed, fragmented character of local peace, human rights, and 
development initiatives, and the limited impact of civic initiatives in 
Colombian politics. 



253 



Colombia: A Country Study 
Ethnic Groups 

Colombia's national population includes about 80 indigenous 
groups located throughout the country and a large number of Afro- 
Colombian communities, many of which inhabit the Atlantic and 
Pacific coastal regions and the islands of San Andres, Providencia, 
and Santa Catalina. Indigenous groups comprise approximately 3.4 
percent of the total population and Afro-Colombians, 10.5 percent. 
Hundreds of organizations represent these groups locally and region- 
ally. At the national level, the National Indigenous Organization of 
Colombia (ONIC) and the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia 
(Aico) represent nearly all of Colombia's indigenous population. 
The Cimarron Movement and the Platform of the Black Communi- 
ties (PCN) are the main umbrella organizations representing Afro- 
Colombian communities. 

One of the major goals of the Constituent Assembly was to open 
the Colombian political system to broader representation, and the 
indigenous population achieved a direct voice through the participa- 
tion of ONIC. The 1991 constitution evinced recognition of Colom- 
bian ethnic minorities in measures to promote their participation in 
the political system, primarily through the creation of special indige- 
nous and ethnic congressional districts, and by acknowledging their 
cultural and territorial rights. Indigenous groups have been repre- 
sented in Congress since later that year. Following the electoral suc- 
cesses of the indigenous movement, Colombia's black communities 
also achieved political representation in the Congress in 1998. 

Access to land and preservation of land rights, considered a basic 
cultural right by indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities alike, 
have been central to the activities of both groups. Although Afro- 
Colombians account for 90 percent of the inhabitants of Choco 
Department, they own only 10 percent of the land, primarily as a 
result of earlier legislation that designated the Pacific basin as a res- 
ervation zone and limited access to individual and collective land 
ownership. In 1993 constitutionally mandated legislation recognized 
the Afro-Colombian community's right to collective property within 
its ancestral territories and to individual property within the Pacific 
basin's cities. Some progress has been made in complying with the 
Colombian state's constitutional obligation to ensure respect for 
Afro-Colombians' territorial, economic, and cultural rights, and by 
2005 more than 100 land titles had been granted. However, the 
active paramilitary presence in and around Choco has lent itself to 
the systematic, violent reappropriation of newly granted titles by the 
paramilitaries. In other regions of the country, ethnic minorities have 
been especially hard-hit by the extremely high concentration of land- 



254 



Government and Politics 



ownership; 1.4 percent of landowners in the country hold 65.4 per- 
cent of the total land. 

More than 90 percent of the Afro-Colombian population in Choco 
continues to lack access to basic public services, and 80 percent 
endures inhuman, overcrowded housing. The black residents are 
extremely vulnerable to armed violence and forced displacement. 
Illegal armed groups have murdered disproportionately high num- 
bers of indigenous and black community members and leaders. 
Approximately one-quarter of the total number of displaced persons 
in the country are of indigenous or African descent. In 2003 alone, 
more than 40,000 Afro-Colombians and 2,800 members of indige- 
nous groups became displaced. 

Although displacement is highly correlated with the internal war, 
the fact that Colombia's Pacific lowlands comprise one of the five 
most biodiverse regions in the world has led to the proliferation of 
agro-industrial megaprojects that also have competed with the local 
population in the struggle to control land. A similar problem arose in 
the case of the U'wa Amerindians, who conducted a highly visible, 
drawn-out legal battle against Royal Dutch Shell and Occidental 
Petroleum between 1992 and 1997 over their attempts to engage in 
oil exploration and extraction on U'wa communal lands. Although 
the U'wa secured the withdrawal of those two companies, the tribal 
struggle continues as the Colombian Petroleum Enterprise (Ecopet- 
rol) and Spain's Repsol YPF seek to drill on their land. 

Colombia's ethnic groups have increased their political and social 
participation, and they have explored new forms of collaborative 
action. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian movements also have fre- 
quently linked up with the country's rural organizations, including 
the National Campesino Council (CNC) and the National Agrarian 
Coordinator (CNA), in protest over the acute social problems that 
plague Colombia's rural population, including government neglect, 
aerial fumigation of coca crops, and violence by armed groups. Nev- 
ertheless, ethnic- and rural-based interest-group activity continues to 
be relatively weak and uncoordinated, largely because of the territo- 
rial dispersion of activists and the diversity of their claims, the 
repressive effects of violence, and the lack of adequate state protec- 
tion for legitimate social protest (see also Race and Ethnicity, ch. 2). 

Labor Unions 

The Colombian labor movement represents only a small percent- 
age of the country's workforce and has rarely played an active role in 
national politics. Since the early 1990s, the scope of labor unions 
decreased even further, given the perpetration of violence against 



255 



Colombia: A Country Study 

them and the implementation of economic liberalization policies. 
Nevertheless, between 1991 and 2004, Colombia continued to expe- 
rience an average of one mobilization, strike, or protest per month. 

Judicial and legislative authorities often have disregarded the 
right to strike and the right of association. For example, the Constitu- 
tional Court ruled that workers in the education, health, telephone, 
and electric-power sectors had only a limited right to strike, because 
of the fundamental entitlement of all Colombian citizens to these 
services. Notwithstanding constitutional recognition of the need to 
establish tripartite negotiations among labor, employers, and the 
state, in practice the Constitutional Court makes crucial decisions 
such as the establishment of the minimum wage. Labor leaders also 
have been accused regularly of sympathizing with guerrilla organi- 
zations. During the Samper administration, leaders of the Workers' 
Social Union (USO), which represents workers in the oil industry, 
were arrested on charges of rebellion. 

In 2007 the labor movement accounted for between 5 and 6 per- 
cent of the economically active population. Traditionally, it con- 
sisted of three central organizations: the United Workers' Federation 
(CUT), representing 75 percent of the unionized workforce, equiva- 
lent to 550,000 affiliates; the General Confederation of Democratic 
Workers (CGTD); and the Confederation of Colombian Workers 
(CTC). These three organizations, which were involved in different 
labor sectors of the Colombian economy, merged to create the 
National Unitary Command (CNU), which has led labor union 
efforts to influence Colombia's development plans and the general 
budget, as well as education, social security, labor reform, and 
pension policies. Attempts by the labor movement to participate in 
Colombian political life reached their peak in 2002, when a former 
president of the CUT, Luis Eduardo Garzon, ran for the presidency. 
Although Garzon lost the presidential election, he was elected mayor 
of Bogota a year later. 

Like other nonelite interest groups, Colombian labor unions have 
been victims of systematic violence. Between its creation in 1986 
and 2001, some 3,500 members of the CUT were murdered. The 
majority of these killings have been attributed to paramilitary 
groups. Notwithstanding the demobilization of most of the paramili- 
taries, 78 union leaders were murdered in 2006. As of November 
2007, there were 26 murders of union members during the year, indi- 
cating a considerable decline since the peak in 1996 of 275 murders. 
Violence against unionized labor has concentrated in the areas most 
characterized by acute armed conflict, abundant natural resources, 
and disputed territorial control between guerrillas and paramilitaries, 



256 




Bogota s 50-story Colpatria Tower, Colombia s tallest building, 
is illuminated at night with multicolored Xenon lights. 

Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 



257 



Colombia: A Country Study 

including Antioquia, Bolivar, Cesar, Cordoba, Magdalena, Norte de 
Santander, Santander, and Uraba (see Labor Markets, ch. 3). 

Business Associations 

At least 200 business associations exist in Colombia today, a more 
than twentyfold increase since the 1950s. They vary in size, specific- 
ity, geographical coverage, and longevity. The oldest Colombian 
business associations have existed for more than 100 years. They 
include the Society of Colombian Farmers (SAC) and the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers (Fedecafe). Several associations, such 
as the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), which was 
formed in the 1940s, and the SAC, cover a significant portion of the 
national economy and represent various smaller industrial and agri- 
cultural associations. Groups such as the Association of Colombian 
Sugarcane Growers (Asocana) and the Colombian Association of 
Flower Exporters (Asocolflores) are geographically limited to Valle 
del Cauca and the plains surrounding Bogota, where sugarcane and 
flowers are mainly grown. 

The National Business Council (CGN), founded in 1991, speaks 
for the most important business associations representing each sector 
of the Colombian economy. The members of the council account for 
approximately 60 percent of national production, even though only 
16 associations are members. The original purpose of the CGN was 
to support Cesar Gaviria's attempt to liberalize the Colombian econ- 
omy and diversify the country's commercial relations. 

Independent economic conglomerates also exercise significant 
political and economic influence, given their size and their impor- 
tance for the national economy. The most important ones are the 
Ardila Liille Organization (soft drinks, beer, textiles, media, and 
sugar); the Santo Domingo Group (beer, financial and insurance 
services; the media; and, until the recent sale of the national airline, 
air transportation); the Sarmiento Angulo Organization (construc- 
tion, financial and pensions sectors, and telecommunications); and 
the Antioquian Syndicate (construction, the financial and insurance 
sectors, cement, and foodstuffs), which was the result of a concerted 
effort to pool business capital in its department in order to fend off 
potential outside competitors. 

Colombian business has been relatively active in regional economic 
integration efforts and in issues related to the internal armed conflict. 
Inspired by the Mexican business sector's effective participation in the 
negotiations leading up to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), various business associations participated as advisers to the 
Colombian delegation's negotiations at the Group of Three (G-3) 



258 



Government and Politics 



talks with Mexico and Venezuela during the early 1990s. The Colom- 
bian business groups also were involved in their country's talks con- 
cerning the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the bilateral free- 
trade agreement, called the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement, which Colombia began negotiating with the United States 
in 2004. However, the U.S. Congress halted progress on the bilateral 
agreement because of the parapolitics scandal and still had not 
approved it by November 2009. Several business leaders also partici- 
pated in the Colombian government's negotiating team during peace 
negotiations with the FARC. Despite these initiatives, the business 
sector is highly divided, making collective action extremely difficult. 

Internal Armed Conflict and Peace Negotiations 

Following nearly four decades of internal war, the Belisario Betan- 
cur administration (1982-86) attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate 
peace agreements with Colombian armed groups. The administration 
of Virgilio Barco Vargas (president, 1986-90) resumed peace efforts, 
and some rebel organizations viewed the proposal to convoke a 
national constituent assembly in a positive way, as an opportunity to 
participate in political reform. The example set by the M-19, the first 
group to lay down its arms, was followed by four others, which signed 
peace agreements during the Barco and Gaviria governments. During 
this period, approximately 3,720 guerrillas demobilized. However, 
neither the FARC nor the ELN, two of Colombia's oldest and largest 
guerrilla organizations, signed accords. 

In the mid-1990s, internal armed conflict changed significantly 
because of Colombia's altered role in the drug trade and the intensi- 
fication of the war. The dismantling of the Medellm and Cali drug 
cartels during the Gaviria and Samper governments gave way to fun- 
damentally different drug-trafficking organizations, characterized by 
greater horizontal dispersion and low-profile tactics. Guerrilla (pri- 
marily FARC) and paramilitary units that became more directly 
involved in drug-related activities filled an important portion of the 
void created by the disappearance of these two cartels. Colombia 
also replaced Bolivia and Peru as the primary producer of coca leaf 
between 1996 and 1997. Manual-eradication campaigns in the latter 
two countries, the successful rupture of the air bridge that previously 
facilitated the illegal transport of Bolivian and Peruvian coca leaf to 
Colombia, and a fungus that wiped out a large percentage of Peru's 
coca crops pushed coca cultivation into areas of southern Colombia 
controlled by the FARC. 

During this same period, the FARC expanded its territorial base 
and its personnel, and it achieved financial autonomy through 



259 



Colombia: A Country Study 

increased kidnapping, extortion, and involvement in the early stages 
of the drug chain. Between 1996 and 1998, the rebels won a series of 
impressive victories that led many to suspect that the military bal- 
ance had shifted in their favor. In turn, paramilitary groups, formed 
in the 1980s to combat the increasing threat of the guerrillas, joined 
together in 1995 to form the AUC, in order to gain military strength 
and political recognition. 

The intensification of violence and combat, the legitimacy crisis 
surrounding Ernesto Samper's presidency, and the climate of law- 
lessness and government paralysis in Colombia fed popular support 
for new efforts to negotiate peace with the illegal armed groups. The 
most visible expression of that support was the Citizens' Mandate 
for Peace, a ballot initiative presented by different sectors of civil 
society in the 1997 mayoral and gubernatorial elections that received 
10 million votes in favor of negotiations with the guerrillas. 

Although the Pastrana administration began peace negotiations 
with the FARC, the process suffered from dramatic reversals. During 
the approximately 1,100 days that talks lasted, negotiations were fro- 
zen on six different occasions for reasons related to either paramili- 
tary or FARC demands, acts of violence committed by the FARC, 
and the management of a demilitarized zone the size of Switzerland 
that the government created in order to hold the talks. Civil-military 
relations became strained as a result of Pastrana's perceived leniency 
in handling the zone. When the talks finally ended in Feburary 2002, 
it became clear that the FARC had used the zone to hide kidnap vic- 
tims, conduct arms transactions, and organize military attacks on 
neighboring areas. Although the Colombian government also initi- 
ated peace talks with the ELN in 1999, these, too, were unsuccessful. 

Pastrana's peace efforts yielded extremely disappointing results. 
Peace remained elusive, and extrajudicial killings, massacres, popula- 
tion displacements, and kidnappings continued to escalate. Although 
U.S. military aid provided through Plan Colombia helped reinforce the 
Colombian military, the FARC also drew attention to the weakness of 
the Colombian state by attacking local police stations, threatening gov- 
ernment officials, attacking infrastructure, and strengthening its pres- 
ence in rural cities. Notwithstanding Pastrana's promise to combat 
paramilitarism in the country, the AUC, too, experienced unprecedented 
growth during his administration. Paramilitary strength increased from 
5,000-6,000 combatants in 2000 to approximately 12,000-15,000 in 
2004, their territorial presence mushroomed, and their public acceptance 
grew. 

Alvaro Uribe's election in the first round of the 2002 presidential 
race signaled an important shift in the Colombian political climate, 



260 



Government and Politics 



mainly because his campaign was based on hard-line war rhetoric. 
Since he took office in August 2002, Uribe's Democratic Security 
Policy has focused on combating the illegal use of arms and the drug 
traffic, and reestablishing state control over the national territory. 
Specific measures include the enlargement and modernization of the 
armed forces, increased taxation in order to finance the war effort, 
the use of local informants, and recruitment of peasant soldiers. 
Many of these policies took effect during the state of internal com- 
motion declared by Uribe on August 12, 2002, which expired in May 
2003. 

Although the Democratic Security Policy emphasizes military 
and security strategy within the parameters established by the law, in 
practice the Uribe government has found it difficult to reconcile the 
search for public order with the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. International institutions, such as the UN and the Euro- 
pean Union (EU), and numerous human rights organizations have 
expressed concern that many measures adopted by the Uribe govern- 
ment in fighting illegal armed groups may be incompatible with 
international humanitarian law. They particularly criticized an anti- 
terrorist statute presented by the government, given that it proposed 
to limit fundamental rights provided in the constitution, such as Arti- 
cle 15's "freedom of personal and family intimacy" and Article 
310's "right of movement and residency," to give the police and the 
military extraordinary search and detention powers, and to grant 
judicial police powers to the military. However, on August 30, 2004, 
the Constitutional Court ruled the statute unconstitutional. In addi- 
tion, recent annual human rights reports issued by the U.S. Depart- 
ment of State, the UN, and some international NGOs maintain that 
the Uribe government, although successful in reducing human rights 
violations in the country, has failed to completely sever links 
between members of the armed forces and paramilitary groups and 
to effectively punish officials involved in human rights violations 
and corruption. 

Government negotiations with the AUC have been another key 
aspect of President Uribe's domestic policy. In late November 2002, 
the AUC announced a unilateral cease-fire to demonstrate its will- 
ingness to lay down its arms. On July 15, 2003, the government and 
the paramilitaries signed the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement, whereby 
the AUC agreed to demobilize its forces gradually and lay down its 
weapons by the end of 2005. Following nearly another year of dis- 
cussion of the terms of this process, formal talks began in May 2004. 
The government set up a zone consisting of 368 square kilometers in 
Santa Fe de Ralito, Cordoba, to relocate demobilized paramilitaries 



261 



Colombia: A Country Study 

and conduct the talks, and an Organization of American States 
(OAS) mission came to verify this process. Between November 
2004 and December 2005, more than 20 AUC groups amounting to 
more than 13,000 fighters demobilized, in addition to the demobili- 
zation of nearly 1 ,000 members of the paramilitary Cacique Nutibara 
Bloc (BCN) in November 2003. 

Despite considerable progress in paramilitary demobilization, the 
process has been highly controversial. One of the most significant 
obstacles is that the paramilitaries are responsible for approximately 
70 percent of the human rights violations committed in Colombia. A 
second obstacle derives from the AUC's direct involvement in drug 
trafficking, which has created internal divisions between those 
favoring and those opposing links with the drug business. Before the 
negotiations formally began in mid-2004, several AUC leaders criti- 
cal of such links, including paramilitary leader Carlos Castano Gil, 
were either killed or disappeared. The United States requested the 
extradition of four members of the AUC's negotiating team between 
2003 and 2004 (see Current National Security Panorama, ch. 5). 

Since 2003 several legislative proposals for the punishment of 
crimes of violence or combat have been presented to the Congress. 
For example, the Justice and Peace Law came into effect in late 
December 2005. However, it has been strongly criticized by an 
important group of Colombian legislators, NGOs, and politicians, 
and by international bodies for its perceived leniency to paramili- 
taries guilty of human rights violations. The law also has been 
faulted for the lack of justice and compensation provided to the vic- 
tims of such crimes, and for its neglect of the problem of drug traf- 
ficking. In particular, the law allows relatively lenient sentences for 
paramilitary members who confess their crimes and protects them 
from extradition, and it lacks concrete measures for extricating 
former paramilitaries from the drug trade. Because of these short- 
comings, in May 2006 the Constitutional Court declared several of 
the law's articles unconstitutional. 

Several days after his second inauguration, in August 2006, Presi- 
dent Uribe gave demobilized paramilitary leaders an ultimatum, 
demanding their compliance with the Justice and Peace Law as a 
precondition for avoiding extradition to the United States. Subse- 
quently, nearly all of them were captured and incarcerated. The 
demobilization process has resulted in significant reductions in the 
country's rates of homicide, abduction, and forced displacement. 
Nevertheless, the Colombian Commission of Jurists claimed that 
paramilitaries, demobilized or active, had killed more than 3,000 
civilians from December 1, 2002, through July 2006. Moreover, in 



262 



Ingrid Betancourt Pulecio, 
a former senator, shortly after 
being rescued on July 2, 2008, 
from six years of FARC captivity 
Courtesy National Army, Ministry of 
National Defense, Colombia 




February 2008 the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement 
reported that the 2007 displacement rate of 305,996 people consti- 
tuted a large increase over 2006 and was the highest figure since 
2002. In 2006 both the Colombian human rights ombudsman and the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported a 
rise in complaints of human rights violations and extrajudicial exe- 
cutions committed by the Colombian security forces. In most cases 
of extrajudicial killings, which occurred in 21 of the country's 
departments, civilians were portrayed as having died in combat, and 
the crime scene had been altered. 

Attempts to conduct a humanitarian exchange of prisoners with the 
FARC have met with less success than the demobilization process. 
Since early 2006, the Colombian government and the guerrillas have 
discussed the possibility of such a negotiation. However, the govern- 
ment has consistently rejected FARC demands that the Andean towns 
of Florida and Pradera, located in the southeastern part of Valle del 
Cauca Department, be demilitarized in order to facilitate the 
exchange. In May 2007, this process received a push from French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy, who petitioned the Uribe government to 
release captured FARC leader Rodrigo Granda so that he could act as 
intermediary. In addition to freeing Granda on June 4, President 
Uribe announced the unilateral release of imprisoned guerrillas, 
apparently as a gesture of goodwill. However, on June 18, 2007, the 
FARC reportedly murdered 11 of the 12 assemblymen from Valle del 



263 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Cauca who were kidnapped in 2002. This incident provoked a mas- 
sive protest in July 2007, when millions of Colombians marched to 
demand that the government and the FARC negotiate in order to lib- 
erate all kidnapping victims. In August the government appointed 
Liberal senator Piedad Cordoba Ruiz to facilitate the humanitarian 
exchange and invited Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez Frias to act 
as mediator. However, President Uribe interrupted the process in mid- 
November 2007 following several disagreements between him and 
Chavez concerning the latter 's role, including a meeting between 
Chavez and FARC leader Luciano Marin Arango ("Ivan Marquez") 
in Caracas. Nevertheless, in February 2008 the FARC released six 
political hostages to Chavez. Uribe easily topped that feat in July 
when a daring rescue operation freed Ingrid Betancourt, three U.S. 
hostages, and 1 1 military and police members. 

Foreign Relations 

General Foreign Policy Traits 

The particular nature of Colombia's political system and the coun- 
try's relations with the United States have been the main determinants 
of the nation's foreign policy. The major features include: the amount 
of power vested in the president, the traditional Liberal-Conservative 
consensus on foreign policy, the personalized nature of Colombian for- 
eign relations, the degree of fragmentation in the formulation of foreign 
policy, the centrality of international law, a pro-United States outlook, 
a low international profile, and lack of popular influence or interest. 

As is the case in most Latin American countries, the concentration 
of power in the hands of the president, the absence of a true separa- 
tion of powers, and the marginal role played by the legislature in 
international matters historically have granted the executive a signif- 
icant degree of autonomy in foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign 
Relations is formally responsible for the planning and execution of 
the country's international relations. In addition, the president has a 
consultation mechanism, the presidential Advisory Commission on 
Foreign Relations (CARE), composed of all former elected presi- 
dents and several other members appointed by Congress and the 
president. This commission advises the executive on diverse interna- 
tional issues of strategic importance. The original purpose of CARE, 
founded in 1914, was to forge a consensus between the Liberal and 
Conservative parties over Colombia's negotiations with the United 
States following the independence of Panama. CARE has thus been 
important in nurturing the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy 
that has remained intact throughout most of the country's history. 



264 



Government and Politics 



The extreme personalization of the Colombian political system, 
along with its powerful presidency, has allowed for a marked distinc- 
tion between the formal structure of the country's foreign policy 
apparatus and the actual execution of external affairs, which have 
tended to revolve around a small network of individuals directly 
associated with the president of the republic. In practice this situa- 
tion has resulted in varying foreign policy orientations, depending on 
the idiosyncracies of the administration of the time, and the absence 
of consistent, long-term state policies. 

Colombian foreign policy has been fragmentary, partly because of 
the perceived inefficacy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in con- 
ducting the country's external affairs and the politicization of the for- 
eign service. Traditionally, this ministry's activities have been 
concentrated in two areas: the resolution of territorial and border dis- 
putes and the conduct of conventional diplomacy in international 
organizations. However, the changing nature of international and 
domestic politics and the inability of the ministry to exercise effective 
coordination of the country's external affairs have led to the creation 
of parallel public posts, and the ascendance of alternative institutions 
involved in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. 

The practice of conventional diplomacy by the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations has sometimes been driven more by the consistent applica- 
tion of the basic principles of international law than by specific polit- 
ical goals. The loss of Panama in the early twentieth century and the 
subsequent national humiliation led Colombian policy makers to 
view international law as the principal means of guaranteeing the 
country's sovereignly and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the strict 
application of juridical principles has at times led to political incon- 
sistency. Following the onset of the Falklands-Malvinas War in 1982, 
for instance, Colombia abstained, along with the United States, from 
voting on the application of the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance in support of Argentina. This decision, based entirely on 
legal considerations, marginalized the country from its Latin Ameri- 
can neighbors, with which Colombia was supposedly seeking to build 
stronger ties. 

Another central characteristic of Colombian foreign policy is the 
country's alignment with the United States, both in economic and 
political terms. Following the independence of Panama, Colombia 
began to seek the satisfaction of its foreign policy objectives through 
a close affiliation with the United States. In addition to becoming a 
passive recipient of U.S. policy, the country's insertion into broader 
international relations became strongly conditioned by its links with 
Washington. 



265 



Colombia: A Country Study 

The lack of public input and interest in international relations has 
been marked in Colombia. After the loss of Panama, for many years 
the country adopted an inward-looking, isolated stance in relation to 
the rest of the world. For the vast majority of the population, the 
nearly continuous existence of civil conflict since the late 1940s has 
compounded this historical predisposition, given that the challenges 
inherent in Colombia's external affairs seem to pale in comparison 
with the domestic situation. 

Primary Doctrines of Foreign Policy 

Colombia's foreign relations have tended historically to reflect 
two conflicting views of the country's place in the world. One posi- 
tion is that its peripheral, subordinate status allows marginal leeway 
in foreign policy and warrants strict alignment with the hegemonic 
power, the United States. The opposite view is that the diversifica- 
tion of foreign relations, in combination with more active participa- 
tion, would increase Colombia's negotiating power and create 
relative margins of autonomy in its relations with the United States. 

The tendency to align Colombia's interests with those of Wash- 
ington is widely known as the respice polum doctrine — the term 
implying an attraction toward the "polar star" of the north, the 
United States. In practice, this principle has consistently led the 
country to adopt a pragmatic position of economic and political sub- 
ordination to the United States. In exchange for its loyalty, the coun- 
try normally has expected to receive substantial economic, political, 
and military assistance from the United States. 

Periodically, however, Colombia also has oriented its foreign pol- 
icy toward Latin American neighbors and other nations, with the 
goal of diversifying its international relations — the respice similia 
doctrine. Following this principle, Colombia at times has sought 
greater interaction with its Latin American neighbors, as well as 
increased leeway vis-a-vis the United States. 

Beginning in the early 1980s, both the respice polum and the 
respice similia doctrines came to be used interchangeably, and Colom- 
bian foreign policy began to alternate between the two, depending on 
the administration, issue, and circumstances in question. This pendular 
swing largely resulted from the growing impact of domestic factors on 
the country's foreign policy, including the end of the National Front 
power-sharing agreement, decreasing political consensus, intensifica- 
tion of the armed conflict, growing political and social unrest, and 
escalation of the drug problem. 

The foreign policy of the Barco administration in the late 1980s, 
for example, alternated between the two principles described. 



266 



Government and Politics 



Although Barco asserted Colombia's independence in relation to the 
United States, primarily by stressing diversification of the country's 
foreign relations through foreign economic diplomacy and regional 
economic integration, he also initiated a war against drug-trafficking 
organizations, a move that aligned the country with Washington's 
policy. The election of Cesar Gaviria in 1990 marked the continua- 
tion of many strategies implemented during the Barco administra- 
tion. In particular, President Gaviria stressed Colombia's foreign 
economic relations over domestic politics as a means of asserting 
greater autonomy and an enhanced international negotiating capac- 
ity. However, Gaviria 's drug policy strayed considerably from the 
U.S. position. 

Foreign Policy Decision Making 

The constitution gives the president of the republic responsibility 
for the conduct of foreign policy. Despite the existence of foreign 
relations committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
the Congress plays only a marginal role in making foreign policy. 
The Ministry of Foreign Relations is responsible for carrying out the 
country's external relations, for coordinating the individual govern- 
mental institutions involved in international affairs, and for resolving 
disputes and inconsistencies that arise between different institutional 
policies. 

Although Colombia has had a career foreign service since the late 
1960s, a considerable percentage of diplomatic posts abroad are allo- 
cated to noncareer individuals based on political considerations. In 
2004 political appointees occupied more than 60 percent of Colom- 
bia's diplomatic positions. Since President Uribe assumed office in 
2002, the media and the political opposition have been highly critical 
of his systematic use of diplomatic posts to reward support for the 
government's political initiatives, particularly because he came to 
power on an anticorruption platform. Control by political appointees 
over the great majority of high-level posts in the country's embassies 
and consulates has led to considerable inconsistency in the develop- 
ment of foreign-policy strategies. 

The 1991 constitutional reform also included efforts to modernize 
public administration. One result of this process was the creation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Commerce (currently, Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, and Tourism) and the Ministry of Environment (currently, 
Ministry of the Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development), 
responsible for Colombian foreign economic policy and environmental 
policy, respectively. International relations offices also came into exis- 
tence in the great majority of the other ministries. The result of these 



267 



Colombia: A Country Study 

changes was to shift Colombia's international relations even further 
into the domain of the president, to marginalize the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations from the most strategic areas of foreign-policy decision mak- 
ing, such as foreign trade and relations with the United States, and to 
obstruct the effective coordination of Colombia's foreign affairs. 
Although the advisory bodies played a considerable role in executive 
decision making and the management of particularly sensitive domestic 
and foreign-policy issues during the Barco, Gaviria, and Samper 
administrations, they were dismantled during the Pastrana government. 

The intensification of the internal armed conflict and its entangle- 
ment with the drug trade in the mid-1990s gave the Ministry of 
National Defense, the military, and the National Police greater dis- 
cretion in determining the country's foreign policies in matters 
involving the war against drugs and insurgents. The Ministry of For- 
eign Relations, which lacked sufficient relevant expertise, thus 
became further marginalized from crucial aspects of the country's 
international relations. 

Diplomatic Relations 

International Institutions 

Colombia has been an active member of the UN and the OAS 
since their creation in the midtwentieth century and also has actively 
participated in a large number of other international institutions, 
including the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). During the Samper 
administration, Colombia held the NAM presidency. Samper aimed 
to improve the country's international image and visibility, diversify 
its political and commercial relations, and increase its international 
negotiating power. On all of these counts, Samper's efforts proved 
insufficient to overcome U.S. opposition. 

In relations with the UN and the OAS, the foreign policy preroga- 
tives since 1991 have been the drug problem, the armed conflict, and 
the human rights crisis. Colombian strategies have included insis- 
tence on the shared responsibility of the international community in 
combating drug trafficking, defense of the government's human 
rights policy, and engagement of global support for domestic objec- 
tives such as development and peace. Colombia has participated as a 
nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council on two occasions 
in recent years, in 1989-90 and 2001-2. During the first period on 
the council, the Colombian government criticized the U.S. invasion 
of Panama in December 1989 and promoted the peaceful resolution 
of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, also known as the 
Iraq-Kuwait War, that ultimately escalated into the Gulf War in 



268 



Minister of National Defense 
Juan Manuel Santos Calderon 
resigned in order to qualify as a 
potential presidential candidate 
in the 2010 election. 
Courtesy Colombian presidential 
Web site 




1991. In the second period, which coincided with particularly close 
relations with the United States, Colombia consistently voted as 
Washington would have wished. In 2003 Colombia was one of the 
few countries in Latin America and the world to support President 
George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq. In UN General Assembly 
debates on the Middle East, Colombia consistently has favored the 
creation of a Palestinian state. 

Throughout the 1990s, consecutive Colombian presidents reiter- 
ated the international community's responsibility for increased con- 
sumption of illegal substances and its duty to assist Colombia in 
confronting drug trafficking. One concrete result of such efforts was 
the approval of the Andean Trade Preference Act (1991) in the 
United States and the Special Cooperation Program in Europe 
(1990), which were designed to assist drug-producing nations in the 
Andean region to diversify their commercial relations. The UN Gen- 
eral Assembly held extraordinary sessions on the drug problem in 
1998, incorporating the principle of joint responsibility. In the OAS, 
similar measures aimed to counteract the unilateral nature of U.S. 
counternarcotics policies. In particular, the OAS started a multilat- 
eral evaluation mechanism within the Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission (CICAD) to ascertain member governments' 
compliance with jointly established antidrug goals. 



269 



Colombia: A Country Study 

The Samper government introduced significant changes to 
Colombia's human rights policy, which traditionally had ignored the 
existence of systematic violations. Between 1994 and 1995, Samper 
explicitly acknowledged that grave violations of human rights 
occurred in Colombia, promoted the Geneva Convention Protocol II, 
and accepted the state's responsibility in the 1988-90 massacres of 
nearly 100 people in Trujillo. In 1996 the Colombian government 
acknowledged the binding nature of Inter- American Commission on 
Human Rights rulings and agreed to open a national branch of the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Since 1998 this office has issued yearly reports, which the Colom- 
bian government has criticized, that have become increasingly criti- 
cal of the country's human rights situation. 

Andres Pastrana emphasized a "diplomacy for peace" initiative to 
engage foreign support for the peace process that the Colombian 
government began with the FARC in 1999. The basic assumption of 
this policy was that human rights and international humanitarian law 
violations would subside once peace was achieved in Colombia, and, 
thus, that international assistance should concentrate mainly on the 
peace effort. Notwithstanding Pastrana's attempts to internationalize 
the peace process, the government was reluctant to request interna- 
tional mediation and the creation of a UN peace mission. Only when 
the process was near collapse did Colombia accept the special UN 
envoy as intermediary, but the envoy was ultimately unsuccessful in 
preventing the breakdown of the talks. The Uribe administration's 
relations with the UN have been tense. President Uribe has unsuc- 
cessfully sought out greater UN involvement in the internal armed 
conflict, mainly because the UN secretary general has insisted that 
all parties to the conflict and not just the government must request 
any measures taken to resolve the war. The UN also has been highly 
critical of the Uribe government's failure to comply with many of 
the recommendations of the Colombian Office of the High Commis- 
sioner for Human Rights for improving human rights standards in 
the country, and on several occasions the government has accused 
UN officials of being terrorist sympathizers. 

The United States 

Beginning in the 1980s, the salience of the drug issue in Colom- 
bia's relations with the United States reinforced the dependent rela- 
tions between the two countries and crowded other issues off the 
agenda. Notwithstanding the willingness of previous governments to 
collaborate with the U.S. "war on drugs," the terror campaign that 
the Colombian drug cartels adopted in order to impede their extradi- 



270 



Government and Politics 



tion to the United States led the Gaviria administration to focus its 
drug policy on domestic objectives rather than those established by 
Washington. The mid- 1992 escape from prison of Medellin Cartel 
leader Pablo Escobar Gaviria, ultimately killed in December 1993, 
led to increasing U.S. apprehension over the effectiveness of Colom- 
bia's drug strategy (see United States-Colombia Security Coopera- 
tion and Plan Colombia, ch. 5). 

The bilateral relationship experienced a severe breakdown follow- 
ing the scandal over Samper's presidential campaign. The United 
States began to refer openly to Colombia as a "narco-democracy" 
and a "narco-state," and U.S. policy toward the country became 
markedly aggressive. In June 1996, Samper's U.S. visa was revoked, 
and direct relations with the Colombian president ceased altogether. 
However, the National Police, the Attorney General's Office, and 
other institutions maintained close ties with the U.S. government 
throughout this period and often acted independently of the Colom- 
bian executive. Although the Samper government consistently com- 
plied with Washington's antinarcotics policy, the United States, in its 
annual ratings of Colombia's cooperation in counternarcotics efforts, 
decertified the country in 1996 and 1997. 

U.S. ostracism of Samper had significant domestic and interna- 
tional effects. Domestically, it forced the Colombian government to 
vigorously embrace the U.S. counternarcotics strategy while eroding 
Samper's internal credibility. Internationally, Colombia became iden- 
tified as a pariah state, with significant political costs for the coun- 
try's foreign policy. During his entire presidency, Samper received 
only two official state visits by heads of state — those from Venezuela 
and Ecuador. Ten of Samper's 12 international trips were taken in his 
capacity as president of the Nonaligned Movement, not as president 
of Colombia. 

The election of Andres Pastrana in 1998 appeared a prime oppor- 
tunity for reestablishing a cooperative tone in the bilateral relation- 
ship. Before his inauguration, Pastrana met with President William 
Jefferson Clinton in Washington. One of Pastrana's primary goals 
was to press for an "opening" of the bilateral agenda beyond the 
issue of drugs. During Pastrana's first official visit to the White 
House in late October 1998, Clinton made an explicit pledge to sup- 
port the Colombian peace process, and to work with international 
institutions to mobilize resources to support this objective. The 
United States also stepped up its military assistance to Colombia, 
which reached US$289 million in 1999, compared with only US$67 
million in 1996. The increased funding was spurred by the deterio- 
rating security situation and extensive drug trafficking. 



271 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Growing skepticism among key U.S. officials regarding the viabil- 
ity of the peace process led to an important shift in the Colombian 
government's foreign policy strategy. In particular, Plan Colombia, 
presented to the U.S. Congress in late 1999, addressed the drug prob- 
lem instead of the peace process in order to secure U.S. support. 
Colombia's strategy was successful in that the aid package approved 
for 2000-1 amounted to more than US$1 billion. Of that funding, 80 
percent consisted of military assistance for the "war on drugs," and 
20 percent was for social and economic assistance related to alterna- 
tive development (see Glossary), the administration of justice, human 
rights, and peace. 

The Pastrana government's termination of the peace process with 
the FARC in February 2002 placed Colombia squarely within Wash- 
ington's post-9/11 counterterrorist efforts. Although President Pas- 
trana had never publicly referrred to the guerrillas as terrorists, he 
made this association explicit when he announced his decision to 
call off the peace talks. Colombia's insertion into the George W. 
Bush administration's global "war on terror" intensified following 
Alvaro Uribe's inauguration. The effect of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks in the United States and the end of the peace process with the 
FARC was to lift the previous strict distinction of U.S. drug policy 
between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency. This distinction 
had restricted all U.S. aid to Colombia to use in drug-producing 
regions. With the lifting of this restriction, all U.S. aid received 
under Plan Colombia could now be used in both counternarcotics 
and counterinsurgency (now called counterterrorism). Counternar- 
cotics assistance already disbursed through Plan Colombia became 
available for Colombia to use in its counterterrorism efforts. And in 
its 2003 budget proposal, for the first time since the end of the Cold 
War, a U.S. administration requested military funding for activities 
unrelated to the drug war in Colombia, including monies to train and 
equip Colombian army brigades to protect the Cano Limon-Covenas 
oil pipeline. Between 2001 and 2005, aid to Colombia averaged 
approximately US$500 million per year. Beginning in 2004, a por- 
tion of this total was used to finance Plan Patriota, the largest 
Colombian military offensive against armed groups in the country's 
history. 

Increased U.S. military assistance to Colombia between 2000 and 
2005 led to greater U.S. involvement in the country's internal con- 
flict. However, extremely close bilateral ties established during this 
period did not eliminate altogether sources of tension in Colom- 
bian-U.S. relations. The Uribe government's negotiations with the 
paramilitaries are a particularly sensitive issue, given these groups' 



272 



Government and Politics 



links with drug trafficking and outstanding U.S. extradition requests 
for several AUC members. Although the human rights situation 
showed some improvement, the persistence of high levels of viola- 
tions and the Colombian government's failure to sever links between 
paramilitaries and members of the military and to punish military 
officials charged with human rights crimes also continue to be prob- 
lematic areas. 

After the November 2006 congressional elections in the United 
States, the tone of bilateral relations changed dramatically. Demo- 
cratic control of both houses of the U.S. Congress led to greater lev- 
els of scrutiny over U.S. military aid to Colombia, higher levels of 
skepticism toward the existing counternarcotics strategy, and 
increased demands on President Uribe over human rights, particu- 
larly in relation to the murders of labor union activists. Two results 
of the changing political climate within the United States were the 
postponement o%he congressional vote on the free-trade agreement 
(FTA) with Colombia and the readjustment of the 2008 aid package 
to favor social and economic assistance over military aid. In early 
2009, however, President Barack H. Obama tasked the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative with addressing unresolved issues sur- 
rounding the Colombia FTA. 

Latin America 

Close ties with the United States have tended to overshadow 
Colombia's relations with the rest of the world, including its Latin 
American neighbors. Nevertheless, regional relations normally have 
been cordial, with the exception of long-standing border disputes 
with Venezuela and Nicaragua, and more recently with Ecuador. 
Colombia has signed free-trade agreements with Chile, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. Since the early 1990s, the country has had a strong bilat- 
eral trade agreement with Venezuela, its second-largest trading part- 
ner. The Uribe administration favors extending these bilateral trade 
agreements across the hemisphere. 

The adoption of the respice similia doctrine between the late 1960s 
and the early 1980s contributed to the establishment of further links 
with similar, nearby countries, to more active participation in regional 
organizations, and to efforts to create institutionalized frameworks to 
nurture relations with regional counterparts. In addition to attempts to 
strengthen the Andean group, President Barco, with his Venezuelan 
counterpart, Carlos Andres Perez, initiated an ambitious program of 
integration in Feburary 1989, designed to expand the scope of bilat- 
eral relations beyond the border disputes that traditionally had domi- 
nated. Colombia and Ecuador formed a similar bilateral border 



273 



Colombia: A Country Study 

commission several months later. The G-3, also formed in 1989, pri- 
marily had the goal of increasing political and diplomatic cooperation 
among Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. 

The explicit reference in the 1991 constitution preamble to 
Colombia's commitment to promoting Latin American integration 
signaled a tentative shift in the country's perception of its role in the 
subcontinent. President Gaviria's Latin American policy stressed 
regional dynamics and diversification of Colombia's foreign rela- 
tions as part of a larger economic liberalization strategy. As well as 
continuing President Barco's policies, under Gaviria Colombia also 
nurtured relations with the Caribbean, assumed the leadership of the 
Association of Caribbean States (ACS), and formed border commis- 
sions with Brazil in 1993, Panama in 1993, and Peru in 1994. 

During the first half of the 1990s, the border commissions contrib- 
uted to more productive relations with Colombia's closest neighbors, 
the expansion of its bilateral regional agenda, and considerable reduc- 
tions in tensions with neighbors, particularly Venezuela. However, 
heavier emphasis on traditional border security in the mid-1990s and 
mixed success in implementing methods of handling shared problems 
at the border tended to reduce the border commissions' effectiveness 
and importance. More importantly, the intensification of the Colom- 
bian armed conflict between 1996 and 1997 led to the prioritization 
of security issues in Colombia's relations with its neighbors. 

Although armed guerrillas have long been present on Colombia's 
borders, their presence there began to increase during the second half 
of the 1990s. In addition, movement beyond the borders became 
more frequent, as well as isolated skirmishes between Colombian 
groups and national forces from neighboring countries, and incidents 
of violence involving local border populations. The increased U.S. 
military presence in Colombia — following the approval of Plan 
Colombia in 2000 — became a major cause for alarm in Brazil, Vene- 
zuela, and Ecuador, given their fear of growing U.S. intervention in 
the region. All five countries bordering Colombia (Brazil, Ecuador, 
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela) adopted varying degrees of border 
militarization in order to protect themselves from the spillover 
effects of Plan Colombia, mainly the increased numbers of displaced 
persons fleeing from armed violence, the growing presence of armed 
groups on the border, and environmental and public health problems 
caused by aerial fumigation of illegal crops. 

The regional foreign policy focus of presidents Pastrana and 
Uribe has consisted largely of requesting that neighboring countries 
express their solidarity with Colombia's internal crisis. The Pastrana 
government's strategy of seeking out Latin American support for 



274 



A FARC guerrilla of the 53d 
Front with a South African 
grenade launcher, 
somewhere in southern 
Cundinamarca Department 
Courtesy David 
Spencer Collection 




both the peace process with the FARC and for Plan Colombia met 
with limited success, particularly given the region's wariness of U.S. 
involvement in Colombia. Uribe has insisted on the need for stronger 
regional initiatives to combat terrorism and has consistently sought 
the support of Latin America in declaring illegal armed groups, par- 
ticularly the FARC, terrorists. On both counts, he, too, has been rela- 
tively unsuccessful. Aside from a series of diplomatic statements 
expressing regional support for Colombia's fight against terrorism, 
neighboring countries have been reluctant to publicly identify the 
FARC as terrorists, mostly because they disagree with President 
Uribe 's portrayal of the Colombian crisis as a terrorist war and not 
an armed insurgency, and because they are averse to further involve- 
ment in the internal war. Colombia's emphasis on terrorism in its 
foreign policy increasingly contrasted with the foreign policies of 
several neighboring countries that had attempted to distance them- 
selves from the counterterrorist and security policies of the George 
W. Bush administration, with which the Uribe government strongly 
identified. 

Within this worsening climate of regional relations, Colombia's 
bilateral relations with Venezuela and Ecuador have been by far the 
most tense. Given the growing complexity of the border region, the 
increased presence of illegal armed groups, and the many outstand- 
ing problems characterizing Colombian- Venezuelan relations, coop- 
eration between President Uribe and President Hugo Chavez of 



275 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Venezuela was close to impossible until 2005, particularly over secu- 
rity. In addition to strong ideological differences, a lack of mutual 
trust between the two leaders has characterized the relationship. 
Chavez views the Uribe government as part of a Colombian oligar- 
chy that supports the Venezuelan opposition, and as an ally of the 
former Bush administration, which was consistently critical of 
Chavez. Colombia has suspected that President Chavez maintains 
close relations with the guerrillas, a situation that reached a tipping 
point in December 2004, when FARC leader Rodrigo Granda was 
apprehended on Venezuelan territory and secretly moved to Colom- 
bia for official capture. Following the withdrawal of the Venezuelan 
ambassador in Colombia and the temporary suspension of bilateral 
trade relations, the Colombian government offered an unofficial 
apology. Recognizing the importance of the bilateral relationship to 
both countries, the two presidents worked to restore mutual confi- 
dence and were largely successful, vide Chavez's role between 2005 
and 2008 as mediator in the humanitarian exchange with the FARC. 

Tensions between Colombia and Ecuador revolve mainly around 
the fumigation of coca crops in the border region — particularly the 
alleged public-health problems and environmental damage it 
causes — and the presence of Colombian illegal armed fighters who 
commit acts of violence in Ecuadorian territory. In contrast to 
Colombia's relations with Venezuela, a similar rapport does not exist 
between presidents Uribe and Rafael Correa Delgado, nor do the two 
countries enjoy adequate degrees of mutual confidence (see Interna- 
tional and Regional Security Relations, ch. 5). 

Europe 

Colombia's relations with Europe, although long-standing, have 
been of secondary importance compared to its relations with the 
United States and within the region and have mostly been limited to 
trade and investment flows. However, in the years following 1990 
several factors converged to increase the relevance of both bilateral 
and multilateral relations with the continent. First, approval of the 
Special Cooperation Program in Europe, in addition to economic lib- 
eralization and diversification of Colombia's foreign economic rela- 
tions, led to considerable growth in trade and investment, thus 
strengthening Colombian interdependence with Europe. Second, the 
prioritization in the early 1 990s of issue areas in Europe that were of 
lower priority to the United States, including human rights, develop- 
ment, and the environment, led to increased efforts on the part of 
Colombia to consolidate its political relations with the continent. In 
addition to government interaction, a significant number of Colom- 



276 



Government and Politics 



bian NGOs began to work directly with specific European official 
and private-sector organizations. Third, the internationalization of 
the Colombian armed conflict in the late 1990s led to growing Euro- 
pean involvement in peace and humanitarian assistance efforts in the 
country. Lastly, interregional negotiations between the Andean Com- 
munity of Nations (see Glossary), of which Colombia has been an 
active member, and the EU have opened additional forms of multi- 
lateral interaction. 

Europe's involvement in Colombia grew noticeably during the 
Pastrana administration as a result of the president's efforts to inter- 
nationalize solutions to the country's armed conflict. The Colombian 
government sought to counteract the excessive weight of military 
factors in the Plan Colombia package by requesting social, develop- 
ment, and diplomatic assistance from Europe. Initial European par- 
ticipation in the peace effort was clouded precisely by skepticism 
concerning Plan Colombia, seen as a U.S. -inspired counternarcotics 
strategy with some objectionable aspects such as aerial spraying of 
coca crops. 

In 2000 Europe declared explicit support for the peace process 
and government efforts to seek a negotiated settlement (notwith- 
standing substantial reservations) while simultaneously rejecting 
U.S. intervention in Colombia. European governments participated 
in peace talks with both the FARC and the ELN guerrillas, while 
total European contributions for peace, humanitarian assistance, and 
development efforts during the Pastrana and the first Uribe adminis- 
trations amounted to approximately 350 million euros. This level of 
support made Europe the principal source of international coopera- 
tion funding in Colombia. 

Colombia's relations with Europe deteriorated following the termi- 
nation of the peace talks with the FARC and Uribe 's electoral victory. 
The EU has been critical of the Uribe government's hard-line coun- 
terterrorist language, is suspicious of its Democratic Security Policy, 
and has systematically criticized its human rights record and its so- 
matization of NGOs accused by Uribe of supporting terrorists. 
Europe also has been unwilling to support negotiations with the para- 
militaries, because of the lenient treatment that they stand to receive 
when they lay down their arms and the lack of adequate reparations 
and justice for the victims of human rights abuses committed by 
them. 

A July 2003 meeting, held in London by Colombian and Euro- 
pean government officials, NGOs, and representatives of the UN, 
made European assistance contingent on Colombia's compliance 
with a series of 24 UN recommendations for improving the country's 
human rights situation. The London declaration also was celebrated 



277 



Colombia: A Country Study 

widely in Colombia as a step forward in securing European coopera- 
tion. However, the Uribe government's failure to comply with many 
of the UN's recommendations has constituted a serious obstacle to 
progress. Uribe 's antiterrorist discourse received a tepid reception 
during his official visit to Europe in the first half of 2004. 

Several developments within Europe itself also account for the 
state of Colombian-European relations. The replacement of right- 
winger Jose Maria Aznar as Spanish prime minister by the socialist, 
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, in early 2004, prompted Spain to dis- 
tance itself from Colombia while seeking closer diplomatic relations 
with ideologically sympathetic Latin American leaders in Brazil and 
Venezuela. In addition, the expansion of the EU's membership in 
2004 and later, and continuing debate concerning its constitution, 
has drawn the continent's attention closer to home. French president 
Nicolas Sarkozy's interest in Colombia and a proposal to exchange 
FARC prisoners for Ingrid Betancourt was directly related to domes- 
tic pressures to free the former presidential candidate, who is also a 
French citizen, from FARC captivity. 

Asia 

In comparison to other Latin American countries, Colombia's 
relations with Asia traditionally have been weak, notwithstanding 
their formal commencement in the early twentieth century, in the 
case of Japan. Unlike Chile, Mexico, or Peru, Colombia also has 
been slow to strengthen its links with this part of the world, in partic- 
ular with China, in the post-Cold War period. 

Barco initiated diplomatic outreach with two visits to Asia in 
1987 and 1989, followed by a visit by Gaviria to Japan in 1994 and a 
tour to China, South Korea, and Indonesia by Samper in 1996. In 
1994 the Pacific Basin Economic Council and the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council accepted Colombia as a member. Although the 
Samper government lobbied hard for Colombian admittance to the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in 1998 this organiza- 
tion decided to freeze its membership for a period of 10 years, to 
concentrate on achieving its main goal of promoting economic dyna- 
mism and growth among its members. 

Japan continues to be Colombia's primary trade and investment 
partner in Asia, although current levels of interaction are low, given 
visa requirements for Colombian travelers to Japan and what is per- 
ceived by Japanese investors as an unfavorable business climate in 
Colombia. However, private-sector interest in China has grown con- 
siderably during the past five years. In 2003 about 400 representa- 
tives of the Colombian private sector participated in the Guangdong 
Sheng Fair, the most important commercial fair in China. In contrast 



278 



Government and Politics 



to the private sector, Colombian diplomatic coverage in Asia has 
been reduced, with the closing of embassies in Thailand, New Zea- 
land, Australia, and Indonesia, and of the consulate in Singapore in 
2003. In April 2005, President Uribe, accompanied by a commission 
composed of more than 25 government representatives, 140 private- 
sector representatives, and 40 university presidents, conducted an 
official visit to China and Japan. Additionally, following the end of 
APEC's freeze of new country members in December 2006, the 
Colombian government requested that the other members of the 
institution support its application for membership. 

Outlook 

The Colombian political system continues to pose a major para- 
dox. The country has been able to maintain formal democracy and 
relatively successful levels of economic, political, and social devel- 
opment notwithstanding the existence of prolonged armed conflict, 
humanitarian crises, human rights violations, drug trafficking, cor- 
ruption, and social and economic inequality. Colombia's political 
future is largely tied to this contradiction. Indeed, as one of the few 
countries in Latin America with an uninterrupted democracy for 
nearly 50 years, Colombia has state institutions that can be consid- 
ered fairly robust and stable. 

The stated goal of President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy is 
precisely to put an end to the internal armed conflict while reinforcing 
democratic governance, yet the Uribe administration's "war against 
terrorism" has tended to undermine fundamental constitutional rights 
and guarantees, while stigmatizing certain sectors of Colombian and 
international society. These include local and global human rights 
organizations, ethnic communities, labor unions, journalists, and inter- 
national institutions such as the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, which have been critical of Uribe's leadership. Negoti- 
ations with the paramilitaries, although a fundamental component of 
peace, threaten to pardon heinous human rights crimes committed by 
these groups with inadequate reparations for the victims. Of equal 
concern are the paramilitaries' close ties with the drug trade. 

The Uribe government's hardhanded strategy earned it high 
domestic approval and the support of the George W. Bush adminis- 
tration in the United States, which regarded the Colombian president 
as a key ally in the region. However, the U.S. Congress and opposi- 
tion political groups within Colombia, including the Liberal Party 
and the Alternative Democratic Pole, have become increasingly crit- 
ical of the Colombian president. The country's political future will 
depend largely on the outcome of the parapolitics scandal and the 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

internal armed conflict. Although the Uribe government has argued 
at home and abroad that the ties between politicians and paramilitar- 
ies came to light as a result of the Democratic Security Policy, the 
fact that several Uribe appointees and numerous members of the 
government's political coalition in the Congress, including the presi- 
dent's cousin, have been accused of or are under investigation for 
such links does not sit well among the Colombian president's critics. 

The formal participation of former paramilitaries in political 
activities, which is forbidden by law until they confess their crimes 
and serve their sentences, will also have profound effects on Colom- 
bian politics. One of the most acute problems during the 2006 and 
2007 elections was precisely that of paramilitary influence in elec- 
toral campaigns. In addition to their legal and illegal participation in 
the electoral process, paramilitary penetration of public institutions, 
in particular outside Colombia's larger cities, poses a considerable 
threat to the democratic state of law. 

It is feasible that informal talks with the ELN guerrillas — begun 
in October 2005 in Cuba — will eventually culminate in a peace 
agreement. However, peace negotiations with the FARC are unlikely 
in the short term. Given the high-profile role of the United States in 
the Colombian conflict, the evolution of U.S. policy toward negotia- 
tions with the paramilitaries, Plan Colombia, and the war against ter- 
rorism will also continue to influence the country's political 
scenario. The outcome of the 2008 U.S. presidential election might 
have seemed likely to lead to renewed criticism from Washington of 
President Uribe 's handling of a number of issues, from human rights 
to the parapolitics scandal. Surprisingly perhaps, Colombia-United 
States relations appeared not to be especially strained during the first 
eight months of the administration of President Barack H. Obama. 
Neither did the approval by the Colombian Congress of Uribe 's ref- 
erendum proposal, which could allow him to run in the 2010 presi- 
dential election, appear to have any adverse impact on Colombia's 
relations with the new U.S. administration. President Uribe 's bid for 
a third term depended on the outcome of the Constitutional Court's 
review of the referendum proposal and other political factors affect- 
ing his decision. 

* * * 



Frank Safford and Marco Palacios offer an interesting sociologi- 
cal and historical discussion of Colombia's spacial fragmentation 
and the subsequent difficulties that the country has encountered in 



280 



Government and Politics 



constructing the nation-state in Colombia: Fragmented Land, 
Divided Society. An exhaustive analysis of political violence in 
Colombia can be found in Violencia polhica en Colombia: De la 
nacion fragmentada a la construccion del estado by Ingrid Bolivar, 
Fernan E. Gonzalez, and Teofilo Vasquez. El conflicto, callejon con 
salida: Informe nacional de desarrollo humano para Colombia, a 
UNDP multiauthor report edited by Hernando Gomez Buendia, 
offers a particularly useful study of the development of the armed 
conflict in Colombia and the distinct avenues available for its peace- 
ful resolution. Ann C. Mason and Luis Javier Orjuela's volume, La 
crisis polhica colombiana: Mas que un conflicto armado y un pro- 
ceso armado de paz, conducts a thorough examination of the Colom- 
bian crisis, including studies of the origins and construction of the 
state, the evolution of the armed conflict, the development of 
national and local political dynamics, and the role of global factors. 
In Una democracia asediada: Balance y perspectivas del conflicto 
armado en Colombia, Eduardo Pizarro Leongomez discusses the 
protracted nature of the armed conflict in Colombia and its effects on 
the development of political and social dynamics in the country. A 
useful analysis of judicial power in Colombia is provided by El 
caleidoscopio de las justicias en Colombia: Andlisis socio-juridico, 
a two-volume study edited by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Mau- 
ricio Garcia Villegas. The contributors analyze the transformations 
in the judicial system introduced by the 1991 constitution and their 
primary strengths and weaknesses. 

In Sintesis, the National University of Colombia's Institute for 
Political Studies and International Relations (IEPRI) publishes excel- 
lent annual analyses of Colombia's principal political, social, and 
economic phenomena. OASIS, also published yearly, by the Exter- 
nado University of Colombia, provides analyses of Colombian for- 
eign policy that address a diverse range of issue areas and geographic 
regions. Martha Ardila, Diego Cardona, and Arlene B. Tickner's vol- 
ume, Prioridades y desafios de la pohtica exterior colombiana, pro- 
vides a comprehensive analysis of Colombia's foreign relations 
during the decade up to 2002. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



281 



Chapter 5, National Security 



Top: An indigenous geometric design, C Jaramillo Collection, Pas to 
Bottom: An indigenous geometric design, Museo Zambrano, Pasto 
Courtesy Carlos Arturo Jaramillo Giraldo, Murmullos del lenguaje Uik: 
La practica del mopa mopa: De lo recolector a lo sedentario, Medellin, 
1986, 79, 81 



COLOMBIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY situation is the most com- 
plex in Latin America. A protracted armed conflict, chronic criminal 
and political violence, and an illegal drug industry that supplies 80 
percent of the world's cocaine have combined to create a security pre- 
dicament of multiple dimensions. Colombia has an established tradi- 
tion of political violence, as evidenced by the War of the Thousand 
Days (1899-1902), the period of sectarian violence called La Violen- 
cia (1946-58), and the internal armed conflict since the 1960s. Never- 
theless, the country's security scenario in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century involves a multifaceted maze of threats, human 
rights violations, and diverse forms of violence. Colombia's security 
problems are largely internal in nature, and yet they are also part of 
complex transnational dynamics related to global markets for illicit 
drugs and small arms. 

Following a failed peace process with the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the late 1990s, the government pursued 
a two-pronged counterinsurgency strategy. It called for eradicating the 
insurgency by means of a military offensive designed to defeat the guer- 
rillas, or at least to force them into negotiations, and continuing the "war 
on drugs" to seek elimination of the insurgents' primary source of 
financing. This policy was implemented with significant U.S. military 
assistance dedicated to the aerial fumigation of coca crops and military 
Iraining. Plan Colombia later evolved into a more comprehensive 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism posture with an increased U.S. 
military presence committed to strengthening Colombia's armed forces 
and their fighting ability. Since 2003 the government has also engaged 
in negotiations with the right-wing paramilitaries to achieve their disar- 
mament and demobilization. Although the administration of Alvaro 
Uribe Velez (president, 2002-6, 2006-10) has improved Colombia's 
security situation, negotiations with the FARC have remained dead- 
locked, and the process of demobilization of paramilitaries also has been 
fraught with difficulties. 

The Military 

Historical Background 

Colombia's current armed forces had their origins in the militia 
organized in 1811 by a rebellious league called the United Provinces 
of New Granada (see Breaking the Spanish Connection, ch. 1). The 
force — composed of poor, uneducated, campesino volunteers — was 



285 



Colombia: A Country Study 

divided into infantry and cavalry units trained by a senior officer 
corps. The constitutional charter of 1811 assigned the power to raise 
and organize the army to the nascent Congress, which proved sup- 
portive of the military. Spanish military structure and traditions were 
adopted and plans laid for the creation of an academy to regularize 
military training. Many key military leaders died during the first 
phase of the war for independence that lasted from 1810 to 1816, and 
their troops gradually came under the command of Simon Bolivar 
Palacios. 

Unlike the military of several Latin American countries, the 
Colombian forces played a subordinate role during the first few 
decades of the nineteenth century. A strong antimilitarist tradition 
emerged in the postindependence period among the nation's civilian 
leaders, who wanted to prevent the military from becoming an 
autonomous power. The country's two-party system, which limited 
the leading party's power to establish absolute control over the mili- 
tary, also held military influence in check. It was customary for the 
opposing party to raise its own army. Government opposition to the 
development of a strong professional military led to the transforma- 
tion of the armed forces in the 1860s into a sort of Colombian 
national guard as well as to the creation of official state-level militias 
with marked sectarian loyalties. 

When factional fighting subsided in the 1880s, the government 
approved the first laws governing the military and defined its consti- 
tutional responsibilities of providing for domestic order and external 
defense. The constitution of 1886 also called for a program of uni- 
versal male conscription, which was not enforced until the early 
twentieth century. These measures encouraged limited progress in 
military discipline and morale. However, the 1899 revolt by the Lib- 
eral Party (Partido Liberal), which marked the start of the War of the 
Thousand Days, set back these military-reform efforts (see The War 
of the Thousand Days and Loss of Panama, 1899-1903, ch. 1). 

Modernization of the Military 

A government campaign to revitalize the country following the 
civil war included plans for the reorganization and modernization of 
the armed forces. Although there were concerns over border tensions 
with Venezuela, efforts to modernize the military at the start of the 
twentieth century were motivated by an interest in creating a nonparti- 
san, professional, and, above all, apolitical military. The reforms had 
two main objectives: to subordinate the armed forces to civilian 
authority and to purge the military of the political rivalry between sup- 
porters of the Liberal Party and those of the Conservative Party 



286 



National Security 



(Partido Conservador). The centerpiece of the first military reorgani- 
zation that began in 1907 was the establishment of education centers 
to provide nonpartisan training in doctrine, tactics, and technology. 
Chilean military officers trained in the Prussian tradition developed 
the curricula in the newly founded Military Cadet School (Esmic), the 
Superior War College (Esdegue), and the Naval Cadet School (Enap). 
The first Military Aviation School (Emavi) began operating in 1921 as 
the flight school of the newly established Colombian Air Force (FAC). 
In 1933 Emavi moved from Flandes, Tolima, to its present location in 
Cali and, in the late 1950s, named itself after Marco Fidel Suarez 
(president, 1918-21). The second military aviation school, the Army 
Aviation Branch School (Escuela de Arma de Aviation del Ejercito), 
also opened in 1921. Meanwhile, the government widened the con- 
scription base and set new standards for salaries and promotions. 

After this flurry of reform activity, official interest in the armed 
forces began to wane. On December 6, 1928, the government called 
on the army to suppress a banana workers' strike against the United 
Fruit Company (see Decline of the Conservative Hegemony, ch. 1). 
The army's use of extensive and indiscriminate force in that incident, 
in what came to be known as the "massacre of the banana workers," 
raised doubts as to the military's professionalism. During the 
1932-34 border conflict with Peru over Leticia, Colombia had seri- 
ous problems with military readiness, which spurred increases in 
ground forces and military spending in the 1930s. 

The Role of the United States 

The United States played a major role in the modernization of the 
armed forces in the second half of the twentieth century. The first U.S. 
military adviser in Colombia counseled the National Navy in the 
defense of ports and arms procurement during the conflict with Peru 
over Leticia. In 1938 a U.S. naval mission arrived, charged with plan- 
ning for the defense of the Panama Canal in case of German aggres- 
sion. This mission was followed in the 1940s by the construction of air 
and naval bases on Colombian territory and Colombia's participation in 
the Inter- American Defense Board. Military cooperation entered a new 
phase in 1950 with Colombia's decision to support the United Nations 
(UN) action in Korea by sending an infantry battalion and a warship in 
1951. With the Colombian battalion attached to a U.S. infantry regi- 
ment, the Korean theater represented another opportunity for Colom- 
bian troops to receive training from their U.S. counterparts. In 1952 the 
Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Colom- 
bia established a U.S. mission in Colombia's Ministry of War, and 
Colombian officers began training in counterinsurgency operations at 



287 



Colombia: A Country Study 

the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. Two 
years later, Colombia founded the first counterguerrilla-training center 
in Latin America, followed in 1960 by the establishment of the organi- 
zation that later became the Superior Council on National Defense and 
Security (CSSDN). 

Partisanship and the Armed Forces 

Efforts to modernize the armed forces remained thwarted by the 
persistent partisanship of certain segments of the military. Despite 
efforts to depoliticize the forces, many high-ranking officers remained 
loyal to the Conservative Party, whereas the lower ranks were more 
partial to the Liberal Party. In 1944 disgruntled mid-ranking officials 
attempted to overthrow Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (president, 1934-38, 
1942-45) for his reformist political agenda. Although the coup 
attempt failed for lack of support by the military command, the action 
suggested that the military's restraint from political involvement was 
deteriorating. 

In the late 1940s, the military abandoned any pretense of neutrality 
when the Conservative government of Luis Mariano Ospina Perez 
(president, 1946-50) openly employed the army to harass the Liberal 
opposition. Conservative officers received favorable treatment in 
terms of salaries and promotions, whereas many of their Liberal 
counterparts were discriminated against, cashiered, or sent to fight in 
Korea. This split echoed a broader rupture within Colombia's law and 
order institutions, as the police in Bogota aligned themselves with the 
Liberal Party, whereas rural police were loyal to the Conservatives. 
The principles of modernization and professionalism in the military 
were dealt a severe blow following the assassination of presidential 
contender Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948, when the army was called out 
to help defend Bogota after the police sided with the rioters protesting 
events. 

In 1953, at the height of La Violencia, Colombia's military lead- 
ers overthrew the archconservative Laureano Eleuterio Gomez Cas- 
tro (president, 1950-53), placing General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
(president, 1953-57) in power. Despite having engineered the only 
successful coup d'etat since the War of the Thousand Days, the mili- 
tary command was reluctant to accept Rojas's efforts to involve the 
services in political affairs. Although he dubbed his administration 
the "government of the armed forces," opposition by military leaders 
forced Rojas to jettison plans to create a political support group 
directed by the army chief of staff. In the midst of growing tension 
with top military leaders, Rojas transferred certain powers from the 



288 



National Security 



General Command to the Ministry of War and the army's General 
Staff. 

Colombia's armed forces were strengthened overall during the 
Rojas dictatorship. Troop strength more than doubled in the 1950s to 
32,000 soldiers, and reforms with lasting repercussions included the 
reorganization of the National Police under the direct control of the 
military. In addition to implementing a one-year obligatory military 
service, Rojas created the Military Industry (Indumil) as an autono- 
mous company to manage the domestic production of weapons and 
ammunition, established two new training schools, including the 
Tolemaida training base modeled after Fort Benning, founded the 
Military Club for officers, built the military hospital, and created the 
military's National Administration Center. 

In 1957 the military again intervened in politics. Dissatisfaction 
with the internal situation, rising popular discontent, and growing 
concern that corruption charges against the general would further 
tarnish its image led the army to overthrow Rojas in a bloodless 
coup. His successor ruled with a military junta that one year later 
turned power over to the first National Front government (see The 
National Front, 1958-78, ch.l). 

Organizing for Counter ins urgency 

During the four administrations of the National Front, the military 
largely submitted to civilian power and respected the political status 
quo, vindicating the professional reputation of the armed forces. 
Attempts by the military to become more active in national politics 
were sporadic and not widely supported. This shift in the military's 
attitude to its role in relation to the civil government was closely 
linked with national security developments beginning in the 1960s. 
The evolution of a counterinsurgent, anticommunist posture to meet 
the growing guerrilla threat not only shaped the' strategic evolution of 
the armed services but also became a unifying ideological force for the 
military, replacing Liberal and Conservative loyalties. Consensus 
regarding the new internal enemy allowed the military finally to over- 
come the factionalism that had been the principal obstacle to achieving 
a modern and professional force since Colombia's founding. Changing 
the name of the Ministry of War to the Ministry of National Defense in 
1965 reflected the military's modernizing trend, although army offi- 
cers still controlled the ministry. 

Military organization and operations became increasingly respon- 
sive to the necessities of irregular warfare. The first mobile brigade and 
elite counterguerrilla force began operating in the 1960s, and the army 
restructured into divisions in the late 1980s. Among the institutional 



289 



Colombia: A Country Study 

reforms enacted by the administration of Cesar Augusto Gaviria Tru- 
jillo (president, 1990-94), the most significant was the creation of a 
civilian Ministry of National Defense that established political author- 
ity over security and defense affairs, restricting the autonomous power 
of the military. In the late 1990s, the changing nature of the internal 
conflict was the impetus for a major military reform that consisted of 
increases in personnel, resources, territorial presence, and intelligence 
capabilities. Significant defeats at the hands of the FARC between 1996 
and 1998 and a general deterioration in public order were apparently 
due to the military's still-inadequate preparation for irregular warfare 
and a posture that was dispersed, static, and defensive. The population 
held the military in low regard because of a poor human rights record 
and a passive attitude to paramilitarism. At the turn of the century, 
Colombia implemented important reforms in military doctrine and 
institutional structure emphasizing a force that was professional and 
mobile, with an effective offensive capacity supported by air transport 
and air combat, and with improved intelligence and advanced combat 
technology. The reforms of the administration of Andres Pastrana 
Arango (president, 1998-2002) included a troop buildup, additional 
divisions, and the mobile brigades, as well as the creation of the army's 
first aviation brigade. 

Although the military was one of the least-respected institutions 
in Colombia in the 1990s, with only a 34-percent favorable rating 
with the public in 1994, by 2003 it had an 82-percent public 
approval rating. The surge in popularity resulted from a combination 
of the increase in military successes and expanded territorial cover- 
age of the armed forces, the army's recovery of the demilitarized 
zone from the FARC, and the popularity of Alvaro Uribe's get-tough 
policy (see Current National Security Panorama; National Security 
Doctrines and Policies, this ch.). 

Constitutional Authority 

The 1991 constitution establishes the president of the Republic of 
Colombia as the head of state, head of government, and commander in 
chief of the armed forces, which include the National Police. Accord- 
ing to Article 189, the president's functions in the area of defense and 
security are to direct foreign relations and, as commander in chief of 
the Armed Forces of the Republic (Fuerzas Armadas de la Republica), 
to direct the Public Force (Fuerza Publica), protect public order, lead 
military operations during war, and defend the country's external secu- 
rity. Article 216 defines the Public Force as being composed of the 
Military Forces (Fuerzas Militares) and the National Police. Article 
217 establishes that the Military Forces are permanent and made up of 



290 



National Security 



the army, navy, and air force, whose collective mission is to defend 
Colombia's sovereignty, territory, and constitutional order. 

The constitution also establishes the executive's authority in the 
matter of states of exception. It is within the president's legal mandate 
to declare a state of external war (Article 212) to respond to foreign 
aggression, defend Colombia's sovereignty, meet the requirements of 
a war in which Colombia is involved, or reestablish internal order. A 
state of internal commotion grants exceptional powers to the executive 
when the ordinary powers of the National Police are inadequate to 
maintain public order. Article 213 permits this state of internal com- 
motion to be declared for a period of 90 days and to be renewed twice. 
A declaration of war (Article 212) and a state of emergency (Article 
215) require cabinet and Senate authorization. 

The 1991 constitution, like its predecessor, stipulates that the Mil- 
itary Forces and National Police are nondeliberative. The armed 
forces are legally prohibited from political activity, and personnel 
have no right of assembly for political purposes. Citizens in active 
police and military service also have no right to vote. 

Organization of the Armed Forces 

As commander in chief, the president appoints the minister of 
national defense (see fig. 7). One of the most significant reforms of the 
Gaviria presidency was changing the head of the ministry from a mili- 
tary to a civilian post, breaking a practice that had been uninterrupted 
since 1953, and in 1991 Rafael Pardo Rueda became minister of 
national defense. The Ministry of National Defense directs the military 
and police forces by formulating and implementing defense and secu- 
rity policies. The general commander of the Military Forces of Colom- 
bia, the highest-ranking military position (held by General Freddy 
Padilla de Leon in late 2009), has maximum authority for the planning 
and strategic management of all operational and administrative matters 
and exercises a legal mandate over the armed forces through the minis- 
ter of national defense, the second in command after the president. In 
practice, however, the president has routinely issued orders directly to 
the general commander. 

The General Command of the Military Forces consists of the com- 
mander and his General Staff, the Advisory Group, and offices of the 
inspector general, general adjutant, strategic planners, and legal 
advisers. The Supreme Military Tribunal (TSM), which is headed by 
the general commander of the Military Forces, also reports to the 
General Command, but its judgments in some cases may be appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Justice. Directly under the General Com- 
mand are the deputy commander and the Joint General Staff, with the 



291 



Colombia: A Country Study 



PRESIDENT 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 



ADVISORY BODIES -- 



MINISTER OF 
NATIONAL DEFENSE 



NATIONAL POLICE 
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE 



DIRECTOR GENERAL 
OF THE NATIONAL POLICE 



ADVISORY GROUP 



SUPREME MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 



GENERAL COMMANDER 
H OF THE MILITARY FORCES 



ARMY 



MILITARY PENAL 
JUSTICE 



7 DIVISIONS 
AND VARIOUS 
SPECIAL FORCES* 



VICE MINISTRY 
FOR POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS 



GENERAL 
SECRETARIAT 



VICE MINISTRY 
FOR STRATEGY 
AND PLANNING 



NAVY 



AIR FORCE 



3 NAVAL FORCES 
4 COMMANDS, 
AND GENERAL 

MARITIME 
DIRECTORATE 



6 COMBAT AIR 
COMMANDS, 
3 AUXILIARY 
COMMANDS, AND 

2 AIR GROUPS 



DEPUTY COMMANDER 
AND JOINT STAFF 
HEADQUARTERS 



JOINT COMMANDS 



SUPERIOR WAR COLLEGE 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

COORDINATION 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
CARIBBEAN 
JOINT TASK FORCE 



JOINT HEADQUARTERS 



PERSONNEL 
INTELLIGENCE AND 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
OPERATIONS 
LOGISTICS 
INTEGRATED ACTION 
EDUCATION AND DOCTRINE 



— — — Advisory capacity 

— Line command 



'Special forces include counterterrorist (Afeur), antikidnapping (Gaula), counterguerrilla, and antinarcotics units. 

Figure 7. Organization of the Ministry of National Defense and the Public 
Force, 2009 

directorates for general military health, administration and finance, 
the United Action Groups for Personal Freedom (Gaula), as well as 
the Commercial Arms Control Department, and the five joint com- 
mands (see Joint Commands, this eh.). The General Command exer- 
cises direct authority over the three military services, and each 



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service commander is in direct line of command. The deputy com- 
manders of each service are also the chiefs of staff, who together con- 
stitute the Joint Chiefs of Staff and report directly to the General 
Command, rather than being part of the chain of command. The 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the General Command in 
the coordination of operational and administrative affairs of the three 
services and the Urban Counterterrorist Special Forces Group 
(Afeur). Roughly paralleling the U.S. military, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff is divided into six departments, or headquarters (jefaturas), for 
personnel (J-l), intelligence and counterintelligence (J-2), operations 
(J-3), logistics (J^l), integrated action (J-5), and education and doc- 
trine (J-6). 

The establishment of the joint command structures represented an 
important step toward the implementation of a major reform of the 
Colombian military modeled on the command structure of the U.S. 
Armed Forces. Five joint commands under the general commander 
of the Military Forces are those of the Superior War College, 
National Intelligence Coordination, Special Operations, Caribbean, 
and Joint Task Force. The Joint Task Force Command includes Joint 
Task Force Omega (Fuerzas de Tarea Conjunta Omega), which was 
created in 2003 by recruiting the best 15,000 troops in the military. 
Initially created to support Plan Patriota, it began supporting Plan 
Consolidacion (Consolidation Plan) on December 10, 2006. Head- 
quartered at Larandia Air Force Base in Caqueta Department, 
Omega's mission is to engage in counterinsurgency operations, espe- 
cially against the FARC and its leaders. 

The Military Forces have been gradually introducing a sweeping 
organizational change, which calls for replacing the current structure 
with five joint operational commands: Pacific (covering the western 
coastline and Ecuadorian border); Caribbean (north coast and Pana- 
manian border); Eastern (frontier with Venezuela); Central (the 
Andean heartland of Colombia); and the existing Joint Task Force 
Omega, expanded to cover the southeast, including the borders with 
Peru and Brazil. The new organization is designed to encourage 
closer cooperation among different branches of the military and to 
ensure dedicated resources of troops and naval and air assets in all 
zones. However, as of mid-2009 it appeared that the proposed new 
organization had been either only partially implemented or possibly 
further modified. 

The Superior Council on National Defense and Security, formed 
by the executive branch in 1992, is an advisory body on defense and 
security matters. Chaired by the president, the CSSDN counts as its 
members the minister of national defense, the general commander of 
the Military Forces, the director general of the National Police, the 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

director of the Administrative Security Department (DAS), the min- 
ister of interior and justice, the minister of foreign relations, and the 
heads of two congressional committees — constitutional affairs and 
defense and international relations. The CSSDN advises on the plan- 
ning and execution of defense and security policy and is responsible 
for coordinating the various civilian and military entities involved in 
national security. 

Ministry of National Defense 

The Ministry of National Defense is responsible for the administra- 
tion and planning of security and defense policy. The rninistry manages 
administrative functions related to policy execution, including the 
defense budget, ministry personnel, and military procurement con- 
tracts. In coordination with the president and the military command, the 
institution has definitive responsibility for the formation of national 
security and defense strategies. The ministry also works with the Min- 
istry of Foreign Relations in the negotiation of international agreements 
on national security and is responsible for presenting bills to the Con- 
gress of the Republic (Congreso de la Republica) that relate to defense. 

Reporting to the minister of national defense are the General Sec- 
retariat, which is responsible for internal management, including the 
ministry's budget, human resources, legal matters, anticorruption pro- 
grams, and veterans' affairs; the Vice Ministry for Policy and Inter- 
national Affairs, which also serves as the ministry's liaison with the 
presidency, Congress, other ministries, and the press; and the Vice 
Ministry for Strategy and Planning. Both the military and the 
National Police are fully integrated into the Ministry of National 
Defense. Reporting up through the General Command are the com- 
manders of the three military services and the joint commands. The 
director general of the National Police is also under the direct author- 
ity of the ministry, as is the National Police Commissioner's Office. 

Various advisory bodies also report directly to the minister of 
national defense. These include the Joint Advisers of the Military 
Forces and the National Police, the Advisory Council on Military 
Justice, the National Council Against Kidnapping, the Superior 
Health Council of the Military Forces and the National Police, the 
Administrative Development Committee, the Internal Control Sys- 
tem Coordinating Committee, and a Human Resources Commission. 
Also under the auspices of the ministry is the Superintendency of 
Guard Forces and Private Security Companies (SVSP). This semi- 
autonomous agency, headed by a lawyer, monitors and inspects the 
several hundred guard forces of companies and the approximately 
3,500 private security companies. The SVSP operates in close coop- 



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eration with the National Police. The ministry additionally super- 
vises the activities of a large number of entities that do not depend 
on it financially, including the Nueva Granada Military University, 
the military and police retirement funds, the Central Military Hospi- 
tal, the Military Club, and Indumil. 

Military Services 

Military personnel are under the authority of the general commander 
of the Military Forces. The General Command headquarters, as well as 
those of the three services, are located in the ministry's complex in 
Bogota. The military reserves are made up of those who have fulfilled 
their military service, retired officers and noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs), and civilians who have undergone special reservist training. 
According to London's International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), in 2008 Colombia's Military Forces were made up of 267,231 
active personnel (army, 43,013 career active-duty plus 183,339 con- 
scripts, for a total of 226,352; navy, 23,515 plus 7,214 conscripts, for a 
total of 30,729; and air force, 10,150). The IISS total does not include 
naval aviation, 146; and marines, 14,000. The ability to mobilize the 
reserve force is considered limited. 

The Army 

The effective combat strength of the National Army (Ejercito 
Nacional) is considerably less than that suggested by the total strength 
figures. Despite having a total of 226,352 members in 2008, well over 
half of the army, or 128,818 personnel in early 2009, could not legally 
be used for combat duty because they were serving their obligatory 
military service. In 2008 the army ranks included approximately 7,000 
officers and 26,000 NCOs. 

The general commanding the army is assisted by a staff consisting 
of a chief of army operations and an inspector general. The army dep- 
uty commander is also the army chief of staff. This general oversees 
the directorates of planning and information and coordinates opera- 
tions, logistics, human development, and education and doctrine. 

Various special units are under the direct authority of the General 
Command of the Military Forces. The 3d Colombian Battalion, an 
infantry unit comprising 31 officers, 58 NCOs, 265 soldiers, and 
some civilians, is assigned to the multinational observer force in the 
Sinai Peninsula. Between 120 and 150 Colombian soldiers are likely 
to have joined the Spanish contingent deployed in Afghanistan by the 
end of 2009. The Aviation Brigade is made up of a helicopter battal- 
ion, an aircraft battalion, and the army's aviation school. The Army 
Aviation School (EAE), originally known as the Army Aviation 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

Branch School, has been part of the brigade since 2003. The EAE 
moved from Tolemaida to Bogota's El Dorado International Airport 
in 2004. The army's air capacity has expanded by more than 300 per- 
cent since 1999 as a result of aircraft contributions by Plan Colombia, 
even though the army's fleet size has remained fairly constant (see 
table 5, Appendix). The Counternarcotics Brigade with four separate 
battalions, created as a part of Plan Colombia, also reports directly to 
the commander of the army. 

By October 2007, the army had 20 mobile brigades, each contain- 
ing four counterguerrilla battalions of approximately 375 personnel 
each, with the capacity to undertake special missions in any part of 
the national territory and to engage in night operations. Six of these 
counterguerrilla units are special infantry battalions trained to oper- 
ate in high-altitude zones frequently utilized by insurgents as strate- 
gic corridors. The first high-mountain battalion succeeded in driving 
the FARC out of its traditional stronghold in the Sumapaz region to 
the south of Bogota. The Rapid Deployment Force (Fudra) is an elite 
counterinsurgent unit made up of the 1st, 2d, and 3d mobile brigades 
with their own transport capacity and air support. 

In 1996 the army formed the United Action Groups for Personal 
Freedom (Gaula), an elite force dedicated to combating kidnapping 
and extortion. There are 16 army Gaula units throughout the country, 
each composed of individuals trained to carry out rescue operations 
of kidnap victims and to dismantle criminal organizations. The Gaula 
units also include members of the DAS, the Technical Investigation 
Corps (CTI), the crime scene unit, and the Attorney General's Office 
(Fiscalia General de la Nacion). Plan Meteoro (Meteor Plan) units, 
which President Uribe founded in 2002 in order to reestablish secu- 
rity on the country's roads and provide protection to motorists, also 
came under the General Command of the Military Forces. 

In 2007 the army had seven divisions assigned to territorial 
regions. The divisions are organized into brigades, which in turn 
comprise some 320 battalions. The 1st Division is headquartered in 
Santa Marta and has jurisdiction over the northern departments of 
Atlantico, Magdalena, La Guajira, Cesar, Bolivar, Cordoba, Sucre, 
Antioquia, and northern Choco. This division has five fixed bri- 
gades, with regional headquarters in Barranquilla (the 2d), Medellfn 
(the 4th), Valledupar (the 10th), Monteria (the 11th), and Carepa (the 
17th). The 4th Mobile Brigade, with three counterguerrilla battalions 
and two Afeur units, is also assigned to this divisional jurisdiction. 

The 2d Division operates out of Bucaramanga and has responsi- 
bility for Santander, Northern Santander, Arauca, parts of Antioquia, 
parts of Bolivar, and the southern region of Cesar. The division has 
three brigades in Bucaramanga (the 5th), Puerto Berrio (the 14th), 



296 



Soldiers from a Plan Meteoro company after arriving in Mocoa, 
Putumayo Department. Since their formation in 2002, seven Plan Meteoro 
companies have practically eliminated highway violence and 
have also assisted in counternarcotics operations. 

Courtesy David Spencer 
An army special jungle group training in 
Facatativd, Cundinamarca Department 
Courtesy Narcotics Affairs Section Office, U.S. Embassy, Bogota 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

and Arauca (the 18th). Various special units also operate in this divi- 
sion, including the 2d Artillery Airborne Defense Battalion, the 5th 
and 22d mobile brigades with a total of nine counterguerrilla battal- 
ions, the Plan Meteoro 3d Company, and two Afeur units. 

Cali is home to the 3d Division, based in Quindio, Risaralda, Caldas, 
Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Narino, and southern Choco. It is composed of 
the 3d Brigade, based in Cali, the 8th Brigade in Armenia, and the 29th 
Brigade located close to Popayan. Also in this jurisdiction are the 6th 
and 14th mobile brigades, six counterguerrilla battalions, the 9th Afeur 
unit, and the Plan Meteoro 4th Company. 

The 4th Division is headquartered in Villavicencio and operates in 
Casanare, Guaviare, Guainia, Vichada, Caqueta, Vaupes, the extreme 
southern territory of Cundinamarca, southern Boyaca, and the eastern 
areas of the departments of Cauca and Meta. It has two brigades, the 
7th, based in Villavicencio, and the 16th, which operates out of Yopal. 
The Eastern Specific Command, also assigned to this division, is 
based in Puerto Carreno. Special units in the 4th Division's jurisdic- 
tion include the 7th and 9th mobile brigades, with 12 counterguerrilla 
battalions and two Afeur units, the 3 1st Combat Company for Support 
Services, and the Plan Meteoro 5th Company. 

The 5th Division is assigned to Bogota, with jurisdictional control 
over Cundinamarca, Tolima, Huila, and Boyaca. It is composed of the 
1st Brigade in Tunja, the 6th Brigade in Ibague, the 9th Brigade in 
Neiva, and the 23d Brigade in Bogota. The 8th Mobile Brigade, six 
counterguerrilla battalions, the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Afeur units, and the 
Plan Meteoro 6th Company are also part of the 5th Division. 

The 6th Division is headquartered in Florencia, Caqueta Department 
(12th Brigade). Its other brigades are located in Mocoa, Putumayo 
Department (27th Brigade); Leticia, Amazonas Department (26th Bri- 
gade); Santana, Putumayo (13th Mobile Brigade); and the Counter- 
narcotics Brigade in Larandia, Caqueta. This division operates in the 
departments of Amazonas, Putumayo, and Caqueta, as well as in a few 
municipalities in Cauca and Vaupes. The 6th Division also includes the 
12th Afeur unit and the Plan Meteoro 7th Company, and it has addi- 
tional brigades serving with the Southern Naval Force in Puerto 
Leguizamo on the Putumayo and the 6th Airborne Combat Command 
(6th Cacom) in Tres Esquinas, Caqueta. 

Finally, the 7th Division is responsible for Antioquia, Cordoba, 
Sucre, and Choco and is based in Medellin. Created in 2005 to cover 
territory previously under the 1st Division's jurisdiction, the 7th Divi- 
sion provides more autonomy to operations conducted in the northwest 
region of the country. This division encompasses the 4th Brigade sta- 
tioned in Medellin; the 11th Brigade, which covers Carepa, Chigirodo, 
and Monteria; the 14th Brigade in Puerto Berrio; and the 17th Brigade 



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based in Maporita. The 11th Mobile Battalion is also assigned to the 
7th Division. 

The Navy 

In 2008 the National Navy (Armada Nacional) had a total of 30,729 
personnel, plus about 14,000 marines and 146 naval aviation personnel. 
The navy operates in three naval forces and four commands. The naval 
forces are the Caribbean Naval Force, the Pacific Naval Force, and the 
Southern Naval Force. The latter consists of the Southern River Fleet, 
which controls and guards the Caqueta and Putumayo rivers. The first 
of the four commands is the Marine Infantry Command, which oper- 
ates on land along the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, on the island terri- 
tories, and on the country's rivers, where its amphibious capabilities 
can support the naval forces as needed. The second command is the 
Coast Guard Corps Command, which operates two task forces, one 
along the Caribbean coast and one along the Pacific coast. The third is 
the Naval Aviation Command, which is equipped with some small air- 
planes and helicopters. The fourth is the Specific Command (Comando 
Especifico) of San Andres and Providencia; it consists of the General 
Headquarters of the Specific Command, Naval Base No. 4, and a unit 
attached to the Caribbean Naval Force. 

Although the navy has maintained its traditional mission of defend- 
ing the nation's maritime waters, the evolution of the internal conflict 
during the 1990s also led to the development of new objectives. The 
navy not only participates in antinarcotics activities through the detec- 
tion and interception of boats suspected of drug trafficking, but its 
Marine Infantry Command also became directly involved in the coun- 
terinsurgent effort through a buildup on the nation's coastal and inter- 
nal waterways. The navy also has two Gaula units. 

The commander of the navy is assisted by a chief of naval opera- 
tions and an inspector general. The Marine Infantry Command and 
seven headquarters (jefaturas) report directly to the navy's deputy 
commander. Naval Education oversees the Enap, the Naval School for 
Noncommissioned Officers (ENSB), and the Marine Infantry School 
(EFIM). Logistics Operations is responsible for the four largest naval 
bases, in Cartagena, San Andres, Malaga, and Puerto Leguizamo on 
the Rio Putumayo. Naval Operations commands the Caribbean Naval 
Force, the Pacific Naval Force, the Southern Naval Force, the Coast 
Guard Corps Command, and the Naval Aviation Command. Other 
jefaturas include Plan Orion, naval intelligence, naval materiel, and 
human development. 

The commander of the navy's Marine Infantry Command is 
advised by the marines' chief of staff. The Marine Infantry Command 
has three brigades and one Riverine Task Group that patrol a total of 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

16,000 kilometers of rivers and coastline and are under the opera- 
tional authority of the chief of naval staff; two are coastal and riverine 
brigades, and one is a counternarcotics brigade. The 1st Marine 
Infantry Brigade has three marine infantry rifle battalions, two coun- 
terguerrilla battalions, and one command and support battalion that 
conduct operations in 46 municipalities in Cordoba, Sucre, and Boli- 
var. Based in Buenaventura, the 1 st Marine Infantry Riverine Brigade 
consists of five battalions that cover the coastal regions in the depart- 
ments of Narino, Cauca, Valle, and Choco. The 2d Marine Infantry 
Riverine Brigade is based in Bogota and has battalions stationed 
throughout the country on the Atrato, Magdalena, Arauca, Meta, 
Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo rivers. All six Nodriza PAF-III 
riverine patrol craft are assigned to this brigade, including one on the 
border with Ecuador. Each of these heavy, Colombian-built, counter- 
insurgency ships is equipped with a small hospital, four M-60 
machineguns, and a helicopter and can accommodate up to 200 sol- 
diers. The Riverine Task Group operates out of Puerto Leguizamo in 
Putumayo and is responsible for the border waterways with Ecuador 
on the Putumayo and with Peru on the Amazon, as well as the Caque- 
ta, Orteguaza, and Caguan. The Marine Infantry Command also has 
its own training center and a Logistics Support Command. The 
marines have their own BTR-80A armored personnel carriers. 

The two task forces of the Coast Guard Corps Command operate 
on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. The Caribbean task force, under 
the command of the Caribbean Naval Force, maintains five stations 
based in La Guajira, Santa Marta, Cartagena, Covenas, and Turbo. 
The Pacific task force is under the operational authority of the 
Pacific Naval Force and maintains stations in Buenaventura and 
Tumaco. An eighth Coast Guard station is located in Leticia on the 
Amazon. The Naval Aviation Command conducts logistical support 
missions for the navy. 

The navy's General Maritime Directorate is responsible for Colom- 
bia's maritime policies and programs, the Merchant Marine, and mari- 
time signals. It also manages port authority for ship registration and 
titles and the development of research and maritime cartography. The 
Corporation for Science and Technology for the Development of the 
Naval, Maritime, and Riverine Industry is in charge of the shipyards in 
Mamonal and Boca Grande, near Cartagena. This entity is responsible 
for the design and construction of the Coast Guard's fast patrol craft 
and riverine supply vessels (see table 6, Appendix). 

The Air Force 

The Colombian Air Force (FAC), the smallest of the armed ser- 
vices, had a total of 10,150 personnel in 2008. This total included up 



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to 2,000 conscripts. The commander of the air force is assisted by a 
staff made up of a chief of air operations, an inspector general, and a 
council of former commanders. The deputy commander, in addition to 
being the chief of staff, coordinates the FAC's nine directorates: air 
operations, intelligence, logistics operations, aeronautic education, air 
base security and defense, logistics support, human development, judi- 
cial, and health. The FAC deputy commander also coordinates the ser- 
vice's Directorate of Health. 

In addition to the conventional mission of protecting Colombian 
airspace, the air force is involved in both antinarcotics and counter- 
insurgent operations. The FAC has primary responsibility for aerial 
interdiction, which includes detection, interception, and neutraliza- 
tion of aircraft used in drug-trafficking activities. The air force also 
plays a key role in counterinsurgent operations through direct aerial 
bombing, air-fire assistance to ground troops, and troop and materiel 
transport using a wide range of aircraft (see table 7, Appendix). 

The basic unit of the air force, the Combat Air Command (Cacom), 
is responsible for air operations in a specific geographic area. Aircraft 
can be deployed or loaned to a different Cacom, as needed. The air 
force has six Cacom units and two training schools. The 1st Cacom is 
assigned to the Captain German Olano de Palanquero Air Base in 
Puerto Salgar, Cundinamarca, and operates six squadrons; its mission 
is air defense and combat training. The 2d Cacom is headquartered in 
the Captain Luis F. Gomez Nino Air Base in Apiay, Meta, and oper- 
ates four squadrons; it is responsible for counterinsurgency and offen- 
sive operations. The 3d Cacom is located at the Major General Alberto 
Pauwels Rodriguez Air Base at Malambo, near Barranquilla, Atlant- 
ico, and operates two squadrons; it conducts search-and-rescue and 
maritime patrol operations along the Caribbean coast. The 4th Cacom 
is located at the Lieutenant Colonel Luis Francisco Pinto Parra Air 
Base in Melgar, Tolima, and operates five helicopter squadrons; it is 
dedicated to tactical support operations and training. The 5th Cacom is 
assigned to the Brigadier General Arturo Lema Posada Air Base in 
Rionegro near Medellin, Antioquia, where it operates one helicopter 
group and conducts search-and-rescue, transport, and heavy-helicopter 
support operations. The 6th Cacom is located at the Captain Ernesto 
Esguerra Cubides Air Base in Tres Esquinas, Caqueta, and operates 
two squadrons; it is devoted to counterinsurgency operations. In addi- 
tion, the air force has a Military Air Transport Command (Catam), 
based at Bogota's El Dorado International Airport; an Air Training 
Command (CAE), based at the Emavi in Cali; and an Air Maintenance 
Command (Caman), based in Madrid. 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

The air force also has two air groups, which are smaller units than 
the Cacoms and do not have their own operational aircraft. The East- 
ern Air Group (Gaori) is located in Puerto Carreno, Vichada, and is 
the launching base for joint operations in the Vichada, Arauca, and 
Vaupes region. The Caribbean Air Group (Gacar) is based on Isla de 
San Andres. Gacar 's mission includes the strategic and tactical 
patrol of airspace and island and coastal areas and support for the 
navy in its search-and-rescue missions. The FAC's training schools 
include the Marco Fidel Suarez Military Aviation School (Emavi) in 
the Cali suburb of Santiago de Cali, where officers receive instruc- 
tion, and an NCO school (Esufa) in Madrid, Cundinamarca. The 
other schools are the Aeronautics Military Institute (IMA), which is 
part of the Superior War College, and the Helicopter School of the 
Public Force (Ehfup) in Melgar. 

Joint Commands 

In 2003 the services took the first step toward a significant organi- 
zational restructuring, prompted by the difficulties in conducting mis- 
sions that involved more than one service and by delays in responding 
to insurgent actions. Joint commands that will oversee personnel and 
resources from each of the services, assigned to different geographical 
designations, will replace the conventional configuration. 

This model, based on the organizational arrangement of the U.S. 
military, resulted in the first experimental joint command in 2003, the 
Joint Task Force Omega, which directed the joint operations of Plan 
Patriota in the southern regions of Colombia and now supports Plan 
Consolidation. The formation of the Caribbean Joint Command fol- 
lowed in 2005, and it directly manages 20,000 personnel and logistics 
resources in eight departments along the Atlantic coast and in Antio- 
quia. The chiefs of both of these joint commands are army generals. 

Despite uncertainty in 2009 about the extent of progress in planned 
military restructuring, various other joint operations have been held by 
the armed forces. These include actions by the amalgamated navy's 
40th and 50th marine infantry riverine battalions with the 1 8th and 28th 
brigades of the army, which operate in the east of the country. The for- 
mation of the Decisive Action Force, a special rapid-deployment force 
composed of the 16th, 17th, and 18th mobile brigades, a high-mountain 
battalion, two Plan Meteoro units, two counterguerrilla battalions, and 
an operative command, is another positive step 

Conscription and Military Service 

According to Article 216 of the 1991 constitution, "all Colombians 
are bound to bear arms when public necessity so requires, in order to 



302 




One of the military s Bell 212 helicopters after refueling at Per ales 
Airport, on the outskirts oflbague, Tolima Department 
Courtesy Narcotics Affairs Section Office, U.S. Embassy, Bogota 



defend the independence of the nation and the country's institutions." 
The Military Service Law of 1993 stipulates that all Colombian males 
between 16 and 18 years of age must present themselves for military 
service. In practice, the ages of conscripts may range from 15 to 24, 
and they may serve in the Military Forces or the National Police. Mili- 
tary service for those who have completed secondary education 
(bachilleres) lasts for a year; for others, it is 18 to 24 months. 

Although previous legislation explicitly exempted women from 
obligatory military service, the 1991 constitutional provision permits 
women to volunteer for any of the armed services, including the 
police, and stipulates that they may be conscripted into service if 
national security so warrants. Barred from active combat, women's 
military service is restricted to logistical support or administrative, 
social, and cultural functions. In 2007 the number of women serving 
in the army totaled 3,900. 

Permanent exemptions are granted to priests, physically or mentally 
handicapped individuals, and members of indigenous communities 
who reside within established reserves. Peacetime exemptions are 
granted to individuals who can prove themselves to be essential for the 
support of their families, including only sons and married men cohab- 
iting with their spouses. Anyone who has been divested of political 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

rights on account of criminal activities may not be conscripted. There 
is no conscientious-objector status. Deferments are granted to high- 
school and university students, including those studying to enter the 
priesthood, men who already have a brother fulfilling obligatory mili- 
tary service, and prisoners. Once the reason for the deferment expires, 
the individuals in question must report for service or otherwise resolve 
their military obligation. 

Those who receive a peacetime exemption, whether barred 
because of a psychological or physical incapacity, or, although fit to 
serve were not drafted because the service lottery did not select 
them, must pay a special tax in lieu of performing military service. 
Every Colombian male more than 1 8 years of age has to resolve his 
military duty, either through fulfilling obligatory service or through 
being exempt from doing so. Such an exemption usually involves a 
monetary payment. Only then are adult males issued a military 
reservist card (tarjeta de reservista) that is evidence of resolution of 
status and signifies that the individual could be called into the 
reserves in case of a national emergency, up to age 50. This card is 
an indispensable public document for Colombian men. A 1995 
decree requires presentation of the card in order to register profes- 
sional titles, to engage in contracts with public entities, and for 
employment in the public sector. 

Despite legislatively mandated military service, only about 
30,000 to 40,000 of an estimated 350,000 to 450,000 eligible male 
youths are drafted annually. Once the military establishes its person- 
nel needs, a lottery system selects those to be conscripted. Starting in 
1997 during the Pastrana administration, the number of conscripts 
began to decline as the ranks of professional soldiers increased. This 
trend has accelerated during the Uribe administrations, with the ratio 
of conscripts to professional soldiers decreasing significantly. The 
government's goal is for mandatory military service to be eliminated 
once the number of professional soldiers reaches 100,000. By July 
2007, the level had reached 76,000. 

Serious social inequalities continue to plague Colombia's con- 
scription system. The informal rules of the lottery arrangement are 
such that a higher percentage of rural, uneducated youths are drafted. 
In addition, the special tax paid by young men not called up varies 
according to family income, serving as an incentive to grant exemp- 
tions to draft-age males from relatively wealthy families. Although 
there is a legislative review of the measure, its underlying premise of 
differentiated payments is not being modified. The purchase of 
exemptions from the military by families whose sons have been 
selected by the lottery is also widespread. This practice also discrim- 



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inates against youths from the lower social strata. Any male not 
called up, but unable to pay the tax, has to perform service in order 
to fulfill his military obligation. Furthermore, poor, rural draftees 
bear a disproportionate share of active fighting because conscripted 
high-school graduates, who are likely to be urban and more affluent, 
are exempt from combat service. 

The Military Service Law establishes that unmarried, male citi- 
zens between the ages of 16 and 23 are eligible for regular enlist- 
ment as NCOs or officers. As in the case of conscripts, enlisted men 
have to pass physical and psychological tests. It is common practice 
for individuals to enlist in the NCO corps upon completion of oblig- 
atory military service. 

Military Education System 

The military education system plays a critical role in the forma- 
tion of a professional officer corps in all branches of the armed ser- 
vices. With the exception of officers trained in medicine or law, all 
commissioned officers are graduates of one of the three service 
academies. 

The Jose Maria Cordova Military Cadet School (Esmic), the 
army's training academy located in Bogota, represents the backbone 
of the military's professional education system. The school's pro- 
gram ranges from three to five years, depending on the need to grad- 
uate troops for active service. On completing the training phase, the 
student obtains the rank of second lieutenant and a degree in military 
sciences. The school also grants degrees in business administration, 
law, civil engineering, and military physical education. 

The Naval Cadet School (Enap), established in Cartagena in 
1938, is an accredited four-year university. Cadets pursue profes- 
sional degree programs in naval mechanical engineering, electron- 
ics, physical oceanography, maritime administration, and naval 
sciences. Enap graduates also become officials in the Marine Infan- 
try Command and the Merchant Marine. Navy cadets spend nearly 
one year of the four-year program at sea on the navy's sail-training 
ship, the frigate Gloria. The air force's Marco Fidel Suarez Military 
Aviation School (Emavi) was founded in Cali in 1933 and like Enap 
is an accredited four-year university. On completion of the program, 
graduating second lieutenants gain a diploma in mechanical engi- 
neering or in aeronautical administration. 

The requirements for admission to the service academies include 
being a Colombian citizen by birth, having completed — or being in 
the final year of — secondary school, being between 1 6 and 20 years 
of age, being unmarried, and having no children. In addition to the 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

medical, psychological, and physical examinations that candidates 
must pass before admission, family members are interviewed, and a 
security background check is performed. Emavi also requires its 
applicants to be males. Admission to Enap has height requirements: 
at least 1.68 meters tall in the case of men and 1.62 meters tall in the 
case of women. Emavi additionally requires special entrance exami- 
nations in mathematics, physics, and general culture. 

Postacademy professional training is increasingly a requirement 
for a successful military career. The Lancers School at the military 
base in Tolemaida provides three to six months of training in counter- 
insurgency strategy and tactics, equivalent to the U.S. Army Rangers 
School. This course, although no longer required for promotion to 
first lieutenant, remains highly prestigious and is frequently attended 
by members of foreign militaries. All of the branches of the 
army — infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, logistics, and intelli- 
gence — additionally operate their own application schools, which 
offer six-month training programs required for promotion to the rank 
of major. Majors in the army and air force and lieutenant commanders 
in the navy are eligible to attend a six-month Staff Course at the 
Superior War College (Esdegue), which is required for promotion. A 
one-year course taught at Esdegue, known as the Higher Military 
Studies Course (CAEM), also is required of army and air force colo- 
nels and navy captains before they are eligible for promotion to gen- 
eral officer or flag rank. The course emphasizes the formulation of 
national security policy and analysis of national and international 
affairs. Esdegue also offers a one-year Comprehensive Course of 
National Defense (Cidenal). Attended mainly by public and civilian 
officials, Cidenal provides basic information on the military's mis- 
sion and organization, as well as familiarizing civilian personnel with 
the military's perspectives on national policy. The course is a require- 
ment for promotion from the rank of colonel to brigadier general in 
the National Police, and officers in the Higher Military Studies 
Course usually also take Cidenal. 

A select number of Colombian officers receive advanced training 
in special programs for foreign military personnel offered by the 
U.S. military's professional schools. Colombian military officials 
and soldiers receive special instruction in counterinsurgent tactics 
and assault operations, antiterrorist and antinarcotics operations, the 
detection of land mines, operational planning and implementation, 
evacuation techniques, and first aid. The majority of U.S. military 
personnel in Colombia in 2006 were instructors training Colombian 
aircraft and helicopter pilots and mechanics. Plan Colombia pro- 
grams also provide advice on the design of curricula for advanced 
programs at Esdegue in the areas of security, conflict, and terrorism. 



306 




NCOs are trained in the Sergeant Inocencio Chinca Military 
School for Noncommissioned Officers in Tolemaida, Tolima. The 
training program lasts 18 months, and graduates qualify as military 
sciences technicians. Continuing instruction and retraining of profes- 
sional soldiers take place at the Training School for Professional Sol- 
diers (EFSP), established in 2000 in Nilo, Cundinamarca. Training 
lasts from three to six months. Individuals may enter the school 
either directly or after having first fulfilled obligatory military ser- 
vice. Aspirants to the NCO corps must pass screening by a board of 
officers and preparatory exams. On meeting these minimum physical 
and testing requirements, the individual is appointed to the lowest 
NCO grade. With additional training, NCOs may be promoted fur- 
ther. In 2003, with the assistance of the U.S. Southern Command, 
Colombia created the rank of command sergeant major, with the aim 
of strengthening senior enlisted ranks. NCOs promoted to command 
sergeant major had first passed an intensive 11 -week training and 
leadership course. 

The Military Judiciary 

Military Penal Code 

As part of the Ministry of National Defense, the military judiciary 
falls under the executive branch rather than under the judicial 
branch. In an effort to correct failings of the military judiciary, 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

including the lack of transparency and accountability, the govern- 
ment adopted a new Military Penal Code in August 2000. The 
reformed system denies unit commanders the power to judge subor- 
dinates and provides legal protection for service members who 
refuse to obey illegal orders to commit human rights abuses. The 
reformed code excludes torture, genocide, and forced disappearance 
from the military criminal jurisdiction and stipulates that such 
crimes be tried in civilian courts. 

Under Article 221 of the constitution, military courts have juris- 
diction over offenses committed by members of the Public Force 
(the military and National Police forces) on active duty, in accor- 
dance with the prescriptions of the Military Penal Code. These mili- 
tary courts are composed of members of the Public Force on active 
duty or in retirement. 

Military Penal Justice 

Military Penal Justice, an agency of the Ministry of National 
Defense, tries cases involving active-duty members of the armed 
forces. The military justice system consists of 44 military courts of 
Military Penal Justice and the Supreme Military Tribunal or military 
appeals court. The Supreme Court of Justice serves as an additional 
appeals court in cases of prison sentences of six years or more. 
According to the U.S. Department of State, military judges preside 
over courts martial without the presence of juries. The accused have 
the right to counsel, and witnesses may be called. Representatives of 
the civilian Inspector General's Office must be present at military 
trials. 

Conflicts between Military Penal Justice and civil jurisdictions 
normally have involved cases of human rights violations and, to a 
lesser degree, corruption in the military ranks. The Constitutional 
Court has ruled that serious human rights violations should not be 
tried under Military Penal Justice. Although cases continued to be 
tried there, given the slowness with which the Attorney General's 
Office transfers specific cases to the civil jurisdiction, the military 
justice system has greatly increased its cooperation with civilian jus- 
tice counterparts; for example, it has expedited the transfer of more 
than 600 human rights cases from military justice to the civilian sys- 
tem. In late 2005, it was estimated that nearly 16,900 cases awaited 
trial in the military justice system, and, despite improvements, it 
remains overloaded. 

Although the attorney general has the power to dismiss convicted 
officers from service, high-ranking military officials accused of 
human rights violations and brought to trial rarely have been con- 



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National Security 



victed. A number of cases absolved by Military Penal Justice and 
then tried by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have 
resulted in decisions against the Colombian state. During Alvaro 
Uribe's consecutive terms in power, more than 150 officers and 300 
soldiers have been dismissed because of links with drug-trafficking 
groups. In 2006 Congress passed new legislation to bring Military 
Penal Justice under the jurisdiction of the judicial branch and to 
reform the Military Penal Code. As of mid-2009, however, the office 
remained part of the Ministry of National Defense, headed by a colo- 
nel appointed by the minister. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Colombian military personnel wear uniforms in three general cat- 
egories: full-dress, dress, and the service uniform. The army's full- 
dress attire consists of a midnight-blue jacket and sky-blue trousers, 
the air force full-dress uniform is midnight-blue, and the navy's for- 
mal dress is a full-white uniform. All full-dress uniforms have piping 
on the trousers. The army's dress uniform is dark green, the air 
force's is midnight-blue, and the navy's dress uniform is full-black. 
All three services use a camouflage field uniform, and the navy addi- 
tionally has a khaki tropical-service uniform. There are no signifi- 
cant differences between the officer and NCO uniforms. Hot- 
weather uniforms differ by a short shirt-sleeve length. 

In 2006 the army updated its forest-type uniform for a so-called 
digital- or pixel-model camouflage design. The new uniforms are 
made only in Colombia, and only Colombian Military Forces may 
use them. The army uses two types of camouflage uniform — one for 
the jungle (selva), which is used by most soldiers; and the other for 
the desert, which is used by troops deployed to La Guajira Depart- 
ment and the Colombian Battalion assigned to the Sinai. With these 
sartorial changes, the troops now have more comfortable uniforms 
made of material that permits the application of mosquito repellent 
and minimizes bacterial concentration. 

The rank structure for all services closely parallels that of the U.S. 
military, with some exceptions (see fig. 8; fig. 9). Army and air force 
officer rank insignia are shown in gold on shoulder boards. General 
ranks use stars with 10 identical points that resemble suns. Insignia 
for army enlisted personnel consist of yellow, blue, and red chevrons 
placed with their vertices down at the bottom of the right sleeve. Air 
force enlisted insignia are in gold. Navy officer and cadet insignia 
are indicated in gold on shoulder boards or sleeves. Navy enlisted 
insignia consist of gold markings worn on the outer left sleeve of the 



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Colombia: A Country Study 




310 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

coat, jumper, or shirt (depending on the uniform), halfway between 
the top shoulder seam and the elbow. 

Defense and Security Spending 

State resources for military and police spending in Colombia are 
determined according to the same procedures followed for all other 
spending items in the national budget. Spending items are public, 
voted on by Congress, incorporated into the national budget, and sub- 
ject to control by the Comptroller General's Office (Contraloria de la 
Republica) and other civilian oversight agencies. Annual budgets are 
prepared based on the objectives and programs defined by each 
administration's national development plan. The first time that defense 
and security objectives appeared in this planning document was in the 
first year of the presidency of Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994-98). Bud- 
get preparation for defense takes place in the first half of the year, with 
input from the Ministry of National Defense Planning Office, the Min- 
istry of Finance and Public Credit, and the National Planning Depart- 
ment (DNP) in the case of procurements. Before July 20 of each year, 
a spending bill goes to the Congress, and prior to September 15 the 
Senate (Senado) and the House of Representatives (Camara de Repre- 
sentantes) decide on specific appropriations. After final congressional 
and then presidential approval, the spending bill takes effect on Janu- 
ary 1 . Modifications to the federal budget are permissible, and defense 
and security items frequently receive additional appropriations in the 
second half of the fiscal year. 

Spending on defense and security in Colombia grew steadily dur- 
ing the 1990s, because of redoubled efforts against the guerrillas and 
illicit drug activities. In 1999 dollars, Colombia spent on average 
US$2.15 billion annually during the 1990s, placing fourth after Bra- 
zil, Argentina, and Mexico in defense spending among Latin Ameri- 
can countries. As a percentage of gross national product (GNP), 
Colombia's defense spending increased from 2.3 percent in 1990 to 
3.2 percent in 1999, contradicting a global trend of reductions in 
defense outlays. Defense spending in 1999 as a percentage of GNP 
was higher than the developed-country average (2.3 percent), the 
developing-country average (2.7 percent), and the Latin American 
average (1.5 percent). Defense spending in Colombia in 1999 was 
second in Latin America only to Ecuador, which in the same year 
spent 3.7 percent of GNP on defense and security. As a percentage of 
overall government spending, defense and security outlays through- 
out the 1990s remained constant at 15.9 percent. From 2001 to 2005, 
Colombian spending on defense grew more than 30 percent after 
inflation, from US$2.6 billion to more than US$3.9 billion. 



312 



National Security 



In 2006 the portion of GNP dedicated to defense and security 
amounted to 4.0 percent, nearly double what it was in 1990, and 12.6 
percent of the overall national budget went to the same sector. 
Between 1999 and 2005, Plan Colombia, which contributed to 
improving national capabilities against drug trafficking and terror- 
ism, was jointly financed by US$3.4 million from Colombia's 
national budget and US$2.8 million by the U.S. government. In 2007 
Colombia spent US$5.7 billion on national security and defense. Of 
this total, 7 1 percent went to the Military Forces and 29 percent to 
the National Police. Spending was broken down as follows: 53 per- 
cent on personnel, including pensions; 14 percent on internal trans- 
fers; 23 percent on operating expenses; and 10 percent on 
procurements. This distribution indicated excessive spending on 
operations and pensions, with relatively little invested in acquisi- 
tions, modernization, or research and development. Of the 10 per- 
cent spent on procurement, 64 percent went to armaments and war 
materiel, 1 1 percent to maintenance and transport, 9 percent to com- 
munications and intelligence functions, and 7 percent to new infra- 
structure. The remaining 9 percent was spent on information, health 
services, human resource training, and welfare. 

The government has compensated for its defense budget shortfalls 
with additional funding, including funds derived from departmental or 
municipal governments, the armed forces' own security-related busi- 
nesses, the "wealth tax" that raised more than US$800 million 
between 2004 and 2006, and annual U.S. military aid in the form of 
"foreign military financing" and financial assistance from counternar- 
cotics initiatives. In 2007 the Colombian government announced a 
new tax on wealthy Colombians. The expectation is that this wealth 
tax will generate up to US$3.6 billion between 2007 and 2010. 

Law Enforcement 

National Police 

Colombia's first national police force of 450 men originated in 
1891 with the assistance of a commissaire (commissioner) from 
France's national police, primarily to maintain law and order in 
Bogota. The present-day executive-level ranking system of the 
National Police reflects the French influence. Over the ensuing 
decades, the police became active participants in Colombia's parti- 
san struggles. During La Violencia, the national character of the 
police was diluted as local forces were organized and directed by 
caciques. The first attempt to reconstitute the police as a national, 
centralized entity occurred during the military government of Rojas 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

Pinilla, when the police force was moved from the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Government to that of the Ministry of National Defense. 
In 1962 the National Police came into being, assuming centralized 
administrative and operational control over the multiple, individual 
forces that had previously operated in the country's departmental 
divisions. Along with the successful nationalization of the force, the 
National Police also aspired to reassert its autonomy from the mili- 
tary, although it remained within the Ministry of National Defense 
with a marked military character. 

The militarization of the National Police deepened when it entered 
the "war on drugs" in the 1980s as the country's primary antinarcotics 
body. The police force also was drawn into counterinsurgency opera- 
tions as conflict dynamics and drug activities became intertwined, and 
as the irregular armed groups increasingly targeted police posts in con- 
flict zones. By the early 1990s, in the face of soaring crime rates, the 
National Police came under sharp criticism for having lost sight of its 
primary function of protecting the civilian populations in urban areas, 
and for the high levels of institutional corruption. A series of reform 
efforts throughout the 1990s aimed to transform the military identity 
of the National Police by increasing civilian controls, scaling back on 
rural security, and reemphasizing conventional urban crime prevention 
functions. The National Police's public standing improved signifi- 
cantly in the wake of this restructuring, although the force will likely 
continue to play some military role in Colombia's future. 

According to Article 218 of the 1991 constitution, the National 
Police is a "permanently armed civilian force responsible for the 
nation, and whose primary objective is to uphold the necessary inter- 
nal conditions for the full exercise of public rights and liberties, so 
that Colombian citizens can live in peace." Like the military, the 
National Police is part of the Ministry of National Defense, and the 
minister exercises formal operational command. In practice, the 
president of the republic maintains direct communication with the 
director general of the National Police. 

In 2008 the National Police had 136,097 personnel plus a 
mounted rural paramilitary force of between 8,000 and 10,000 mem- 
bers. During the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the service had fairly 
constant personnel numbers, but it doubled in size from 1988 to 
2007. The director general of the National Police is a general with a 
permanent staff that includes a chief of planning and an inspector 
general. Next in the chain of command is a deputy director who 
oversees individual directorates, each run by a brigadier general. 

A November 2006 decree partially modified the structure of the 
Ministry of National Defense and reorganized the National Police. It 



314 



National Security 



divided the National Police into eight regions and created eight oper- 
ational directorates (citizen security, carabineros and rural security, 
criminal investigation, police intelligence, antinarcotics, protection 
and special services, antikidnapping and antiextortion, and transit and 
transportation) and six support directorates (schools, incorporation, 
personnel, administration and finance, health, and social welfare). 

At the national level, the police are further organized according to 
the country's administrative divisions. Each of the 32 departments 
has a departmental police command that supervises personnel 
assigned to the various districts, stations, substations, and police 
posts throughout the jurisdiction. There are an additional three 
municipal police commands in the country's largest cities — Bogota, 
Cali, and Medellm. The departmental and municipal commanders 
depend administratively on the central operational and support direc- 
torates of the National Police but coordinate local operations with 
governors and mayors, who have constitutional authority to super- 
vise police commands. Police commanders have the rank of colonel 
or lieutenant colonel. The Transit and Transportation Directorate 
oversees all patrol agents and transit police in urban areas, including 
those that staff the Immediate Care Centers (CAIs), which provide 
neighborhood police services in large municipalities. Approximately 
70 percent of police personnel are concentrated in urban centers, and 
most of these are patrol officers. As this distribution suggests, the 
primary police function is to provide security in urban areas. The 
National Police, like the army and the navy, has a Gaula unit to 
counter kidnappers. 

The Carabineros and Rural Security Directorate supervises the 
Mounted Police, or Carabineros Corps, a rural paramilitary police 
force resulting from the 1993 reform to patrol and maintain public 
order in conflict zones and in the national parks. Despite its reestab- 
lishment in 1993, the Carabineros Corps is actually Colombia's old- 
est police force, created by a law of May 18, 1841. Beginning in 
1936, a Chilean mission helped to professionalize the corps. In 2006 
there were 9,800 Carabineros officers, located principally in rural 
areas and trained in irregular conflict and in the rescue of hostages. 
Units of the Mobile Squadron of Mounted Police (Emcar), which 
operate in 120-member squadrons, were formed in 2004 as a part of 
President Alvaro Uribe's Democratic Security and Defense Policy 
(usually referred to as Democratic Security Policy) to provide extra 
support for police activities in conflict areas. Special Carabineros 
Corps units also provide backup to urban police during public events 
or civil protests. 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

By 2004 each of the nation's 1,096 municipalities had a police 
station or substation. This 100-percent police coverage was main- 
tained through late 2007, when the number of municipalities had 
increased to 1,120. Redeploying personnel to towns where police 
had been withdrawn in the 1990s, in conjunction with the increased 
Carabineros Corps units, is a key aspect of President Uribe's strategy 
to regain control of the countryside. Nevertheless, this policy is con- 
troversial because isolated agents with no police or military backup 
are the frequent targets of guerrilla violence. The strategy addition- 
ally raises concern about the overlapping functions of the Military 
Forces and the National Police in counterinsurgency. The National 
Police also continues to play a central role in Colombia's "war on 
drugs." The Antinarcotics Directorate of the National Police coordi- 
nates the eradication of illicit crops, by both aerial fumigations and 
manual uprooting, and collaborates in the interdiction of drugs and 
chemical supplies for processing drugs. 

In 2006 the National Police budget of US$1 billion covered per- 
sonnel expenses, general operational expenses, government transfers, 
and, to a lesser extent, procurement and modernization. Of that bud- 
get, 63 percent was apportioned to personnel, 19 percent to general 
expenses, 15 percent to transfers, and 3 percent to procurements. Mil- 
itary and police procurement expenses were similar, because of the 
military missions that the Mounted Police undertook in rural areas. 

The National Police fleet of aircraft is second only to that of the 
FAC (see table 8, Appendix). Its aircraft and helicopters are used in 
antinarcotics operations, provide logistics support for police opera- 
tions, and transport police personnel. The bulk of the National Police 
transport inventory is composed of motorcycles, trucks, vans, and 
other vehicles. 

The National Police maintains its own professional education sys- 
tem, separate from that of the Military Forces. Of about 20 police 
schools, the main educational institution is the General Santander 
Police Cadet School (ENP) in Bogota, an accredited four-year uni- 
versity that offers programs in police and criminal administration, 
technical programs in police studies, police communications, and 
aeronautic maintenance. The academy additionally offers graduate 
degrees in criminal investigation, vehicle accident investigation, 
security, and police service. The National Police also operates 12 
other training units throughout the country, where agents and traffic 
patrol units receive instruction. The Police Justice and Investigation 
School is located in Sibate, Cundinamarca. The Mounted Police 
operates two specialized training programs in its schools: the 
National Carabineros School located in Facatativa, Cundinamarca; 
and the Carabineros School of Velez Province, in Velez, Santander. 



316 




Antiriot police in Bogota 
Courtesy Lorenzo Morales 

Police officer ranks are similar to those of the army, but the insig- 
nia differ. The ranking system in the National Police is a quasi- 
military structure with three career tracks as in the army: superior 
officers (generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors), subor- 
dinate officers (captains, lieutenants, and second lieutenants), non- 
commissioned officers (sergeant majors, master sergeants, sergeants, 
and corporals), and police agents, who correspond to the army's rank 
and file. A fourth rank, intended since 1993 to fuse subordinate offi- 
cers and agents into a single category, has yet to be implemented 
fully. The insignia of generals in the National Police are the same as 
for the military. They have stars with 10 identical points that resem- 
ble suns. Police majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels use one, 
two, or three bars, respectively, separate and surrounded by two lau- 
rel branches joined in a semicircle. Lieutenants and second lieuten- 
ants are identified by two and one stripes, respectively. 

Overseeing the National Police is the National Police Commis- 
sioner's Office (OCNP), which is also under the Ministry of 
National Defense. Created by a 1993 law, the OCNP serves as an 
intermediary between the citizenry and the National Police. Under a 
2000 law, the National Police adopted an executive-level rank and 
insignia system for members of the OCNP. It allows National Police 
NCOs to become OCNP agents after taking certain courses at the 
ENP. Headed by a commissioner {comisario), the OCNP ranks also 



317 



Colombia: A Country Study 

include those of subcomisario, intendente jefe, intendente, subinten- 
dente, and patrullero. 

The OCNP has a national, departmental, and municipal organiza- 
tion paralleling that of the National Police. The president appoints 
the National Police commissioner to a nonuniformed position requir- 
ing qualifications similar to those of a Supreme Court justice. The 
commissioner is responsible for overseeing the operational and dis- 
ciplinary actions of the police and guaranteeing the fulfillment of the 
constitution and the law by means of prevention, vigilance, control, 
and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The commissioner's duties 
include analyzing citizen complaints against the police, proposing 
policies and institutional improvements, supervising internal disci- 
plinary control, ordering and monitoring penal investigations against 
police members, ensuring that police activities are within the legal 
framework, and presenting an annual report to Congress. In late 
2009, the exact status of the OCNP was unclear. 

Administrative Security Department 

Another key law enforcement organization is the Administrative 
Security Department (DAS). The DAS is the state's primary intelli- 
gence agency and has a national role similar to that of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in the United States. Founded in 1960 by 
Alberto Lleras Camargo (president, 1945^6, 1958-62) to replace the 
Colombian Intelligence Service, which had been associated with 
abuses and repression during La Violencia, the DAS mandate is to 
produce intelligence for the state, with an emphasis on information 
about threats to national security. Nevertheless, DAS involvement in a 
variety of policing functions not directly related to intelligence has 
made the organization a de facto parallel police service. 

According to a 2000 decree, the DAS mandate is to provide a 
wide range of intelligence, security, and police-related services to 
the national government. Its primary functions relate to domestic and 
foreign intelligence gathering, the performance of counterintelli- 
gence activities, and the investigation of crimes against the internal 
security of the state. It assists the executive in policy formulation 
and in decisions affecting security. The DAS exercises judicial 
police functions, maintains all crime records and judicial files of cit- 
izens, manages all migration matters of both Colombian citizens and 
foreigners, administers the citizen registration and identification sys- 
tem, and provides protection services to high-ranking government 
officials and to individuals whose security is at risk. The DAS is also 
the national office of the International Police (Interpol). 



318 



National Security 



The director of the DAS is a civilian appointed directly by the 
president. In addition to being aided by a secretary general and a 
deputy director, the director's support staff includes the offices of 
planning, legal counsel, communication and press, disciplinary con- 
trol, and special protection. The organization is divided into two 
general directorates for intelligence and operations. Intelligence 
comprises five subdirectorates, including analysis, operations, 
human resources, counterintelligence, and technological develop- 
ment. The Operations Directorate has four subdirectorates, including 
strategic investigations, Interpol, alien affairs, and antikidnapping. 
The capital city of each department has its own section of the DAS. 
These sections each oversee about 20 security and operational units 
in municipalities with operational and strategic importance through- 
out the department's territory. In 2007 the DAS had an operating 
budget of US$118 million and approximately 7,000 employees 
throughout the country, an increase of approximately 10 percent in 
personnel since 1990. 

The Superior Intelligence Academy, located in Bogota, provides 
training for intelligence officials and detectives. The academy addi- 
tionally offers courses required for the advancement of officials and 
detectives, as well as induction and training programs for all DAS 
personnel. 

Since 2005 a series of institutional crises has shaken the DAS. 
Evidence of paramilitary penetration of the entity first emerged after 
the DAS chief of intelligence was accused of corruption involving 
drug traffickers and paramilitaries. Jorge Noguera Cotes, DAS direc- 
tor from 2002 to 2005, was arrested in 2007 after he had resigned his 
position and been assigned to a diplomatic post; he was charged with 
electoral fraud, leaking information to the paramilitaries, and having 
links with paramilitary leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, alias Jorge 40. 
This episode not only seriously damaged the credibility of the orga- 
nization but also had negative implications for U.S. support for Pres- 
ident Uribe, who had named Noguera to the position and had 
repeatedly expressed confidence in his innocence. After Noguera 
was found guilty of the charges, Maria del Pilar Hurtado became the 
first female director of the DAS in August 2007. However, she, too, 
was implicated in the scandal and resigned on October 24, 2008, and 
the president appointed her deputy to lead the DAS. 

Judicial Police 

The 1991 constitution, Article 250, stipulates that the Attorney 
General's Office must direct and coordinate the activities of all state 
entities with either permanent or temporary judicial police facilities. In 



319 



Colombia: A Country Study 

2004 the Attorney General's Office, the Directorate of the Judicial 
Police and Investigation (Dijin) of the National Police, and the DAS 
had permanent judicial police powers. The principal responsibility of 
Dijin is to carry out criminal investigations and to assist in the techni- 
cal preparation of criminal cases. Dijin's role in the process of discov- 
ery is essential to judicial rulings in the new accusatory penal system 
in Colombia. Although Dijin is organizationally under the National 
Police and reports to it, the Attorney General's Office also directs and 
coordinates the activities of the judicial police with all state agencies. 
Thus, there may be some overlapping control over Dijin activities by 
the National Police and the Attorney General's Office. There are addi- 
tionally a wide variety of other state organs with some judicial police 
authority within their organizations, including the Comptroller Gen- 
eral's Office, transit authorities, national and regional directors of the 
National Jail and Penitentiary Institute (INPEC), the directors of secu- 
rity personnel, mayors, and police inspectors. 

The National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences is 
the primary entity responsible for assisting the Attorney General's 
Office in criminal investigations and providing technical and scien- 
tific evidence. The DAS, the Technical Investigation Corps, and 
Dijin all maintain separate forensic laboratories. National and for- 
eign private laboratories, as well as public and private universities, 
also provide scientific-technical support. The multiplicity of training 
centers in judicial police functions, which results in a lack of stan- 
dardization in academic programs, technical training, and proce- 
dures, is a problem for all the entities involved. To address this 
concern, the Uribe administration proposed the establishment of a 
Central School of Judicial Police in its 2002-6 Development Plan, as 
well as the strengthening of the Dijin School of Criminal Investiga- 
tion and Forensic Science. 

The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (US AID) have assisted Dijin in achieving its 
reform goals. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assis- 
tance Program (ICITAP) spearheads training and reform initiatives 
oriented to developing specialized investigative units to improve coor- 
dination and cooperation among all entities involved in the investiga- 
tive process. These ICITAP writs, composed of prosecutors, forensic 
specialists, paralegals, judicial police, and specialized government 
personnel, focus on money laundering and asset forfeiture, human 
rights, and anticorruption. ICITAP also works with the Colombian 
government in standardizing Dijin training by designing a unified 
investigative pilot program, from which 5 1 judicial police graduated 
in 2003. In 2004 ICITAP helped prepare Dijin for the accusatory trial 



320 



National Security 



system with specialized training in crime-scene management. The 
U.S. Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and 
Training also participated in a reform of Colombia's four forensic lab- 
oratories aimed at standardizing forensic protocols and procedures. 

Penal System 

Colombia's penal system established laws that are applicable to 
both citizens and aliens who commit crimes defined by the Penal Code 
of 2000. The primary categories of crimes, classifiable as felonies or 
misdemeanors, include crimes against persons, property, individual 
liberties, or state security; political crimes, including rebellion and 
sedition; and sex crimes. In 2003 the majority of convictions were for 
crimes against property, followed by crimes against persons. 

The maximum prison term allowable under 2005 legislation is 50 
years for a single crime and 60 for multiple crimes. The 2000 code 
establishes two forms of punishment: detention (usually meaning 
imprisonment) and fines. Terms of confinement for criminal conduct 
are served in a maximum-security penitentiary or a prison facility. 
House arrest is common for white-collar crimes and for offenses 
committed by public officials. A Penal Code for Minors establishes 
separate courts, sentences, and juvenile detention centers. The Code 
of Criminal Procedure provides for the rights of defendants and also 
stipulates the detention of accused individuals prior to trial in the case 
of serious offenses. The death penalty was abolished in 1910. 

Colombia's extradition laws, which permit citizens to be tried in 
foreign jurisdictions, have been a source of national controversy 
since the 1980s. The assassination of the minister of justice in 1984 
and the ensuing wave of terrorism and violence against judges, poli- 
ticians, and journalists was a strategy by the Medellm Cartel to pres- 
sure the state to ban extradition to the United States. The campaign 
succeeded, at least for the short term, and extradition was prohibited 
in 1987. However, Virgilio Barco Vargas (president, 1986-90) can- 
celed this policy two years later following the killing of presidential 
candidate Luis Carlos Galan. The policy reversal led to an all-out 
assassination and bombing operation by the so-called Extraditables 
that lasted until 1991, when a constitutional ban on extradition was 
enacted in an effort to stem narco-terrorism. Extradition was subse- 
quently reestablished in 1997, and in 2004 Colombia extradited the 
first guerrilla insurgents for drug trafficking to the United States. 

The National Jail and Penitentiary Institute (Inpec) runs the coun- 
try's 139 national prisons and is responsible for inspecting municipal 
jails. Although part of the Ministry of Interior and Justice, Inpec has 
an independent budget and administrative decentralization. Inpec 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

personnel do not have permanent general investigative authority, 
although the Attorney General's Office does have the power to grant 
them such authority for specific purposes. 

In November 2007, the capacity of the country's prison system 
was 52,555 inmates, yet the prison population was 63,000, about 6 
percent of whom were female. This total was more than double the 
number of prisoners incarcerated in 1984. Nevertheless, the over- 
crowding rate of nearly 18 percent in 2006 was an improvement 
compared with nearly 40 percent overcrowding in 2005. Other seri- 
ous problems include poor training of many of Inpec's 14,000 prison 
guards and administrative staff, a lack of security, corruption, and an 
insufficient budget. 

Colombia's high crime rate and the backlog of cases are the pri- 
mary causes of the overcrowding. Alternative punishment mecha- 
nisms for those convicted of minor offenses should reduce the prison 
population. Only individuals arrested for crimes that carry more than 
a four-year sentence and who are considered flight risks are held in 
jail before trial. Judges may suspend prison terms for those con- 
victed of minor crimes that carry a sentence of less than three years. 
In the case of sentences between three and four years, judges rou- 
tinely order house arrest. Much longer prison terms exist for serious 
crimes, such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, terrorism, and 
drug trafficking. 

Colombia's prison system is organized geographically into six 
regional directorates: Bogota (central), Cali (western), Barranquilla 
(northern), Bucaramanga (eastern), Medellin (northeastern), and 
Pereira (Old Caldas). There were six maximum-security prisons in the 
country in 2007, of which the Penitenciaria de Combita in Boyaca was 
one of the best known because of the drug traffickers incarcerated 
there. Smaller penitentiaries are located in Barranquilla, Ibague, Man- 
izales, Medellin, Palmira, Pamplona, and Pasto. There are prison facil- 
ities for women in the major cities. An agricultural penal colony is 
located at Acacias, Meta. Each judicial district and municipality also 
operates its own jail. The majority of prisoners convicted or awaiting 
trial are detained in facilities in large municipalities. Juvenile reforma- 
tories for youths aged 14 to 18 are located at Bogota and Dagua. 
Imprisoned insurgents are incarcerated with regular criminal detainees 
in many of the penitentiaries. Occasionally, captured guerrillas are 
grouped together as a protective measure. Guerrillas historically have 
been imprisoned for rebellion or treason, although a 1991 constitu- 
tional reform permits their prosecution and trial for criminal acts. 

The 1991 constitution also instigated a significant reform of the 
Colombian justice system and penal process. The legal modification 



322 



National Security 



introduced a hybrid penal system, combining elements of both 
inquisitory and accusatory models in order to make the penal process 
more efficient and more compatible with modern concepts of justice 
and democracy. Nevertheless, the predominantly inquisitory aspect 
was preserved amid concerns that the accusatory system was too 
weak for the scale of Colombia's criminal problems. The inquisitory 
system is largely written, partially private, and limits participation 
by the accused. Likewise, under this system, the Attorney General's 
Office not only investigates crimes but also participates in judicial 
decisions. These problems led to concerns regarding the ability of 
the Colombian penal system to adequately comply with constitu- 
tional guarantees and deliver justice. 

In 2004 a new law provided for the conversion of the penal sys- 
tem from the mixed model to an entirely accusatory arrangement. 
The new system took effect in January 2005 and introduced the pro- 
cedures of oral arguments and trials open to the public. The conver- 
sion process has not been without its problems, and full transition to 
the new model will take some years to complete. Nevertheless, the 
accusatory system is expected to deliver justice more speedily and to 
limit the role of the attorney general to the investigation of crimes, 
the process of discovery, and the presentation of material evidence. 
A new judicial police was established for the purpose of unifying all 
criminal investigations and bringing about central control. The 
National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences works 
directly with the Judicial Police and the Attorney General's Office in 
the collection and verification of state's evidence in criminal trials. 
Since 2003 US AID 's program on democracy has provided technical 
assistance and training in the penal system reform, funded the estab- 
lishment of 28 oral trial courtrooms, and trained judges in oral trials, 
legal evidence, and procedures. 

By 2007 the system had succeeded in speeding judicial processes 
in cases involving in flagrante delicto. However, there were serious 
problems with other types of cases that demand an investigation, and 
the new accusatory system had made no significant difference in 
cases of organized crime, personal lawsuits, or corruption. 

National Security Background 

Colombia's national security experience following independence 
consisted of persistent domestic unrest and civil conflicts that culmi- 
nated in the devastating War of the Thousand Days at the end of the 
nineteenth century. International security affairs took on more impor- 
tance with the secession of Panama in 1903, followed by a border war 
with Peru (1932-34) and territorial disagreements with Venezuela. 



323 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Sectarian violence in the 1950s diverted Colombia's attention from its 
deepening security relations with the United States and its commit- 
ment to a new hemispheric security structure at the end of World War 
II. In conjunction with the guerrilla movements that had their origins 
in the period of La Violencia (1946-58), the subsequent development 
of drug trafficking and paramilitarism submerged Colombia in its cur- 
rent domestic security crisis. 

Nineteenth-Century Civil Unrest 

Colombia's earliest security challenges in the postindependence 
period were entirely internal in nature. In the nineteenth century, there 
were recurring ideological disagreements that split political elites into 
rival camps that resorted to armed conflict to settle differences and 
determine the exercise of power. The first significant civil war was the 
War of the Supremos, or Supreme Commanders (1840-42), which pit- 
ted the proto-Conservative government against the more liberal federal- 
ist model of government. This was followed by the Conservative 
rebellion in 1851 and a military coup in 1854. Civil war broke out again 
in 1859, when Liberals declared their opposition to the Conservative 
regime. The resulting Liberal Rionegro constitution of 1863 sparked 
another period of fighting, during which Liberals and Conservatives 
engaged in some 40 local conflicts and several major military battles. 
The conspiracy of May 23, 1867, brought radical Liberals to power, put- 
ting an end to four years of chronic instability, yet prompted a Conserva- 
tive armed rebellion in Tolima and Antioquia that was suppressed by the 
government. When Conservative-leaning Rafael Nunez Moledo (presi- 
dent, 1880-82, 1884-86, 1887-88, 1892-94) was reelected in 1884, 
Liberals started an armed uprising against the government that spread 
throughout much of the country. 

By century's end, the two main parties had splintered into multi- 
ple factions, each promoting a particular political and economic 
agenda. Liberal militants inspired by the earlier reformist policies of 
Francisco de Paula Santander y Omana (president of New Granada, 
1832-37) started another rebellion against the government in 1899 
that became the War of the Thousand Days. After an early defeat, the 
Liberal army persisted in a desperate strategy of guerrilla warfare 
that dragged on for two more years. The defeated Liberals finally 
sued for peace after nearly three years of fighting and more than 
100,000 deaths. One of the most violent conflicts in Colombia's his- 
tory, the War of the Thousand Days ushered in a new century, having 
devastated much of the country. 



324 



National Security 



International Security Affairs 

International security affairs took on more prominence in the twen- 
tieth century, starting with the secession of the department of Panama 
in 1903. What began as a local rebellion in the Panamanian province 
turned into an international incident when U.S. Navy gunships inter- 
cepted Colombian soldiers sent to suppress the revolt. After the 
Colombian Senate refused to approve the Hay-Herran Treaty, which 
would have granted Washington permission to construct a canal across 
the isthmus and to gain effective authority over the territory surround- 
ing the canal, President Theodore Roosevelt took advantage of both 
the insurrection and the Colombian government's weakness in the 
aftermath of the War of the Thousand Days to intervene. Having 
encouraged separatist sentiments and militarily supported the revolu- 
tionaries, the United States moved quickly to grant diplomatic recog- 
nition of Panama following the new government's declaration of 
independence in November 1903. Almost immediately, a treaty was 
signed that granted the United States, in perpetuity, exclusive control 
over the Canal Zone. The subsequent payment of US$25 million to the 
Colombian government as compensation for the loss of its territory 
did little to assuage national resentment or to repair U.S. -Colombian 
relations. 

Colombia also was involved in various border disputes with its 
immediate neighbors in the first half of the century. The most signif- 
icant of these was with Peru over control of the Amazon town of 
Leticia. The first treaty that established the boundary according to 
the colonial demarcation placed the outpost in Colombian territory, 
although Peru continued to press its claim to the land. Four subse- 
quent treaties designed to solve the dispute did not end repeated mil- 
itary skirmishes over the territory. In 1932 about 300 armed Peruvian 
civilians seized Leticia in protest of the 1922 agreement. Colombia's 
mobilization of troops to retake the town prompted Peru's military 
invasion. Open fighting in the Amazon basin between the armies 
resulted in 850 deaths. A League of Nations commission resolved 
the conflict in 1934 through a resolution that returned the disputed 
area to Colombia. 

Acrimonious territorial disputes centered on the Peninsula de La 
Guajira also characterized the Colombia- Venezuela relationship, 
although there was never open conflict. The Pombo-Romero Treaty 
of 1842 initially established Colombian sovereignty over the terri- 
tory. The persistence of conflicting claims led in 1891 to Spanish 
arbitration, which awarded territory to each country but failed to 
demarcate the entirety of the shared frontier. The Santos-Lopez 
Treaty of 1941 finally settled the boundary issue, granting most of 



325 



Colombia: A Country Study 

the Peninsula de La Guajira to Colombia. Nevertheless, uncertainty 
regarding the extension of the maritime boundary into the Golfo de 
Venezuela remained a contentious issue between the countries, and it 
nearly erupted into open warfare in the late 1980s. 

During World War II, Colombia broke diplomatic relations with 
the Axis powers after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, and later declared war against Germany following a 1943 sub- 
marine attack that destroyed a Colombian schooner. As the war 
entered its final stage, along with 19 other nations Colombia signed 
the Act of Chapultepec in March 1945, the first multilateral collec- 
tive security treaty in the Western Hemisphere that provided for con- 
sultation in the event of an attack on an American state. In 1947 
Colombia entered into the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty, which mandated a policy of 
collective defense against possible communist aggression. Closely 
aligned with U.S. geopolitical and security interests, Colombia also 
participated in the Korean War, contributing an infantry battalion 
and a warship. 

La Violencia and the Emergence of Insurgency 

Although partisan fighting following the end of 16 years of Lib- 
eral rule was already threatening to destabilize the nation in 1946, 
the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948 and 
the ensuing political violence that engulfed the country transformed 
Colombia's national security. The murder initially sparked massive 
rioting in Bogota that resulted in the deaths of 2,000 people. To this 
day, what came to be known as the Bogotazo has remained the larg- 
est urban riot in the history of the Western Hemisphere. The greatest 
disturbances during La Violencia occurred in the countryside, how- 
ever, where the Liberal-Conservative civil war is estimated to have 
claimed more than 200,000 lives. Swept up in the ideological furor 
and exploited by political parties, Colombia's security forces were 
ineffective at reestablishing order. The cacique-controlled police in 
rural areas were active agents for the Conservative cause, whereas 
the police in Bogota supported the Liberals. The army remained 
loyal to the Conservative Party. The hard-line Conservative Presi- 
dent Gomez brutally suppressed Liberal resistance in the countryside 
in the early 1950s and increasingly relied on the military to crush his 
political opposition, further corrupting the already highly politicized 
armed forces. 

General Rojas seized power in 1953 in the first successful military 
coup in a century. Rojas achieved some early success in reducing the 
fighting in the countryside, as many responded to an offer of political 



326 



National Security 



amnesty in exchange for abandoning the violent struggle. Neverthe- 
less, the partisan conflict continued because of the proliferation of 
armed bands dedicated to local criminal enterprises or involved in 
self-defense activities. Indeed, at the height of the internal conflict, 
approximately 20,000 members of illegal armed groups operated 
throughout the country, some of whom had established their own 
"independent republics" in remote regions. Self-defense organizations 
composed of campesino rebels loosely affiliated with the outlawed 
Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) represented a strong pocket of 
resistance to the government's amnesty program. Military offensives 
in the 1950s increasingly targeted these campesino vigilantes, espe- 
cially in the central coffee-growing regions (see Things Come Apart, 
1946-58, ch.l). 

The FARC, long Colombia's most important insurgent movement, 
had its origins in this midcentury period of political violence as an 
organization that provided protection to campesino communities in 
southern Tolima and the Sumapaz region of Cundinamarca. As the 
National Front regime of 1958-78 reconstructed the state and sought 
to reestablish centralized authority in remote regions, it increasingly 
clashed with campesino movements striving for land rights and local 
autonomy. After providing protection to rural populations in local 
struggles during La Violencia, various groups evolved into more 
mobile and offensive guerrilla movements in response to the state's 
counterinsurgency strategies. One such group, headed by the 
campesino Pedro Antonio Marin, also known as Manuel Marulanda 
Velez and Tiro Fijo (Sure Shot), first established itself as the Armed 
Southern Bloc in 1964. The radicalization of his organization occurred 
in reaction to Operation Marquetalia, a massive counterinsurgency 
action by the army in May and June of that year. In July 1966, during 
the bloc's second conference, the group announced its reconstitution 
as the FARC, an armed resistance movement associated with the PCC. 
Throughout the 1970s, the FARC slowly expanded by consolidating 
its campesino base of support in remote areas with little or no state 
presence. 

During the 1980s, the FARC developed into an independent, well- 
established guerrilla movement with its own political agenda and 
military doctrine. It more than tripled in size, with action spreading 
from 10 fronts to more than 30, and expanded into new areas of 
influence throughout the national territory. Paradoxically, peace dis- 
cussions with the government of Belisario Betancur Cuartas (presi- 
dent, 1982-86) in the mid-1980s fortified the FARC in two ways: the 
guerrilla organization gained recognition as a legitimate political 
movement, and the three-year truce permitted a steady buildup and 
expansion. The FARC also gained strength in the second half of the 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

1980s by its disassociation from the PCC. Both the decimation of the 
Patriotic Union (UP), the FARC's political party, by paramilitary 
violence between 1985 and 1996 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 led to a reduced emphasis on the FARC's Marxist ide- 
ology and a corresponding emphasis on its identity as an armed 
guerrilla force. The FARC's increasing strength at the end of the 
1980s was facilitated by its first tentative alliances with drug traf- 
fickers who had pushed into areas under guerrilla influence, offering 
new sources of financing (see Other Parties and Political Move- 
ments, ch. 4). 

The evolution of the FARC from its loose Marxist roots happened 
at the same time as a number of other guerrilla organizations 
inspired by the Cuban Revolution also developed in Colombia dur- 
ing the National Front period. The most influential of these, the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), was an urban-based movement 
founded by university students that gradually became a rural guer- 
rilla group with close ties to radical urban networks. Divided by 
internal class and ideological conflicts, the ELN did not become a 
serious threat until the 1980s, when, under the leadership of the 
priest Manuel Perez Martinez, the organization grew rapidly follow- 
ing the discovery of oil in Arauca. Extorting oil companies not only 
transformed its financial base but also contributed to ELN expansion 
as it gained influence among local populations affected by socioeco- 
nomic dislocations caused by oil exploration. 

Other guerrilla movements that shaped Colombia's internal secu- 
rity scenario during the 1970s and 1980s included the Quintin Lame 
Armed Movement (MAQL), which was based in the indigenous 
community in Cauca; the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), based in 
the northern regions of Uruba and Alto Sinu; and the urban Nine- 
teenth of April Movement (M-19). The M-19 became notorious first 
for its armed occupation of the embassy of the Dominican Republic 
in 1980, during which it held many diplomats hostage for 59 days, 
and later for its dramatic 1985 seizure of the Palace of Justice, which 
ended with the deaths of half of the Supreme Court justices, scores 
of civilians, and all but two of the guerrillas involved in the takeover. 
The organization demobilized soon after, forming a political party 
whose members participated in the mainstream political process. 

Drug Trafficking and the Origins of Paramilitarism 

The twin developments of drug trafficking and paramilitarism fur- 
ther compounded Colombia's internal security problems in the 1980s. 
By the early part of the decade, trade in cocaine had replaced Colom- 
bia's involvement in marijuana cultivation and smuggling. Following 
a highly successful aerial fumigation campaign against cannabis by 



328 



National Security 



the administration of Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (president, 1978-82), 
traffickers turned to the more lucrative business of processing coca 
paste imported from Bolivia and Peru and then exporting finished 
cocaine. The major cartels that emerged in Colombia during the 1980s 
in Medellin and Cali were initially involved exclusively in cocaine 
processing and trafficking. As the cocaine business flourished, with 
income from trafficking tripling throughout the decade to US$4.5 bil- 
lion, drug money penetrated the country's most important public insti- 
tutions, including the police, Congress, and the justice system, as the 
cartels sought to maintain their enormous wealth, influence, and 
resulting privileges. The cartels' response to the state's efforts to limit 
their activities brought about nearly a decade of violence and terror. 
From the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 
1984 and through the murder of Galan in 1989, the drug interests per- 
petrated a narco-terrorist campaign against the government, politi- 
cians, and journalists, and the related violence threatened to 
destabilize the national government. As domestic conditions and 
crackdowns in Peru and Bolivia reduced coca production there in the 
late 1980s, coca-leaf cultivation began to shift to Colombia, sparking 
the widespread purchase of cultivable land by criminal organizations 
involved in drug trafficking. 

Colombia's paramilitary groups emerged in the 1980s at the inter- 
section of the drug-trafficking phenomenon and the leftist insur- 
gency. The first paramilitaries were urban vigilante groups in the 
employ of drug cartels in the early 1980s, the most notorious of 
which was Death to Kidnappers (MAS), which retaliated against 
guerrillas who kidnapped cartel family members. Parallel develop- 
ments in the countryside involving the guerrillas were another factor 
that drove paramilitarism. The FARC's territorial expansion and the 
early electoral successes of its UP party following peace talks with 
the Betancur administration led large landowners and ranchers to 
begin forming local security forces to defend themselves. They 
argued that the state was ineffective in protecting their interests and 
maintaining order in rural areas; the resulting self-defense militias 
first appeared in the middle Magdalena valley. 

The arrival of drug lords, who were becoming large landowners 
themselves, in the middle Magdalena in the mid-1980s, compounded 
land struggles between the left-wing insurgents and agrarian inter- 
ests. Private militias proliferated to protect cocaine -processing labo- 
ratories, and eventually coca cultivations. By the late 1980s, in 
collaboration with military units, the self-defense groups adopted 
progressively more offensive and violent strategies against the guer- 
rillas and leftist sympathizers who threatened their increasingly 
independent territorial domination. Paramilitaries openly targeted 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

civilian politicians from the UP, approximately 3,000 of whose 
members were assassinated. The paramilitaries also unleashed a 
wave of political violence against journalists, campesino associa- 
tions, labor leaders, politicians, and regional government functionar- 
ies. Nevertheless, the perception that the military was ineffective at 
combating the guerrillas and protecting the rural population from the 
growing insurgent threats of extortion and kidnapping strengthened 
local support for these so-called self-defense forces. With roughly 
1,800 adherents in the late 1980s, these groups rapidly spread from 
the middle Magdalena region to Cordoba and Uraba, where they 
continued to unleash a reign of criminality and lawless violence. The 
growing direct involvement of paramilitaries, as well as guerrillas, in 
drug activities would be a key ingredient in the downward spiral in 
the next stage of Colombia's security situation (see The Contempo- 
rary Era, 1978-98, ch. 1). 

Current National Security Panorama 

Colombia limped into the 1990s, destabilized by the growing 
strength and lethal convergence of its three primary security threats: 
the FARC guerrillas, the right-wing paramilitaries, and the drug traf- 
fickers. Despite the successful demobilization of the M-19 and some 
smaller guerrilla groups, Colombia's primary insurgent movement 
continued its territorial expansion and organizational growth and 
improved its offensive capabilities. The paramilitary groups, which 
had been largely left alone, or in some cases nurtured, by the author- 
ities, also increased in strength through the unification of their dispa- 
rate groups into the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). 
At the same time, the paramilitaries and the guerrillas filled the void 
left by the collapse of the drug cartels in the early part of the decade. 
The expansion of these illegal armed groups and the intensification 
of the conflict coincided with the explosion of the illegal drug busi- 
ness in Colombia, which provided both left and right with an incom- 
parable source of independent financing. 

Internal Armed Conflict 

Colombia's internal conflict underwent a dramatic escalation dur- 
ing the 1990s. Both the FARC and the paramilitaries increased their 
personnel, armaments, organization, and territorial presence. Confron- 
tations with state security forces increased, and the proportion of the 
civilian population affected by direct actions or hostilities among the 
armed groups grew exponentially. The extent of the FARC buildup 
during the previous decade became obvious following the army's 



330 



A young officer communicates with his superiors while on a 
counterguerrilla patrol near San Jose del Guaviare, Guaviare Department. 

Courtesy David Spencer 
Two counterguerrilla soldiers of the 7 th Brigade pause 
after a successful operation, Apiay, Meta Department. 

Courtesy David Spencer 

attack against the FARC headquarters in Casa Verde in 1990. The 
guerrillas responded with the largest offensive in their history, made 
possible by a new ability to conduct well-organized, large-scale, mili- 
tary operations. By 1995 the FARC had approximately 7,000 members 
in 60 fronts, up from 32 fronts in 1986. Likewise, the number of guer- 
rilla actions committed the same year increased fourfold to more than 
600, consisting of attacks on police stations and villages with a police 
presence, ambushes of military units, and sabotage of infrastructure. 
Between 1996 and 1998, the FARC launched a series of direct assaults 
against army units and bases in the south of the country, resulting in a 
total of 220 soldiers dead and 242 captured. In one spectacular opera- 
tion, the FARC even took control of the military base in Mini, near the 
Brazilian border. 

The insurgent movement expanded into much of the national terri- 
tory, particularly in coca-growing regions and areas of strategic 
importance for national security and the economy. The insurgents 
spread into border areas with neighboring countries and increased 
their influence in urban centers. The FARC also took advantage of the 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

three-year peace process with the government of Andres Pastrana 
(president, 1998-2002) in the late 1990s, using the demilitarized 
sanctuary {zona de despeje) to train combatants, harbor kidnapping 
victims, and improve its finances. As a result, peace negotiations 
were aborted in 2002. By 2006 the FARC had an estimated 60 to 80 
fronts, with a total fighting force of approximately 16,000. 

The ELN also continued to play a role, albeit an increasingly 
minor one, in Colombia's conflict dynamics. Eschewing the drug 
trade until about 2005-7 limited the ELN's military growth and thus 
its capacity for attacks on security forces. Instead, the ELN dedicated 
itself to sabotage of the energy and oil infrastructure in Arauca. Start- 
ing in 1999, the ELN began to carry out mass kidnapping operations, 
including hijacking an airplane with its passengers and crew and 
abducting all the Sunday worshippers in a church. The ELN grew 
from approximately 2,000 combatants at the start of the 1990s to 
4,500 by the end of the decade. Hard hit by the paramilitaries and the 
security forces, it was estimated to number 3,300 combatants in 2004. 

The growth of paramilitary organizations and their geographical 
expansion paralleled that of the FARC during the 1990s. A radical 
anticommunist agenda framed their strategy of using violence and 
terror to subdue or expel local populations sympathetic to the left, 
and to drive out any FARC presence. The paramilitary groups in 
Cordoba and Uraba were infamous for their indiscriminate massa- 
cres and torture of civilians up until the late 1990s, and they were 
responsible for the majority of human rights violations committed in 
Colombia. Multiple independent paramilitary movements united 
under the umbrella of the AUC in 1997, permitting greater coordina- 
tion, growth, and advancement of their political agenda. The number 
of AUC combatants grew from only 1,800 in 1990 to an estimated 
13,500 in 2004. 

The critical ingredient in the conflict's expansion and intensifica- 
tion during the 1990s was the explosion in domestic coca production 
and the involvement of the FARC and the paramilitaries in different 
facets of drug cultivation and trafficking. Harvesting coca leaves had 
been a relatively small-scale business in Colombia. As it became 
harder to obtain coca base from neighboring countries, the new baby 
cartels — smaller and more independent organizations that replaced 
the Cali and Medellfn cartels, such as the Norte del Valle Cartel, now 
considered Colombia's most powerful drug syndicate — dedicated 
themselves to shifting coca cultivation to Colombia. With only 14 
percent of the global coca-leaf market in 1991, by 2004 Colombia 
was responsible for 80 percent of the world's cocaine production. 
The 13,000 hectares of coca in Colombia in the mid-1980s had bal- 



332 



National Security 



looned to 80,000 hectares by 1998. By 2007 the coca-cultivation 
hectarage had increased to 99,000. 

Drug-related activities became the principal source of income for 
the illegal armed groups, funding 50-70 percent of both the AUC and 
the FARC actions. According to the United Nations Development 
Programme, of the FARC's average annual income of US$342 mil- 
lion, US$204 million derived from the drug business. Drug-related 
enterprises were considered responsible for some US$190 million of 
the AUC's US$286 million average annual income. The FARC ini- 
tially took part in production, processing, transportation, and extor- 
tion of protection payments, although it had diversified into drug 
trafficking by the early 2000s. The AUC appeared to control directly 
40 percent of the drug-trafficking business. Whereas the paramilitar- 
ies engaged in direct drug trafficking, the FARC now preferred drugs- 
for-arms swaps. Armed groups dominated the country's major coca- 
growing regions. Paramilitaries had a presence in 86 of the 162 
municipalities where coca was cultivated, and half of the FARC's 60 
to 80 operational fronts participated in either coca or poppy cultiva- 
tion and trade. Bitter territorial fighting between the AUC and the 
FARC to control regions dominated by coca cultivation and the drug 
business were a key feature of the conflict, although occasional inci- 
dents of pragmatic, strategic cooperation between them in narcotics 
operations demonstrated the complex dynamics of the Colombian 
conflict. The intimate relationship between drug trafficking and the 
armed conflict led to the formation of Plan Colombia, and eventually 
to a change in policy regarding the use of U.S. drug-control resources 
for antisubversive activities (see United States-Colombian Security 
Cooperation and Plan Colombia, this ch.). 

The intensification of the internal conflict following the failed nego- 
tiations with the FARC in 2002 dashed the nation's hopes for peace. 
After the FARC retreated to remote bases, it resumed military offen- 
sives by trying to retake strategic corridors. It also increasingly resorted 
to terrorist acts, one of the most significant of which was the bombing 
of the Club Nogal in Bogota in February 2003. This change of tactics 
could be interpreted variously as a sign of the guerrilla movement's 
strength and urban penetration or of its military weakness. 

The character and aspirations of these illegal armed groups continue 
to generate debate. The United States considers them outright terrorists 
(vide their inclusion in the U.S. Department of State's terrorism list); 
many others see them as common criminals, or purely politically moti- 
vated insurgents or counterinsurgents. The FARC, ELN, and AUC dis- 
play a mix of all these elements. They commit acts of terrorism, with 
the FARC, in particular, accused of increasingly resorting to terrorist 
acts. The groups engage in a range of criminal activities, including drug 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

cultivation and trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion; yet they also 
maintain political agendas and have some base of social support. All 
the armed groups, both on the left and on the right, have established 
certain sociopolitical structures and gained autonomous authority in 
their respective zones of influence, effectively substituting for the state, 
with rudimentary systems of justice, conflict resolution, and political 
participation. The FARC continues to espouse a broad socialist political 
agenda and militant opposition to the Colombian government, even 
though the likelihood of its gaining national power through armed rev- 
olution is virtually nil. The FARC remains committed to territorial con- 
trol and to local power, with an eye toward maximizing political gains 
in eventual negotiations. The paramilitaries seek status as legitimate 
political representatives in regional and national politics. Various para- 
military groups entered negotiations with the government in 2003, 
seeking legal pardon for their criminal activities and human rights 
abuses in exchange for their complete demobilization and an entry into 
the political process. Having gained local support for their anti-insur- 
gent platform and restoration of public order, the paramilitaries have 
achieved some success at penetrating national political institutions, as 
attested by the parapolitics scandal of 2006 (continuing in 2009). In 
mid-2008, at least 33 regional and national elected politicians were 
jailed awaiting trial, accused of collusion with the paramilitaries, while 
another 62 members of Congress were official suspects (see Corrup- 
tion, ch. 4). 

Human Rights 

Colombia's internal conflict has caused the Western Hemisphere's 
worst humanitarian crisis. Civilians bear the brunt of the conflict, in 
which the warring parties commit serious and extensive breaches of 
human rights and act in disregard of international humanitarian law. 
Although the situation improved after 2002, the overall human rights 
panorama in Colombia continues to be cause for grave concern. In 
pursuit of their military objectives of dominating coca regions and 
controlling strategic corridors for the transport of drugs and arms, the 
illegal armed groups have increasingly targeted civilian populations. 
Credible threats of direct attacks or massacres, as well as the risk of 
violence from military confrontations between the FARC, the AUC, 
and the armed forces, forcibly displaced about 220,000 people in 
2006, raising the total of internally displaced civilians since 1985 to 
3.7 million. Women, children, indigenous populations, and Afro- 
Colombians are especially vulnerable to displacement. By 2006 some 
observers considered the paramilitaries to be responsible for 50 per- 
cent of displacements and the FARC for 25 percent. 



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National Security 



Massacres, assassinations and extrajudicial executions, torture, 
abductions, forcible recruitment, the use of child soldiers, land-mine 
maiming, terrorism, and attacks on villages routinely target Colom- 
bia's civilian population. Although the situation remained very grave 
in 2007, important improvements in many indicators suggest prog- 
ress is being made in the area of security, according to the U.S. 
Department of State's 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices: Colombia. 

In 2008 Colombia experienced 37 confirmed mass killings (defined 
by the government as killings of four or more persons), in which 169 
people were killed. Although this was a 32-percent increase from 
2007, it was a significant reduction in the annual number of victims 
since 2002, attributed principally to the sharp decrease in AUC vio- 
lence following demobilization. Political assassinations are a particu- 
larly virulent tool in Colombia's conflict; mayors, congressional 
representatives, and candidates for political office are frequent targets. 
In 2006 the country had 153 politically related murders, including of 
one mayor and four former mayors. Many others were forced from 
office and banished from their towns by threats of violence, replaced 
by illegal armed actors who exercised de facto rule. In the first six 
months of 2006, more than 70 Colombians were "disappeared" forci- 
bly, down significantly from 1,358 for the entire 2002 calendar year, 
but 23 percent more than during the same period of 2005. In 2006 an 
average of three persons a day, both civilians and soldiers, fell victim 
to land mines and other improvised explosive devices placed by the 
FARC and ELN across Colombia, a more than sevenfold increase 
from 2000. The figure was down to two persons per day in 2008. 
FARC attacks on villages continued to fall significantly during 2006, 
as did the group's previously indiscriminate use of gas-cylinder bombs 
against villages, which resulted in high civilian casualties. In 2005 an 
estimated 11,000 child combatants were serving in the various irregu- 
lar groups in Colombia, approximately 80 percent of them abducted 
by the FARC or the ELN. 

Until 2006 Colombia had the highest kidnapping rate in the world. 
During the 30-year period ending in 2006, almost 29,000 people were 
kidnapped for ransom, and on average seven kidnappings occurred daily 
from 1999 to 2002. Kidnapping for ransom is an important source of 
income for both the FARC and the ELN, and illegal armed groups com- 
mit approximately 60 percent of both extortive and political kidnappings. 
By 2006 this rate had decreased to two kidnappings per day, down nearly 
76 percent from 2002. This reduction is attributed largely to the reduced 
kidnapping activity by the FARC, even while the participation of com- 
mon criminals in such abductions grew. Of the 687 recorded kidnappings 
in 2006, which included children, 282 were for ransom. In 2007 the 



335 



Colombia: A Country Study 

FARC still held more than 750 people captive, while the ELN continued 
to hold 410 people. More than 4,000 people are still considered as disap- 
peared. Between 1997 and 2007, more than 622 kidnapped Colombians 
died in captivity. 

Besides extortive kidnappings, politically motivated kidnappings 
by the guerrillas continued to be a serious concern in 2008. Approxi- 
mately 50 kidnapped victims were still being held by the FARC as 
potential bargaining chips with the government, among them politi- 
cians and members of the Colombian armed forces. The political 
hostages had included former presidential candidate Ingrid Betan- 
court Pulecio, who was kidnapped in 2002 while campaigning, and 
three American citizens kidnapped in 2003 while working as drug- 
control contractors with the U.S. military; they and 1 1 other hostages 
were rescued in a spectacular blow to the FARC in 2008. Colombia's 
minister of foreign relations in 2008, Fernando Araujo Perdomo, had 
been held by the FARC for more than six years until his daring 
escape in 2007. The June 2007 massacre of 11 assembly members 
from Valle del Cauca, who had been kidnapped by the FARC in 
2002, underscored fears for the future of hostages whose value is 
measured in terms of their political bargaining weight. 

Human rights abuses attributed to Colombia's military and secu- 
rity forces were acknowledged publicly for the first time during the 
Samper administration. International pressure by the United Nations 
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the linkage 
of U.S. military aid with Colombian human rights compliance, and 
reforms in the military penal system have contributed to improve- 
ments in the military and police human rights record since the late 
1990s. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commis- 
sioner for Human Rights in Colombia, violations by the security 
forces are considered low, and all state agencies have made consider- 
able efforts to increase their compliance with human rights norms. 
However, credible allegations of serious violations continued to be 
reported by this office in 2006. In addition to extrajudicial killings, 
security forces committed 32 known acts of torture in the first half of 
2006 and 74 in the first half of 2008, a 46-percent increase compared 
with the first six months of 2007. To the extent that military partici- 
pation in human rights abuses has declined, the paramilitaries, fol- 
lowed by the guerrillas, have increasingly replaced security forces as 
perpetrators of such violations. 

Violence and Crime 

Although the internal conflict is at the core of Colombia's acute 
security crisis, multiple forms of violence and criminality also pose 



336 



National Security 



grave risks to domestic order. No other country formally at peace 
registers Colombia's level of violence. Homicides, kidnappings, vio- 
lence against journalists and activists, social cleansing (based on 
class and socioeconomic factors), and the systematic use of violence 
in the commission of property crimes underscore the country's secu- 
rity crisis. Criminal and social violence are frequently intertwined 
with conflict dynamics and drug cultivation and trafficking, with the 
majority of homicides and kidnappings taking place in municipali- 
ties where at least one of the principal illegal armed groups is pres- 
ent. Urban gangs, vigilante groups, and the notorious sicarios, or 
juvenile hired assassins, are also responsible for much of the vio- 
lence in association with criminal, guerrilla, and paramilitary organi- 
zations, often through the extralegal application of security and 
justice. 

Colombia's kidnapping rate has declined significantly in recent 
years. Although the majority of abductions are attributed to the ille- 
gal armed movements, common criminals account for the remaining 
40 percent of kidnappings. In most cases, delinquents sell their cap- 
tives to the guerrilla or paramilitary armies, creating a complex web 
of kidnapping. 

The presence of organized crime and its links to drug trafficking, 
guerrilla and paramilitary movements, death squads dedicated to 
social cleansing, and high levels of impunity are all correlated with 
the homicide rate in Colombia, once the highest in the world. After 
having doubled throughout the 1980s, the homicide rate reached its 
peak of 70 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991 and then 
dropped from 28,500 cases in 2002 to 17,500 cases in 2006. This 
figure contrasted sharply with the Latin American average of only 
17 in the late 1980s. The average homicide rate of 61 per 100,000 
people in the 1990s increased in the early 2000s, then fell approxi- 
mately 20 percent in 2003, because of the Democratic Security Pol- 
icy and the paramilitary demobilization process. It was estimated 
that 5,000 of the 28,500 homicides committed in 2002 were directly 
related to the conflict. 

Certain sectors of society, including the press, human rights work- 
ers, intellectuals, teachers, and labor leaders, are especially vulnerable 
to violence by both the left and right. In 1999 the Colombian govern- 
ment created a special Human Rights Unit within the Attorney Gen- 
eral's Office to investigate violence against journalists and also 
implemented a Journalist Protection Program. Colombia has had the 
highest homicide rate against the press in the hemisphere, with 114 
journalists murdered during the 1997-2007 period. In 2003 alone, five 
journalists were murdered, 11 kidnapped, and 31 threatened. However, 



337 



Colombia: A Country Study 

no journalists were murdered in 2008, despite 72 death threats during 
the year. Human rights activists also are particular targets, with 73 
murdered between 1996 and 2002 and 11 in 2008. The paramilitaries 
are considered responsible for the majority of these acts. Labor is also 
vulnerable to right-wing violence; an estimated 1,800 union members 
were killed between 1993 and 2003. Violence against labor was down 
sharply in 2004 as paramilitaries began the process of negotiation with 
the government. Unionized teachers are also often victims of Colom- 
bia's political violence, suffering 60 assassinations and 13 disappear- 
ances in 2005-6. In 2008 some 55 percent of all union members who 
were killed were teachers. 

National Security Doctrines and Policies 

Colombia's national security doctrines and policies evolved pri- 
marily in response to the threats posed by the insurgency and illicit 
drugs. Military plans to defeat or eliminate these problems lay at the 
core of the country's security policy. In the case of the guerrilla 
movements, the aim of counterinsurgency strategies first imple- 
mented in the 1960s was a military solution to what was considered 
an illegitimate armed challenge to the state. The inefficacy of this 
strategy led to various efforts in the 1980s and 1990s to seek a 
peaceful, negotiated solution to the armed conflict. When the last of 
these initiatives failed in 2002, Colombia readopted an exclusively 
military approach to the guerrilla problem. Drug trafficking also 
played a vital role in shaping security policies in Colombia, first in 
the 1980s with the rise of narco-terrorism, and later because of the 
increasing reliance on drug-related activities by both the guerrillas 
and the paramilitary organizations. In the early twenty-first century, 
all of these elements form part of a complex and paradoxical 
national security policy: the government is engaged in an all-out mil- 
itary campaign to defeat the FARC and the drug traffickers, at the 
same time that it aggressively pursues peace negotiations with the 
paramilitary organizations. 

Counterinsurgency Strategies and Emergency Decrees 

Colombia's military orientation since the 1940s reflected the Cold 
War anticommunist agenda that prevailed throughout South America. 
National security doctrines to counter growing internal challenges 
from the left were first elaborated in Brazil and Argentina, and soon 
dominated military institutions across the continent. Colombia's 
national security doctrine developed in the 1950s in response to rural 
self-defense units, which by the 1 960s had evolved into guerrilla orga- 
nizations engaged in irregular warfare against the state. This counter- 



338 



National Security 



insurgency posture coincided with changes in military institutions that 
began in the second half of the twentieth century, and with strengthen- 
ing ties between Colombia and the United States in defense and secu- 
rity matters. Military assistance, counterinsurgency instruction of 
Colombian officials by the U.S. Army, and the creation of a national 
counterinsurgency training center were all precursors to the develop- 
ment of Colombia's first counterguerrilla strategy launched in 1960. 

Plan LASO (Latin American Security Operation) was a direct off- 
shoot of Colombia's national security doctrine and the counterinsur- 
gent tactics learned from the U.S. military. With financing from the 
Kennedy administration, Colombia sought to use the plan to wipe 
out the guerrillas by applying the counterinsurgency doctrines 
employed by the United States in Vietnam. At the same time, the aim 
was to win the support of the civilian population through social and 
economic projects implemented by the army. In this regard, a key 
aspect of security thinking was economic development as a social 
defense against communism, as embodied in the Alliance for Prog- 
ress ideology. The balance at the end of the five-year Plan LASO 
was mixed, however: some rural outlaw groups were eliminated, but 
others such as the FARC merely moved to outlying regions of the 
country where there was little or no state presence. Indeed, the radi- 
calization of the FARC and its conversion into an offensive revolu- 
tionary movement were in large measure attributed to Plan LASO. 

Two developments shaped national security policy in the immedi- 
ate wake of Plan LASO. First, counterinsurgency became the center- 
piece of the military's security strategy. Training and equipment 
acquisitions became oriented toward combating the guerrillas, and 
all the army's operative units developed into counterinsurgency 
companies. A National Intelligence Board, which reported to the 
military command, came into being in 1967 in order to develop 
intelligence and counterintelligence functions related to combating 
the guerrillas. The government intended a new National Defense 
Statute to improve coordination between the country's defense and 
civilian authorities. 

Despite these reforms, counterinsurgency efforts in the late 1960s 
and through the 1970s failed to make much headway against the 
growing guerrilla threat. Divorced from broader state policies and 
political considerations, security strategy was largely in the hands of 
the army and remained of a strictly military nature. Colombia also 
increasingly relied on the implementation of states of emergency to 
respond to the internal situation. Constitutional provisions authorized 
the president to implement emergency measures, including legisla- 
tion, in case of situations of extreme public disorder or war. Execu- 
tive emergency decrees provided cover for summary executions, 



339 



Colombia: A Country Study 

permitted the trial of citizens by military courts, and granted the mili- 
tary authority over the civilian population. In 1978 President Turbay 
made permanent certain facets of what had until then been considered 
extraordinary measures with a new security statute. By granting even 
greater autonomy to the Military Forces and loosening civilian con- 
trols over security matters, this legislation was sharply criticized for 
the systematic military abuses it engendered. 

Peace Processes 

Growing concern over the failure of counterinsurgency, the mili- 
tary's excessive autonomy over national security, and the escalation 
of repressive authoritarian responses to the internal conflict during 
the Turbay administration all led to consideration of a negotiated 
solution in the government's political agenda. Breaking with Colom- 
bia's national security paradigm, President Betancur announced his 
intention to seek peace with the country's various armed insurgent 
groups and declared that civilian authorities would manage negotia- 
tions. The ambitious peace policy involved the establishment of a 
commission to initiate dialogues with the guerrillas, a congressio- 
nally approved amnesty law, a rehabilitation plan, a series of public 
works projects in conflict zones dominated by the insurgents, and a 
commitment to strengthening the role of the National Police in main- 
taining public order. Significantly, both the FARC and the M-19 
reached tentative agreements with the government in 1984. The suc- 
cess of the peace initiative was short-lived, however. The FARC was 
unable to sustain a viable political movement, and the M-19 broke 
the truce and took over the Palace of Justice on November 6, 1985. 

Despite these setbacks, President Barco refused in the mid- to late 
1980s to abandon the pursuit of a negotiated solution with the two 
principal guerrilla organizations, continuing efforts to demobilize 
insurgents, increasing resources for conflict zones, and creating the 
new position of presidential peace adviser. Indeed, the political com- 
mitment to reach a peace agreement with the guerrilla groups took 
on more urgency, as the drug cartels and narco-terrorism emerged as 
the country's new security priority in the mid-1980s. The govern- 
ment's 1988 peace initiative culminated in the demobilization of the 
M-19 and the participation of many of its leaders in the political pro- 
cess. The continuing threat posed by the FARC and the drug-traf- 
ficking groups, however, kept the military option very much on the 
table, and the strategic and operational autonomy of the armed forces 
intact. 

The administration of President Gaviria represented a turning 
point in the early 1990s in Colombia's management of its national 



340 



National Security 



security strategies. With a series of far-reaching reforms, including 
the designation of the Ministry of National Defense as a civilian 
department, security ceased to be controlled exclusively by the 
armed forces as nonmilitary institutions gained a central role in the 
security decision-making process. For the first time, security entered 
the sphere of state policy, which allowed the government greater lat- 
itude in pursuing political solutions to the armed conflict and facili- 
tated the demobilization agreements with the minor Renewed 
Socialist Movement (MSR) and various militia groups in Medellm. 
The government again failed, however, to reach an agreement with 
the FARC on a proposal to include guerrilla leaders in the 1991 Con- 
stituent Assembly in exchange for their demobilization. This failure, 
in conjunction with the political fallout from Pablo Escobar 
Gaviria's escape from prison in 1992, again led to the declaration of 
successive states of emergency to deal with the country's growing 
security crisis. In 1993 the government passed a public order bill that 
permanently legalized some of the more moderate aspects of the 
state of emergency provisions. Ironically, the same administration 
that wrested control over security policy from the military in the end 
resorted to the traditional formula of a military approach combined 
with emergency measures to restore domestic order. 

In an effort to jump-start negotiations in the face of the FARC's 
impressive advances in the 1990s, President Pastrana accepted a 
bold proposal by the FARC to demilitarize five municipalities in an 
extensive territory in the department of Meta. Simultaneously, the 
military also withdrew from a smaller area in northern Colombia for 
the purpose of engaging in peace talks with the ELN. Both negotia- 
tions were fraught with difficulties and controversy because of the 
continuation of guerrilla attacks on state infrastructure and criminal 
activities such as kidnapping and coca cultivation while the talks 
were taking place. With suspicions high regarding the sincerity of 
the guerrillas' commitment to peace, and with doubts as to the profi- 
ciency of the government's negotiating skills, the process with the 
FARC was particularly contentious. When the government called off 
the talks and redeployed troops in February 2002 after a series of fla- 
grant provocations by the FARC, including the assassination of a 
congressman and the hijacking of a commercial airplane, once again 
Pastrana declared a state of exception, followed by a new 2002 
defense and security bill that granted the military judicial powers. 
Thus, Colombia arrived at the beginning of the new century with a 
somewhat contradictory track record in counterinsurgent security 
policy, alternating between the two extremes of political dialogue 
and the application of military force, which tended toward excesses 
sanctioned by emergency decrees. 



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Colombia: A Country Study 

The latest attempt at a peace process involved negotiations with a 
number of paramilitary fronts. By 2007 approximately 35,000 para- 
military combatants had participated in a national demobilization 
program established in the agreement between the government and 
the AUC signed on July 15, 2003, in Santa Fe de Ralito. The goal 
was to dismantle the entire AUC apparatus by the end of 2006, 
although serious difficulties remained regarding the demobilization 
process, the reabsorption of AUC members into civil society, and the 
nature of the judicial treatment of paramilitary leaders, who 
demanded pardons in exchange for demobilizing. Concerns were 
widespread that perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities commit- 
ted during the conflict would receive excessively lenient punish- 
ments, that drug-trafficking operations would not be dismantled, and 
that the paramilitary command structures and political influence 
would remain intact. 

Antidrug Strategies 

The earliest antinarcotics efforts in Colombia in the 1970s 
occurred within the same counterinsurgency framework that guided 
security strategy, consisting of military offensives in marijuana- and 
coca-growing areas. Following the assassination of the minister of 
justice by drug traffickers in 1984, the military justice system 
expanded to cover not only guerrilla activities but also crimes com- 
mitted by cartel members. At the same time, the military imple- 
mented forced eradication of coca crops and aerial fumigation. 

The drug phenomenon became more complex, violent, and desta- 
bilizing by the mid-1980s, and Colombia responded with institu- 
tional measures to combat what was increasingly seen as a narco- 
terrorist threat to national security. Not only did the Barco adminis- 
tration pass the first antiterrorist statute, but the DAS and Ministry of 
Justice emerged as key players in the state's fight against drug traf- 
ficking and related criminal activities. One of the most significant 
developments was the shift in responsibility to the National Police 
for counternarcotics operations, as the military preferred to concen- 
trate on its counterinsurgent priorities. An elite unit within the 
National Police also took charge of pursuing death squads, paramili- 
tary groups, and drug organizations. 

The Gaviria administration was the first to employ judicial incen- 
tives to combat the drug-trafficking threat. Invoking national secu- 
rity interests, the 1991 constitutional ban on extradition aimed at 
weakening the assassination and bombing campaign by the extradit- 
ables against the government. Reduced sentences and a prohibition 
on extradition to the United States were intended to encourage crim- 



342 



A soldier stands guard while 
coca crops are fumigated. 
Courtesy Narcotics Affairs 
Section Office, 
U.S. Embassy, Bogota 




inals to turn themselves in, which would eventually lead to the dis- 
mantling of the country's drug cartels. The Gaviria government also 
created an elite search unit of both police and military agents, origi- 
nally to hunt down Pablo Escobar following his escape from prison, 
and later to pursue the country's other drug traffickers. 

Under the Samper government, antinarcotics strategies broadened 
and the military reentered the "war on drugs." Samper not only rein- 
stated Colombia's extradition laws but also stiffened sentences for 
drug-related crimes. A new search unit was established to hunt down 
the Cali Cartel, and an antinarcotics strategy led to increased fumiga- 
tion of illicit coca crops. Military operations targeted destruction of 
the drug business infrastructure in the southern part of the country 
where coca cultivations dominated. With the installation of a radar 
system from the United States in Vichada, aerial interdictions began 
against suspected narco-trafficking flights. 

United States-Colombia Security Cooperation and Plan 
Colombia 

Although the hardening of Colombia's antidrug policies stemmed 
from the upsurge of political violence and terrorism perpetrated by the 
drug-trafficking organizations in the 1980s, the escalation of the U.S. 
"war on drugs" became a key factor in Colombia's national security 
orientation in the late 1990s. The Pastrana administration, while nego- 
tiating with the insurgents, also aggressively pursued international aid 



343 



Colombia: A Country Study 

to help finance alternative counternarcotics policies, as well as to sup- 
port institutional reforms, state building, trade relations, and the peace 
process itself. Early backing by the Clinton administration for Pas- 
trana's comprehensive peace initiative stopped abruptly when the 
FARC murdered three American activists for indigenous rights in 
1999. U.S. skepticism over the demilitarized zone and political negoti- 
ations with the FARC led to a shift in emphasis in Colombia's request 
for assistance in its counternarcotics efforts and military aid. 

Following an intensive diplomatic campaign, in 2000 the U.S. Con- 
gress approved a US$860 million aid package to reduce the cultivation 
and production of drugs, largely through the aerial spraying of coca 
crops. The goal was to reduce coca cultivation by 50 percent in five 
years. Although there were also provisions for judicial reform, human 
rights, and democratic strengthening, 74 percent of the aid package, 
known as Plan Colombia, was earmarked for strengthening the mili- 
tary and the police and improving their antinarcotics capacity. Most of 
this aid went to the acquisition of intelligence-gathering equipment, 
vehicles, and helicopters; the creation of a new counternarcotics bri- 
gade; professional training; and the enhancement of military bases at 
Larandia and Tres Esquinas, both in Caqueta Department, and Tole- 
maida in Cundinamarca. The centerpiece of Plan Colombia's strategy 
was a push into southern Colombia by the 2,300-strong mobile bri- 
gade, followed by the massive fumigation of coca crops in Putumayo 
Department. 

Two years later, another appropriation of US$400 million was 
part of a wider strategy called the Andean Regional Initiative, which 
placed the "war on drugs" within a regional context. The most sig- 
nificant change in this new round of U.S. legislation, however, was 
that U.S. military funding in Colombia broadened from counternar- 
cotics activities to include counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. 
As the U.S. global posture took shape post-September 11, Colom- 
bian criminals and insurgents alike were increasingly viewed as ter- 
rorists. The lines between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency 
strategies became blurred, as it became evident that both the guer- 
rilla and paramilitary movements were directly involved in the drug 
business. This change allowed U.S. -aided military units to actively 
pursue the FARC, ELN, and paramilitaries, led to the arrival of U.S. 
Special Forces to train Colombian soldiers in counterinsurgency and 
in the protection of the pipelines of U.S. oil companies, and permit- 
ted the sharing of nondrug intelligence. 

The expansion of the U.S. mission in Colombia from a "war on 
drugs" to a "war on terror" had two immediate effects. It contributed 
to the intensification of Colombia's military campaign against the 



344 



National Security 



FARC and triggered Colombia's reframing of its armed conflict and 
the illegal drug business according to the antiterrorist logic. With a 
new reading of Colombia's security situation as a terrorist threat, 
President Uribe became a top supporter of the U.S. "war on terror." 
Colombia gained an additional US$105 million of mostly military 
assistance in 2003 under the emergency supplemental bill for the 
war in Iraq, and the cap on U.S. troop numbers rose from 400 to 800 
in 2004. U.S. military training reached 13,000 Colombian personnel 
in 2003, up from 2,500 in 1999. Finally, U.S. intelligence and logis- 
tical provisions supported the implementation of Plan Patriota, a 
large-scale, multiforce, counterinsurgency offensive of 17,000 
Colombian troops in the country's southern region meant to be the 
beginning of the end of the guerrilla insurgency. Plan Patriota was 
replaced in 2006 by Plan Consolidacion, intended to uproot the terri- 
torial control that the FARC still exerts upon the southern depart- 
ments of Caqueta, Cauca, Guaviare, southern Meta, and Putumayo, 
and to combat drug trafficking in these regions. Financing came in 
part through a special war tax levied in December 2006 on the 
wealthiest individuals and companies in Colombia, which should 
raise US$4 billion between 2007 and 2010. 

U.S. congressional criticism of military assistance to Colombia 
grew in 2005-6, owing to the poor results from aerial fumigation 
and persistent concerns about the Uribe government's leniency with 
the paramilitaries, and aggravated by incidents of corruption by U.S. 
troops in Colombia. Given the Uribe administration's overall secu- 
rity performance, however, and Colombia's role as one of the 
George W. Bush administration's strongest Latin American allies in 
Washington's global "war on terror," U.S. military assistance to 
Colombia rose to US$772.2 million in 2005. The U.S. Congress 
approved military and police aid totaling US$733.8 million in 2006. 

After the November 2006 U.S. elections, in which Democrats 
gained control of both houses of Congress, Colombia began to lose its 
status as the darling of Latin America, and United States-Colombia 
relations suffered serious setbacks. As the voices of criticism in the 
U.S. Congress grew increasingly vociferous over what was perceived 
as a failing antidrug strategy, a series of scandals in Colombia led to a 
plummet in Washington's support for the Uribe administration in 
2007. Charges of paramilitary collusion against a number of Colom- 
bian congressional representatives loyal to President Uribe 's political 
party, together with incidents involving the army's ties to paramilitary 
groups and its role in the massacre of an elite police and antidrug unit, 
seriously damaged Uribe 's reputation and resulted in the entire aid 
package to Colombia being called into question by the Democratic 



345 



Colombia: A Country Study 

majority. A bill passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in June 
2007 reduced the portion of U.S. aid destined for military assistance 
from 80 percent to 55 percent. 

Democratic Security Policy 

Frustrated by a steadily worsening security situation and the failure 
of Pastrana's peace negotiations with the FARC, Uribe rode to victory 
in the 2002 presidential election on a "get-tough" platform. Amid the 
new "war-on-terror" framework, increased U.S. military involvement, 
and a closely managed military strategy, Uribe made law and order his 
priority. These elements came together in his administration's Demo- 
cratic Security Policy, a broad and ambitious policy package designed 
to provide internal security within a framework of democratic protec- 
tions and guarantees. The policy's main strategic objective was to 
change the military balance of power in the armed conflict in order to 
defeat the guerrillas, or to force them to negotiate on terms favorable to 
the government. Achievement would come through the strengthening 
of the armed forces, the reestablishment of military control over the 
totality of Colombian territory, the eradication of drug crops, and the 
elimination of illegal armed groups, all supported by expanded military 
cooperation with the United States. The Uribe government allocated 
the U.S. aid to significantly increasing the number of professional foot 
soldiers, retaking control over strategic corridors from the guerrillas, 
and creating militias of peasant soldiers, additional mobile brigades, 
and new high-mountain battalions. The military offensive against the 
guerrillas also targeted the paramilitary combatants. The armed forces 
sought to improve their professionalism and compliance with interna- 
tional human rights standards, as well as mobility, readiness, and intel- 
ligence capabilities. 

Lasting and comprehensive security was understood as going 
beyond military victory over the illegal armed groups. Uribe 's Dem- 
ocratic Security Policy broke with previous military doctrines by 
incorporating institutional protections of citizens' rights (tutelas), 
guarantees of justice, and the rule of law as essential components in 
a comprehensive, viable vision of security. By improving gover- 
nance and strengthening confidence in public institutions and 
democracy, state legitimacy would be enhanced at the same time that 
nondemocratic alternatives would become discredited. 

These objectives notwithstanding, government policy continued 
to favor military protection of public order over institutional 
strengthening. Early in Uribe 's first administration, a state of emer- 
gency that temporarily granted judicial powers to the military, spe- 
cial powers for security forces, and the application of security 



346 



National Security 



measures to noncombatants generated concerns about possible mis- 
uses of government power. Improvements in most security indicators 
in Colombia in 2003^ suggested that Uribe's approach had made 
important gains, although questions remained about the govern- 
ment's interpretation of the conflict as a struggle against terrorism, 
and about the prospects for long-term success of a military strategy 
to defeat the 45 -year-old insurgency at the expense of dealing with 
fundamental social and economic problems. 

President Uribe's plan included the formation of legally recruited 
platoons of campesino soldiers; they would perform their obligatory 
military service by serving on guard duty around previously 
unguarded municipalities in support of the police and regular troops. 
By August 2004, more than 8,000 campesino soldiers had been 
recruited and trained. The military program for the second half of 
2006 provided for 32,376 campesino soldiers. By 2009 the actual 
number of trained campesino soldiers in the armed forces totaled 
25,202. Nevertheless, analysts believe that it would take years to 
make any significant progress in reducing the territory held by the 
illegal armed groups. 

According to official figures, the military campaigns within the 
framework of the Democratic Security Policy accounted for a 35 
percent decrease in attacks against infrastructure. They also resulted 
in the state's regaining control of key rivers such as the Atrato, 
Caguan, Caqueta, Guaviare, and Guayabero; the seizure of 153 tons 
of cocaine; the eradication of 223,000 hectares of illicit plantations; 
and the destruction of 2,000 laboratories for coca processing. 

The Uribe administration's military offensive has had a significant 
effect on the FARC's fighting force. By early 2008, as a result of sus- 
tained military operations in regions traditionally controlled by the insur- 
gents and improved intelligence capabilities, the number of FARC 
combatants had been reduced from a high of between 18,000 and 21,000 
to approximately 10,000, a number that may have declined further by 
2009 to less than 8,000. The number of guerrilla fronts was generally 
estimated at between 60 and 80 at most. 

Negotiations in 2007-8 

The various illegal groups involved in Colombia's internal security 
problems have required the government to pursue separate peace 
agendas with the FARC, the ELN, and the paramilitaries, each with 
very different mechanisms and results. The most significant progress 
toward a negotiated solution has been with the paramilitaries. 

The Justice and Peace Law of 2005 formalized the paramilitary demo- 
bilization process that had been established in 2003. This provision 



347 



Colombia: A Country Study 

offered release from prison, reduced sentences, and other judicial conces- 
sions to paramilitaries in exchange for demobilization, surrendering 
arms, and confessing all crimes committed as a way of providing repara- 
tion to the victims' families. Compliant paramilitary combatants not 
accused of human rights violations or war crimes would not be impris- 
oned. Those accused of such crimes would receive a maximum of eight 
years in prison, including exemption from extradition to the United States 
under charges of drug trafTicking. 

When the process ended in August 2007, approximately 32,000 
people claiming to be members of the AUC had demobilized, hand- 
ing in more than 15,000 weapons, explosives, and pieces of commu- 
nications equipment. Most analysts agree that the process has 
produced positive results insofar as a significant number of paramili- 
tary leaders are now in prison or in reintegration programs. Never- 
theless, the volume of demobilized individuals far surpasses the 
estimated number of AUC paramilitary combatants, raising concerns 
that drug traffickers and other criminals have co-opted the demobili- 
zation program in order to avoid legal prosecution, or that campesi- 
nos were seeking access to the social and monetary benefits that the 
Justice and Peace Law provides. Either way, the government's abil- 
ity to control the process has been seriously questioned. The dispar- 
ity between the number of decommissioned weapons and the 
number of demobilized combatants has also led to speculation that 
many paramilitaries have stashed arms for future use. The most seri- 
ous concern about the demobilization process is that it has been 
unable to guarantee the complete dismantling of the paramilitary 
infrastructure. By 2007 more than 3,000 supposedly demobilized 
individuals had been recruited by 22 newly formed paramilitary 
groups that continue to vie for control of the territories abandoned by 
the AUC, especially in drug-trafficking corridors. This new genera- 
tion of paramilitarism is principally active in the Caribbean and 
Pacific coastal regions. 

The demobilization process has also produced significant political 
fallout in Colombia. The confessions of paramilitary leaders involved 
in the truth and reconciliation process have compromised many 
elected politicians and regional leaders. In one particularly dramatic 
episode, the computer records of the paramilitary leader Rodrigo 
Tovar Pupo, known as Jorge 40, revealed the names of 1 1 congress- 
men who had signed an accord with the paramilitaries in 2001, in 
which they committed themselves to supporting a new political order 
in Colombia, presumably founded on values held by the AUC (see 
Internal Armed Conflict and Peace Negotiations, ch. 4). 

The Justice and Peace Law also provided for the creation of a new 
National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) in 



348 



A unit of the navy s Marine Infantry Command patrols the Guaviare, 
which divides the eastern llanos from the Amazonian jungle. 

Courtesy David Spencer 

2005. In 2006 the CNRR recommended forms of reparation to the 
victims of paramilitary violence and atrocities, established regional 
offices to attend to the victims, and started a program to investigate 
disappearances. Nevertheless, the nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) community has been critical of the CNRR, alleging a lack of 
effective reparation mechanisms. 

After more than 25 years of intermittent talks, a formal peace pro- 
cess with the ELN had its start in December 2005 in Havana. The 
talks were preceded by the release from prison of ELN leader 
Gerardo Bermudez, alias Francisco Galan, and his confinement to a 
casa de paz, or peace house, established by the government in 
Medellin for the purpose of facilitating peace discussions with lead- 
ers of civil society and the international community. Eight rounds of 
talks during 2006-7 took place with Mexico in the role of facilitator, 
and a more formal dialogue was held with the participation of Nor- 
way, Spain, and Switzerland. Although the ELN's military capability 
has been curtailed by Uribe's security policy, the armed group has 
continued its military operations, including bombings of pipelines 
and energy towers, assassinations, and kidnappings. Disagreements 
on the conditions for a cease-fire and the role of the international 
mediators have thwarted progress in the talks, which thus far have 



349 



Colombia: A Country Study 

produced no tangible results. Although the process had not formally 
broken down in 2008, the peace initiative has been at an impasse. 

Having repeatedly refused to have any contact with the govern- 
ment while Alvaro Uribe is in office, the FARC has minimized pos- 
sibilities for a viable peace process. The government for its part has 
opted for a military offensive against the guerrillas and has not 
actively sought the resumption of peace talks. The lesson learned 
from the Pastrana administration is that negotiating with the FARC 
is a losing formula, and that a military solution is possible. At the 
same time, the Uribe government has pursued parallel strategies to 
its military approach designed to contribute to the overall weakening 
of the FARC organization. Such policies include incentives for uni- 
lateral demobilization through the benefits of the Justice and Peace 
Law to FARC deserters and cash payments to people whose infor- 
mation contributes to the capture or killing of FARC leaders. In 
2007, for the first time in the history of the internal conflict, more 
FARC members deserted than were killed in combat. By early 2008, 
the number of demobilized guerrilla combatants had grown to 
11,320, and an additional 3,461 guerrillas demobilized during 2008. 

Despite the apparent irreconcilability of their positions, the gov- 
ernment and the FARC continued to have regular communications in 
2007 on a humanitarian agreement that would liberate several hun- 
dred guerrillas from prison in exchange for the release of members 
of the armed forces and political figures who had been held in cap- 
tivity by the FARC for more than five years. To negotiate the condi- 
tions of the trade and effect the actual exchange, the FARC 
demanded a demilitarized zone in the south of the country, which the 
government firmly rejected. The Uribe administration also insisted 
that freed guerrillas not return to the FARC or engage in any subver- 
sive activity. The humanitarian agreement drew the attention of the 
international community, motivated by the plight of the kidnapped 
victims and an interest in moving forward a peace process in Colom- 
bia. France, Spain, and Switzerland offered to serve as mediators, 
while French president Nicolas Sarkozy was actively involved in 
attempts to reach an agreement between the government and the 
FARC for the liberation of former presidential candidate Ingrid 
Betancourt, who is also a French national. In late 2007, the Colom- 
bian government granted permission to Venezuelan president Hugo 
Chavez Frias to hold talks with the FARC in order to facilitate an 
agreement. However, this mediation effort was short-lived. Dissatis- 
faction with President Chavez's refusal to abide by the previously 
agreed terms of mediation led the Colombian government to termi- 
nate his role in November 2007. 



350 



National Security 



International and Regional Security Relations 

Agreements and Treaties 

Colombia is involved in a number of international security instru- 
ments, especially in the Western Hemisphere, and is a member of its 
principal collective security agreement. In the face of a perceived 
communist threat following the end of World War II, in 1947 Colom- 
bia participated in founding the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance (Rio Treaty), which stipulates collective defense in the 
event of military aggression by an extrahemispheric power. Addition- 
ally, Colombia is a founding member of the Organization of American 
States (OAS — see Glossary), the regional organization responsible for 
determining when the Rio Treaty's collective security provisions 
should be implemented, and is bound to the peaceful settlement of dis- 
putes among signatory nations by the American Treaty on Pacific Set- 
tlement, or Bogota Pact, of 1948. Colombia also supports a number of 
the inter-American conventions on arms trafficking; drugs; conven- 
tional, chemical, and biological weapons; and terrorism. Colombia 
participates in the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security and sup- 
ports its initiatives on antiterrorism, transregional crime, and confi- 
dence- and security-building measures. Colombia also ratified the 
Inter- American Human Rights Convention in 1978, and the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights made a series of important rulings 
ordering reparations for victims of human rights abuses or violations 
of due process by Colombia's security forces. 

In 1972 Colombia signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America, or Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits 
the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region. The country also 
became a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons in 1986. 

Colombia and the OAS entered into an agreement in January 
2005 that established a special OAS mission in Colombia to observe 
the paramilitary demobilization process. OAS activities include veri- 
fication of the cease-fire, demobilization and disarmament, and the 
reintegration of combatants, as well as the proposal of confidence- 
building measures. The United Nations, for its part, decided to sus- 
pend its special mission in Colombia in April 2005 after five years of 
involvement in diverse efforts to help end the country's conflict. 

Colombia is a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established 
the International Criminal Court. In 2002 the government was 
granted the statute's Article 124 exception, exempting Colombia 
from the court's jurisdiction for seven years from the date of signing 
the treaty. Colombia argued that this temporary exclusion would 



351 



Colombia: A Country Study 

facilitate future peace negotiations and act as an incentive to armed 
groups to negotiate within that time period. In order to avoid losing 
its U.S. military aid, in 2003 Colombia also accepted the Article 98 
agreement with the United States, which stipulates that it pledges not 
to seek the prosecution of U.S. military personnel and other citizens 
in the International Criminal Court for human rights crimes. 

Regional Relations 

Closer to home, the internal conflict has had a direct impact on 
Colombia's security relations with neighbors in the Andean region, 
as well as with bordering Brazil and Panama. Some 6,000 kilometers 
of shared boundaries through mostly remote, ungoverned territory 
have contributed to the regionalization of a conflict conventionally 
assumed to be domestic. Certain aspects of the Colombian conflict 
cross international borders, such as criminality and population dis- 
placement, and conditions and activities in the region in turn have 
aggravated Colombia's situation. Andean leaders routinely accuse 
Colombia of making insufficient efforts to contain the conflict, 
which is considered the driving force behind regional instability. 
Bogota, for its part, blames neighboring governments for turning a 
blind eye to the inflow of illegal arms and outflow of illegal drugs 
through Colombia's ports, as well as to narcotics-related money 
laundering. Recurrent recriminations and high levels of political 
instability in all the Andean states are obstacles to effective regional 
security cooperation in the early 2000s. 

Venezuela 

Colombian- Venezuelan security relations are the most complex 
and conflictive of the region. President Chavez openly sympathized 
with the FARC's political platform, and Caracas is routinely accused 
of providing material support and haven to the FARC in Venezuelan 
territory. Chavez's ideological empathy with Colombia's guerrilla 
movements was tested in 2004 following a series of incidents involv- 
ing the FARC, the ELN, and paramilitaries in Venezuelan territory, 
one of which resulted in the deaths of five Venezuelan soldiers. In 
2004 Colombian police extralegally captured and then transported to 
Colombia a FARC leader resident and naturalized in Venezuela, caus- 
ing a near rupture in diplomatic relations. Although Colombia and 
Venezuela maintain a binational border commission, security coopera- 
tion is poor. 

In addition to tensions directly associated with the internal armed 
conflict in Colombia, the territorial dispute over maritime waters in 
the Golfo de Venezuela continues to plague bilateral relations. In the 



352 



National Security 



1960s, the disagreement revolved around control over access to the 
Golfo de Venezuela and the Islas Los Monjes, a chain of three islands 
located at the gulf's northern mouth. Although the islands themselves 
are minuscule, ownership permits control over a 200-nautical-mile cir- 
cumference around them. Thus, by gaining recognition of a rightful 
claim to the islands, Colombia would gain control over a substantial 
maritime territory in the Caribbean Sea that extends into the gulf, 
including waters suspected of having significant oil reserves. Follow- 
ing several unsuccessful attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to come to 
an agreement on the border, Colombia anchored a warship in the dis- 
puted waters for 10 days in 1987. The mobilization of both countries' 
armies and air forces suggested that the countries were dangerously 
close to war. The situation defused after Venezuela's military buildup 
in the border area prompted Colombia's withdrawal. 

Colombia and Venezuela also traditionally have viewed each 
other as a potential military rival in the region. Venezuela's stronger 
military capacity increased in 2005 through the acquisition of 10 
Russian helicopters and Spanish transport airplanes, patrol boats, 
and assault rifles. Venezuela attributes the buildup to the Colombian 
situation and to the potential threat posed by the U.S. regional mili- 
tary presence. Colombia, for its part, has accused Venezuela of start- 
ing an arms race and creating a military imbalance in the region. 

Ecuador 

Colombia's internal conflict has dominated its relations with 
Ecuador. Ecuador increasingly has been concerned during the early 
2000s by the growing presence of paramilitary and FARC units in 
the Ecuadorian border region and the criminality and violence this 
presence has engendered. There have been confirmed cases of kid- 
napping and extortion in all the Ecuadorian provinces that border 
Colombia. Coca regularly crosses the border to Ecuador, either for 
direct export or for processing, and then usually reenters Colombia 
as cocaine for export. Although the expected surge of refugees into 
Ecuador because of Plan Colombia's fumigation policy did not 
occur, there were approximately 6,300 Colombian refugees on Ecua- 
dorian soil in 2003 and an estimated 600,000 Colombian citizens 
who lived there irregularly. In response to what is seen as the Colom- 
bianization of the country, the Ecuadorian government increased its 
troops and patrols of the border region and restricted its traditional 
open-border policy in 200 1 . The Ecuadorian government has opted 
for a modus vivendi with Colombian illegal armed groups in the bor- 
der area, whereas Bogota has accused Quito of being too tolerant of 
what it considers terrorist organizations. President Rafael Correa 



353 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Delgado denounced the effects of aerial fumigations of coca crops in 
the Ecuadorian border areas and advocated manual eradications. Fol- 
lowing a temporary suspension of aerial spraying, the Colombian 
government resumed it in December 2006, triggering an immediate 
condemnation from Ecuador. The two presidents reached an agree- 
ment in 2007, in which Colombian authorities agreed to inform their 
Ecuadorian counterparts before every aerial fumigation, in order to 
allow a special commission from Ecuador to verify that glyphosate 
was not reaching Ecuadorian territory. 

Colombia's relations with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela 
came to a crisis point in early 2008 as a consequence of Colombia's 
bombing of a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory that killed the 
FARC second in command, Luis Edgar Devia, also known as Raul 
Reyes, as well as an Ecuadorian citizen. Venezuela and Ecuador 
responded by terminating diplomatic relations with Colombia, 
accusing it of violating Ecuadorian sovereignty. Colombia, for its 
part, denounced the direct ties between each government and the 
FARC. Information recovered from Reyes's computer files pointed 
toward political and financial support from the Correa and Chavez 
governments to the FARC, in addition to face-to-face meetings with 
ministers from the Correa cabinet. Tensions were calmed through an 
OAS ministerial meeting in March 2008. 

By January 2009, Colombia had reinforced its border with Ecuador. 
Colombia brought 27,000 army, navy, and air force members to its 
side of the border and a Nodriza riverine craft to patrol the San Miguel 
and Putumayo rivers 24 hours a day. However, the two countries 
agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations by November 15, 2009. 

Panama 

Of all the neighboring territories, Panama is the most vulnerable 
to the volatility of Colombia's security. Both the FARC and the para- 
militaries openly operate along the 225 -kilometer-long border 
through the remote jungles of the isthmus of Darien. These armed 
groups routinely cross into Panamanian territory for provisions and 
relaxation; and they also have engaged in combat and attacked vil- 
lages for collaborating with the guerrillas or the paramilitaries, as the 
case may be. A strategic transit point for arms and drug smuggling, 
the border region is not only fiercely disputed by armed groups but 
also plagued by Colombian and Panamanian criminal organizations. 
The high levels of insecurity are compounded by the lack of a Pana- 
manian military to defend its border, and by a police force with 
insufficient capacity to effectively patrol the region. A 1999 agree- 
ment between the Colombian and Panamanian naval forces strength- 



354 



A FARC guerrilla having lunch at a camp in Cundinamarca Department 

Courtesy David Spencer Collection 

ened maritime and border controls, and in 2002 Panama passed a 
resolution that allowed U.S. law enforcement agencies to conduct 
antidrug operations within Panama. Nevertheless, Colombia and 
Panama do not have a binational border commission, such as Colom- 
bia maintains with Peru and Venezuela. 

Brazil 

Despite an enormous shared border area that is a haven for criminal 
groups and insurgents, the possible expansion of the conflict into 
national territory is not Brazil's primary concern. Rather, regional 
trade, integration, and technical cooperation dominate Brazil's agenda 
with Colombia. Security relations were strained by the Colombian mil- 
itary's unauthorized use of a Brazilian military base during a 1998 
operation to recover the town of Mini, which had been taken over by 
the FARC. Brazil initially had concerns over Plan Colombia and the 
implications of U.S. military involvement in Colombia for its own sov- 
ereignty. Brazil prefers a more measured and somewhat distant diplo- 
matic position regarding Colombia, citing its potential role as a peace 
facilitator as the reason for refusing to declare the FARC a terrorist 
group. It also considers the Colombian conflict an internal mat- 
ter — external interference in which would constitute a violation of 
Colombia's sovereignty. Brazil's concern over the Colombian situation 



355 



Colombia: A Country Study 

is more related to criminality, in particular the growing drug and arms 
smuggling through the jungle that spans the two countries, and the 
soaring crime rates and drug use in Brazilian cities. Although Brazil 
has shown a preference for unilateral measures to respond to the grow- 
ing insecurity in the Amazonian border region, bilateral security coop- 
eration and the exchange of intelligence and information between the 
countries have increased in recent years. The two governments signed 
several security accords in 2007, and commercial relations showed a 
slight improvement over previous years. 

Peru 

The Colombian-Peruvian relationship is the least tense in the 
region and is marked by the greatest levels of security cooperation. 
Peru's concern is limited to the possible increase in coca cultivation 
in Peru as a result of Plan Colombia's crop-eradication efforts at 
home. Despite a slight increase in coca plants in Peru in 2002, the 
much-feared balloon effect did not materialize. Colombia, for its 
part, is concerned that Peru's political instability might permit a 
repeat of the Vladimiro Montesinos scandal of 1999, in which the 
head of Peru's intelligence service arranged a shipment of Jordanian 
arms to the FARC. Bilateral security mechanisms put in place in the 
1990s established defense and police collaboration on river and air 
interdiction. A 2001 agreement on security and judicial cooperation 
against terrorism, corruption, and illegal drug trafficking was fol- 
lowed in 2002 by the creation of a bilateral defense working group. 

Nicaragua 

Another regional geopolitical worry for Colombia relates to the con- 
tested sovereignty of the Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y 
Santa Catalina, located off the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua. In 1979 
the Sandinista government renewed historical claims to the islands, 
charging that the 1928 Treaty of Esguerra-Barcenas, which granted 
Colombia jurisdiction, was invalid because Nicaragua had signed the 
agreement under pressure from the United States. Colombia responded 
by dispatching a naval task force, a squadron of Mirage fighters, and 
500 marines to the islands and constructing a new base to serve as 
headquarters for the Caribbean Naval Command. During the 1980s, the 
presence of Nicaraguan fishing boats irritated Colombia, although there 
was no real threat of open conflict. Nicaragua's interest in oil explora- 
tion near the archipelago led to renewed interest in the islands, and in 
2001 Nicaragua instituted proceedings with the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, requesting recognition of its jurisdictional 
claim to the islands and the fixing of a single maritime boundary and 



356 



Three FARC guerrillas using a laptop computer at a 
temporary camp in Cundinamarca Department 
Courtesy David Spencer Collection 

economic zone between the two countries. After the Nicaraguan gov- 
ernment granted four foreign oil companies a license to drill in its off- 
shore oil fields within several kilometers of the islands in 2003, 
Colombia claimed the concessions were in its maritime waters and 
threatened to use force if drilling commenced. Colombia argued that 
the ICJ had no competence to resolve the dispute, given that both coun- 
tries had signed a legally binding agreement, whereas the ICJ resolves 
border disagreements only where there is no previous agreement. The 
preliminary hearings phase ended in August 2007, and that December 
the ICJ ratified the Treaty of Esguerra-Barcenas, under which Nicara- 
gua recognized Colombian sovereignty over the islands, and Colombia 
recognized Nicaraguan sovereignly over the Costa de Mosquitos (see 
Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

Outlook 

Mixed signs for Colombia's security appeared in 2008. On the pos- 
itive side, a series of unexpected and rather extraordinary events 
related to the FARC in the first half of the year suggested the possibil- 
ity that the Western Hemisphere's longest-running internal armed con- 
flict could be entering a critical last stage. Although the FARC has 
proved itself to be remarkably resilient over the years, recent develop- 
ments point to the guerrilla organization's unmistakable weakness and 
fracturing. In the span of a few short months, a cross-border bombing 
raid of a guerrilla camp in Ecuador killed Luis Edgar Devia, also 



357 



Colombia: A Country Study 

known as Raul Reyes, the FARC's second in command; Secretariat 
member Manuel de Jesus Munoz, alias Ivan Rios, was murdered by 
one of his own security guards, who then turned himself in; the high- 
est-ranking female commander in the FARC, Elda Neyis Mosquera, 
alias Nelly Avila Moreno and Karina, surrendered along with a close 
collaborator; and the FARC founder and leader of near-mythic propor- 
tions, Pedro Antonio Marin, died of a supposed heart attack in his jun- 
gle hideout. On top of these major setbacks for the FARC, on July 2, 
2008, a spectacular operation by the Colombian military, which freed 
15 victims of political kidnappings, including Ingrid Betancourt and 
the three U.S. military contractors held captive for five and six years, 
respectively, was the strongest blow to date. All these events taken 
together not only point to incontrovertible deterioration in the FARC 
command structure but also to a devastating blow to the organization's 
cohesion and morale. It is likely that the steady flow of guerrilla 
deserters will only accelerate, as the FARC leadership, discipline, 
communications, and logistics capabilities continue to deteriorate. 

The parallel story to this apparent implosion of the FARC is the 
success of the government's military approach and its Democratic 
Security Policy in dealing with the internal conflict. The Uribe 
administration's strategy of giving priority to a military offensive 
over negotiations with the FARC has shown undeniable results, rein- 
forcing President Uribe 's long-held position that a military victory 
over the FARC is possible. At the same time, the Military Forces' 
recent wave of successes over a much-discredited subversive organi- 
zation has contributed to a renewed confidence by the public in 
Colombia's military. 

It is quite premature, however, to claim that the FARC has been 
defeated. It retains substantial military capability and financial 
resources from drug-related activities. The group also still had in its 
power in late 2009 numerous civilians, public figures, and members 
of the armed forces to use as bargaining chips with the government. 
Although the FARC has clearly been routed in certain traditional 
areas of control such as Antioquia, Caldas, Risaralda, southern Cun- 
dinamarca, and parts of Choco, in the southern regions of Colombia 
it continues to have an important presence and capacity for military 
actions. It is doubtful that the FARC, having endured for so many 
years, will simply fade away. More violence and acts of terrorism are 
expected, in part as a way of attempting to demonstrate its continued 
power and relevance. At the same time, given its proven capacity for 
hunkering down in remote jungle and mountainous areas of the 
country and playing a defensive waiting game with the government, 
the FARC may be trying to outlast President Uribe, whose term 
expires in 2010. 



358 



National Security 



Given the apparently irreversible disintegration of the FARC's 
hierarchy and control and communications, which have been 
exposed by recent events and by the personal testimonies of desert- 
ers, a more likely scenario is the organization's fracturing. While 
some guerrilla fighters will follow the lead of those who have 
deserted, other units will break off and pursue autonomous guerrilla 
warfare in isolated regions of the country, or establish alliances with 
smaller subversive groups, including the ELN. Still other fronts will 
turn entirely to criminality, joining forces with narco-traffickers and 
reconstituted paramilitary groups. 

The implications of these developments for a negotiated settle- 
ment to the Colombian conflict are mixed. On the one hand, Presi- 
dent Uribe has stepped up calls on the FARC to release all kidnapped 
victims and make an historic peace with the Colombian government. 
Military pressure on the FARC will continue unabated until it dem- 
onstrates interest in a negotiation. The international community has 
joined Colombia in this effort. Not only has global public support for 
the FARC plummeted following recent events and Ingrid Betan- 
court's eloquent denunciation of its inhumane practices in the name 
of a leftist struggle, but also political sympathy for the Colombian 
insurgents has all but evaporated in Latin America. Venezuela's 
President Hugo Chavez, who in 2008 praised the FARC's struggle 
and called on the international community to grant the guerrilla 
organization belligerent status, is now urging the FARC to disarm 
and continue its political activities within the parameters of Colom- 
bia's democratic institutions. Even Fidel Castro of Cuba publicly 
denounced the FARC's kidnapping practices. 

An optimistic view of the FARC's hard-line new leader, 
Guillermo Leon Saenz Vargas, alias Alfonso Cano More, is that, as a 
university-educated ideologue, he will be concerned with trying to 
reestablish the FARC's political legitimacy, be more cognizant of 
changing global conditions that do not favor the FARC's violent 
struggle, and advocate abandoning criminal and terrorist activities, 
which would bode well for political negotiations with the govern- 
ment. At the same time, the FARC leadership may accept that they 
have lost their leftist struggle and that the time for negotiation has 
arrived. Nevertheless, the antipathy between President Uribe and the 
FARC is well known. The guerrillas have repeatedly refused to con- 
sider any peace discussions with the Uribe administration and 
insisted on another demilitarized zone as a precondition for a 
humanitarian exchange. The new balance of power between the 
FARC and Colombia's Military Forces is such that the government 
is hardly likely to consider any real power-sharing arrangement. A 



359 



Colombia: A Country Study 

peace process that is little more than a surrender, however, will not 
be especially attractive to the FARC, which continues to espouse its 
goal of exercising political power. The window of opportunity for 
reaching a negotiated settlement to Colombia's conflict may also be 
short-lived because of the FARC's partial disintegration and frac- 
tures. The collapse of the guerrilla organization's central command 
and the simultaneous creation of multiple, autonomous illegal armed 
groups would foil chances to establish a decisive and lasting peace in 
Colombia. 

Negotiations with the paramilitaries are, on the other hand, pro- 
ceeding apace. Although there are many uncertainties regarding the 
judicial treatment of individuals accused of some of the worst human 
rights violations, the generally successful demobilization of AUC 
fighters and dismantling of paramilitary structures would represent 
an important step toward ending Colombia's internal conflict. A 
legal framework has been established for paramilitary disarmament 
and reintegration into civilian life — an attempt to reconcile the com- 
peting goals of peace and justice. However, the approved bill has 
elicited severe criticism, including accusations of being too generous 
to the illegal groups. The success in the implementation of the law is 
also threatened by the insufficient capacity of the Colombian judicial 
system to expedite the number of cases and to determine whether the 
demobilized fighters had complied with the requirement to confess 
their crimes. At the same time, there was mounting evidence in early 
2008 that many demobilized paramilitaries had regrouped in autono- 
mous criminal organizations dedicated to narco-trafficking, while 
others maintained their criminal operations during incarceration. 

In early 2008, the Colombian government decided to suspend the 
judicial benefits offered to most of the high-ranking AUC leaders 
who participated in the process, arguing that they had continued to 
commit crimes from prison following their demobilization. President 
Uribe signed an executive order that led to the unexpected extradition 
of 14 paramilitary leaders to the United States to be tried on drug-traf- 
ficking charges. They included Salvatore Mancuso Gomez; Francisco 
Javier Zuluaga, alias Gordolindo; Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, 
alias Don Berna; and Rodrigo Tovar Pupo. This action effectively 
placed the paramilitary leaders beyond the reach of the Colombian 
justice system, raising concerns about the impossibility of trying 
these persons for crimes against humanity under the Justice and 
Peace Law in Colombia. 

A wild card in the future of the Colombian conflict remains 
cocaine. Even with redoubled fumigation efforts, it appears highly 
unlikely that coca cultivations can be entirely eradicated by this 



360 



National Security 



method, leaving intact the illegal drug trade, which sustains Colom- 
bia's internal conflict. In 2008 the annual report of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicated that in 2007 some 
99,000 hectares in Colombia were cultivated with coca plants, the 
same as 2002 levels. A key element in this dynamic is external 
demand for cocaine, most of which originates in the United States 
and Europe. Unless drug use in the advanced industrialized countries 
declines, and as long as its illegality maintains the incentives associ- 
ated with black-market trading, it is unlikely that drug cultivation 
and trafficking in Colombia will go away entirely. The strengthening 
of Colombia's rural economy and the implementation of alternative 
development (see Glossary) and crop-substitution programs are also 
needed to discourage cultivation of coca. 

The Colombian Military Forces, with U.S. military assistance, 
have made significant progress against the insurgent threat. In Janu- 
ary 2007, the Colombian government launched the Strategy to 
Strengthen Democracy and Social Development. Known as Plan 
Colombia II, this six-year program will continue the successful strate- 
gies and consolidate the results of its predecessor plan and achieve 
the steady transfer of responsibility for the plan to Colombia. Its com- 
ponents include the "wars on drugs and terror," improved human 
rights, justice reform, free-market trade, social development, assis- 
tance for the internally displaced population, and the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration into society of armed combatants. 

Institutional weakness and persistent poverty and inequality also 
are correlated closely with the violent ruptures in Colombian society. 
Fragile state institutions and poor socioeconomic conditions for 
much of Colombian society continue to aggravate the conditions that 
gave rise to the internal conflict and contribute to illegality. Violence 
and privatized systems of justice undermine the state's capacity to 
govern effectively, to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, and to provide security, justice, social services, and sustain- 
able growth. A viable, comprehensive security agenda in Colombia 
requires not only the establishment of public order and protection for 
citizens, but also enhancements in both the institutional and socio- 
economic aspects of national life. Military progress against the 
insurgent movements and the pervasive drug problem is a necessary 
but insufficient condition to achieve genuine national security. In 
that regard, the shift in U.S. aid to Colombia for 2007-8 toward 
social programs was a promising development. 

There is cautious optimism about the possibility for peace in 
Colombia despite persistent obstacles. The challenge for the govern- 
ment is to articulate its military successes against the FARC and 



361 



Colombia: A Country Study 

important gains in public security into a broad-based platform of 
political, social, and economic inclusion and justice. After three 
failed peace processes, a government campaign that has brought the 
guerrilla organization to the lowest point in its 45 -year history, and 
the loss of its domestic and international support, the FARC for its 
part faces the choice between clinging to a futile struggle or embrac- 
ing an historic opportunity to end Colombia's internal conflict and 
facilitate the transition to a postconflict stage. 

* * * 



There is an abundance of material available on Colombian national 
security, which encompasses a wide variety of thematic issues. 
Among the most authoritative Spanish-language sources on military 
and defense are Estado y Fuerzas Armadas en Colombia: 1886-1953 
by Adolfo Leon Atehortua and Humberto Velez; Fuerzas Armadas y 
seguridad nacional by Cesar Torres del Rio; Russell W. Ramsey's 
Guerrilleros y soldados; and Andres Villamizar's Fuerzas Militares 
para la Guerra: La agenda pendiente de la reforma militar. English- 
language sources include Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insur- 
gency by Thomas Marks and Richard L. Maullin's Soldiers, Guerril- 
las and Politics in Colombia, which continues to offer a solid 
overview of the military. Francisco Leal Buitrago's La seguridad 
nacional a la deriva: Del frente nacional a la posguerra fria is the 
definitive source for the evolution of Colombia's national security pol- 
icy. Maria Victoria Llorente's chapter "Demilitarization in Times of 
War: Police Reform in Colombia," in Public Security and Police 
Reform in the Americas, edited by John Bailey and Lucia Dammert, is 
most informative on the National Police. On the formation of the 
FARC, Eduardo Pizarro Leongomez and Ricardo Penaranda's Las 
FARC (1949-1966): De la autodefensa a la combinacion de todas for- 
mas de la lucha is the best reference. Alfredo Rangel Suarez analyzes 
the guerrilla movement today in Las FARC-EP: Una mirada actual A 
general overview of the rise of the leftist insurgent phenomenon can 
be found in Pizarro 's chapter "Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in 
Colombia," in Charles W. Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo 
Sanchez Gomez's volume, Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary 
Crisis in Historical Perspective, and also in Gonzalo Sanchez Gomez 
and Donny Meerten's Bandits, Peasants and Politics. Mauricio 
Romero offers an analysis of the development of paramilitarism in 
Paramilitares y Autodefensas, 1982-2003, the arguments of which 
can also be found in English in the article "Changing Identities and 



362 



National Security 



Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colom- 
bia," in the International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 

The literature on the Colombian conflict, insurgency, and violence 
is immense. Rafael Pardo Rueda's survey study La historia de las 
guerras provides a comprehensive historical overview of war and con- 
flict in Colombia since independence. The current internal conflict is 
showcased in diverse studies, including Charles W. Bergquist, Ricardo 
Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez Gomez's volume Violence in 
Colombia, 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace', Camilo 
Echandia Castilla's El conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de vio- 
lencia en las regiones de Colombia', Alfredo Rangel Suarez's Colom- 
bia: Guerra en el fin de sigh; Malcolm Deas and Maria Victoria 
Llorente's volume Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz; and 
Paul H. Oquist's classic Violence, Conflict and Politics in Colombia. 
The political economy aspects of the conflict are explored in Nazih 
Richani's Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and 
Peace in Colombia, as well as by Rangel Suarez in his 2000 Journal of 
International Affairs article "Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and 
the Insurrection Economy of Colombia." Christopher Welna and 
Gustavo Gallon discuss the human rights dimension of the Colombian 
conflict in Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia, and 
Winifred Tate's Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of 
Human Rights Activism in Colombia is also pertinent to this subject. 

Good sources on diverse aspects of contemporary forms of political 
violence include Malcolm Deas's "Violent Exchanges: Reflections on 
Political Violence in Colombia," in David Apter's The Legitimation of 
Violence; Mauricio Rubio's Crimen e impunidad: Precisiones sobre la 
violencia; Herbert Braun's Our Guerrillas, Our Sidewalks: A Journey 
into the Violence of Colombia; and Jaime Arocha, Fernando Cubides, 
and Myriam Jimeno's volume, Las Violencias: Inclusion creciente. 
Colombia's experiences with peace processes are explored in Harvey 
Kline's State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 
1986—1994; Armor la paz es desarmar la guerra: Herramientas para 
lograr la paz, by Alvaro Camacho Guizado and Francisco Leal 
Buitrago; and Mark W. Chernick's "Negotiated Settlement to Armed 
Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process." 

Francisco E. Thoumi's Drogas ihcitas en Colombia: Su impacto 
econdmico, politica y social and Maria Clemencia Ramirez, Kim- 
berly Stanton, and John Walsh's "Colombia: A Vicious Circle of 
Drugs and War," in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, edited 
by Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, are informative on the 
national security implications of drug trafficking. Finally, recent 
studies of the interconnections of drug trafficking, U.S. national 



363 



Colombia: A Country Study 



security, and U.S -Colombian security relations include Ingrid 
Vaicius and Adam Isacson's working paper "The War on Drugs 
Meets the War on Terror"; Russell Crandall's Driven by Drugs: U.S. 
Policy Toward Colombia; and Ted Galen Carpenter's Bad Neighbor 
Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



364 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Presidents of Colombia, 1 8 1 9-20 1 

3 Natural Regions of Colombia (by Department) 

4 Annual Estimates of Displaced People in Colombia, 1985-2007 

5 Major Army Equipment, 2009 

6 Major Naval Equipment, 2009 

7 Major Air Force Equipment, 2009 

8 Major National Police Aviation Equipment, 2009 



365 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



vv ut. 11 yuu PiAiyj w 


Multiply by 






0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares 


2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters ... 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 




and add 32 





The following special weights and measures are also used in Colombia: libra=0.5 kilograms; carga= 125 kilograms; 
arroba=\2.5 kilograms; vara=19.% centimeters; quintal=50 kilograms; cuadra=%Q meters; saco=62.5 kilograms; and 
fanegada=Q. 64 hectares. 



Table 2. Presidents of Colombia, 1819-2010 

Term President(s) and Party Affiliations 

REPUBLIC OF GREAT COLOMBIA, 1819-32 

1819-28 General Simon Bolivar Palacios (1819-28, and dictator, 1828-30) 

1 82 1-27 General Francisco de Paula Santander y Omana (acting) 

1 830- 3 1 Joaquin Mariano Mosquera y Arboleda 

183 1 General Rafael Jose Urdaneta Farias (by military coup) 

1831- 32 General Domingo Caycedo Santamaria, General Jose Maria Obando del Campo, and 

Jose Ignacio de Marquez Barreto (vice presidents and acting presidents) 

REPUBLIC OF NEW GRANADA, 1832-58 

1832- 37 General Francisco de Paula Santander y Omana 
Early Conservatives (Ministerials) 

1837-41 Jose Ignacio de Marquez Barreto 

1 84 1-45 General Pedro Alcantara Herran y Zaldua 

1 845^19 General Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera y Arboleda 

Early Liberals 

1 849-53 General Jose Hilario Lopez Valdez (Liberal Party— PL) 

1853- 54 General Jose Maria Obando del Campo (PL) 

1854 General Jose Maria Dionisio Melo y Ortiz (PL; by military coup) 

1 854- 55 Jose de Obaldia y Orejuela (PL; acting president) 
Conservative Interval 

1855- 57 Manuel Maria Mallarino Ibarguen (Conservative Party — PC; acting, to complete 

Obando 's term, elected vice president) 

1 857- 58 Mariano Ospina Rodriguez (PC) 
GRANADENE CONFEDERATION, 1858-61 

1858- 61 Mariano Ospina Rodriguez (PC) 

1861 Juan Jose Nieto Gil (PL), Bartolome Calvo y Diaz de Lamadrid (PC), and Julio Arbo- 

leda Pombo (PC) 



367 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Table 2. Presidents of Colombia, 1819-2010 (Continued) 

Term President(s) and Party Affiliations 

UNITED STATES OF NEW GRANADA, 1861-63 
A Liberal Era 

1861-64 General Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera y Arboleda (now PL; provisional president by 

victory in civil war, then elected to the office by constitutional convention) 

UNITED STATES OF COLOMBIA, 1863-86 



1864-66 


Manuel Murillo Toro (PL) 


1866-67 


General Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera y Arboleda (PL) 


1867-68 


General Santos Acosta Castillo (PL; by coup that overthrew Mosquera) 


1868-70 


General Jose Santos Gutierrez Prieto (PL) 


1870-72 


General Eustorgio Salgar (PL) 


1872-74 


Manuel Murillo Toro (PL) 


1874-76 


Santiago Perez de Manosalbas (PL) 


1876-78 


Jose Bonifacio Aquileo Parra Gomez (PL) 


1878-80 


General Julian Trujillo Largacha (Independent PL) 


1880-82 


General Rafael Wenceslao Nunez Moledo (Independent PL) 


1882 


Francisco Javier Zaldua (PL) 


1882-84 


Jose Eusebio Otalora Martinez (Independent PL; as presidential designate, completed 




term of Zaldua, who died in office) 


1884-86 


General Rafael Wenceslao Nunez Moledo (Independent PL / Nationalists) 


REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA, 1886-Present 


1886-87 


Jose Maria Campo Serrano (acting) 


1887 


Jose Eliseo Payan Hurtado (acting) 


1887-88 


General Rafael Wenceslao Nunez Moledo 


1888-92 


Carlos Holguin Mallarino (acting) 


1892-94 


General Rafael Wenceslao Nunez Moledo (acting) 


1894-98 


Miguel Antonio Caro Tovar (PC / Nationalists; as vice president, completed term of 




Nunez, who died in office) 


Conservative Hegemony 


1898-1900 


Manuel Antonio Sanclemente Sanclemente (PC / Nationalists) 


1900-1904 


Jose Manuel Marroquin Ricaurte (PC / Nationalists; as vice president, completed San- 




clemente's term when the latter was overthrown by coup in 1900) 


1904-9 


General Rafael Reyes Prieto (PC) 


1909 


Jorge Holguin Jaramillo (PC, acting) 


1909-10 


General Ramon Gonzalez Valencia (chosen by Congress to fill out the term of Reyes, 




who resigned) 


1910-14 


Carlos Eugenio Restrepo Restrepo (PC / Republican Union) 


1914-18 


Jose Vicente Concha Ferreira (PC) 


1918-21 


Marco Fidel Suarez (PC) 


1921-22 


Jorge Holguin Jaramillo (PC; as presidential designate, completed the term of Suarez, 




who resigned) 


1922-26 


Pedro Nel Ospina Vasquez (PC) 


1926-30 


Miguel Abadia Mendez (PC) 



368 



Appendix 



Table 2. Presidents of Colombia, 1819-2010 (Continued) 

Term President(s) and Party Affiliations 

Liberal Reformers 

1 930-34 Enrique Olaya Herrera (PL) 

1934-38 Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (PL) 

1938-42 Eduardo Santos Montejo (PL) 

1942^5 Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (PL) 

1945^6 Alberto Lleras Camargo (PL; as presidential designate, completed term of Lopez, who 

resigned) 

Conservative Rule during La Violencia 

1 946-50 Luis Mariano Ospina Perez (PC) 

1950- 53 Laureano Eleuterio Gomez Castro (PC) 

195 1- 53 Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez (PC, acting) 
1953-57 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (by military coup) 

1 957- 58 Major General Gabriel Paris Gordillo (chair, military junta) 
The National Front 

1 958- 62 Alberto Lleras Camargo (PL) 
1962-66 Guillermo Leon Valencia Munoz (PC) 
1 966-70 Carlos Lleras Restrepo (PL) 

1 970-74 Misael Eduardo Pastrana Borrero (PC) 

1 974-78 Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (PL) 

Contemporary Era 

1 978-82 Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (PL) 

1 982-86 Belisario Betancur Cuartas (PC) 

1 986-90 Virgilio Barco Vargas (PL) 

1990-94 Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (PL) 

1 994-98 Ernesto Samper Pizano (PL) 

1 998-2002 Andres Pastrana Arango (PC) 
2002-6 Alvaro Uribe Velez (PL / independent) 

2006- 1 Alvaro Uribe Velez (PL / independent) 



369 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Table 3. Natural Regions of Colombia (by Department) 1 



Natural Region Department 

Amazonia Amazonas, Caqueta, Guainia, Guaviare, Putumayo, Vaupes 

Andean highlands 2 Antioquia, Arauca, Bolivar, Boyaca, Caldas, Caqueta, Cauca, 

Cesar, Cordoba, Cundinamarca, Huila, Magdalena, Meta, Narino, 
Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Quindio, Risaralda, Santander, 
Tolima, Valle del Cauca 

Caribbean lowlands Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, Cordoba, La Guajira, Magdalena, Sucre 

Eastern llanos Arauca, Casanare, Cundinamarca, Meta, Vichada 

Insular 3 Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y Santa Catalina 

Pacific lowlands Cauca, Choco, Narino, Valle del Cauca 



1 Departmental boundaries of the natural regions may overlap. 

2 Also includes Distrito Capital de Bogota (not a department). 

3 Also includes Isla de Malpelo (not a department). 

Source: Based on information from Alberto Gerardino Rojas, "Regiones Naturales" (a 
map), Colombia: Geografia, Bogota, 2001, 25. 



Table 4. Annual Estimates of Displaced People 
in Colombia, 1985-2007 



Consultancy for Human Social Solidarity Network 

Year Rights and Displacement (RSS) / Social Action of the 

(Codhes) 1 Colombian Government 

1985-94 720,000 7,886 2 

1995-99 1,123,000 86,734 

2000 317,375 287,064 

2001 341,925 347,663 

2002 412,553 414,814 

2003 207,607 211,203 

2004 287,581 199,965 

2005 310,387 217,773 

2006 221,638 201,623 

2007 305,966 284,055 

Cumulative total 4,248,032 2,258,780 



1 A nongovernmental organization. 

2 No information available for 1994. 

Source: Based on annual data on Colombian displacement from Consultancy for Human 
Rights and Displacement (Codhes), http://www.codhes.org; and Internal Displace- 
ment Monitoring Centre, http://www.internal-displacement.org. 



370 



Appendix 



Table 5. Major Army Equipment, 2009 



Type and Description In Inventory 

Light tanks/reconnaissance vehicles 

EE-9CascaveI 123 

M-8 Greyhound (antiriot vehicle) 6 

M-8 Greyhound (with 1 TOW 1 missile) 8 

Ml 117 Guardian 39 

Armored personnel carriers 

BTR-80 80 

EE-llUrutu 56 

RG-31 Nyala 4 

TPM-113(M-13A1) 54 

Armored utility vehicles 

M-20 8 

Artillery 
Towed artillery 

105mm M-101 86 

155mm 155/52 APUSBT-1 15 

Mortars 

81mm M-l 125 

107mm M-2 148 

120mm Brandt 210 

Antitank guided weapons 

TOW missiles (including 8 self-propelled) 18 

Recoilless launchers 

106mm M-^lOAl 63 

Rocket launchers 

66mm M-72 LAW 15+ 

73mm RPG-22 n.a. 2 

89mm M-20 15 

90mm C-90C n.a. 

106mm SR-106 n.a. 

Air defense guns 

12.7mm M-8/M-5 5 18 

35mm GDF Oerlikon 21 

40mm M-1A1 towed 21 

Helicopters 
Observation 

OH-6A Cayuse 6 

Support 

Mi-17-lV Hip 8 

Mi-17-MD 9 



371 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Table 5. Major Army Equipment, 2009 (Continued) 



Type and Description In Inventory 

M-17-V5 Hip 5 

Utility 

K-MAX 5 

UH-1H-II Huey U 30 

UH-1N Twin Huey 20 

UH-60L Black Hawk 35 

Aircraft 
Electronic Warfare 

Beechcraft Super King Air B-200 2 

Transport 

Antonov AN-32 1 

B-727 9 

Beechcraft C-90 1 

Casa 2 1 2 Aviocar (Medevac) 2 

CV-580 1 

PA-34 Seneca 2 

Rockwell Turbo Commander 2 

Utility 

Cessna 208B Grand Caravan 2 

Training 

Utva-75 5 

1 Tube launched optically wire guided. 

2 n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Colombia," 
The Military Balance, 2010 (London) 110, no. 1 (February 2010): 75. 

Table 6. Major Naval Equipment, 2009 



Type and Description In Inventory 
Submarines 

Pijao (German T-209/1200) 1 2 

Intrepido 2 2 

Principal surface combatants 
Corvettes 

With guided missiles 3 4 

Patrol and coastal combatants 

Coastal patrol craft 

Reliance offshore patrol vessel 1 

Espartana (ex-Spanish Cormoran; 1 

Lazaga 2 

Pedro de Heredia (former U.S. tug) 
with one 76mm gun 1 



372 



Appendix 



Table 6. Major Naval Equipment, 2009 (Continued) 



Type and Description In Inventory 

Quitasuefio fast patrol craft ex-U.S. Asheville-class 

with one 76mm gun ^ 

Toledo patrol craft 2 

Jaime Gomez inshore patrol craft 2 

Jose Maria Palas swiftships 105 2 

Castillo y Rada swiftships 110 2 

Point inshore patrol craft 4 

Riverine patrol craft 

Andromeda (ex-Piranha) 11 

Arauca 3 

Delfin 20 

Diligente 4 

LPR-^10 Tenerife 9 

NodrizaPAF-111 

with Bell 212 or 412 helicopters 6 

Rio Magdalena 11 

Rotork 2 

Amphibious 

Mechanized landing craft 1 

Morrosquillo utility landing craft 7 

Logistics and support 

Hydrographic survey vessel 1 

Oceanographic research vessel 2 

Hospital ship 1 

Transport 1 

Sea-going buoy tender 1 

Training (sail) 4 ^ 

Naval aviation 
Aircraft 
Transport 

C-212Medevac 1 

Cessna 208 Caravan 2 

Maritime patrol 

PA-31 Navajo 1 

CN-23 5-200 Persuader 2 

Utility 

Cessna 206 4 

PA-31 Navajo 1 

Helicopters 

Antisurface warfare 

AS-555SN Fennec 2 



373 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Table 6. Major Naval Equipment, 2009 (Continued) 



Type and Description In Inventory 
Utility 

Bell 212 1 

Bell 412 4 

BK-117 1 

Bo-105 2 



Each diesel-electric submarine with eight single 533mm torpedo tubes with 14 surface-and-underwater target 
heavy-weight torpedoes for antisubmarine warfare. 

2 Italian SX-506, special forces delivery (midget submarines). 

3 The four frigates — Almirante Padilla, Antioquia, Independiente, and Caldas — are each equipped with one 
Bo-105 utility helicopter, two B515 ILAS-3 triple 324mm antisubmarine torpedo launchers, each with an A244 
light-weight torpedo, two quad — eight, in effect, each with one MM-40 Exocet tactical surface-to-surface mis- 
sile — and one 76mm gun. 

4 The training ship Gloria is a three-mast Spanish Bricbarca sailing vessel built in 1968 with a capacity for 125 sail- 
ors. Still in use, the ship visited Shanghai and Manila in June-August 2009. 

Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Colombia," 
The Military Balance, 2010 (London) 110, no. 1 (February 2010): 76. 

Table 7. Major Air Force Equipment, 2009 



Type and Description In Inventory 

Aircraft 

Fighter ground attack 

A-3 7B/OA-3 7B Dragonfly 10 

EMB-312Tucano 12 

EMB-3 1 4 Super Tucano ( A-29) 25 

IA-58APucara 3 

Kfir C-2, C-12 1 20 

KfirTC-7 1 4 

Mirage 5 COAM 2 5 

Mirage 5 CODM 2 2 

T-37C 4 

Electronic intelligence 

Ce-208 2 

Forward air control 

OV-1 OA Bronco 7 

Special operations 

ACM7T Fantasma 8 

Reconnaissance 

Aero Commander 3 

B-300 Super King Air 2 

SA-2-37A/SA-2-37B 6 

Surveillance 

Ce-650 Citation IV 5 

C-26B 4 



374 



Appendix 



Table 7. Major Air Force Equipment, 2009 (Continued) 

Type and Description In Inventory 
Transport 

Arava 201 1 

B-737 1 

B-727-700 1 

B-707 1 

B-767ER 1 

Ce-208 1 

Ce-550 1 



C-130B Hercules 4 3 

C-130H Hercules 3 

C-90 King Air 1 

C-26 Metro 3 

C-95(EMB-110P1) 2 

C-295M 4 

C-212 4 

CN-235M 3 

Do-328 3 

F-28T 1 

Queen Air B65 2 

Training 

AC^17T 8 

Ce-3 1 OR (multiengine training) 2 

T-27 Tucano 13 

T-34M Turbo Mentor 9 

T-37 Tweet 6 

Mescalero 10 

Liaison 

B-300 Super King Air (Medevac) 2 

Ce-1 85 Floatplane 1 

Ce-210 2 

Ce-337G/H 2 

Ce^lOl 1 

Ce-^04 3 

PA-31 Navajo 2 

PA-3 IT Navajo ! 

PA-42 Cheyenne 1 

PA-34 Seneca 4 

PA-44 Seminole 1 

Turbo Commander 1000 2 



375 



Colombia: A Country Study 

Table 7. Major Air Force Equipment, 2009 (Continued) 



Type and Description In Inventory 

Helicopters 
Attack 

MD-500MD Defender 1 

MD530MG Escorpion 4 

H369HM 7 

Sikorsky/Elbit AH-60L Arpia III 14 

Utility 

Bell 212 Rapaz 8 

H500C 8 

H500M 2 

UH-1B Uroquois 2 

UH-1H 6 

UH-1H Iroquois 6 

UH-60Q 2 

Training 

Bell206B 11 

H500C 2 

H500ME 1 

Bell 212 1 

Transport 

UH-lPHueyll 7 

Bell 212 Twin Huey 12 

Bell412HP/SP 2 

UH-60A Black Hawk 8 

UH^60L Black Hawk (on order) 8 



The Kfirs are in one squadron; being upgraded to C-10 and C-12; 13 more on order. The first four Kfirs were 
received in June 2009, but one subsequently crashed while being tested. 

2 The Mirages are in one squadron. 

3 Plus four in storage. 

Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Colombia," 
The Military Balance, 2010 (London) 110, no. 1 (February 2010): 76. 



376 



Appendix 



Table 8. Major National Police 
Aviation Equipment, 2009 



Type and Description In Inventory 

Aircraft 

Air Tractor AT-802 6 

Ayres52R 3 

Caravan 208 5 

Caravan 208B 1 

Cessna C-l 52 3 

Cessna 206 5 

C-26SA227-AC 4 

C-26B 2 

King Air C-99 1 

DC-3 1 

King 200 2 

King 300 1 

OV-1 OA Bronco 5 

Turbo Truck 1 

DHC 6 Twin Otter 2 

Transport 

Basler Turbo-67 11 

Utility 

Gavilian 358 12 

Helicopters 
Utility 

Bell 206B 3 

Bell 206L LongRanger 7 

Bell 212 12 

Bell 412 1 

Hughes 500D 2 

MD 500D 2 

MD-530F 1 

UH-1H Iroquois/ UH-lH-IIHuey II 25 

UH-60L Black Hawk 7 



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Colombia," 
The Military Balance, 2010 (London) 110, no. 1 (February 2010): 77. 



377 



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(Various issues of the following publications, and their Web sites, also 
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para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento), 2003 (Bogota), http:// 
www.codhes.org.co; Center for International Policy Colombia Program 
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Colombia, Ejercito Nacional, http://www.ejercito.mil.co/; Colombia, Fuerza 
Aerea Colombiana, http://www.fac.mil.co/; Colombia, Ministerio de De- 
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419 



Colombia: A Country Study 

(ONDCP), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/index.html; and 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), http://www.unodc. 
org/unodc/index.html.) 



420 



Glossary 



alternative development — The officially recognized definition endorsed 
by the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World 
Drug Problem in 1998 characterizes it as "a process to prevent and 
eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural develop- 
ment measures in the context of sustained national economic growth 
and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against 
drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural characteristics of the 
target communities and groups, within the framework of a compre- 
hensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs." 

Andean Community of Nations — The Andean Community (Comu- 
nidad Andina de Naciones — CAN) is a trade bloc consisting of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (it was known as 
the Andean Pact or Andean Group from 1969 until 1997). 

Andean Price-Band System (APBS)— Introduced in 1995, the APBS had 
the announced goal of reducing domestic price instability by buffering 
fluctuations in international prices through use of a variable import 
tariff. The APBS consists of the application of variable levies in 
addition to a basic ad valorem tariff established through the common 
external tariff policy of the Andean Community. 

barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum products 
frequently is measured in this unit, which often is abbreviated bpd 
or bd. As a measurement of volume, a barrel is the equivalent of 42 
U.S. gallons. Conversion of barrels to tons depends on the density 
of the specific product in question, which varies by country. In 
Colombia 7.08 barrels of crude oil weigh one metric ton. 

clientelism (clientelismo) — Personal relationships that link patrons 
and clients together in a system in which jobs, favors, and 
protection are exchanged for labor, financial support, and loyalty. 

Common Market of the South (Mercado Comun del Sur — Mercosur) — An 
organization established on March 26, 1991, when the Treaty of 
Asuncion was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay for 
the purpose of promoting regional economic cooperation. Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela are associate (nonvoting) 
members. 



421 



Colombia: A Country Study 

compadrazgo — Literally, copaternity. A system of ritual coparenthood 
that links parents, children, and godparents in a close social and 
economic relationship. 

crawling-peg system — A system of exchange-rate adjustment in 
which a currency with a fixed exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate 
within a band of rates. The par value of the stated currency is also 
adjusted frequently as a result of market factors such as inflation. 
This gradual shift of the currency's par value is done as an 
alternative to a sudden and significant devaluation of the currency. 

encomendero — The holder of the administrative authority in a 
territory, called an encomienda (g.v.), where indigenous people 
were settled. The encomendero was entitled to some services from 
Amerindians in exchange for their Roman Catholic instruction. 

encomienda — A tribute institution used in Spanish America in the 
sixteenth century. The Spaniard received Amerindians as an 
entrustment (encomienda) to protect and to Christianize them, but in 
return he could demand tribute (including labor). 

fiscal year (FY) — Calendar year. 

Gini coefficient or index — A measure of a country's inequality of 
income distribution by means of a ratio analysis with values between 
and 1. A lower Gini coefficient represents better equality and 
income distribution and vice versa. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of all the production 
generated by the factors located in a country, regardless of their 
nationality, GDP is the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the 
valuation of output. 

intermediation — The process carried out by a financial institution, 
such as a brokerage firm, bank, or insurance company, serving as a 
link, or intermediary, between borrowers and savers. Savers deposit 
funds in the institution, which lends those funds to homebuyers and 
other borrowers. Thus, "intermediation spreads" are the gap 
between the interest charged by banks for loans they made and the 
interest paid by the banks for the deposits they received. 

liberation theology — An activist movement led by Roman Catholic 
clergy who trace their inspiration to Vatican Council II (1965), when 
some church procedures were liberalized, and the Latin American 
Bishops' Conference in MedelKn, Colombia (1968), which endorsed 
greater direct efforts to improve the lot of the poor. Advocates of 
liberation theology — sometimes referred to as "liberationists" — work 



422 



Glossary 



mainly through ecclesiastical base communities, which are grassroots 
groups consisting of mostly poor Christian lay people. 

narco-terrorism — Sometimes defined as terrorism resulting from an 
alliance between drug traffickers and political terrorists, narco- 
terrorism may be carried out by either category and may include 
assassinations, extortion, hijackings, kidnappings, and other violence 
and intimidation against judges, elected officials, or law-enforcement 
agents, in an effort to extract concessions from the government. 

neoliberalism — A somewhat nonstandard academic term for an 
economic and social model that is based on the primacy of the 
individual with only a minimal role for government. Neoliberal 
policies recommend solutions based on free movement of goods, 
services, and capital, with reliance on market forces to allocate 
resources. Neoliberalism is characterized by laissez-faire economic 
policies and reduction of public spending and social welfare programs. 

Organization of American States (OAS) — An inter-American organ- 
ization that brings together the nations of the Western Hemisphere to 
strengthen cooperation on democratic values, defend common 
interests, and debate the major issues facing the region and the world. 
The OAS is the region's principal multilateral forum for strengthening 
democracy, promoting human rights, and confronting shared 
problems such as poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs, and corruption. It 
plays a leading role in carrying out mandates established by the 
hemisphere's leaders through the Summits of the Americas. 

peso — Colombia's unit of currency. The exchange rate between the 
Colombian peso and the U.S. dollar as of February 16, 2010, was 
Colombian pesos (formally abbreviated as COPs and informally as 
COL$ orPs) 1,900.8 -US$1. 

resguardos — Communal lands held in common by Amerindians during 
colonial times and formed under an encomendero (g.v.), that is, the 
manager of an encomienda (q.v.), a colonial institution that employed 
Amerindians as slaves. In present-day Colombia, resguardos, or 
reserves communally owned by indigenous groups, cover about 24 
percent of the national territory. 



423 



Index 



Abadia Mendez, Miguel, 368 
Acacias, 322 
ACES (airline), 172 
Acosta Castillo, Santos, 368 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 
117 

ACS. See Association of Caribbean States 
Act of Chapultepec (1945), 326 
Administrative Department of the Presidency 

of the Republic (DAPR), 221 
Administrative Department of the Public 

Function (D AFP), 221 
Administrative Security Department (DAS), 

lxxvi, lxxxi, lxxxii, 220, 221, 247, 294, 296, 

318-20, 342 
Advisory Commission on Foreign Relations 

(CARE), 264 
Advisory Council on Military Justice, 294 
Aero Republica, 172 
Afghanistan, 295 

Afro-Colombians, 3, 10, 59, 86, 88, 90, 125, 
254-55; and displacement, 72, 97, 254; and 
political representation, 57, 136, 224, 243 

agencies, autonomous/semiautonomous/con- 
trol,218, 220, 221-22 

Agrarian Bank of Colombia, 184 

agreements and treaties, lxxvi-lxxxi, 34, 35, 
68, 106, 325, 351-52, 354-55, 356-57 

agriculture (see also bananas; coffee; exports), 
59, 71, 76, 78, 134, 152-57, 216; and colonial 
economy, 5, 8-1 1, 144; and economic reform, 
49, 152; and flower industry, 155-56; and 
livestock, 11, 71, 76, 147, 152-53; and palm 
oil, 157; and sugar, 156-57 

Aguilas Negras. See Black Eagles 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome 

Air Bridge Denial program, 190 
aircraft, 301,316 

air force. See Colombian Air Force (FAC) 
airlines (see also transportation), 172 
airports, lxxvii, 171-72, 209, 296, 301 
alcaldia distrital (district mayoralty), 222 
Alliance for Progress, 339 
Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), lxii, 

lxxxviii, 241, 245, 279 
alternative development, lxiv, 272, 361 



Alternative Social Development Association 

(Minga), 253 
Alto Sinu, 328 
Amar y Borbon, Antonio, 1 5 
Amazon river, 173, 300; basin, 10, 77 
Amazonia, 65, 71, 76-77, 81, 84-86, 91, 170, 

356 

Amazonas Department, 71, 88 

American Airlines, 172 

American Revolution, 14, 16 

American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Bogo- 
ta Pact, 1948), 351 

Amerindians (see also indigenous peoples), liii, 
3, 8, 12, 20, 26, 82-86, 125; displacement 
and, 86; languages and, 84-85; laws and cus- 
toms, 88, 135; other rights of, 224; political 
representation and, 57, 135 

Amnesty International, 252 

Andean Community of Nations, 147, 185, 
277; and regional trade, 156, 164 

Andean Price-Band System, 152, 156 

Andean region, 71, 73-76, 84, 352-54 

Andean Regional Initiative, 344 

Andean Trade Preference Act (ATP A), 164, 
269 

Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradica- 
tion Act, 164, 185 
Andes Mountains, 17, 70-71, 73, 76 
Angostura, lxx, 18 

antinarcotics strategy. See counternarcotics 
operations and strategy 

Antioquia Department, lxv, 107, 176, 190, 358; 
agriculture in, 37, 155; and drug trade, 190; 
exports from, 186 

Antioquia Entrepreneurial Group (GEA), 164 

Antioquia region, 16, 22, 93, 324 

Antioquian Syndicate, 258 

APEC. See Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera- 
tion 

apertura (opening of the economy), 58-59 
Apiay, lxxvii, 301 
Arab immigrants, 92-93 
Aracataca, 94 

Arauca Department, lxv, 298, 328, 332 
Arauca river, 300 
Araujo, Maria Consuelo, 247 
Araujo Castro, Alvaro, 247 



425 



Colombia: A Country Study 



Araujo Perdomo, Fernando, 336 

Arawak (language group), 5 

Archipielago de San Andres, Providencia y 

Santa Catalina, 67-69, 88, 136, 169, 356 
Ardila Liille Organization, 164-65, 249, 258 
Argentina, lxxviii, lxxxi, 30, 265 
Argos, 188 
Arhuaco people, 85 
Ariari river, 71, 77 

Armada Nacional. See National Navy 
Armario people, 85 

armed conflict, internal. See internal armed 
conflict 

Armed Forces of the Republic (Fuerzas Arma- 
das de la Republica; see also Colombian Air 
Force, National Army, National Navy, and 
National Police), lx, 36, 288-94; antecedents 
of, 11-18, 21, 24, 26, 31, 36, 285-87; and 
conscription, 303; and corruption, lxii-lxiii; 
links to paramilitaries, lxiii; and violence, lvi 

Armed Southern Bloc, 327 

Armenia, 126, 298 

army. See National Army 

Asia, lxxxix, 278-79 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
278-79 

assassinations, li, lxvii-lxviii, lxxiii, lxxxiii, 
43, 53, 56, 86, 123, 215, 321, 335, 337, 338, 
341 

Association of Caribbean States (ACS), 274 
Association of Colombian Banana Producers 

(Augura), 155 
Association of Colombian Stockbreeders 

(Fedegan), 153 
Association of Sugarcane Growers (Asocana), 

157, 258 
Atlantic coast, 16 
Atlantico Department, 91 
ATP A. See Andean Trade Preference Act 
Atrato river, 72, 74, 173, 176 
attorney general (fiscal), lxiii, lxxv, lxxxii-lxxxv, 

234 

Attorney General's Office (Fiscalia General 
de la Nation), lx, lxiii-lxiv, lxxxii, 218, 233, 
238, 247, 271, 296, 308, 319-20, 322-23; 
Human Rights Unit of, 337 

AUC. See United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia 

audiencia, 7, 14 

auditor general of the republic, 218, 235 
ausencia del estado (absence of the state), liii 
Australia, 279 



automobile assembly and parts, 165 

auxilios parlamentarios (pork-barrel politics), 

229 
Avantel, 180 
Avianca, 172 

Avila Moreno, Nelly. See Mosquera Garcia, 

Elda Neyis 
Axis, 42 

Aznar, Jose Maria, 278 



Bajo Nuevo, 69 

balance of payments, 98, 193-95 
bananas, 37-40, 71, 155 
Banco Bilbao Viscaya Argentaria (BBVA), 
184 

Banco Caja Social Colmena (BCSC), 184 
Banco de Quita Sueno, 67, 69 
Banco de Serrana, 67, 69 
Banco de Serranilla, 67, 69 
Banco Santander, 184 
Bancolombia, 184, 188 
Bank of the Republic (Banrep). See Central 
Bank 

banking sector, 181-84 

Banking Superintendency, 181 

Barco Vargas, Virgilio, 51, 57, 259, 266-67, 

273,278,321,340 
Barrancabermeja, 173 

Barranquilla, 29, 71, 72, 74, 76, 80, 92, 160, 
1 76, 1 78, 222; growth of, 94-95; military role 
of, lxxvii, 296; modem port of, 173 

Basel rules, 181 

Battle of Ayacucho (1824), 21 

Battle ofBoyaca(1819), 17 

Battle ofCarabobo(1821), 18 

Battle ofPichincha(1822), 18 

bazuco (crack cocaine; see also coca and 
cocaine), 117 

beer, 164, 165, 187 

Belalcazar (or Benalcazar), Sebastian de, 7 
Belgium, 186 
Bellsouth, 178 

Bermudez, Gerardo (alias Francisco Galan), 
349 

Bema, Don. See Murillo Bejarano, Diego Fer- 
nando 

Betancourt Pulecio, Ingrid, lxvi-lxix, lxxii, 
lxxv, 242, 263-64, 278, 336, 350, 358-59 

Betancur Cuartas, Belisario, lxxxiii, 51, 94, 
223, 259, 327, 340 

biodiesel, 157, 187 



426 



Index 



biodiversity, 72, 79,81 

birthrate. See population 

Black Eagles (Aguilas Negras), lxiv 

Black Legend, 12 

black market. See informal sector 

black population, 86-90 

blanqueamiento (whitening), 87 

Boca Grande, 300 

Bogota: li, liv, lxii, 39, 47, 76, 78, 95-96, 107, 
130, 160, 186, 298, 300, 322, 326; in colonial 
times, 7, 8, 15-18; Distrito Capital de Bogota, 
lxv, 222; founding as Santafe, 7; growth of, 
94-96; Plaza de Bolivar, 33, 55, 229; pollu- 
tion in, 80; postindependence, 18-19, 21-23; 
and surrounding area, 156, 258; as tourist des- 
tination, 169; and transportation, liv, 171-72, 
175, 176, 177; and violence, lxvi, lxxiii, lxxv, 
lxxxvi; violence in, 43 

Bogota Pact (1948), 351 

Bogota river, 80 

Bogota Telephone Company (ETB), 178 
Bogotazo(1948), li, 43,326 
Bolivar Department, 88, 89 
Bolivar Palacios, Simon, Hi, liii, lxxxiv, 
16-23,286 

Bolivia, lxii, lxxxi, 21; and drug trade, 52, 53, 

259, 329 
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 15 
Botero, Fernando, li, lxvii, lxx, 59 
boundaries, 273-74; disputes over, 40, 67-70, 

287 

Boyaca, 76, 82 

Boyaca Department, 39, 75, 93, 177 

Brazil, liv, 9, 37, 86, 188; relations with, lxx- 

viii, lxxxi, 274, 355-56; trade with, 186 
Briceno Suarez, Jorge (alias El Mono Jojoy), 

lxxiv 

Britain, lxxxviii, 20, 187 
British Virgin Islands, 187 
Bucaramanga, 76, 95, 160, 18, 296 
Buenaventura, lxvi, lxxvii, 72, 173, 176, 177, 
300 

Bueno Largo, Wilson (alias Isaza), lxxiii 
bureaucracy. See public administration; local 

government 
Bush, George W., 269, 272, 345 
Bushnell, David, liii 

business community, lxxxiv, 247, 258-59 



cabildos (colonial municipal councils), 7 
cabinet of ministers, 217-18, 220-21 



Cabo de la Vela, 6 

Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN), 262 

Caguan river, 300, 347 

Cajamarca, 177 

Caldas Department, 93, 358 

Cali, lxii, 7, 76, 78, 80, 160, 176, 178, 298; 

growth of, 94; violence in, lxxiii 
Cali Cartel, lxviii, lxxxiii, 53, 188, 247, 251, 

329 

California Public Employees Retirement Sys- 
tem (CalPERS), 183-84 
Calvo y Diaz de Lamadrid, Bartolome, 367 
Cambio, 250 

Camara de Representantes. See House of Rep- 
resentatives 

campesino soldiers, 346-47 

campesinos, lviii, lxii, 47, 65, 80, 88, 134, 327, 
348 

Campo Serrano, Jose Maria, 368 
Canada, lvi, 185 
Canal Uno, 180 

Cano, Alfonso. See Saenz Vargas, Guillermo 
Cano Limon, 159 

Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, 272 
Capital District of Bogota. See Bogota 
Capital Markets Commission, 184 
Caqueta Department, lxvi, lxxxvi, 95, 190, 
344-45 

Caqueta river, 74, 299, 300, 347 
Carabineros Corps. See National Police 
Caracas (Venezuela), liv, 7, 15, 17-19, 352 
Caracol Television, S.A., 180, 249-50 
caravanas turisticas (tourist caravans), 170 
Carepa, 296, 298 

Carib linguistic and ethnic group, 5, 82 

Caribbean coast, 91, 94, 186 

Caribbean Highway, 176 

Caribbean lowlands, 71-72, 78, 82, 84, 121 

Caribbean Sea, 67, 73, 74, 353 

Caro Tovar, Miguel Antonio, 34, 368 

Carrefour, 166 

Cartagena, lxxvii, lxxxvi, 6, 7, 12, 14-18, 45, 

71, 72, 92, 95, 169, 173, 176, 178, 222, 299 
Carter Center, lxxx 
Carulla Vivero, 166 

Carvajal, Hector Fabio. See Montoya Sanchez, 

Eugenio 
Carvajal, General Hugo, lxx-lxxi 
Casa Editorial El Tiempo (CEET), 187, 249 
Casa Verde, 331 
Casino, 166 

Castano Gil, Carlos, 262 



427 



Colombia: A Country Study 



Castro, Fidel, 359 

cattle raising, lviii, 11, 71, 76, 81, 85, 147, 
152-53 

Cauca Department, 84, 88, 94, 243, 328, 345 
Cauca Regional Indigenous Council, 135 
Cauca river, 71, 81; valley, 74, 78 
Caycedo Santamaria, Domingo, 367 
Cayman Islands, 187 
Cayos de Roncador, 67-69 
Cenozoic Era, 70 

census data, 86-87, 91, 97, 100, 101 

Central Bank (Bank of the Republic — Banrep), 

lxiii, 143, 146, 147, 161, 183, 192-94,227 
Central Cordillera. See Cordillera Central 
Central Highway, 176 
Central Junta, 15 
centralism, lii, 33 
Cepeda Vargas, Manuel, 244 
Cerrejon, 158, 175 
Cesar Department, 158 
Charles m (king of Spain), 14, 25 
Charles IV (king of Spain), 14, 15 
Chavez Frias, Hugo, lxix-lxxi, lxxvii-lxxxi, 

lxxxiv, lxxxvii, 264, 275-76, 350, 352, 354, 

359 

chemical industry, 164-65 
Chevrolet, 165 

Chibcha linguistic and ethnic group, 5, 82 
Chigirodo, 298 

children {see also education, family), 99; 

abuse of, lxxii, 66; and health, 1 13, 1 16 
Chile, lxxviii, lxxxi, 185, 187, 273 
China, 186, 278-79 
Chiquinquira, 76 

Chiquita Brands International, 155 
Chirac, Jacques, lxvi 
Chiricoa people, 85 

Choco Department, 72, 78, 81, 84, 88, 89, 97, 
176, 254, 358; and political violence, lxxiii, 
90 

Choco people, 176 
Christian National Party, 125 
Christian Union, 125 

Christianity (see also Protestantism; Roman 

Catholicism), 9, 11-12, 119-25 
Cienaga, 176 
Cimarron Movement, 254 
cimarrones (maroons), 89 
Citibank, 184 
Citigroup, 187 

Citizen Commitment for Colombia (Compro- 
mise Ciudadano por Colombia), lxxxviii 



Citizens' Convergence, 242, 248 

Citizens' Mandate for Peace, 260 

CityTV, 187, 250 

Ciudad Bolivar (Venezuela), 18 

Civil Code, 106, 107 

civil service. See public administration 

civil wars, 28, 30, 34-35 

class and social structure, 101-3; and education, 
126; and income, 101-3, 108; lower classes, 
102-4; middle classes, 101-3; and pensions, 
117-18; and racial distinctions, 86-90, 94, 
101-2; and religion, 104, 105-6, 120-21, 124; 
and residence, 94, 101-3; upper classes, 101 

clientelism, 224-26, 228, 240, 246, 247; 
armed clientelism, 226 

climate, 73, 77-78 

Clinton, William Jefferson, 271; administra- 
tion of, 344 
Club Nogal, 333 
"CM&," 250 

coal industry, 158, 173, 174, 185 

coca and cocaine (see also drug trade), 
lvii-lviii, lix, lxii, 52-53, 73, 77, 80-81, 96, 
110, 188-91,251,259,332,360-61 

Code of Criminal Procedure (2005), 238, 321 

Code of Criminal Procedure (2008), lxi 

coffee, 3, 39, 40, 153-54, 175; early develop- 
ment of industry, 37-38, 144-45; exports, 
34, 37, 46, 54, 185; prices, 110, 146 

Cogui people, 85 

Cold War, 338 

Colegio Anglo-Colombiano, 130 

Colegio Nueva Granada, 130 

colegios de garage (garage schools), 129, 130 

College of Cardinals, 120 

Colombia Alive, 248 

Colombia Coal (Carbocol), 158, 209 

Colombia Investment Corporation, 187 

Colombia Telecommunications, 178 

Colombian Air Force (FAQ, 287, 300-302; air 
bases, 301; Caribbean Air Group (Gacar), 
302; Combat Air Command (Cacom), 301; 
Eastern Air Group (Gaori), 302; materiel, 301, 
302; Military Air Transport Command 
(Catam), 301; ranks and insignia, 309-11; 
training schools, 287, 302, 305-7 

Colombian Association of Flower Exporters 
(Asocolflores), 156, 258 

Colombian Association of Sugarcane Produc- 
ers and Suppliers (Procana), 157 

Colombian Chamber of Commerce, 252 



428 



Index 



Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), 253, 
262 

Colombian Company of Air Navigation, 171 
Colombian Confederation of NGOs, 252 
Colombian Episcopal Conference (CEC), 120, 
248 

Colombian Family Welfare Institute, 1 13, 199 
Colombian Federation of Educators (Fecode), 
129 

Colombian Federation of Municipalities 

(Fedemunicipios), 226 
Colombian Financial Superintendency (SFC 

or Superfinanciera), 184 
Colombian Gas Company, 160 
Colombian Indigenous Movement (MIC), 243 
Colombian Intelligence Service (SIC), 318 
Colombian Petroleum Enterprise (Ecopetrol), 

46,58, 159-60 
Colombian Platform for Human Rights, 

Democracy, and Development (Plataforma 

Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democ- 

racia y Desarrollo), 253 
Colombian Titling, 163 
colonial economy, 8-9, 144 
colonial government, 7-11, 13 
colonial society, 8-10 
Colpatria Multibank Network, 1 87 
Colpatria Tower, 257 

Columbus, Christopher (Cristobal Colon), lii, 
liii 

Columbus Day, liii 

Comando Nacional Unitario. See National 

Unitary Command 
Comcel, 178 

comisiones (permanent congressional commit- 
tees), 227 
commerce, 166 

Commercial Arms Control Department, 292 
Common Market of the South (Mercosur), 
185 

Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), 41, 44, 
244, 327 

compadrazgo (godparenthood), 104 
Compania Nacional de Chocolates, 188 
comptroller general, lxiv, 235 
Comptroller General's Office (Contraloria 
General de la Republica), 218, 238, 312, 320 
Computer Associates, 187 
Comunero Rebellion (1781), 14-15 
comunes (revolutionary committees), 14 
Concha Ferreira, Jose Vicente, 368 
concordat (1887), 34, 106 



Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC), 
200, 256 

Congress of Angostura, liii 

Congress of Cucuta, 20, 21, 25 

Congress of Ocana, 22 

Congress of Panama, 20 

Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la 
Republica), lx, lxii, lxiv, lxvi, lxxx, lxxxv, 
21, 36-37, 57, 149, 198, 207, 217-18, 222, 
227-30, 246-48, 267,312 

conmocion interior. See state of internal com- 
motion 

conquistadors, 7 

consejerias presidenciales (presidential advi- 
sories), 210 
Consejo de Estado. See Council of State 
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura. See Supe- 
rior Judicial Council 
Conservative Hegemony, 37, 39-40 
Conservative Party (PC), li, lx, lxviii, lxxxvii, 
lxxxviii, 27, 34, 43^14, 123, 215, 228, 
240-41, 288, 324, 326; precursors of, 23, 25 
constituent assemblies in nineteenth century, 
20, 32 

Constituent Assembly (1991), 57, 122, 135, 
215,254, 341 

constitution of 1991, lx-lxi, 4, 57-58, 122-23, 
143, 215, 219-20, 223, 274; anticorruption 
measures and, 246-48; and decentralization, 
223; and economic reform, 148, 162, 166, 
196; and environmental protection, 79; and 
extradition issues, 188; and gender equality, 
107; and health care, 1 12; and judicial branch, 
233; and minority representation, 83-84, 229, 
242-43; and national defense, 290-91; and 
National Police, 314; and political reform, 
240, 242; and press freedom, 249; and refer- 
endum issues, lxi, lxii, lxxxiv-lxxxv, lxxxvii, 
237; and resgnerdos, 84 

Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional), 
lx, lxii, lxxxiv, lxxxv, lxxxvii, 117, 119, 123, 
196-98, 217-20, 228, 233, 237-38, 256, 
262, 308 

constitutions, nineteenth-century, lx, 20, 23, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 32-34, 57, 219, 286, 324 

construction industry, 39, 71, 162-63 

Consultancy for Human Rights (Codhes), 
96-97, 253, 263 

Continental Airlines, 172 

Contraloria General de la Republica. See 
Comptroller General's Office 

Copa Airlines, 172 



429 



Colombia: A Country Study 



Copenhagen climate conference (2009), 
lxxxvi 

Cordillera Central, 32, 70, 73, 74, 78, 176 
Cordillera Occidental, 70, 72, 73, 74 
Cordillera Oriental, 37, 70, 73, 74, 76, 78, 176 
Cordoba Department, lxv, 89, 330, 332 
Cordoba Ruiz, Piedad, lxxv, 264 
Corona Group, 188 

Corporation Nuevo Arco Iris. See New Rain- 
bow Corporation 

Corporation for Science and Technology for 
the Development of the Naval, Maritime, 
and Riverine Industry, 300 

Correa Delgado, Rafael, lxxix-lxxx, 276, 
353-54 

corruption, lix, lxi, lxvii, lxxvi, lxxxiii, 54, 1 15, 
191, 216, 223, 225, 246-48, 251, 296, 308, 
314, 315, 319, 329, 345; and politics, lxiii, 
lxviii, lxxii; and the military, lxiii 

Corruption Perceptions Index 2008, lxiii 

Corte Constitucional. See Constitutional Court 

Cortes, 15 

Cortes, Heman, 6 

Costa de Mosquitos (Nicaragua), 68, 357 
costeno, 94 

cotton. See textile industry 

Council of State (Consejo de Estado), lxxvi, 
lxxx,218, 235, 236, 246 

Council of the Indies, 8 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, lxi, 
lxiv-lxvi, lxxii, lxxvii, lxxxi, 56, 261, 272, 
275,301,322,327, 338^0, 344 

Counternarcotics Brigade, 296, 298 

counternarcotics operations and strategy, lviii, 
lxxi, lxxvii, lxxxi, 52-53, 56, 80-81, 188-91, 
216, 271-72, 276, 299, 301, 342-46, 
360-61; and extradition, 53-54 

courts {see also judicial branch, military jus- 
tice system, Supreme Court of Justice), 
234-38; indigenous courts, 234 

crawling-peg system, 184, 192-93 

Credit Risk Management System (SARC), 
182 

Creole language, 88 
Cretaceous Period, 70 

crime. See homicide rate; kidnapping; vio- 
lence 

criollos (Creoles), 8-10, 11, 13-14, 15-17 

Cuba, 11,259 

Cuban Missile Crisis, 69 

Cuban Revolution, 49, 328 

Cucuta, 74, 95, 176 



Cuna indigenous people, 85, 176 
cundiboyacense, 93 
Cundinamarca, 16, 82 

Cundinamarca Department, lxv, 91, 93, 95, 

156, 344,358 
Cupiagua, 159 
Cusiana, 159 

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terror- 
ism (C-TAP), 186 



d'Hondt method {see also elections), 232, 246 

Dagua, 322 

Darien, 170, 176-77 

Darien Gap. See Tapon del Darien 

Davivienda, 184 

Day of the Race (Dia de la Raza), liii 
Death to Kidnappers (MAS), 56, 329 
debt, external, 52, 147, 168, 192, 194-95 
debt, public-sector, lxxxix, 146, 148, 168, 183, 

192, 195, 198, 208 
decentralization, liv, 57, 128, 129, 143, 148, 

196, 225 

Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 

13 

decree laws, 219, 227, 236, 237, 314, 318, 339 
defense budget and spending, 312-13 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA, 

2009), lxxvi-lxxxi 
Defensor del Pueblo. See human rights 

ombudsman 
Defensoria del Pueblo. See Human Rights 

Ombudsman's Office, 
deforestation {see also forests), lxxxvi, 81-82 
Del Monte Fresh Produce, 155 
Dell, 187 

Democracy and Security Foundation (Fun- 
dacion Seguridad y Democracia), 226 

democracy in Colombia, li, 4, 48, 122, 198, 
215 

Democratic Action M-19 (AD M-19), 243 
Democratic Alternative (AD), 245 
Democratic Colombia Party (PDC), 242, 248 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 
lxxv, lxxxiv, lxxxv, 123, 170, 207, 210, 217, 
222, 261, 279, 315, 337, 346-47, 358 
Democratic Security Policy. See Democratic 

Security and Defense Policy 
demography. See population 
departmental assemblies, 222 
departments, administrative, 218, 221-22 
departments, territorial, 218, 222-26 



430 



Index 



desplazados. See displacement 
Detroit, lxvi 

Devia Silva, Luis Edgar (alias Raul Reyes), 

lxx, lxxxiii, 354, 357-58 
devolution. See decentralization 
Dia de Colon. See Columbus Day 
Dia de la Raza. See Day of the Race 
Diario Oficial, 228 
DIRECTV, 180 

disappearance, lxiv, lxxxi, lxxxii 
diseases, 79, 116-17 

displacement, of population, liv, lxi, 65-66, 
72, 95-98, 104, 110-11, 133, 205, 248^19, 
255, 262-63, 334, 352; by counternarcotics 
efforts, 8 1 ; of ethnic minorities, 85-86 

district mayoralty {alcaldia distritat), 222 

Distrito Capital de Bogota. See Bogota 

Dix, Robert H., li 

Doctors Without Borders, 252 

Dole Food Company, 155 

Dominican Republic Embassy, 54, 328 

Don Diego. See Montoya Sanchez, Diego 

drug addiction, 117 

drug trade (see also counternarcotics operations 
and strategy; narco-terrorism), lviii, lxii, 
lxxxiii, lxxxvi, 52-54, 56, 58, 93, 96-97, 111, 
147, 219, 285, 322, 328-30, 332-33; coca and 
cocaine, 52-53, 73, 77, 80-81, 96, 110, 
188-91, 251, 259, 332, 360-61; drug cartels, 
lxii, lxxv, lxxxiii-lxxxiv, 215, 259, 270, 329, 
332, 340; effects on the economy, 111, 191; 
and guerrillas, 55, 190, 259-60, 328, 331; her- 
oin, 53, 73, 81, 188-91; marijuana, 52, 
328-29; and military personnel, 309; and 
paramilitaries, lvii, 190, 259, 262, 329-30; 
shipments and flights, 72, 343; and wealth, 
103,111,329,330 



earthquakes, 70-71, 127 

Eastern Cordillera. See Cordillera Oriental 

eastern plains. See llanos 

EasyFly, 172 

Economic Commission for Latin America and 

the Caribbean (ECLAC), 100 
economic liberalization, 162 
economic performance, 37, 149 
economic policy, 149-50, 162, 186, 188 
Economist Intelligence Unit (ERJ), liv, lxii 
Ecopetrol (Peru), lxiv, 188, 191-99, 205 
Ecuador, liii, lvi, lxxxv-lxxxvi, 19, 21, 23; base 

agreement with United States, lxxvi; border 



issues with, 81, 273, 300, 353-54; Colombi- 
ans in, 96, 98, 353; relations with, lxxix, 
lxxx-lxxxi, lxxxvi, 275-76, 353-54; and sup- 
port for Colombian insurgents, lxx-lxxi, 
lxxiv, 354; trade with, lix, 186 
education (see also colegios de garage; univer- 
sities), 9, 12, 31, 34, 41, 49, 126-33; basic, 
29-30, 126; coverage, 128-29, 132; enroll- 
ment in, 66; primary, 126-29; public spend- 
ing on, 203-6; quality of, 128-30; and the 
Roman Catholic Church, 120, 132; second- 
ary, 25, 49, 126, 128-30; technical and voca- 
tional, 132 

Education Compensation Fund (FEC), 196 

Education Law (1994), 128 

Ejercito Nacional. See National Army 

El Dorado, 6 

El Espectador, 249-50 

El Mono Jojoy. See Briceno Suarez, Jorge 

El Salvador, 188 

El Tiempo, lxvi, lxxxviii, 250 

Eladio Perez, Luis, lxix 

elections, lxi, 4, 7, 20, 27, 29, 37, 40, 48, 57, 
218, 230-33, 242-46; and campaign finance, 
232-33; congressional, lxxxvii, 231; fraud 
and violence in, 48, 226; local, 52, 225; pres- 
idential, lxxxiii-lxxxix, 231, 280; senatorial, 
231 

electricity, 73, 163, 168, 207 

ELN. See National Liberation Army 

Embera people, 72, 84 

emigration, 49, 98-99 

encomendero, 9 

encomienda, 9 

energy, 158-60, 332, 349 

Energy and Gas Regulatory Commission 

(CREG), 168 
Enlightenment, 12 

environmental considerations, 78-82, 136-37, 

254; and Pan-American Highway, 72 
Escobar Gaviria, Pablo, 53, 188, 271 
Escuela Nueva. See New School 
Estacion Acapulco, 173 
estado de conmocion interior. See state of 

internal commotion 
estado de emergencia. See state of emergency 
estado de emergencia ecoldgica. See state of 

ecological emergency 
estado de emergencia economica. See state of 

economic emergency 
estado de emergencia social. See state of 

social emergency 



431 



Colombia: A Country Study 



estado de exception. See state of exception 
estado de guerra exterior. See state of external 
war 

estado de sitio. See state of siege 

Estados Unidos de Colombia. See United 

States of Colombia 
ETA. See Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
ethanol, 156-57, 160, 187 
ethnic groups {see also Afro-Colombians; 

indigenous peoples), liv, 82-86, 254-55 
European Community, 184 
European Free Trade Association, 185 
European Union (EU), lvi, lxvii, lxxxi, 

184- 85, 261; aid from, 277; Colombian 
exports to, 155, 191; relations with, 276-78 

Eva Peron Foundation, 46 
Evangelical Confederation of Colombia, 125 
exchange-rate policy, 147, 149-50 
executive branch, lxii, lxxxv, 217-22; admin- 
istrative departments, 217, 221-22 
Exito, 166 
Exocet missiles, 69 

Export Promotion Fund (Proexpo), 161, 187 
exports, lv, 24, 32, 37, 40, 145, 174, 185; agri- 
cultural, 50, 145, 155, 156; direction of, lxxix, 

185- 86; industrial, 163-65; mineral, 143, 
158; petrochemical, 158-59; policy, 146, 
161; and ports, 173-74 

Express Divorce Law (2005), 107 
extended-fund facility, 150, 194, 223 
Extraditables, lvi, 321 

extradition issues, lvi, lxv, lxviii, 57-58, 215, 
235,251,321,342-43,348, 360 



Facatativa, 297 

Failed States Index, lxiii 

Fajardo Valderrama, Sergio, lxxxviii 

Falabella, 166 

Falklands-Malvinas War (1982), 265 
false-positives scandal, lxxiv-lxxv, lxxxi-lxxxii, 
lxxxiii 

family, 103-7; and marriage, 100, 104, 123; 
roles, 104-5; size and structure, 100, 103-5, 
107 

Family Compensation Funds (CCFs), 113, 

199-200 
family planning, 50, 90, 99, 1 19 
FARC. See Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia 
federalism, Hi, 20, 25, 27, 28, 31, 33 
Federmann, Nikolaus, 7 



Ferdinand VII (king of Spain), 15, 16-17 

financial sector, 181-84, 187 

First Colombian Radio Channel. See Caracol 

Television, SA. 
fiscal (attorney general), lxiii, lxxv, lxxxii-lxxxv, 

234 

Fiscalia General de la Nation. See Attorney 

General's Office 
fish catch, 80 
Florencia, 298 
Florida, 263 
flowers, 155-56 

foreign direct investment (FDI), 147, 186-88, 
195 

foreign relations, 264-79; with Asia, 278-79; with 
Europe, 276-78; with Latin America, 273-76, 
352-57; with United States, lxxvi-lxxxi, 265-66, 
269-73,343-46 

Foreign Trade Bank of Colombia (Bancol- 
dex), 161 

forests, 78-80; and deforestation, Ixxxvi, 
81-82; and ethnic minorities, 84; protection 
of, 79; rainforest (selva), Ixxxvi, 65, 71, 72, 
76, 77, 84, 85, 176-77, 309, 354, 356; and 
reforestation, 79 

Fort Benning, 289 

Forward Operation Location (FOL), lxxvi 

Foundation for Higher Education and Devel- 
opment (Fedesarrollo), lxxxviii-lxxxix 

fourteenth monthly wage (mesada 14), 197 

France, lxxii, lxxiii, 1 87, 350 

Franco, Francisco, 42 

free-birth laws, 20,21,89 

Freedom House, lxi, lxiv 

freedom of speech, 26, 28; and news media, 
249-51 

freedom of worship, 26, 28 

free-trade agreement (FTA), lxiv, lxxvi, 259, 
273 ■ 

Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 259 
Frente Nacional. See National Front 
fuero (special judicial privileges), 24 
Fuerza de Action Decisiva. See joint com- 
mands 

Fuerza Publica. See Public Force 

Fuerzas Armadas de la Republica. See Armed 
Forces of the Republic 

Fuerzas Militares. See Military Forces 

Fund for the Finance of the Agricultural Sec- 
tor (Finagro), 152 



432 



Index 



Gaitan, Jorge Eliecer, li, 42-43, 288, 326 
Gaitan Self-Defense Groups of Colombia 

(AGC), lxv 
Galan, Francisco. See Bermudez, Gerardo 
Galan, Luis Carlos, lxvii-lxviii, lxxxiii, 53, 

215,321,329 
Galeras, 73 

Gallup Poll, lv, lxxi, lxxv 
Gamarra, 173 

garage schools and colleges, 129, 130, 132 
Garcia Marquez, Gabriel, li, lxvii, 59, 94 
Garzon, Jaime, 250 

Garzon, Luis Eduardo (alias Lucho), 134, 244, 
245, 256 

Gaviria Diaz, Carlos, 245 

Gaviria Trujillo, Cesar Augusto, lxxxiii, 57, 
58, 94, 1 14, 1 18, 181, 215, 258, 340-41; and 
defense, 290; and foreign relations, 267, 
274, 278 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), 185 

General Confederation of Democratic Work- 
ers (CGTD), 256 

General Electric, 187 

General Participation System, 197 

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
184 

Geneva Convention Protocol II, 270 
geography (see also climate; geology), 67-77, 

93, 170; regions, 71-78 
geology, 70-73 
Germany, 186 
Gini Coefficient, 108 
Girardot, 80 
Gloria, 305, 307 
GNP. See gross national product 
Gobierno en Linea. See Government Online 
gold, 6, 11,24, 158 
Golfo de Coquibacoa, 69 
Golfo de Uraba, 6, 71, 72, 84 
Golfo de Venezuela, 69, 326, 352-53 
Golfo del Darien, lii, 73 
Gomez Castro, Laureano Eleuterio, 42, 44, 

288, 326 
Gomez Hurtado, Alvaro, 244 
Gonsalves, Marc, lvii, lxxi 
Gonzalez Valencia, Ramon, 
Government Online, 180 
Granadine Confederation, 28 
Granda, Ricardo, lxxi 
Granda, Rodrigo, 263, 276 



Great Colombia (Gran Colombia), lii-liii, 1 8, 
23 

Great Depression, 39^40, 145 

Great Liberator. See Bolivar Palacios, Simon 

Green Party (Partido Verde), lxxxviii 

gremio (economic association), 1 14 

gross domestic product (GDP), lv, 46, 115, 145, 
150, 154, 182, 191, 193, 195, 199; growth of, 
191-93, 208; and industry, 159-62, 164-65; 
and informal sector, 202; and pensions, 
206-7; and public-sector spending, 195-98, 
203^1, 238-39; and service sector, 165 

gross national product (GNP), 312-13 

Group of Three (G-3), 185, 258, 274 

Grupo Bavaria, 165, 187, 249 

Grupo Empresarial Interconexion Electrica 
S.A., 188 

Grupo Fenosa, 187 

Grupo Planeta, 187, 250 

GSP. See Generalized System of Preferences 

Guainia Department, 88 

Guajira Peninsula. See Peninsula de la Guajira 

Guajiros. See Wayuu people 

Guangdong Sheng Fair, 278 

Guano Islands Act (1856), 69 

Guapa, 176 

Guaviare Department, lxv, lxix, lxxi, 190, 345 
Guaviare river, 71, 77, 347 
Guayabero river, 347 
Guayaquil, 18 

guerrillas, leftist, hi, lv, lvii, lxxiii, 48-50, 52-56, 
58, 72, 147, 207, 274, 327-28, 335, 346-47; 
and demobilization, lxv, 54, 259; and dis- 
placement, 95; and drug trade, lviii, 55, 329; 
peace negotiations with, lvi, 332, 340-42 
Gulf of Darien. See Golfo del Darien 
Gulf of Uraba. See Golfo de Uraba 
Gulf of Venezuela. See Golfo de Venezuela 
Gulf War, 268 

Gutierrez de Pineda, Virginia, 87 
Gutierrez Prieto, Jose Santos, 368 
gypsies (Rom), 86 



H1N1 (swine) influenza, lxxxi 
Hague, The, 356 

Hare method (see also elections), 232 
Harvard University, lix 
Havana, 349 

Hay-Herran Treaty (1903), 325 
HDL See Human Development Index 



433 



Colombia: A Country Study 



health and welfare (see also diseases; hospitals), 
1 12-19, 203; access to, 1 12, 1 14; budget for, 
203; cost of, 115; and insurance, 113-15, 
203; physicians, 98, 1 12; quality of care, 1 14 

health-care providers (IPS), 1 14 

health insurance companies (EPS), 1 14 

Heredia, Pedro de, 6 

heroin. See drug trade 

Herran y Zaldua, Pedro Alcantara, 367 

highways. See roads 

hispanidad, 92 

Hispaniola, lii 

Historical Conservatives, 34 
Hitler, Adolph, 42 

HTV. See human immunodeficiency virus 

Holguin Jaramillo, Jorge, 368 

Holguin Mallarino, Carlos, 368 

Holy See. See Vatican 

homicide rate, lxv-lxvi, 262-63, 337, 349 

Honda, 76 

hospitals, 1 12, 115; Central Military Hospital, 
295 

hostages. See kidnapping 

House of Representatives (Camara de Repre- 

sentantes), lxviii, lxxxiv-lxxxv, 34, 83, 218, 

227, 246 
housing, 162-63, 182 
Howes, Thomas, lvii, lxxi 
Huila Department, 76, 94, 95 
Human Development Index (HDI), 115, 204 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 1 17 
human rights, lix, lxi, lxiv, 56, 207, 219-20, 253, 

261-63, 270, 273, 277, 308, 332, 334-36, 

337-38; and armed forces, lxxiv-lxxv, 346-47; 

workers, lxiii-lxiv 
Human Rights and Displacement Consultancy 

(Codhes),81 
human rights ombudsman (defensor del pueb- 

/o),218, 228, 263 
Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (Defensoria 

del Pueblo), lx, lxiv, lxxii, 239 
Human Rights Watch, lxiv, 252 
Humboldt, Alexander von, li 
Hurtado, Maria del Pilar, 319 
hydroelectric power, 73 



Ibague, 298 
Iberia (airline), 172 

ICITAP. See International Criminal Investiga- 
tive Training Assistance Program 
ICJ. See International Court of Justice 



ICSID. See International Centre for Settlement 

of Investment Disputes 
Iguaran Arana, Mario, lxiii, lxxxii-lxxxiii 
illiteracy {see also literacy), 4, 12, 29, 49, 126, 

191,210 
Imarco, 173 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
Immediate Care Centers (CAIs), 315 
immigration, 92-93 

imports, lxxix, 165, 186, 194; duties on, 26, 

30, 40, 152, 155, 184 
import-substitution industrialization, 40, 46, 

50, 145, 146 
income distribution, liv, 59, 107-10, 115, 144, 

199, 200, 203, 206 
independence, 3, 13-18, 19-23; antecedents 

of, 13-15; struggle for, 15-18 
Independent Democratic Pole (PDI), 245 
Independent Movement of Absolute Renewal 

(MTRA), 244 
Indians. See Amerindians 
Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (Aico), 

243, 254 

indigenous peoples, 5-7, 10, 12, 59, 82-86, 88, 
254-55, 328; and displacement, 72, 86, 255; 
and military service, 303; and political repre- 
sentation, 57, 135; and social organization, 
82-84 

Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI), 243 
indigenous territories. See resguardos 
Indonesia, 279 

Industrial Development Institute (ITT), 161 

industrial sector, 38, 160-65, 202 

Industry and Commerce Superintendency 

(SIC), 161, 178 
inflation, lv, 34, 35, 143, 146-47, 162, 184, 

192-93, 198, 208,215 
informal sector, lxxxix, 98, 110, 118, 166, 

202-3, 205, 216 
inspector general of the nation (Procurador 

General de la Nation), lxiv, lxxxvii, 218, 

228, 234, 239 
Inspector General's Office, 239, 308 
Institute of Foreign Trade, 192 
Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and 

Environmental Studies, 80 
insular region, 71 

insurgency. See guerrillas, leftist; internal 

armed conflict 
Inter- American Coffee Agreement (1940), 

153 



434 



Index 



Inter-American Commission on Human 

Rights, 244, 270, 336 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 309, 

351 

Inter-American Defense Board, 287 
Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Commis- 
sion (CICAD), 269 
Inter-American Human Rights Convention, 
351 

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assis- 
tance (Rio Treaty; 1947), 265, 326, 351 
Interamerican Press Society (SIP), 250 
internal armed conflict, liv, lvi-lviii, lxix-lxx, 
lxxxv, 48^9, 54-57, 58, 216-17, 259-64, 
330-34, 338; and displacement, 95-98, 352 
International Airport Operator (Opain), 171 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT), 79 

International Centre for Settlement of Invest- 
ment Disputes (ICSID), 187 
International Coffee Agreement (1963), 153 
International Coffee Agreement (1989), 153 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 68, 69, 
356-57 

International Criminal Court, 351-52 
International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program (ICITAP), 320 
International Finance Corporation, 163 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 

(ESS), 295 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 150, 182, 

192, 194, 197, 223 
International Peace Brigades, 252 
International Police (Interpol), 318 
International Red Cross, 252 
international relations. See foreign relations 
Internet, 180,210 
invierno (wet winter season), 77 
Iraq, 268-69 

Irish Republican Army (ERA), lviii 

Isaza. See Bueno Largo, Wilson 

Isla de Malpelo, 67 

Isla de Providencia, 67 

Isla de San Andres, 67, 69 

Isla de San Bernardo, 67 

Isla de Santa Catalina, 67 

Isla del Rosario, 67 

Isla Fuerte, 67 

Isla Gorgona, 67 

Isla Gorgonilla, 67 

Islam, 126 

Islas Los Monjes, 69, 353 



Israel, lxxii, lxxvii 

Isthmus of Panama, 4, 18, 29, 72 

Ituango, lxxiii 

Jamaica, 69, 89 
Japan, 186, 278-79 
Jara, Alan, lxxv 

Jaramillo, Mauricio (alias El Medico), lxxiv 

Jaramillo Ossa, Bernardo, 244 

Javeriana University, 120, 122, 130 

jefaturas (headquarters), 293 

Jesuits, 25, 26, 29, 120 

Jewish community, 125 

Jimena Duzan, Maria, lxix 

Jimenez, Carlos Mario (alias Macaco), lxv 

Jimenez de Quesada, Gonzalo, 6-7 

Joint Advisers of the Armed Forces and the 

National Police, 294 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 293 
joint commands, 292-93, 302; Caribbean Joint 

Command, 302; Decisive Action Force, 302; 

Joint Task Force Command, 293; Joint Task 

Force Omega, 293, 302 
Joint General Staff, 291 
Jorge 40. See Tovar Pupo, Rodrigo 
Journalist Protection Program, 337 
Juan Valdez coffee shops, 154 
judicial branch, lxii, lxxxv, 218, 233-38 
judicial police, 319-21 
judicial reform, lxiv 
jungle. See forests 
Jurassic Period, 70 

Justice and Peace Law (2005), 244, 262, 

347^8, 350, 360 
Justice, Peace and Nonviolent Action (Justa- 

paz), 249 
justices of the peace, 224 
Justicialismo (Fairness), 47 

Karina. See Mosquera Garcia, Elda Neyis 

Kawasaki, 165 

Kennedy administration, 339 

kidnapping, lvii, lxv-lxvi, lxix, lxxii, 55-56, 

110, 262, 296, 315, 319, 322, 332, 334, 

335-36, 349 
Korean War (1950-53), 287, 288, 326 
Kuwait, 268 
Kyoto Protocol, 79 



435 



Colombia: A Country Study 



La Clinica Barraquer, 1 12 
LaDorada, 173 

La Guajira Department, lxxxii, 78, 85, 88, 

158, 176,309 
La Linea, 177 
La Linea Tunnel, 177 

La Violencia (1946-58), li, 4, 43^4, 50, 93, 

95,288,313,326-27 
labor force, 8-11, 59, 144, 147, 164, 199, 

202-3 

labor reforms, 41, 109, 200, 202 

labor unions, 46-47, 110, 129, 133-34, 168, 
200, 255-56; violence against, lxiv, 134 

Laguna de Guatavita, 6 

land mines, lviii, lxxiv, lxxxv-lxxxvi, 335 

landownership, 8-1 1, 83, 84, 1 10 

languages {see also Spanish language and cul- 
ture), 84-85, 88, 89 

Lara Bonilla, Ricardo, 53, 329 

Larandia, lxxvii, 344 

Las Papas, 74 

Latin American & Caribbean Demographic 

Centre (Celade), 100 
Lauricocha (Peru), 77 
Law 100 (1993), 114, 118 
League of Nations, 325 
Lebanese Colombians, 92-93, 126 
legislative branch {see also Congress of the 

Republic), lxii, 218, 227-30 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT), 

137 

Leticia, 40, 287, 298, 325 
ley del monte (law of the jungle), liii 
LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender), 
137 

liberal factions, 30 

Liberal Party (PL), li, lx, lxviii, lxxxviii, 
25-27, 34, 43^4, 215, 223, 228, 240-41, 
279, 288, 324, 326; antecedents of, 23, 25 

Liberals, Independent, 30, 34 

liberation theology, 50, 122 

Liberty Mutual Insurance, 187 

libraries, 131 

life expectancy, 101 

Lima (Peru), 8, 19 

limpieza de sangre, 9 

literacy {see also illiteracy), 33, 127-28 

Living Colombia Movement (MCV), 248 

llanero, 94 

llanos, 17, 70, 71, 76-77, 79, 84, 91, 94, 160, 
176 

Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 49, 3 1 8 



Lleras Restrepo, Carlos, 49, 99 
Lloreda Caycedo, Rodrigo, 123 
local government, 222-24, 239 
Lomas Aisladas, 1 76 

Londono, Rodrigo (alias Timochenko), lxx 
Lopez Michelsen, Alfonso, liii 
Lopez Pumarejo, Alfonso, 41, 49, 288 
Lopez Valdez, Jose Hilario, 25-26 
lowlands, 71-73, 74, 76, 78; Caribbean, 

71-72; Pacific, 72-73,255 
Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo Organization, 

184 



Macaco. See Jimenez, Carlos Mario 
Macarena Sierra, 76 

Madrid, Cundinamarca Department, 301-2 

Magdalena Department, 155 

Magdalena Highway, 176 

Magdalena river, 6-7, 24, 32, 74, 80, 173; 

basin, 81; valley, 71, 76, 78, 89, 329-30 
Maicao, 92-93 
Makro, 166 
Maku people, 85 
Malaga, 299 
Malambo, lxxvii, 301 
Malcolm X, 126 

Mallarino Ibargiien, Manuel Maria, 367 
malnutrition {see also nutrition), 116 
Mamonal, 174, 300 
Manaure, 85 

Mancuso Gomez, Salvatore, 252, 360 
Manuel Cipeda Vargas Group. See Revolution- 
ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
Manta Base (Ecuador), lxxvi 
manufacturing, 164-65 
Maporita, 299 

Maracaibo (Venezuela), lxxi 
Maradona, Diego Armando, 1 12 
marijuana, 52 

Marin, Pedro Antonio (alias Manuel Marulanda 
Velez, Tiro Fijo, or Sure Shot), lxx, 190, 327, 
358 

Marin Arango, Luciano (alias Ivan Marquez), 

lxx-lxxi, lxxiv, 264 
Marine Infantry Command (Comando de 

Infanteria de Marina). See National Navy 
Marquez, Ivan. See Marin Arango, Luciano 
Marquez Barreto, Jose Ignacio de, 25 
marriage, 100, 104-7, 121 
Marroquin Ricaurte, Jose Manuel, 35 



436 



Index 



Marulanda Velez, Manuel. See Marin, Pedro 

Antonio 
Marxism, 328 
mass transit, 163 
Maza Marquez, Miguel, lxxxiii 
Mazda, 165 
medical insurance, 1 14 

Medellin, liv, lix, 36, 39, 46, 76, 78, 109, 296, 
298, 349; growth of, 94-95; and pollution, 
80; transportation connections, 172, 176, 178; 
and violence, lxvi, lxxxvi 

Medellin Cartel, lvi, 53, 56, 188, 251, 321, 329 

Medellin Public Companies (EPM), 160, 178 

media, lxxxiv, 180-81, 249-51 

Medina, Yidis, lxii 

Medina Caracas, Tomas (alias El Negro Aca- 
cio) 

Melgar, lxxvii, 301-2 
Melo y Ortiz, Jose Maria Dionisio, 26-27 
Mennonites, 125 
Merchant Marine, 300 
mesada 14 (fourteenth monthly wage), 197 
Mesozoic Era, 70 
mestizaje, 87 
mestizos, liii, 10, 11, 72 
Meta Department, lxv, 76, 95, 176, 190, 341, 
345 

Meta river, 300 
Methodists, 124 

Mexico, 164, 185, 186, 188, 259, 273, 274, 
349 

Middle East, 269; migrants from, 92 
migration, internal, 93, 94, 95-98, 110-11, 
162, 199 

Military Assistance Agreement, 287 

Military Club, 289, 295 

military education system, 305-7 

Military Forces {see also Colombian Air Force; 
National Army; National Navy), lxxiv-lxxv, 
lxxxvi, 268, 290-302, 340, 358-59, 361; Gen- 
eral Command of, 291-93, 295; reserves, 295; 
uniforms, ranks, and insignia, 309-12 

Military Industry (Indumil), 289, 295 

military justice system, 307-9; Advisory Coun- 
cil on Military Justice, 294; Military Penal 
Code (2000), 307-8; Military Penal Justice, 
lxxxii, 308-9; Supreme Military Tribunal, 
292, 308 

Military Service Law (1993), 303, 305 
Millicom International Cellular, 178 
minifundistas (smallholders), 1 10 



mining industry {see also coal, gold, oil), 8 1 , 
158 

Ministerial, 25 

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop- 
ment, 190,218, 220 

Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tour- 
ism, lxviii, 161,218, 220-21, 267 

Ministry of Communications, 218, 220 

Ministry of Culture, 218, 220 

Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Terri- 
torial Development, 79, 218, 220, 267 

Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, lv, lxiii, 
lxviii, 218, 221,312 

Ministry of Foreign Relations, 218, 221, 
264-65, 267-68 

Ministry of Interior and Justice, lxxxv, 218, 
220-21 

Ministry of Mines and Energy, 158, 218, 221 
Ministry of National Defense, lxxxii, 218, 

221, 268, 289-90, 294-95, 312, 314, 341 
Ministry of National Education, 128, 218, 221 
Ministry of Social Protection, lxxxi, 113, 134, 

218, 220-21 
Ministry of Transportation, 170, 218, 221 
Miraflores Palace (Venezuela), lxxi 
Mirage fighter jets, 356 
Miranda, Francisco Jose de, liii 
missionary activities {see also Jesuits), 12, 83, 

92, 124 
Mitu, 86,331,355 
Mockus Sivickas, Antanas, 244 
Mocoa, 298 
money laundering, 147 
Monteria, 296, 298 
Montesinos, Vladimiros, 356 
Montilla, Mariano, 1 8 

Montoya Sanchez, Diego (alias Don Diego), 
lvii 

Montoya Sanchez, Eugenio (alias Hector 

Fabio Carvajal), lvii 
Montoya Uribe, General Mario, lxxiv 
Moreno Rojas, Samuel, 178, 245 
Morillo, Pablo, 17 
mortality. See population 
Mosquera Garcia, Elda Neyis (alias Nelly Ari- 

la Moreno and Karina), 358 
Mosquera y Arboleda, Joaquin Mariano, 367 
Mosquera y Arboleda, Tomas Cipriano de, 26, 

27, 28-29 
mosquitoes, 79 
Motilon people, 85 
motorcycle assembly, 165 



437 



Colombia: A Country Study 



Muiscas, 5-7, 11,82 

mulattoes, 72, 86, 88, 94 

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 

(MIGA), 187 
municipalities, liv, 222-24 
Munoz, Manuel de Jesus (alias Ivan Rios), 

lxx,358 

Murillo Bejarano, Diego Fernando (alias Don 

Berna), lvii, 360 
Murillo Toro, Manuel, 368 
Muslims, 126 
Mussolini, Benito, 42 
Mutis, Jose Celestino, li, 12, 13 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 

(1975), lxxx 



NAFTA. See North American Free Trade 

Agreement 
NAM. See Nonaligned Movement 
Napoleonic Code, 238 

narco-terrorism, lii, lvi, lix, lxxiii, 188, 215, 
321,329, 340 

narcotics trafficking. See drug trade 

narinense, 94 

Narino, Antonio, 13 

Narino Department, 81, 94, 190 

Narino Palace, lxiv, lxxxvii 

Nasa Yuwes. See Paez 

National Administration Center (CAN), 289 

National Administrative Department of Eco- 
nomic Solidarity (Dansocial), 221 

National Administrative Department of Statis- 
tics (DANE), lxxix, 91, 103, 166, 210, 
221-22 

National Agrarian Coordinator (CNA), 255 
National Apprenticeship Service (Sena), 132 
National Army, 295-99, 339, 346-47; Aviation 
Brigade, 295; campesino soldiers, 346-47; 
Eastern Specific Command, 298; human rights 
abuses, lxxiv-lxxv, lxxxvi; military education 
for, 287, 293, 295, 305-7; ranks and insignia, 
309-12; Rapid Deployment Force (Fudra), 
396 

National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), 
161,258 

National Association of Peasant Land Users 

(ANUC), 134-35 
National Business Council (CGN), 258 
National Campesino Council (CNC), 255 
National Capitol, 55, 229 



National Commission for Reparation and Rec- 
onciliation (CNRR), lxv, 348^19 

National Consultancy Center, lxxix 

National Council Against Kidnapping, 294 

National Defense Statute, 339 

National Electoral Council (CNE), lxxxvii, 
218, 230, 232-33 

National Environmental System, 79 

National Federation of Coffee Growers (Fede- 
cafe), lxxxii, 114, 154, 258 

National Federation of Merchants (Fenalco), 
lxxix 

National Front (Frente Nacional), lii, 47-51, 

122, 133,215,240, 289, 327 
National Gas Company of the Atlantic Coast, 

160 

National Health Institute (INS), lxxxi 
National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH), 160, 
209 

National Indigenous Organization of Colom- 
bia (ONIC),135,254 

National Institute of Highways, 175 

National Institute of Legal Medicine and 
Forensic Sciences, 323 

National Institutes of Diversified Intermediate 
Education (INEMs), 132 

National Intelligence Board, 339 

National Jail and Penitentiary Institute (Inpec), 
320, 321-23 

National Learning Service, 199 

National Liberation Army (ELN), lv-lvi, lviii, 
lxvi, lxxxvi, 49, 50, 54, 56, 96, 216, 225, 
259-60, 277, 280, 328, 332, 341, 349-50, 
352, 359; hostages of, 336; negotiations with, 
lxxv 

National Livestock Fund (FNG), 153 

National Natural Parks System, 80 

National Navy, 287, 299-300; Caribbean Naval 
Command, 356; Caribbean Naval Force, 299, 
300; Coast Guard Corps Command, 299, 300; 
education institutions, 287, 299, 305-7; Gen- 
eral Maritime Directorate, 300; Logistics 
Operations, 299; Marine Infantry Command, 
299-300, 349; Naval Aviation Command, 
299, 300; Pacific Naval Force, 299, 300; ranks 
and insignia, 309-12; Riverine Task Group, 
299-300; Southern Naval Force, 298, 299; 
Specific Command of San Andres and Provi- 
dencia, 299 

National Network of Development and Peace 

Programs (Redprodpaz), 252 
national parks and forest reserves, 78-79, 80 



438 



Index 



National Party (Partido Nacional, 1856), 27 
National Party (Partido Nacional, 1884), 34 
National Planning Department (DNP), lxv, 

103,221,312 
National Police (PN), 220, 268, 271, 288, 291, 

313- 18, 340, 342; Antinarcotics Directorate, 
316; Carabineros Corps (Mounted Police), 

314- 15; civilian control of the, 314; corruption 
in the, 314; and counterinsurgency role, 316; 
Directorate of the Judicial Police and Investi- 
gation (Dijin), 320; education institutions, 316; 
Immediate Care Centers (CAIs), 315; militari- 
zation of the, 314; Mobile Squadron of 
Mounted Police (Emcar), 315; ranks and insig- 
nia, 317; transit and transport, 315, 316 

National Police Commissioner's Office (OCNP), 

292,317-18 
National Radio and Television of Colombia 

(RNC), 249-50 
National Radio Network (RCN), lxxix, 180-82 
National Reconciliation Commission (CCN), 

248 

National Registrar of Civil Status (also seen as 
National Registrar's Office — RNEC), lxxx- 
vii,218, 230 
National Salvation Movement (MSN), 243 
national security doctrines and policies, 338-50 
National Superintendency of Health (SNS), 
113 

National Union School (ENS), lxiv 
National Unitary Command (CNU), 256 
National Unity Social Party (PSUN), lxxx- 

vii-lxxxviii, 242, 246 
National University Federation, 133 
National University of Colombia, lxx, 29, 130 
Native Americans. See Amerindians 
natural gas industry, 160 
natural resources, 81, 152, 158-60 
Navarro Wolff, Antonio, 243, 245 
navy. See National Navy 
Neiva, 76, 176, 298 
neoliberalism, 115, 134,215-16 
Neruda, Pablo, lxvii 
Nevado del Huila, 73 
Nevado del Ruiz, 73 
New Granada, liii, 7-15, 22 
New Kingdom of Granada, 7 
New Rainbow Corporation (Corporation Nuevo 

Arco Iris), Ixxxv-lxxxvi, 226, 253 
New School (Escuela Nueva), 128-29, 204 



newspapers and magazines {see also freedom 
of speech; media), lxxxiv, lxxxix, 12, 
249-50 

New Zealand, 279 

Nicaragua, lvi, lxxi, 67-69; territorial issues 

with, 67-69, 136, 273,356-57 
Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19), lv, 

lvi, lxxv, 54-56, 215, 243, 259, 328, 340 
Nobel Peace Prize, lxix 
Nobel Prize, li, 94 
Noguera Cotes, Jorge, 247, 319 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 268, 271 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), lxi, 

252-53, 277, 349 
Norte del Valle Cartel, lvii, 332 
Norte de Santander Department, 94 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 

258 

Northern Triangle of Central America, 185 
Norway, 349 

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 72 
"Noticias Uno," 250 
Nueva Granada Military University, 295 
Nunez Moledo, General Rafael Wenceslao, 

30, 32-34, 65, 324 
nutrition, 59, 113 



OAS. See Organization of American States, 

Obaldia y Orejuela, Jose de, 367 

Obama, Barack H., lxiv, lxxvii, 273, 280 

Obando del Campo, Jose Maria, 26, 27 

Obregon, Alejandro, li 

Occidental Petroleum, 255 

OECD. See Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development 

oil industry, 37, 38-39, 76, 158-60, 185, 187, 
208, 328, 332 

oil pipelines, 55, 80, 136, 158-60, 207, 272, 
344, 349 

Ojeda, Alonso de, 6 

Olaya Herrera, Enrique, 40 

Olimpica, 166 

Olympic Radio Organization (ORO), 181 
ombudsmen {personerias; see also Human 

Rights Ombudsman's Office), 239-^0 
Omega. See joint commands 
Operation Check (2008), lxxi 
Operation Marquetalia, 327 
Oracle, 187 
Orbitel, 178 



439 



Colombia: A Country Study 



Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development (OECD), 112 
Organization of American States (OAS), lxxx, 

49, 253, 262, 268-69, 351, 354; Committee 

on Hemispheric Security, 351 
Orinoco river, 71, 173; basin, 17, 76, 77 
Orteguaza river, 300 
Ospina Bernal, Camilo, lxxxiii 
Ospina Perez, Luis Mariano, 43, 288 
Ospina Rodriguez, Mariano, 27, 28 
Ospina Vasquez, Pedro Nel, 368 
Otalora Martinez, Jose Eusebio, 368 
Oxford University, lix 
Oxygen Green Party (PVO), lxvi, lxviii, 242 



Pacific Basin Economic Council, 278 
Pacific coast, 67, 71-72 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 278 
Pacific lowlands, 72-73, 78, 84, 94, 121 
Pacific Ocean, 67 

Padilla de Leon, General Freddy, lviii, lx, 291 

Paez, Jose Antonio, 21-22 

Paez people, 84, 86 

paisa (person from Antioquia), 93 

Palace of Justice, Bogota, li, lvi, lxii, kxxh-lxxxiii, 

54-55,328 
Palace of Justice, Cali, lxxiii 
Paleozoic Era, 70 

Panama, liii, 23, 27, 35, 72, 176, 187, 188, 
265, 268, 274, 325, 354-55; Colombian ref- 
ugees in, 96 

Panama, Isthmus of, 4, 18, 29, 35, 72 

Panama Canal, 29, 35, 287, 325 

Pan-American Highway, 72, 176 

Paraguachon, 176 

Paraguay, lxxxi 

paramilitaries, lvi, lxxxv, 53, 54, 56, 147, 256, 
277, 280, 328-30, 332-34, 337-39, 346, 348, 
352, 353; armed forces links with, 57, 261; 
demobilization of, lxv-lxvi, lxxv, lxxxv, 
197-98, 261-62, 334, 342, 347^18, 360; and 
displacement, 95, 136, 334; and drug trade, 
Mi, lviii, 190, 259, 262, 329-30; and penetra- 
tion of Administrative Security Department, 
319; political links of, 272-73, 345, 348; 
strength of, 226, 260,332 

paramos (areas above treeline), 77 

parapolitics scandal (2006- ), lxi-lxii, lxiv, 
lxxxi, lxxxiii-lxxxiv, 217, 247-48, 259, 279, 
334 

Pardo Rueda, Rafael, lxxx, lxxxviii, 291 



pardos (browns), 10 
Paris, lxvii 

Paris Gordillo, Gabriel, 369 
Parra Gomez, Jose Bonifacio Aquileo, 368 
Partido de la U. See National Unity Social 
Party 

Pasco (Venezuela), 77 
Pasto, 7, 13, 16, 18 

Pastrana Arango, Andres, 190, 216, 223, 242, 
260, 290, 340-41; and foreign relations, 
kvi-lxviii, lxxxviii, 270, 271-72, 277 

Pastrana Borrero, Misael Eduardo, 99 

Patria Boba (Foolish Fatherland), 16, 17 

Patriotic Union (UP), 52, 56, 244, 328-30 

Payan Hurtado, Jose Eliseo, 368 

Paz de Rio, 46 

Peace Planet, lxv 

peace processes, 259-61, 340-42, 347-50, 

359-62 
Pearl Harbor, 42, 326 
Penal Code (2000), 321 
Penal Code for Minors, 321 
penal system, 321-23 
Penalosa Londono, Enrique, 245 
Peninsula de La Guajira, 6, 69, 71, 74, 84, 

325-26 

peninsulares (colonial officials), 8 

Penitenciaria de Combita, 322 

pensions, 113, 117-19, 183, 196, 203, 204-7; 
Administrators of the Subsidized Regimen 
(ARS), 1 14; National Social Pension Fund 
(Cajanal), 113, 117, 119; Pension Funds 
Administrators (AFP), 207; Social Security 
Institute (ISS), 113, 117-19 

Pentecostalism. See Protestantism 

Pereira, 95,99, 178 

Perez, Carlos Andres, 273 

Perez de Manosalbas, Santiago, 368 

Perez Martinez, Manuel, 328 

personal communications service (PCS), 178 

personerias. See ombudsmen 

Peru, lxii, lxx, lxxviii, lxxxi, 18, 21-22, 186, 
188, 274, 300; and illegal drugs trade, 329; 
and Leticia conflict, 40, 287, 325; relations 
with, 356 

peso, 24, 36, 54, 149-50, 194 

Petrel Islands. See Bajo Nuevo 

Petro Urrego, Gustavo, lxxxviii, 243 

Philip n, 92 

Pico Cristobal Colon, liii, 74 
Pico Simon Bolivar, liii 
Pizarro, Francisco, 6 



440 



Index 



Pizarro Leongomez, Carlos, 243 
Pizarro Leongomez, Eduardo, 66 
Plan Colombia, lviii-lix, lxii, lxxvi, lxxvii, 

190, 260, 272, 274, 277, 285, 313, 333, 344, 

353,356 
Plan Colombia II, 361 

Plan Consolidation (Consolidation Plan), 293, 
302, 345 

Plan LASO (Latin American Security Opera- 
tion), 339 
PlanMeteoro, 296-97, 298 
Plan Orion, 299 
Plan Patria, lxxxii 

Plan Patriota, 97, 272, 293, 302, 345 
Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, 

Democracia y Desarrollo. See Colombian 

Platform for Human Rights, Democracy, and 

Development 
Platform of the Black Communities (PCN), 

254 

police. See National Police 

pollution: of air, 80, 136; of soil, 81; of water, 

80,81, 136 
Pombo-Romero Treaty (1842), 325 
Pontifical Bolivarian University, 130 
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (PUJ). See 

Javeriana University 
Popayan, 7, 70, 93, 176, 298 
Popular Liberation Army (EPL), lv, 49, 54, 

96, 328 

Popular National Alliance (Anapo), 48 
population, 99-101; birthrate and, 99; black, 
72, 83, 87, 88-90; density and distribution, 
72, 76, 77, 91; growth, 49, 90-91, 98; insular, 
88; mestizo, 87-88; mortality and, 99, 100, 
116, 119; rural, 94; urban, 87, 94-95; white, 
87, 101 
ports, 173-74, 209 

poverty, liv, 51, 59, 66, 103, 108, 144, 204-5; 

poverty-reduction strategy, liv, 108, 204; 

rural, 4, 110, 216; urban, 111 
Pradera, 263 
Precambrian times, 70 
pre-Columbian civilization, 5-6 
presidency, lxi, 217-20; and foreign relations, 

264-65, 267; and national defense, 290-92 
Presidency of Quito, 7, 8, 18 
presidential advisories (consejerias presiden- 

ciales), 219 

Presidential Program for Integral Action 
Against Antipersonnel Mines (PAICMA), 
lviii 



prima (thirteenth monthly wage), 197 
Prisa, 181,249 
prisons, lvii, 321-22 
Proexport Colombia, 161, 170 
Protestant evangelism, 248 
Protestantism, 88, 124-25; anti-Protestantism, 
50, 124 

public administration (see also local govern- 
ment), 238^10 

Public Force (Fuerza Publica; see also Mili- 
tary Forces; National Police), lxxxii, 290 

public health. See health and welfare 

Public Ministry, 218, 238-39 

public-sector spending, 203-6 

public services, liv, 166-69 

Public Utilities Regime, 166 

Puerto Berrio, 173, 296, 298 

Puerto Bolivar, 173 

Puerto Cabello, 18 

Puerto Carreno, 298, 302 

Puerto Gaitan, 176 

Puerto Leguizamo, 298-300 

Puerto Salgar, lxxvii, 173, 301 

Putumayo Department, 190, 344-45 

Purumayo river, 298, 300, 354 



Quechua (language), 19 
Quibdo, 95 
Quimbayas, 82 

Quindio Department, 91, 93, 127, 177 
Quintin Lame Armed Movement (MAQL), 
328 

Quito (see also Ecuador), 7, 8, 1 8 



racial distinctions, 86-90 
Radical Change Party (PCR), lxxxviii, 242, 
246 

radiobroadcasting, 180-81 
railroads, 29,36, 39,51, 175 
rainforests (see also forests), 71, 72, 77, 84, 
176-77 

raizales (ethnic group), 88, 136 
Real Value Unit (UVR), 162 
reform, political, lxi, 36-37, 240-41 
reform, social, 4, 40 
Regeneration, 30, 32 
regionalism, liii, 65, 93-94 
Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil. See 
National Registrar's Office 



441 



Colombia: A Country Study 



religion {see also under individual religions), 
20, 119-26; and politics, 119; and society, 
119 

remittances, lv, 98-99, 143, 194-95 
Renault, 165 

Renewed Socialist Movement (MSR), 341 
Repsol YPF, 255 

Republic of Great Colombia (Republica de 
Gran Colombia), lii-liii, 18, 23 

Republic of New Granada, 23 

Research and Public Education Center 
(Cinep), 122, 253 

resguardos (Amerindian communal lands), 
11,31,83,224 

Residential Public Services Superintendency 
(SSPD), 80, 166, 169 

respice polum doctrine, 266 

respice similia doctrine, 266, 273 

Restrepo, Luis Carlos, lxxv 

Restrepo Restrepo, Carlos Eugenio, 368 

Revolution on the March, 41 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), lvi, lviii, lxiv, lxvii, lxxi, lxxii, lxxx, 
48, 54-56, 58, 96, 216, 249, 275-76, 339-41, 
350, 352, 353-54, 358-62; and child combat- 
ants, lxxiii, 335; desertions from, lxxiii; and 
displacement, 334; FARC-politics scandal, 
lxxxiii; and forced recruitment, lxxi, lxxiii, 
86, 335; founding of, 327; future of, lxxv; 
hostages of, lvii, lxvi-lxvii, lxix-lxxii, lxxv, 
335-36; illegal drugs, 81, 188, 190, 328, 333; 
international support of, lxx, lxxx; Manuel 
Cepeda Vargas Group in, lxxiii; negotiations 
with, lvi, lxxv, 259-60, 263-64, 270, 277, 
280, 332, 350; Secretariat, lxx, lxxi, lxxiv, 
190, 358; strength of, lxxiv, lxxxv-lxxxvi, 
225-26, 329, 330-32, 347 

Reyes, Raul. See Devia Silva, Luis Edgar 

Reyes Prieto, Rafael, 35-37 

Richani, Nazih, lxv 

Richter scale, 70-71 

Ring of Fire, 70 

Rio Treaty, 326, 351 

Rionegro, 156, 301 

Rios, Ivan. See Munoz, Manuel de Jesus 

riots, 14, 43, 288, 326 

Risaralda Department, 91, 93, 358 

rivers, 68, 73-74, 76, 77, 173 

roads, 5, 24, 39, 51, 72, 175-78, 209 

Rojas, Clara, lxvi, lxix 

Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo, 44, 46-47, 48, 233, 
288-89,313,326 



Rom (gypsies), 86 

Roman Catholic Church, lii, lxxix, lxxxiv, 3, 
12, 25, 28, 34, 50, 57, 65, 119-23, 248-49; 
clergy in, 12, 29, 50, 92, 120-23; and family 
life, 104, 105-7; and health care, 112; mis- 
sionary activities of, 12, 83; and proselytism, 
83; and society, 119-23 

Roman Catholicism, 11-12, 20, 123; Opus 
Dei, 120 

Rome Statute, 351-52 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 325 

roscas (decision groups), 102 

Royal Dutch Shell, 255 

Rubiano Saenz, Pedro, 123 

rural areas: conscription in, 304; education, 
126, 128; health status in, 116; poverty in, 
110; sanitation in, 113; violence in, 134-36 

Russia, lxi, lxxviii, 156 



SABMiller, 165, 187 

Saenz Vargas, Guillermo (alias Alfonso Cano 

More), lxx, lxxiii-lxxiv, 359 
Salazar Volkmann, Christian, lxiv, lxxiii 
Salgado, Carlos, lxv 
Salgar, Eustorgio, 368 
SAM, 172 

Samper Pizano, Ernesto, lxviii, lxxxiii, 125, 
149, 188, 216, 247, 256; and foreign rela- 
tions, 268, 270-71,278 

San Andres, 172, 299 

San Andres y Providencia. See Archipielago 
de San Andres, Providencia y Santa Catalina 

San Basilio del Palenque, 89 

San Martin, Jose de, 1 8 

San Miguel river, 354 

San Sebastian, 6 

San Vicente del Caguan, lxvi 

Sanclemente Sanclemente, Manuel Antonio, 
368 

Sanin Posada, Noemi, lxxxviii, 105, 241 
Santa Fe. See Bogota 
Santa Fe de Ralito, 261 

Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement (2003), 236, 
261, 342 

Santa Marta, lxxviii, 5, 16, 37, 71, 72, 93, 95, 

173, 176, 222 
Santafe. See Bogota 
Santana, 298 

Santander Department, 1 1, 76, 94 
Santander y Omaha, Francisco de Paula, 
17-18, 20-25,324 



442 



Index 



santanderea.no, 94 

Santo Domingo Group, 164-65, 249, 258 

Santos Calderon, Francisco, lviii 

Santos Calderon, Juan Manuel, lx, lxxi, lxxiv, 

lxxxii, lxxxvii-lxxxviii, 269 
Santos family, 250 
Santos Montejo, Eduardo, 41, 369 
Santos-Lopez Treaty (1941), 325 
Sao Paulo, 

Sarkozy, Nicolas, 263, 278, 350 

Sarmiento Angulo Organization, 258 

Save the Children, 252 

savings and loan corporations (CAVs), 182 

schools. See education 

Scorsese, Martin, 1 19 

secuestrados (kidnap victims; see also kidnap- 
ping), lxix 
selva. See forests 

Semana, lvi, lxiv, lxix, lxx, lxxxi, lxxxviii, 250 

Senal Colombia, 150 

Senal Institucional, 150 

Senate of the Republic (Senado de la Republica), 
lxxvi, lxxxiv-lxxxv, 35, 57, 218-19, 227-28, 
246; and minority representation in, 83 

Serpa Uribe, Horacio, 245 

Serrania de Baudo, 73 

service sector, 165-70, 194, 202 

settlement, 5-7, 9, 1 1, 32, 82, 83 

Shakira, 93 

sicarios (juvenile assassins), 337 
Sierra de la Macarena, 80 
Sierra de Perija (Venezuela), lxxi 
Sierra Nevada del Cocuy, 74 
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, 52, 74, 80, 82, 
85 

SEL International, 84 
Silva Lujan, Gabriel, lxxxii 
Sinai Peninsula, 295 
Sinu river, 74 

slavery, liii, 3, 9, 16, 20, 21, 23, 26, 31; 

descendants of, 88-89 
Soacha, lxxv, 80, 95-96 
Social Action Agency, 103 
Social and Political Front (FSP), 244-^45 
social security, 1 17-19 
Social Security Institute (ISS), 1 13, 1 17-19 
social structure, 101-3 
Society of Colombian Farmers (SAC), 258 
Socorro, 11, 14 
Sogamoso, 80, 175 
Soledad, 95 
Southern Cone, 56 



Soviet Union, 328 

Spain, 3, 8, 13-14, 15-18, 186, 187, 278, 349, 
350 

Spaniards, 6, 8, 12, 14-18 
Spanish colonial rule, liii, 3, 12, 13-15, 92 
Spanish Inquisition, 12, 16 
Spanish language and culture, liv, 12, 65, 84, 
92, 93 

Special Cooperation Program in Europe, 269, 
276 

Special Intelligence Force, lxxi 

Stansell, Keith, lvii, lxxi 

state of ecological emergency (estado de emer- 

gencia ecoldgica), 219 
state of economic emergency (estado de emer- 

gencia economicd), 219 
state of emergency (estado de emergencia), 

218, 291,339, 341,346 
state of exception (estado de exception), 218, 

291,341 

state of external war (estado de guerra exte- 
rior), 218-19,291 

state of internal commotion (estado de conmo- 
cion interior), 218-19, 291 

state of siege (estado de sitio), 219, 233 

state of social emergency (estado de emergen- 
cia social), 218-19 

Steiner, Roberto, lxxxviii-lxxxix 

Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Social 
Development (Plan Colombia II), 361 

student activism, 133 

Suarez, Marco Fidel, 38-39 

Sucre, Antonio Jose de, 18, 21 

Sucre Department, 88 

Sugarcane Research Center of Colombia 

(Cenicana), 157 
Sumapaz, 296, 327 

Summer institute of Linguistics. See SIL Inter- 

nationl 
Sun Microsystems, 187 
Superintendency of Guard Forces and Private 

Security Companies (SVSP), 294 
Superior Council on National Defense and 

Security (CSSDN), 220, 288, 293 
Superior Health Council of the Armed Forces 

and the National Police, 294 
Superior Intelligence Academy, 319 
Superior Judicial Council, lx, 218, 234, 

236-37 

Superior War College (Esdegue), 293 
Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and 
Technical Assistance in Defense and Security 



443 



Colombia: A Country Study 



between the Governments of the United States 
of America and the Republic of Colombia 
(Defense Cooperation Agreement — DCA), 
lxxvi-lxxxi 

Supreme Court of Justice, lvii, lxii, lxiv, lxvi, 
lxxxiii, lxxxv, 54, 218, 233-36, 247, 291, 
308 

Supreme Military Tribunal, 291-92 
Sure Shot. See Marin, Pedro Antonio 
Suu Kyi, Aung San, lxix 
Suzuki, 165 
Switzerland, 349, 350 

System for the Identification and Selection of 
Beneficiaries of Social Programs (Sisben), 
205 



Taironas, 5-6, 82 
Tapon del Choco, 72 
Tapon del Darien, 72 
tariffs, 146, 152, 155, 157, 166, 184 
tarjeta de reservista (military reservist card), 
304 

tax system, lxxxix, 198, 209, 223, 261, 313, 
345 

Team Wings Colombia (Equipo Alas Colom- 
bia), 242, 248 

Technical Investigation Corps (CTI), 296, 320 

telecommunications, 178-81 

Telecommunications Regulatory Commission 
(CRT), 178 

telephone service, 178, 180 

television broadcasting, 47, 51, 80 

terrorism. See counterterrorism, guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, violence 

textile industry, 1 1, 38, 46, 53, 164 

Thailand, 279 

thirteenth monthly wage {prima), 197 
Thirty-First of July Movement, 35 
Tibito, 82 

tierra caliente (hot zone), 77-78 
tierra fria (cold zone), 77-78 
tierra templada (temperate zone), 77-78 
tierras baldias (empty lands), 93 
Tigo, 178 

timber industry, 81, 152 

Timochenko. See Londono, Rodrigo 

Tiro Fijo. See Marin, Pedro Antonio 

Todelar Radio, 181,250 

Tolemaida, lxxvii, 289, 344 

Tolima Department, 95, 155, 177, 324, 327 

Torres Restrepo, Camilo, 50, 122 



tourism, 169-70 

tourist caravans (caravanas turisticas), 170 
Tovar Pupo, Rodrigo (alias Jorge 40), 319, 

348, 360 
Toyota, 165 

trade policy and patterns, 184-86 
trade unions. See labor unions 
TransMilenio bus rapid-transport system, 177-79 
Transparency International, lxiii 
transportation {see also airports, railroads, 

roads), 19, 24, 144-45, 170-78; air, 171-72; 

infrastructure, 24, 51, 209; policy, 175; 

river, 32 

transversales (east-west highways), 176 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 

in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 351 
Treaty of Esguerra-Barcenas (1928), 68, 

356-57 

Treaty of Quita Sueno (1972), 68 

Treaty of Wisconsin (1902), 35 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons, 351 
Tres Esquinas, 298, 301, 344 
troncales (north-south highways), 176 
Tropical Oil Company, 39, 46 
Trujillo, 270 

Trujillo Largacha, Julian, 
Truth Commission, lvi 
tsunamis, 71 

tugurios (slums), 65, 96, 109 
Tulio Lizcano, Oscar, lxxiii 
Tumaco, 71 
Tunebo people, 85 
Tunja, 298 

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 

(MRTA), lxx 
Turbay Ayala, Julio Cesar, 51, 93, 329, 340 
Turbo, 176 

turcos (of Turkish or Syrian origin), 126 
tutelas (writs of protection), lxi, 57-58, 
233-38, 346 



underemployment, 216 

unemployment, lxxxix, 109, 134, 193, 200, 

202, 208 
U'wa Amerindians, 255 
Union of Colombian Workers (UTC), 46 
Union of South American Nations (Unasur), 

lxxxi 

unions. See labor unions 



444 



Index 



Unit of Constant Purchasing Power (UP AC), 
162 

United Action Groups for Personal Freedom 

(Gaula), 292, 296, 299 
United Fruit Company, 38-40, 287 
United Nations (UN), 253, 261, 268-70, 277, 
351; Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), 80; General Assembly, 269; Millen- 
nium Development Goals, liv; Security Coun- 
cil, 268 

United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), 79, 204, 333 

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World 
Heritage List, 169 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees, 97 

United Nations Office of the High Commis- 
sioner for Human Rights, lxiv, 263, 270, 
279, 336 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), lix, 190, 361 

United Provinces of New Granada, 16, 22, 285 

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC), lv, 96, 190, 236, 252, 260-62, 330, 
332-33; and demobilization, lxv, lxxv, 
lxxxv, 335, 342, 348, 360 

United States, lxxxviii, 14, 187; Agency for 
International Development (AID), 157, 320, 
323; assistance from, lxxvi, lxxvii, lxiii, 216, 
266, 271-73, 313, 361; boundary issues with, 
67-69; Congress, lxii, lxiv, lxxvi, lxxxvi, 185, 
217, 259, 273, 345; Customs and Border Pro- 
tection (CBP), 186; Department of State, lxi, 
lxxv-lxxvi, lxxxi, 81, 253, 261, 333; Depart- 
ment of the Treasury, lviii; and extradition 
issue, lvii, 57-58, 215, 235; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, lvii; Government Accountability 
Office, lix; military aid and cooperation with, 
69, 87, 88, 306, 313, 335; military schools of, 
288; relations with, lvi, lxxvi-lxxxi, 20, 35, 36, 
38-39, 41-42, 221, 265-66, 269-73, 339, 
344-46, 361; Senate, 69; trade with, lv, 
155-56,158, 164,186,259 

United States-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement, lxiv, 185, 259 

United States Department of Justice, 320; and 
hostages, 336, 358; U.S. Office of Overseas 
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and 
Training, 320 

United States of Colombia, liii, 28, 33 

United States of New Granada, 28 



United Workers' Federation (CUT), 133-34, 
200, 256 

Universidad Nacional (UN, or Unal). See National 

University of Colombia 
Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana (UPB). See 

Pontifical Bolivarian University 
universidades de garage (garage universities), 

132 

universities, 12, 130 

University of the Andes (Uniandes), 130 
University of the North (Uninorte), 132 
Uraba, lxv, lxxxvi, 6, 155, 330, 332 
Urban Counterterrorist Special Forces Group 

(Afeur), 293 
urbanization, 47, 88, 94-95, 162; loss of com- 
munity and, 104 
Urdaneta Arbelaez, Roberto, 44 
Urdaneta Farias, General Rafael Jose, 367 
Ure, 89 

Uribe Escobar, Mario, lxxxiii 

Uribe Velez, Alvaro, hi, liv, lv, lix-lxii, lxiv, 
lxvii, lxix, lxxi, lxxxi-lxxxiv, 79, 94, 190, 207, 
241^12, 245, 253, 261-64; and counterterror- 
ism, lxvii, 345, 346-47, 350, 358-60; and 
defense, lxxix, 290; family of, lxxvi, lxxxiii; 
and foreign relations, lxxviii, 267, 270, 
272-80; and human rights, lxxiv; and reelec- 
tion in 2006 issue, lx, 217, 238; and reelection 
in 2010 issue, lxxvi, lxxxiii-lxxxvii, 280 

Uribistas, lxii, lxxiv 

Uruguay, lxxviii 

Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 

Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 185 
utility services, 166, 168-69 



Valencia Cano, Gerardo, 122 
Valencia Munoz, Guillermo Leon, 
Valle de Aburra, 80 

Valle del Cauca Department, 88, 91, 94, 155, 

156, 186, 258, 263, 336 
vallecaucano, 94 
Valledupar, 72, 176, 296 
Vargas, Lleras, German, lxxxviii 
Vatican, 34, 106 
Vaupes Department, lxix, 88 
Vaupes river, 86 

Venezuela, liii, lix, lxix, lxxx-lxxxi, lxxxv-lxxxvii, 
7, 8, 10, 15, 17-19, 21-23, 49, 259, 273-76; bor- 
der issues with, 67-70, 325-26, 352; Colombi- 
ans in, 96, 98; and corruption, lxiii; and support 
for insurgent groups, lvi, lxx-lxxi, lxxiv, lxxviii, 



445 



Colombia: A Country Study 



lxxx, lxxxvi 352-54; trade with, lxxix, lxxxii, 
185, 186 

verano (dry summer season), 77 
Vespucci, Amerigo, 6 

Viceroyalty of the New Kingdom of Granada, 
8, 18 

Viceroyalty of Peru, 8 

Vichada Department, 88, 190 

Vietnam, 339 

Villapinzon, 75 

Villavicencio, 176, 298 

violence {see also Bogotazo (1948); guerrillas, 
leftist; La Violencia; narco-terrorism; and 
paramilitaries), lvii, lxi, lxv, lxxvi, 3, 95, 207, 
328, 332; against armed forces, lxxiv; against 
journalists, lxi, 250-51, 337-38; against 
judges, lvi, 328; against labor unions, 256, 
337-38; against NGO activists, 253, 338, 344; 
criminal, lii, lix, lxvi, lxxxvi, 56, 66, 98, 1 16; 
homicides, 66, 101, 116; kidnapping, 55-56, 
110; political, li, hi, lix, 48, 56, 95, 116, 215, 
249, 329-30; urban, lxii, lxxiii, lxxxvi 

Violence, The. See La Violencia 

volcanoes, 70, 73 



wages. See income distribution 

Waounan people, 72 

war, with Peru (1932), 287 

War of the Supremos (Supreme Commanders, 

1840-42), 25,324 
War of the Thousand Days (1899-1903), 34-35, 

324 

"war on drugs," lxxvi-lxxvii 
waste collection, 169 

Water and Basic Sanitation Regulatory Com- 
mission (Cra), 169 

water supply and sewerage, 80, 112-13, 116, 
169 



waterways, inland, 1 73 

Wayuu people, 84-86, 126 

West Indies, 9, 17 

Western Highway, 176 

white population, 86-87 

women: in armed forces, 303; and family life, 

99; and maternal deaths, 116; and politics, 

105; rights of, 51, 137; in society, 66, 104-7; 

suffrage for, 47; in workforce, liv, 50, 202 
Workers' Social Union (USO), 256 
World Bank, 160, 205,210 
World Bank Group, 163 
World Health Organization (WHO), 100 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 

153 

World Trade Organization (WTO), 155, 185 
World War I, 37 

World War II, 41-42, 92, 287, 326, 351 
workforce. See labor force 
writs of protection. See tutelas 



Yaguas people, 85 
Yamaha, 165 
Yaviza (Panama), 176 
Yopal, 298 
Yumbo, 80 

Zaldua, Francisco Javier, 

zambos (of mixed Amerindian and black 

ancestry), 86, 89 
Zapata Olivella, Juan, 136 
Zapatero, Jose Luis Rodriguez, 278 
zona de despeje (demilitarized sanctuary), 332 
Zulia State (Venezuela), lxxi 
Zuluaga, Francisco Javier (alias Gordolindo), 

360 



446 



Contributors 



David Bushnell is a member of the Emeritus Faculty, Department of 
History, University of Florida, Gainsville. He has written extensively 
on Colombian history. 

Rex Hudson is a senior analyst for Latin America, Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 

Ann C. Mason is Executive Director, Fulbright Colombia, Bogota. Her 
publications concentrate on Colombian and Andean security affairs. 

Roberto Steiner is Director, Foundation for Higher Education and 
Development (Fedesarrollo), Bogota. He has written widely on 
Colombian economic issues, including economic and institutional 
repercussions of the drug trade in Colombia. 

Arlene B. Tickner is Professor of International Relations in the 
Political Science Department, University of the Andes (Uniandes), 
Bogota. She has written extensively on Colombian foreign relations 
and Andean security. 

Hernan Vallejo is Associate Professor, Department of Economics, 
Uniandes. His research has focused on economic theory and 
empirical evidence on the Colombian economy. 



447 



Published Country Studies 
(Area Handbook Series) 



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Angola 

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and Georgia 
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Austria 
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and Haiti 
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449 



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Yemens, The 

Yugoslavia 

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